Religion in . . Human Affairs

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK

FEB 15 1960

WILEY SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES

EDITED BY

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

Professor of Sociology, New York University

RELIGION IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

WILEY SOCIAL SCIENCE SERIES

EDITED BY

HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD

PUBLISHED BY

JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.

The Foundations of Social Life

By HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD. 279 pages. 5½ by 8. 8 figures. Cloth.

Immigrant Backgrounds

By HENRY PRATT FAIRCHILD and Fifteen Contributors. 269 pages. 5½ by 8. Cloth.

Background of International Relations

By CHARLES HODGES, Assistant Professor of Government, New York University.

Religion in Human Affairs

By CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK. 530 pages. 5½ by 8. Cloth.

RELIGION IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

BY

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK, PH.D.

Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Pennsylvania
Author of "Intelligence and Immigration"



EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
139

NEW YORK
JOHN WILEY & SONS, INC.
LONDON: CHAPMAN & HALL, LIMITED
1929

Copyright, 1929
By Clifford Kirkpatrick

PRINTED IN U. S. A.

PRESS OF
BRAUNWORTH & CO., INC.
BOOK MANUFACTURERS
BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

139

TO

F. H. H. AND H. E. B.

WHO INTRODUCED ME TO THE
STUDY OF SOCIOLOGY

UNITED THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY
FEB 15 1960

PREFACE

Man's interest in religon is perennial. He has never learned to take either the presence or absence of gods for granted. Since the prophets of Jahveh first poured their wrath upon the priests of Baal, philosophers, theologians, anthropologists and, in recent years, psychologists have puzzled over the phenomena of human worship. An attempt here has been made to bring together the best modern scientific thought in regard to the origin, social function and destiny of religion. The goal of the book is a searching yet objective pursuit of facts and their implications with full awareness that, "Our knowledge is a torch of smoky pine that lights the pathway but one step ahead across a void of mystery and dread."

A broader treatment of the subject is attempted than is usually found in the innumerable books that specialize in a discussion of primitive religion, comparative religion, Christian origins or contemporary religious problems. This synthetic approach leads to a sadly superficial treatment of many topics and the vastness of the field makes necessary the reliance upon secondary sources in many instances. The general reader may be interested, however, in a bird's-eye view and the teacher may supplement the text according to the needs of his students.

Religion is approached as a culture pattern and more stress is laid on the sociological viewpoint than in the historical and descriptive studies of comparative religion or the theoretical discussions of the psychology of religion. The primary emphasis is placed upon social processes and

cultural relationships. No attempt is made to present a systematic account of Christian origins in view of the excellent treatments by Case, Lake and others. It is not difficult, however, to find the processes and motives discussed in this book, at work in the Christian tradition and the concepts introduced may be readily applied by those who see their applications and implications.

It was originally intended to present surveys of three sample religions, those of the Winnebago, the Ekoi and the ancient Egyptians, in order to give the reader a perspective less limited by the influence of his own culture and to provide illustrative facts less ruthlessly torn from their culture settings. These descriptive studies proved so voluminous that it was necessary to omit them from the present volume. Many illustrations are taken, however, from these religions. The author is greatly indebted to the works of European scholars like Petrie, Erman and Sayce and most notably to those of America's leading Egyptologist, Professor James Breasted, for material dealing with Egyptian religion. For data on the Ekoi people of Nigeria, Talbot's excellent book *In the Shadow of the Bush* was heavily drawn upon. For information concerning the Winnebago religion the writings of Dr. Paul Radin proved invaluable.

There will be many readers who will doubtless disagree heartily with various portions of this book. It can only be said that the book was written with a keen awareness of the prevalence of wishful thinking and that a sincere attempt was made to keep personal values in the background and separate in so far as possible from the facts under discussion. There is no more insidious rationalization, however, than a claim to complete objectivity.

The book has profited by the use of some of the chapters in a course offered at the University of Pennsylvania dealing with social institutions. As projected, this volume repre-

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

sents the first of a group, dealing with social institutions such as the family, the state and the church, under the supervision of Professor Donald Young of the University of Pennsylvania and will form a part of the Wiley Social Science Series, edited by Professor Henry Pratt Fairchild.

Thanks are due to many friends who have given assistance and helpful criticism. The contribution of Professor Donald Young should be stressed. It was under his leadership that volumes dealing with social institutions were planned. He gave most generously of his knowledge and sacrificed much time and effort to the dreary task of going over the entire original manuscript. Much credit is due to him for the present organization of the book. Valuable suggestions and comments were made by Professors F. H. Hankins, H. E. Barnes, Carl Kelsey and Dr. J. K. Shryock after reading the manuscript. Professors Frank Speck and W. C. MacLeod were kind enough to grant the privilege of examining portions of unpublished material. Professor MacLeod's manuscript has since been included in his scholarly book, *The American Indian Frontier*.

To my wife is due gratitude for invaluable assistance during each stage of the work and for substantial contributions to the discussion of the relation of art and religion.

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK.

PHILADELPHIA,
April 18, 1929.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. The Beginning of Religion 1

II. What is Religion? 12

Definitions of Religion Stressing Belief—Religion as a Search for Values—Definitions Emphasizing Emotion—A Working Definition of Religion—Tylor's Doctrine of Animism—The Origin of Belief in Spirits—Belief in a Future Life—Animistic Origin of Religion—Spencer's Theory of Ancestor Worship—The Origin of Belief in Spirits—The Spirit World—The Dogma of Original Ancestral Ghost Worship—Worship of Non-Human Objects—The Origin of Deities—Evolution of Ecclesiastical Institutions—Durkheim's Sociological Theory—Durkheim's Definition and Approach—The Crowd Psychology Theory of Religious Emotion—The Origin of the Idea of a Soul—The Origin of Mourning Rites—Criticism of Durkheim's Theory.

III. The Sources of Religion 57

Physical Factors in Religion—Psychological Factors in Religion—Emotional Factors in Religion—Intellectual Factors Creating a Supernatural World—The Present Status of the Spencer-Tylor Theory—Other Factors in the Origin of the Ghost Soul Idea—Social Factors in Religion—The Family—The State—Social Inheritance of Religion—The Animistic World—Limitations of Animism—Manaism.

IV. Magic and Religion 109

Conventional Distinctions Between Magic and Religion—Nature and Types of Magic—Magic Based on Assumed Repetition—Magic Based on Autistic Thinking—Will-Magic—Adequacy of Classification of Magic—A Synthetic Distinction Between Religion, Magic and Other Culture Patterns—Ritual.

V. The Evolution of Religion 142

The Evolutionary Theory of Religion—The Origin and Development of Gods—Creator Gods—Change and Fusion of Deities—Immortality—Conclusion as to Trends in Religious Development.

CHAPTER PAGE

VI. Religious Change through Borrowed Culture . 167
Examples of Diffusion and Fusion—The Average Individual and Culture Change.

VII. Religious Change through Leadership . . . 182
Individual Differences and Religious Change—The Mystic—Mental Abnormality and Religion—Types of Religious Leaders—The Priest—The Teacher—The Executive—The Prophet—Indian Prophets—The Mormon Prophet—The Messiahs—Jewish Messiahs—Mohammedan Messiahs—Indian Messiahs—The Social Nature of Leadership.

VIII. Religion and Other Phases of Social Life. . . 222
Religion and Social Organization—Religion and Patriotism—Religion and the Aesthetic Impulse—Art and the Belief Phase of Religion—Influence of Other Forms of Art Upon Religious Belief—Relation of Art to the Emotional Phase—Art and Ritual—Religion and Science—Magic and Science—Religion and Technology—Magic and Technology.

IX. Religion and the Social Order 256
Religion Aids Custom in Making Anything Right—Taboo—Gods and the Morals of Men—Moral Significance of a Future Life—Religion and Moral Teaching—Religion a Conservative Influence—Radical Movements Sponsored by Religion—Characteristics of the Religious Attitude.

X. Religious Disorganization 286
Secularization—Materialism—Individualism—Differentiation of Religion—Causes of Religious Differentiation—Evidences of Religious Differentiation—Religious Unity—Local Religious Unity—Denominational Unity—Nationwide Religious Unity—World Unity.

XI. The Decline in Supernaturalism 309
Church Membership and Attendance—The Questionnaire Study of Religious Belief—Leuba's Study of Belief Among Scientists and Students—Bain's Study of Student Belief—Prevalence of Superstition—Science Supplanting Supernaturalism.

XII. Science and Religion in History 337
Supernaturalism vs. Science in Pre-Literate Groups—Science and Religion in the Ancient World—The Influence of Christianity on Science—Science and Religion in the Middle Ages—Religion and the Revival of Science—Religion and the Rise of Modern Science—Historical Accounts of the Struggle Between Science and Religion—Critical Comments.

CHAPTER PAGE

XIII. The Attack on Modern Science 375
Christian Fundamentalism—The Evolution Controversy—Fundamentalism and "Christian Love"—The War Against Evolution—Causes of Modern Warfare Against Science.

XIV. Religious Reactions to the Modern World . . 406
The Effect of Science on Religious Groupings—Catholics—Fundamentalists—Liberals—Religious Radicals—Future Relations of Religious Groups.

XV. Social Christianity 418
The Rise of Social Christianity—Nature and Aims of Social Christianity—Catholic Social Christianity—Fundamentalist Social Christianity—Liberal Social Christianity—The Proposed Union of Sociology and Religion—Criticism of Liberal Social Christianity—Imperfect Adjustment to Science—Lack of Valid Standards—Lack of Unity and Authority—Fundamentalist Adhesions—Reflection of Economic Situations.

XVI. Religion in an Age of Science 453
The Naturalistic Universe Pictured by Science—The Reaction Against Naturalistic Science—Attempts at Reconciliation of Science and Religion—The Incompatibility of Naturalistic Science and Religion—The Persistence of Religion.

XVII. Faith and Philosophy of the Future . . . 482

Bibliography 491

Index 499

157

RELIGION IN HUMAN AFFAIRS

Chapter I

THE BEGINNING OF RELIGION

The beginning of religion is unknown. From the very dawn of human history man is found bending his knee in supplication to unknown powers, practicing dark rites to achieve his ends, and creating a rich and varied mass of myths, superstitions, and beliefs concerning gods and devils, spirits, fays, and god-like heroes. Countless gods have been cast down and have faded from the mind of man; thousands of ceremonies have sunk into oblivion, or linger on stripped of their meaning and original emotional appeal. Invariably, however, new manifestations of man's religious nature have sprung up to take their place.

Many centuries before the birth of Christ clear evidence of a highly developed religion is to be found in Egypt. Since that time an ever-changing panorama of cults and creeds, beliefs and practices has been unrolled. The picture is often blurred. A lack of data makes analysis most difficult. There is a strange fusion of religious beliefs and rites, and when the historical record is complete it frequently discloses only the dry bones of what was once a warm and living human experience. Furthermore, from the Eskimo to the Patagonian, from the Veddah of Ceylon to the Bushman of Africa, one finds the earth covered with countless groups, large and small, each with some means, more or

less peculiar to itself, of approaching the supernatural. How is it possible to find uniformity in such diversity, or order in such confusion?

Who can say that the religious experience of an American of the twentieth century corresponds to that of the Australian aborigine or the Hindu mystic, or that any one religion typifies the religious experience of the entire human race? One cannot know the stature of Englishmen from the measurements of two or three Britons. Neither is it possible to draw general conclusions concerning religious experience from a small number of localities or from limited periods of time.

What is religion and what are the criteria of the religious? These are questions that will offer difficulty and perhaps can receive no complete answer. Religion merges with magic and with mythology. It is bound up with social and political organization. It joins hands at times with art and literature. It enters into economic life, as among the Todas where religion centers upon the production and use of milk, and the dairyman is the priest. Ethical and religious concepts are frequently found in close alliance, as in Confucianism. In fact, it is a question whether Confucianism in its original form should not be regarded as a system of ethics rather than as a religion.[1]

Often religions show a strange blend in regard to motive and ritual. As Carpenter points out, "Among the Indians of North America speculation is sometimes highly elaborated in mythological tradition; and out of the fusion of nationalities in Mexico rose a developed polytheism in which lofty religious sentiment seems strangely blended with a hideous and sanguinary ritual. Peru, no less, presented to the Spanish conquerors bewildering and incongruous aspects.

[1] Soper, E. D.—*The Religions of Mankind,* Abingdon Press, N. Y., 1921, pp. 222–237.

In these two cultures native American civilization reached its highest forms. In Mexico the apparatus of religion was minutely organized. There were immense temples, which required large numbers of priests and servitors. The capital alone is said to have contained 2,000 sacred buildings, and the great temple had a staff of 5,000 priests. There were religious orders and temple-schools; rites of baptism and circumcision; feasts and sacrifices and sacraments, in which the monkish chroniclers found strange parallels to their own practice." [2] Religion may thus be infinitely complex and may enter into every phase of human experience and resist any attempt to isolate it and place it on the operating table for dissection and examination.

Even when the external forms are accurately described, how is the observer to project himself into the minds of the worshipers and share their subtle emotional experiences "Twice a year was the great Mexican deity Huitzilopochtli presented in the form of dough images to his worshipers, and with elaborate ceremonies was consumed. Tezxatlipoca, in like manner, chief god of the Aztecs, represented by a handsome and noble captive wearing the divine emblems, was slain on the great altar; the body of the victim was respectfully carried down into the court below, divided into small pieces, and distributed among the priests and nobles as blessed food." [3] How difficult it is to fathom the mental processes of the participants in this ceremony; the anticipated results, the emotions of awe and reverence, the degree of belief in the efficacy of the rite!

Another difficulty is suggested by the above example. Suppose that one of the priests were asked to explain the meaning of the ceremony, have we any assurance that his interpretation would fairly represent the beliefs and feelings

[2] Carpenter, J. E.—*Comparative Religion,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., p. 57.

[3] Ibid., n.d., p. 147.

of the mass of the people? One should be on guard against assuming religious homogeneity even within the same group. Would a curious observer from Mars obtain the same interpretation of the Christian religion from a theologian and an ignorant laborer?

The most difficult task of the social scientist has always been to free his mind from the various forms of bias and preconceived opinion and to follow where the search for truth may lead him, accepting results and conclusions that he does not like with the same alacrity as those that are pleasing to him. It is so easy to see what we want to see and to believe what we want to believe. Every evaluation that is made has as its basis some standard which is consciously or unconsciously absorbed from a cultural environment. Resemblances to one's own ways of action or thought are considered superior and differences constitute inferiority in proportion to the degree of divergence. These difficulties are especially prominent in connection with the study of religion, for the student has been so immersed most of his life in some cultural atmosphere that it pervades his entire personality and affects his judgment in favor of the attitudes of his own culture group. Occasionally an individual breaks away from the religious influences and dogmas to which he has been subjected and through the very violence of his antagonism to them loses sanity and perspective in his judgments. The erstwhile religious man is likely to be the most rabid atheist, indicating that he still struggles with his past sentiments which are now suppressed.

It may be helpful to show more definitely the effects of bias acquired in a particular cultural atmosphere. Not long ago the students of religion made their initial classification of religion on the basis of truth or falsity, thus introducing bias into the analysis at the very beginning. "Dr. Johnson could sententiously declare that 'there are two objects of

curiosity: the Christian world and the Mohammedan world —all the rest may be considered as barbarous.' " [4]

Even the very definition of a problem and the use of descriptive terms reflect the bias of a particular culture. Says Parson Thwackum in *Tom Jones,* "When I mention religion, I mean the Christian religion; and not only the Christian religion but the Protestant religion; and not only the Protestant religion, but the Church of England." [5] Perhaps, after all, such an explicit statement is not objectionable, for it is conceivable that more subtle identification of religion with personal concepts and standards may be fraught with greater danger of error.

The question arises whether or not the ideally competent student of religion be merely a thinking machine free from all trace of emotion. It would hardly seem so, for observation and study of the religious attitudes of peoples of other cultures is more penetrating when it is sympathetic. Study of a poem, a painting or a piece of sculpture with a foot rule and a magnifying glass might be strictly scientific but it would fail to give any complete understanding of the phenomena in question. As Havelock Ellis has argued there is no necessary antagonism between the artist or the mystic, as he calls him, and the scientist. In fact, it is the normal thing to have them combined in the same person when not opposed by artificial influences although a mixture of the two at the wrong times and in the wrong way may be disastrous.[6]

In view of the difficulties outlined a word should be said concerning the aim of this study of religion. Its pur-

[4] Quoted, Carpenter, J. E.—*Comparative Religion,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., p. 24.

[5] Quoted, Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni and Liveright, N. Y., 1924, Intro. p. x.

[6] Ellis, H.—*The Dance of Life,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1923, pp. 196–204.

pose is to explain something of the origin, nature, and significance in social life of man's religious attitude. No attempt will be made to pass judgment on the ultimate truth or falsity of religious beliefs, for that is the field of theology and philosophy. We are interested solely in observable facts and their relationships, and merely seek to understand rather than to praise or blame religious beliefs and customs. The chemist accepts his elements without terming them good or bad, and without trying to wish others into existence. We shall try to follow this example in our own field of discussion.

It is legitimate, however, to speculate as to the stage in the evolution of man in which the first dim consciousness of the supernatural came into existence. Do animals have religion? The question is interesting, although to attempt a complete answer would anticipate our later discussion of the exact meaning of religion and magic. Some writers have attempted to demonstrate the beginnings of religion in the higher animals. Such a demonstration is facilitated if the famous view of Hobbes be accepted that the essence of all religion is fear. It is alleged that the strange, the mysterious, and the fearful excite in higher animals what is equivalent to the religious thrill of humans. An oft-cited experiment of Romanes consisted in attaching a fine thread to a bone and thus terrifying a dog by producing movements without any visible cause.[7] Spencer mentions the emotion of a dog in the presence of an umbrella mysteriously moved by the wind.[8] Such anecdotes have little significance since the exact conditions and the past experiences of the dogs are un-

[7] Leuba, J. H.—*A Psychological Study of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1912, Chapt. III. See also Clodd, E.—*Animism the Seed of Religion,* Constable, London, 1905.

[8] Spencer, H.—*Principles of Sociology,* Appleton, N. Y., 1908, Vol. I, pp. 127–128.

known. The situation may have had something in common with a past situation involving pain or injury. It is a question also whether a deity exists for the devoted dog in the master who dispenses praise and blame, rewards and punishments. This claim is a more or less futile attempt to interpret canine behavior in human terms. Frazer, in arguing for the early development of magic prior to the appearance of religion through the mistaken association of ideas, a theory which we shall examine later, says:

"The very beasts associate the ideas of things that are like each other or that have been found together in their experience; and they could hardly survive for a day if they ceased to do so. But who attributes to the animals a belief that the phenomena of nature are worked by a multitude of invisible animals or by one enormous and prodigiously strong animal behind the scenes? It is probably no injustice to the brutes to assume that the honour of devising a theory of this latter sort must be reserved for human reason." [9]

Even if mistaken associations of ideas were the whole story of magic it is stretching a point to attribute either worship or sorcery to animals. True, they do form associations or conditioned responses so as to react to some element of a past situation or according to a new *gestalt,* yet no dog shuns the flesh of a rabbit for fear of acquiring the timidity of that animal nor does a cat scratch an image of a dog with the belief that the canine himself will suffer accordingly. While the dog may fawn upon the human he does not pray to a mental image of his master. Animals do not often react to things not present nor do they apparently have conscious anticipation as a rule of the future results of present acts.

What then is the mental basis of the supernaturalism

[9] Frazer, J. G.—*The Golden Bough,* Macmillan, N. Y., abridged ed., 1922, pp. 54–55.

which is essentially peculiar to man? Three things may be mentioned: (1) imagination, (2) complex emotional development, and (3) language, as made possible by highly developed association areas in the human brain. Imagination is the power of the human organism to store up impressions, to condense them into images or symbols and to recombine them and project them into the future. Man makes his gods by means of his imagination just as he does his scientific systems although he is less inclined in the former case to check up his conceptions with the aid of observation. Again the emotional life of humans is more complicated than that of animals. Awe, love, reverence, wonder and other more or less complex emotional states are possible to him and may be associated with ideas or sub-vocal responses corresponding to things not present to the senses. Such systems of ideas and emotions may be called complexes, sentiments or attitudes and constitute the very core of religious life. Finally, it should be noted that the human power of speech makes possible the transmission of religious beliefs and practices from one generation to another.

The conclusion then must be that magico-religious behavior is not found at the sub-human level but there is reason to think that when man acquired his essentially human traits religion soon appeared. It is something of a paradox that the common-sense behavior of animals degenerates in man, at least for a time, into fantastic magic and gross superstition. The animal fears its natural enemy but being blessed with no imagination does not people the world with evil spirits, demons, hobgoblins, witches and wrathful gods nor does it devise the eight Hells of Japanese Buddhism with their excruciating and eternal tortures for hapless souls.

It has already been ventured that man did not have to rise far from the brute level before his religious life began.

The best evidence of this is furnished by anthropology and archeology. Let us take a hasty glance at what these sciences have to show us concerning the antiquity of religion. Unfortunately religious practices are not preserved to us as are stone tools, yet Kroeber writes: "As far back as the Mousterian, thirty thousand years ago, certain practices were being observed by the Neanderthal race of western Europe which modern savages observe in obedience to the dictates of their religion. When these people of the Mousterian laid away their dead, they put some of their belongings with them. When existing nations do this, it is invariably in connection with a belief in the continued existence of the soul after death. We may reasonably conclude therefore that even in this long-distant period human beings had arrived at a crude recognition of the difference between flesh and spirit; in short, religion had come into being." [10] Somewhat later the Cro-Magnon people folded and painted the bodies of their dead, and buried flint implements and food in their graves.

Ancient skulls have been found pierced presumably to permit the egress of evil spirits believed to cause headaches, if we can judge the purpose of contemporary practices of some primitive people. Another line of evidence is found in the cave paintings dating back some twenty thousand years. Whitnall says that, "Practically all the finest paintings are of animals that were used for food." [11] Furthermore these paintings are found in the most distant and secluded portions of the caves and in this respect at least justify the term "Prehistoric Sanctuary" applied by Marret to one of these caves at Niaux.[12] Recently an underwater

[10] Kroeber, A. L.—*Anthropology,* Harcourt, Brace & Co., N. Y., 1923, p. 171.

[11] Whitnall, H. O.—*The World and Art of the Ancient Cave Men,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XVII: 1, Nov., 1923, p. 425.

[12] Marret, R. R.—*Threshold of Religion,* Chapt. VIII.

swim through a subterranean stream by an adventurous archeologist revealed in a cavern at Montespan the clay image of a bear apparently pierced with spear thrusts. Many of the animals painted on the walls of the French caves are found to be wounded in vital spots.[13]

These latter facts take on significance when it is recalled that many peoples the world over have magic rites in which a desired act or achievement is imitated in the hope and doubtless belief that a mysterious connection between the symbol and the reality will give them the effect desired. Living races pierce images of animals they wish to kill, sprinkle water to produce rain and perform other magical rites. Certainly the hypothesis that magico-religious beliefs and practices entered into the life of man at least twenty thousand years ago is in accord with these facts.

Again, the universality of some sort of religion among the peoples of the entire earth suggests great antiquity for religion. If magic and religion were developed but once in the history of the human race as some anthropologists are inclined to believe, then it must have taken a long time for them to diffuse over the world. On the other hand, if magico-religious practices originated several times and in different places it still would probably mean a venerable age for this social invention. If such an invention were difficult to hit upon it would have taken a long period of time for all peoples to make the discovery, while if it were a natural and inevitable product of the human mind it would have come into being in the dim mists of antiquity when mind first reached the human level, perhaps before the original dispersion of the human species. In studying religion, we are consequently dealing with phenomena almost as old as man himself which have loomed large in human experience even down to the present day.

[13] Lit. Digest, Jan. 5, 1924, pp. 23–24.

It is impossible, then, to trace out the ultimate origins of religion. We must of necessity content ourselves for our foundations with a study of religious systems among contemporary pre-literate peoples. A complete survey of the religious beliefs of pre-literate peoples would be desirable but is, of course, out of the question in the limited space available in this study. Such surveys as have been made have been weakened by the use of the comparative method which takes facts out of their cultural settings and hence leads to comparison of things not properly comparable. It is also true that no one primitive religion is typical of all religions, but there is perhaps less danger in an intensive study of the rôle of religion in certain sample cultures than in an extensive analysis of isolated ethnological anecdotes. Consequently three religions have been selected for detailed study, namely, the religions of the American Winnebago, the African Ekoi and the ancient Egyptians. It is hoped that this procedure will give to the reader a sense of perspective, an insight into cultures other than his own, an understanding of some simpler religions relatively free of secondary accretions not essentially religious, and finally that the samples will serve the author as a convenient source of illustrative material.

Chapter II

WHAT IS RELIGION?

Any discussion of religion raises at once the baffling question, *"What is religion?"* Two people with different views as to what constitutes religion will write about quite different things and wonder why their conclusions are so at variance and why it is so difficult to understand each other. Once upon a time, so the story goes, four blind men felt of an elephant. One, feeling of the trunk, described the animal as like a snake; another, touching a leg, described it as like a tree; the third, touching a side, said that the creature was like a wall, while the fourth, grasping the tail, maintained that an elephant was like a rope. Each was right according to his own approach and so, perhaps, are various writers on religion, for each man is privileged to define his terms as he pleases so long as he uses them consistently. We may note that some writers have attempted to get at what one of them has called a "minimum definition of religion," that is to say, a definition which picks out a common element in all religious experience and uses that element as a mark of identification.

Definitions of Religion Stressing Belief

Perhaps the matter would be made clearer by presenting some definitions of religion beginning with that of E. B. Tylor, who started the search for a "minimum definition of religion." His definition, like those which are immediately

to follow, lays primary stress upon belief.[1] He concludes that, "it seems best to fall back at once on the essential source, and simply to claim, as a minimum definition of religion, the belief in spiritual beings." [2] He thinks that spirits take two general forms, first, as definite ghosts of dead men, and second, as spirits less distinctly associated with a human body, and varying in power up to actual gods. As will be shown later, he holds that belief in spiritual beings makes up an almost universal primitive philosophy known as animism. No group is known which after careful investigation is not found to have some such belief. It must be remembered, then, that according to Tylor the essential thing in religion is a particular *belief*.

The view of Frazer is not markedly different although he includes behavior as well as belief. "By religion, then, I understand a propitiation or conciliation of powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life." [3] Lang likewise lays stress on belief and makes religion essentially a matter of belief in God and immortality.[4]

Thouless defines religion briefly as a "felt practical relationship with what is believed in as a superhuman being or beings." [5] Boas says, "We may define religion as that group of concepts and acts which spring from the relation of the individual to the outer world, so far as these rela-

[1] There is no intention of presenting a complete list of definitions of religion. A valuable collection of definitions may be found in the appendix to Leuba, J. A.—*A Psychological Study of Religion.*

[2] Tylor, E. B.—*Primitive Culture,* 5th ed., Murry, London, 1913, Vol. 1, p. 424.

[3] Frazer, J. G.—*The Golden Bough,* abridged ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 50.

[4] Lang, A.—*The Making of Religion,* 2nd ed., Longmans, Green, London, 1900, p. 46.

[5] Thouless, R. H.—*An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1923, p. 4.

tions are not considered as due to physical forces the action of which is accounted for by purely rationalistic considerations." [6] In Leuba's statement we find an appreciation of the broader aspects of religion as a thing woven into life experience. "Religion should, therefore, be looked upon as a functional part of life, as that mode of behavior in the struggle for life in which use is made of powers characterized here as psychic, superhuman, and usually personal. In its objective manifestations, religion appears as attitudes, rites, creeds, and institutions; in its subjective expression, it consists of impulses, desires, purposes, feelings, emotions, and ideas connected with the religious actions and institutions." [7] Here we still have belief in more or less personal beings or powers as the essential thing but with recognition of both emotion and behavior as part of the religious complex.

A rather similar synthetic definition with stress on belief is presented by Jastrow. "Religion may be defined as the natural belief in a Power or Powers beyond our control, and upon whom we feel ourselves dependent; which belief and feeling of dependence prompt (1) to organization, (2) to specific acts, and (3) the regulation of conduct, with a view to establishing favorable relations between ourselves and the Power or Powers in question." [8] These definitions take into account behavior, in the sense of ritual, but there are some writers, as for example, Robertson Smith, who are inclined to make ritual the essential thing in religion.[9]

[6] Boas, F.—*Handbook of the American Indian,* 30th Report Bur. Am. Eth., p. 365.

[7] Leuba, J. A.—*A Psychological Study of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1912, p. 17.

[8] Jastrow, M.—*The Study of Religion,* Walter Scott, London, 1911, p. 172.

[9] Smith, W. R.—Lectures on the *Religion of the Semites,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1927.

Religion as a Search for Values

Turning for the moment from the writers who lay primary emphasis on belief in more or less personal beings or powers, we may note that others make of religion an attitude which attaches supreme value to certain objects and relationships. A passion for liberty, ardent patriotism and moral fervor are hence closely identified with the religious attitude. King writes, "Entirely aside from questions of origin, the fact of religion of any kind in certain individuals implies some sort of conscious states. These conscious states, whatever else they are, may be described in part at least as valuational. The religious consciousness may be called a valuating attitude toward something real or imagined." [10] He would use the terms highest, permanent, abiding, universal and ultimate to characterize the value associated with the religious attitude. Hoeffding thinks that the feeling determined by the fate of objects of desire is the religious feeling. For him religion consists in a yearning for and a belief in something of supreme importance in the universe with which an individual may identify himself.[11] In modern days social reform may be considered of supreme worth and yet belief in God or immortality may be lacking.

Crawley says religion may arise and subsist without any belief either in God or the soul. The essence of religion is for him the sacred, and the primary function of religion is the "affirmation and consecration of life." [12] The religious emotion then is that which makes something sacred. These things which the primitive tribe regards as sacred

[10] King, I.—*Development of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1910, p. 30.

[11] Hoeffding, H.—*Philosophy of Religion,* Macmillan, London, 1906, pp. 215–217.

[12] Crawley, E.—*Origin and Function of Religion.* Sociological papers, London Sociological Society, Macmillan, London, Vol. 3, 1907, p. 248.

are the elemental interests of life, birth, puberty, marriage, death and burial. It is easy to see that with more civilized people almost any supreme value takes on a sacred quality.

Radin also stresses life values which may be associated with various beliefs, practices and emotions, as the permanent central core of religion. Desire for success, happiness, and long life he finds to be the supreme values among such people as the Winnebago Indians of North America.[13]

Definitions Emphasizing Emotion

Let us now consider briefly some points of view which lay greater stress on the emotional phase of religion. Durkheim holds that true religion deals with the sacred in contrast to the profane and regards a church as essential. Yet, as will be shown later, the sacred is for him but the projection of an emotional thrill and hence the origin and essence of religion is to be found in emotion.[14]

Marett reacting against the intellectualism of Tylor and Frazer feels that primitive religion is not so much thought out as danced out. He considers the emotional reaction to mysterious potency to be the essence of magico-religious experience. Positively, possession of mysterious power or mana makes a thing or person sacred; negatively, it is made taboo and not to be approached lightly. When the emotional reaction involves humility, religion is born. "The upshot of these considerations is to prove that humility, as the child of fear and misgiving, is born of emotions and impulses forming basic elements in the experience of the magico-religious. These elements, being moralized by association with social customs of a salutary kind, beget a mood

[13] Radin, P.—*The Winnebago Tribe,* 37th Report Bureau of American Ethnology, p. 278; also *Anthropology in North America,* Stechert, 1915, p. 261.

[14] Durkheim, E.—*Elementary Forms of Religious Life,* Allen, London, n.d., p. 47; also pp. 214–239.

of chastened striving which, psychologically, will serve better than any system of doctrine—as the differentia of genuine religion; though it must be added that to attempt a final account of religion is beyond the competence of psychology or any form of science." [15]

Shotwell thinks that religion, as a whole, eludes definition but that two common elements can be found; emotion and mystery. Religion then he tersely defines as: "The reaction of mankind to something apprehended but not comprehended." It involves the object which stimulates and the psychic life which responds, the essential emotion in the response being reverence, a compound of fear and appreciation. Given the feeling aroused by mystery there are produced thoughts, actions and customs which bring man into relations with the mysterious.[16]

The view of Goldenweiser is rather similar although he makes somewhat clearer the view that the mysterious is the idea of supernatural power, or mana, which is in turn but the vague projection of the religious thrill. His conclusion is that, "if the religious thrill is the fundamental emotional root of religion, then mana—not Melanesian mana, nor manitou, nor orenda, nor wakan, but a psychologically more basic mana, freed from all historic accretions —becomes the fundamental idea of religion, the pure idea of supernatural power, an idea which, in the very nature of the case, is more sensed than thought." [17]

Like Goldenweiser, Lowie stands opposed to Tylor in his belief that religion arises from an emotional rather than

[15] Marett, R. R.—*The Threshold of Religion,* 2nd ed., Methuen, London, 1914, pp. 169–170.

[16] Shotwell, J.—*The Religious Revolution of Today,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 2nd ed., 1924, p. 101.

[17] Goldenweiser, A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 201. See also, *Spirit, Mana and the Religious Thrill,* Jr. Phil., Vol. XII, 1915, pp. 632–639.

an intellectual need. He claims that aside from the practical rationalism of the workaday world there is "a sense of something transcending the expected or natural, a sense of the Extraordinary, Mysterious, or Supernatural." It is pointed out that this does not necessarily mean a belief in a spiritual being and he concludes, "We shall therefore recognize as the differentia of religion what Drs. Marett and Goldenweiser have called 'supernaturalism.' " [18]

A Working Definition of Religion

We have at last completed our limited survey of varied conceptions of religion which has perhaps been bewildering to the reader but nevertheless should have the salutary effect of showing the complexity of the subject and the need for a solid foundation for further study. The question arises: How can the various points of view be tested? Is it merely a matter of blind choice of a definition of religion? The answer is that the test is a study of definite groups of both primitive and civilized men to see which formula fits the widest range of facts and distinguishes most clearly between religious phenomena and other phases of life. A satisfactory definition of religion must also indicate that constant and basic element in the religious complex, i.e., the norm from which deviations in particular cultures take their point of departure.

A definition is a descriptive statement which places a thing in some general category and then indicates certain attributes which distinguish it from other things of the same category. A domestic cat belongs to the feline group but is distinguished from lions and tigers, wildcats and the like. There are two difficulties in establishing a useful definition: (1) it may be so arbitrary as to limit the field of discourse and make a synthetic discussion impossible, or (2) it may

[18] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni and Liveright, N. Y., 1924, Introd., p. xvi.

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

involve variables rather than attributes as criteria. A short man, for example, is distinguished from a tall man only when certain arbitrary limits to tallness are stated in the definition. In regard to the first difficulty, if Tylor's minimum definition of religion were adopted, then the presence or absence of a single attribute, namely, belief in spiritual beings, would determine whether or not a given culture pattern would be considered as religious. If this belief were lacking it could not be discussed as part of religion. This would exclude certain phenomena which would be considered by many others as religious in nature. We find the second difficulty also involved in attempting a definition of religion. If we accept more than one attribute as the essential criteria of religion we find that these criteria tend to vary in degree to such an extent as to constitute a difference in kind. This means that we have not set religion definitely apart from other things.

It seems best to choose the lesser of two evils and sacrifice a rigid definition for a statement that merely establishes a norm from which variation may take place in specified directions. In short, we shall attempt a synthetic and quantitative statement rather than an arbitrary definition assuming attributes which are either present or absent, but which, as a matter of fact, are present in variable degree.

We will therefore give a general statement which sets up as a kind of norm a description of religion which most authorities would consider as corresponding to the usual meaning of that word. Religion is a culture pattern based on relations with the Supernatural, or the Extraordinary, as conceived by the particular people involved. In its purer form it involves (a) the emotion of reverence, (b) the belief in mysterious powers usually personified and not controllable by ordinary means, and (c) non-coercive behavior bringing man into relations with these powers, often with the aid of culture objects. This is, of course, not a rigid

definition, since the above three variables are not themselves defined. It is merely a patch of ground in the general field of discussion which may be accepted as embodying religion in purer form and from which paths diverge to more uncertain territory.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty yet to be faced is the consideration of the relation between magic and religion. This problem is considered in some detail in Chapter IV with the conclusion that religion and magic merge imperceptibly into one another, the distinction being one of degree rather than kind. We shall find also a blending of religion with other culture patterns such as art and technology. It must be confessed that we have attained merely a useful descriptive statement rather than a definition of religion by means of which hard and fast distinctions can be established. We have, however, adopted a norm that is not too arbitrarily chosen, from which we can trace deviations, and which will guide us in our thinking.

Up to this point we have attempted to find in a definition an answer to the question—What is religion? The definition which we finally adopted proved to be merely a descriptive statement. If this be the case, would not a more complete answer to the question consist in a more detailed description of the origin and nature of religion? There is enough force in this logic to justify a summary at this point of certain of the classical theories of religion.

Theories of religion go back to ancient times and the view of Lucretius that the gods had their origin in fear. It was not until recently, however, that systematic theories were developed with the aid of a knowledge of the religious systems of pre-literate peoples. Of these theories three are so well known to students of religion as to constitute classics in the literature of social science in spite of their weaknesses, which include one-sidedness and an excessively dogmatic

answer to the question which we have raised. The theories are those of Tylor, Spencer and Durkheim.

Tylor's Doctrine of Animism

By animism Tylor means simply belief in spiritual beings. In his great work he traces this system of thought over the entire globe and among practically all peoples, including those of both literate and pre-literate cultures. Under the influence of the evolutionary ideas of his time he finds the development of religion to be largely the development of animism into new forms. For him animism is the core of all religion, the basic system of thought extending from lowest savages to the highest civilizations, whether it be belief in ghosts, spirits or deities.

The Origin of Belief in Spirits.—An outstanding feature of his theory is the common origin of these beliefs from the conception of a soul or other-self located within the body and continuing its existence after death.

He thinks that the earliest men must have been impressed by the difference between a living animated body and one that lay still and inert due to sleep, trance or death. They were doubtless also perplexed by the human shapes that appeared in dreams and visions.[19] These striking facts must lead to the idea of (a) some animating principle and of (b) phantoms connected with the body which may leave it to adventure in some distant spot to meet with the phantoms of those known in waking life to be long since dead. "As both belong to the body, why should they not also belong to one another and be manifestations of one and the same soul." [20] There develops, therefore, a belief in

[19] Tylor, E. B.—*Primitive Culture,* Murry, London, 5th ed., 1913, Vol. I, p. 428.

[20] Ibid., p. 429.

a ghost-soul as "a thin unsubstantial human image, in its nature a sort of vapour, film, or shadow; the cause of life and thought in the individual it animates." [21] It may leave the body, exert physical power and may appear to men apart from the body as a phantom. It exists after death and may enter into other men, animals or into inanimate objects. It is possible that this belief has had more influence upon human affairs than any other notion ever entertained by man. Human thought in its development from dark superstition to systems of modern philosophy has been persistently haunted by the ghost of animism.

There are other phenomena according to Tylor which further this conception of a ghost-soul, such as observation of shadows, cessation of breathing at death, experiences of clairvoyance, second sight, and the like. It has been observed that in many languages the same word is used for soul, breath and shadow. It is argued, however, that for primitive man it is very difficult to distinguish dreams from reality, especially with the added influence of such conditions as sickness, fasting and use of drugs. Tylor draws a significant conclusion: "My own view is that nothing but dreams and visions could have ever put into men's minds such an idea as that of souls being ethereal images of bodies." [22]

The nature of the soul is, of course, variously imagined by different peoples as to shape, size and degree of materiality. In many cases the idea of a plurality of souls is entertained.

Tylor shows with an abundance of illustrations that the soul idea leads to a large number of curious practices: the calling of a sick man after his departed soul, the sacrifice

[21] Ibid., p. 429.
[22] Ibid., p. 450.

of slaves to provide servants in the hereafter and head hunting for the same reason.

Given the idea of souls among human beings, it is but a step to attribute them to animals, since among animals are observed the phenomena of life and death, apparent will and judgment; furthermore, animal phantoms are seen by men in dreams and visions. Down to recent times animals have been killed so that their souls might accompany their masters into the future life. Nor is there reason for the savage to refrain from attributing souls likewise to objects. There is, perhaps, a natural tendency to personification as shown by the kick that a child delivers at an offending chair and the abuse that an adult heaps on a door with which he has collided in the dark. Furthermore, objects are seen in dreams just as are humans or animals thus suggesting that each object has a soul that may leave it under certain conditions. Certainly the fact that so many primitive people offer food and other objects at the graves of their dead kinsmen suggests that for the savage these objects are endowed with souls that can accompany and serve the souls of departed humans. As Tylor points out, such a practice does not, however, *necessarily* imply such a theory for it is shared by people who do not have this theory and may be due to horror of objects belonging to the dead or to a desire to please the hovering ghosts. There may also be a kind of child-like make-believe that the person is not really dead, as when a mother puts a doll on the grave of her dead child. On the other hand, the fact that the objects are buried along with the slaves of the dead chief certainly suggests that the objects like the slaves are believed themselves to have souls. Furthermore, objects are seen in the possession of phantoms and may be demanded by the ghostly apparitions.

Belief in a Future Life.—From this starting point Tylor

extends his theory to explain the beliefs and practices in regard to life after death which he considers as definitely an outgrowth of animism. He makes a distinction between transmigration and the future life. The former includes the transfer of souls of the dead to children who are then regarded as merely the incarnations of their ancestors. In New Zealand the priest recites the names of various ancestors whose souls may have found their way back to earth and the child is supposed to sneeze when the ancestor whose soul it bears is mentioned. There is also the notion that the souls of dead natives will be incarnated into white men or into animals such as snakes, birds and monkeys. The same concept is found on a higher plane in the Hindu philosophy, according to which each person is reincarnated into worm or king according to the good or evil that he has done in his life. Resurrection in the sense of putting on once more the mortal coil does not seem to have been commonly believed in among primitive people and the belief is not manifested in the custom of preserving some part of the dead person's body.

The statements in regard to a future life made by savages often have been misunderstood. For them a future life does not necessarily mean immortality, for the ghost may die naturally or meet death at the hands of some monster as is believed by the Fijians. The ghost of an unmarried Fijian in particular, has little chance of survival. The belief shows the utmost variation from tribe to tribe. As Tylor says, there may be "theories of lingering, wandering, and returning ghosts, and of souls dwelling on or below or above the earth in a spirit-world, where existence is modelled upon the earthly life, or raised to higher glory, or placed under reversed conditions, and lastly the belief in a division between happiness and misery of departed souls, by a retribution for deeds done in life, determined in a

judgment after death." [23] Often the ghosts are believed to lurk close at hand and sometimes at certain periods of the year a grand house cleaning takes place in the course of which the ghosts are driven out of the village with a great noise of drums and human voices. On the other hand, elaborate provision is made by many people for the well-being of the swarms of ghosts that are believed to surround them during feasts of the dead. St. John's Eve and All Souls' Day have come down to us from such festive occasions.

The widespread distribution of belief in a future life and similarities in form of such belief raises the old question of independent origin versus cultural diffusion. It is noted in favor of the former theory that most of the pre-literate peoples claim to base their belief on ancient tradition, direct revelation or personal experience. If there has been diffusion, at least there is no common origin from a single religion and the form of the belief usually shows an originality inspired by local conditions.

The locality of the hereafter varies greatly among peoples of the world although generally it falls into one of five general types. It may be located in (1) an earthly paradise, (2) an island of the dead, (3) a subterranean Hades peopled by ghosts of the dead, (4) celestial bodies such as the sun or moon, or (5) heaven vaguely identified with the sky.

As to the nature of the future life Tylor finds two general theories basic to the various beliefs that he examines: that of *continuance* and that of *retribution.* According to the former, life continues much as on earth, while according to the latter, retribution is made for the good and evil for which a person is responsible in his earthly life. In general among the lower tribes the future life is much like the

[23] Tylor, E. B.—*Primitive Culture,* Murry, London, 5th ed., 1913, Vol. II, p. 24.

present with hunting, fishing, fighting, the milking of cows, and all the duties and joys of mundane existence, although perhaps on a slightly glorified plane. An elaborate theory of rewards and punishments is rare among primitive peoples and as a rule the future life does not depend on moral conduct.

It is very difficult to say where the retribution theory proper begins. As usual, the problem is much complicated by the possibility that beliefs may have been borrowed by lower from higher cultures. Admitting certain minor exceptions, Tylor introduces the evolutionary motif with the statement, "The general mass of evidence still remains to show the savage doctrine of the future state, as originally involving no moral retribution, or arriving at this through transitional and rudimentary stages." [24] Accepting as a possibility that a degeneration of more elaborate conceptions might have taken place, Tylor concludes in the same strain, "A hypothesis which finds the origin of the doctrine of the future life in the primitive animism of the lower races, thence traces it along the course of religious thought, in varied developments fitted to exacter knowledge and forming part of loftier creeds, may well be maintained as in reasonable accordance with the evidence." [25]

Tylor is inclined to think that the belief in a future life has little effect upon modes of living. Widow-burning and destruction of goods for the dead are however admitted as significant. The belief does perhaps increase willingness to risk life or to commit suicide. Among historical nations the belief in a future life has been important, as when it gives rise to asceticism with its contempt of life and longing for death. Moreover, the belief in retribution has often been

[24] Ibid., p. 96.

[25] Ibid., p. 102.

used to gain power and money. "On the banks of the river of death, a band of priests has stood for ages to bar the passage of all poor souls who cannot satisfy their demands for ceremonies, and formulas, and fees." [26]

Animistic Origin of Religion.—We may now turn from the religious conception of the soul and its survival after death to that of spirits and gods. Tylor believes that there is no break in the development from the idea of a soul to a belief in a creator and ruler of the universe, and that animism as the doctrine of souls has expanded to the doctrine of spirits, whether gods or devils. He anticipates Spencer's theory of the origin of religion in ancestor-worship by pointing out that, "souls of dead men are in fact considered as actually forming one of the most important classes of demons and deities." [27] Often a medicine man is regarded as a particularly malignant demon, yet on the other hand a dead British officer is worshiped as a god by an Indian tribe. It is urged on the whole that the spirits of the dead are regarded as kindly disposed to the living. In China, India, Rome and a host of other countries we find a high development of ancestor worship and it may be said that even at the present time this form of worship is important among more than one-half of the peoples of the globe.

Given the idea of spirits and demons, it is only natural that disease and insanity should be explained as due to possession by devils and that animism in turn should receive support from the fact of these ills. All over the world there are found priests, shamans, and oracles suffering from hysteria and epilepsy who are regarded as inspired or possessed. Tylor also connects up the widespread practice of fetish worship with his general doctrine of animism, considering such worship to be based on "the doctrine of spirits

[26] Ibid., p. 106. [27] Ibid., p. 111.

embodied in, or attached to, or conveying influence through certain material objects." [28] He admits the difficulty in determining whether the power in the objects is to be regarded as personal but holds that if the term fetish is to be used, "it must be shown that the object is treated as having personal consciousness and power, is talked with, worshiped, prayed to, sacrified to, petted or ill-treated with reference to its past or future behavior to its votaries." [29] Relics of dead men, the medicine bags of the American Indians, the worship of stones, are all explained by animism. From stone worship, "by a scarcely perceptible transition, we pass to idolatry. A few chips or scratches or daubs of paint suffice to convert the rude post or stone into an idol." [30] Often the idols are thought of as having in themselves divine attributes and the ability to eat, drink and move in their material form.

According to Tylor animism is more than a mere religion, it is an entire philosophy of life and of nature. A belief in personal spirits gives man the key to an explanation of all the phenomena of nature, in themselves and in relation to man. Nightmares are explained as an actual visitation of evil spirits. Volcanoes, whirlpools, storms, earthquakes and other natural phenomena are given animistic interpretations. Both trees and animals have been worshiped all over the world due to the belief that in them reside elves, nymphs or other spirits.

He finds no difficulty in extending his theory to explain the belief in actual gods and proclaims that, "The higher deities of Polytheism have their places in the general animistic system of mankind." [31] Gods of the sun and moon, of

[28] Ibid., p. 144.
[29] Ibid., p. 145.
[30] Ibid., p. 168.
[31] Ibid., p. 248.

childbirth, of agriculture, of war, of the dead, he describes, although, unlike Spencer, he ventures no detailed account of their origin from the soul-ghost idea. Even the supreme deities which are found among peoples of low culture as well as among historical religions are accounted for by the theory of developmental animism.

The work of Tylor will always hold a high place in the literature of comparative religion, thanks to his sound scholarship and the spirit of scientific caution with which he worked. He has not been free from criticism, but that criticism has always been respectful. It has been pointed out that he ignores the emotional side of religion. It was not from any lack of appreciation, however, but from need to narrow his subject.[32] Although more inclined to think in evolutionary terms than the modern ethnologist, he rarely forced his facts into a preconceived scheme. As will be shown, there is reason to think that some supreme deities had an origin which connects them but slightly with ghosts of ancestors, that other spirits had diverse origins and that mysterious power is not always regarded as personal. Nevertheless, the hypothesis that the intellectual side of religion has its principal origin in the ghost-soul idea based on dreams and visions, will probably never be successfully displaced.

Spencer's Theory of Ancestor Worship

In the first volume of *Principles of Sociology* which appeared in installments from 1874 to 1877 Spencer presents a theory of the evolution of all religion from ancestor worship that has many points of similarity with Tylor's work which first appeared in 1871. It is a splendid example of Spencer's remarkable skill in marshalling facts in a logical manner but suffers from an uncritical use of source material

[32] Ibid., p. 359.

and from the ruthless attempt to force facts into a preconceived evolutionary scheme.

The Origin of Belief in Spirits.—Spencer makes an attempt to understand the world of the savage and attributes to him a rationality that operates within the limits set by his cultural environment. There is forced upon the savage by natural phenomena, says Spencer, a vague notion of duality in nature. (1) Things that are visible at one moment suddenly disappear. (2) The notion is further fed by transformations. Living things are found as fossils; trees, on the other hand, grow from inert nuts and birds from eggs. The chrysalis is transformed into the butterfly while that creature through protective coloration may be mistaken for a leaf, only to reveal itself once more in its true character. (3) Shadows also contribute to the idea of duality in nature, for does not each object have another self stretched darkly along the ground or mirrored brilliantly in the shining waters of the woodland pool? In the relation between sound and its echo there is a further manifestation of dualism. It is no accident that the poetic Greeks conceived of an echo as a beautiful nymph. (5) Finally, there is the distinction between the animate and the inanimate. Spencer is not inclined to attribute to the savage any inability to distinguish between the living and the nonliving. There is admitted a recognized distinction between that which has motion and that which does not, which contributes to the primitive conception of dualism. *Animism,* however, in the sense of belief in spiritual beings, Spencer holds to be of secondary origin and due to another factor added to dualism, namely, the experience of dreams and visions.

This brings us then to the dream theory as an explanation of the ghost-soul idea, a theory which Spencer like Tylor considers as all important. Primitive man, says

Spencer, does not have a vocabulary that enables him to distinguish a dream experience from a real one and hence thinks that he has gone to certain places and seen other men, perhaps kinsmen long since dead. There is, however, evidence that his body has remained inert throughout the night and what explanation can there be but that another self has left the body for the time being and met the doubles of other people? Thus we have the dream experience combining with the sense of duality in nature to produce belief in the ghost-soul. To this deductive argument Spencer adds a mass of evidence showing that savages really do explain dreams as a temporary separation of the soul from the body. Fainting and periods of unconsciousness due to disease are naturally interpreted as a prolonged absence of the soul from the body. Savages have been known to call out to their souls to come back when they were feeling sick and, returning from the grave of a friend, may hook their souls along behind them with a branch.

It is inevitable that death be regarded as merely a prolonged absence of the soul and many practices seem to show an expectation that the wandering soul may return to its body. "All these various observances, then, imply the conviction that death is a long suspended animation. The endeavours to revive the corpse by ill-usage; the calling it by name, and addressing to it reproaches or inquiries; the endeavours to feed it, and the leaving it with food and drink; the measures taken to prevent its discomfort from pressure and impediments to breathing; the supplying of fire to cook by, or to keep off cold; the care taken to prevent injury by wild beasts, and to arrest decay; and even these various self-injuries symbolizing subordination—all unite to show this belief and this belief is avowed." [33]

[33] Spencer, H.—*Principles of Sociology,* Appleton, N. Y., 1908, Vol. I, p. 168.

Spencer in discussing the nature of the soul as conceived by primitive man points out that we should not expect logical analysis on his part rather than treating souls as if they were both material and immaterial for there is nothing that forces this inconsistency upon his attention. Souls are presented with food, are thought of as suffering physical injuries and death, yet they are also conceived as thin, vaporous, aerioform creatures identified with the shadow and with the breath. Animals have breath; plants and stones have shadows; so primitive man conceives not only of souls of the dead, the sleeping, and finally the waking, but also of animals, plants and inanimate objects. As an evolutionary trend Spencer detects a progressive tendency for souls to be regarded as less and less material.

The Spirit World.—The future life is conceived as much the same as the present, with perhaps some special consideration for bravery. The souls may die, however, and, as Spencer suggests, may be thought of as no longer living when they cease to appear in dreams. The funeral rites during which tools, weapons, money and other things are put in the graves indicate that the same occupations, whether agricultural or predatory, are supposed to occupy ghosts as well as living men. Often wives or slaves are killed to accompany the dead chief. In the Congo young maids leaped into the grave of the king. According to Spencer, "These maids were then so eager for this service to their deceased prince, that in striving who should be first, they killed one another." [34] In general all the social arrangements of rank and conduct are as in the first life. Yet evolution is not absent here for the mode of life comes in time to be conceived of as different. "The second life diverges by becoming less material; by becoming more unlike in its occupation; by having another kind of social order; by pre-

[34] Ibid., p. 191.

senting gratifications more remote from those of the senses; and by the higher standard of conduct it assumes. And while thus differentiating in nature, the second life separates more widely from the first. Communion decreases; and there is an increasing interval between the ending of one and the beginning of the other." [35]

As to location of the other world Spencer says, "The habitat of the dead, originally conceived as coinciding with that of the living, gradually diverges—here to the adjacent forest, there to the remoter forest, and elsewhere to distant hills and mountains. The belief that the dead rejoin their ancestors, leads to further divergences, which vary according to the traditions. . . . The supposed residence for the dead, originally coinciding with the residence of the living, is little by little removed in thought: distance and direction grow increasingly vague, and finally the localization disappears in space." [36]

The savage does not, of course, have our conception of cause and effect and hence for him a notion of a supernatural in a philosophical sense is impossible. Nevertheless, Spencer shows with a wealth of illustration that mysterious, strange and striking events are attributed to the swarms of spirits. A whirlwind, for example, raising a cloud of dust is stabbed to drive away the evil demon which is causing it, a whirlpool in which a man is drowned is, in time, regarded as haunted by an evil water spirit. Thus for the primitive man the world is filled with invisible beings who may work either good or evil—cause disease and accidents or give success in war and in the hunt.

If a soul can leave a body it is only reasonable to suppose that it may enter into mortal frame and this is the explanation which the savage gives to explain reflex movement and mental disorder.

[35] Ibid., p. 200.

[36] Ibid., pp. 216–217.

"This hypothesis explains, too, the strange behaviour of the delirious and the insane. That a maniac's body has been taken possession of by an enemy, is proved by the fact that it is impelled to self-injury. Its right owner would not make the body bite and tear itself. Further, the possessing demon is heard to hold converse with other demons, which he sees but which the bystanders do not see." [37] The logical remedy is exorcism, perhaps with the aid of a more powerful spirit.

The superhuman intelligence that makes divination and oracular sayings possible is attributed to spirits. Sorcery is control of spirits and a miracle is simply good magic.

The Dogma of Original Ancestral Ghost Worship.—Spencer's evolutionary point of view is especially prominent in his discussion of the origin of sacred places, temples and altars. "The original sacred place is the place where the dead are, and which their ghosts are supposed to frequent; the sheltering cave, or house, or other chamber for the dead, becomes the sacred chamber or temple; and that on which offerings for the dead are put becomes the sacred support for offerings—the altar. Food and drink and other things laid for the dead, grow into sacrifices and libations to the gods; while immolations of victims, blood-offerings, mutilations, cuttings-off of hair, originally occurring at the grave, occur afterwards before idols, and as marks of fealty to a deity. Fasting as a funeral rite, passes into fasting as a religious rite; and lamentations, too, occur under both forms. Praises of the dead, chanted at the burial and afterwards, and recurring at festivals, pass into praises forming parts of religious worship; and prayers made to the dead for aid, for blessing, for protection, become prayers made to divinities for like advantages. Ancestral ghosts supposed to cause diseases, as gods send pestilences, are similarly propitiated

[37] Ibid., p. 235.

by special sacrifices: the ascribed motives of ghosts and gods being the same in kind, and the modes of appealing to those motives the same. The parallelism runs out into various details. There is oversight of conduct by ghosts as there is by deities; there are promises of good behaviour to both; there is penitence before the one as before the other. There is repetition of injunctions given by the dead, as there is repetition of divine injunctions. There is a maintenance of fires at graves and in sepulchral chambers, as there is in temples. Burial-places are sometimes, like temples, used as places of refuge. A distinguished dead man is invoked to witness an oath, as God is invoked. Secrecy is maintained respecting the name of the dead, as in some cases respecting the name of a god." [38]

Such a close correspondence in details, Spencer believes, cannot be explained save by a genetic relationship between ancestor worship and worship of deities. To attribute it to chance similarities would be folly since the number of similarities makes chance association contrary to all the mathematical laws of probability. Here he ignores the possibility of convergence of culture patterns dissimilar in origin but associated through common elements perhaps borrowed from one pattern by the other.

Spencer follows this initial evolutionary argument with a valiant proclamation of his central thesis. The first conception of a supernatural being was that of a ghost. With propitiation of the ghost comes ancestor worship and from ancestors are derived the gods. He turns the heaviest guns of his logic and the small arms of historical fact on those who deny that the religion of Semitic and Aryan peoples originated from ancestor worship, demonstrating to his own satisfaction that his evolutionary scheme holds here as elsewhere and that alleged moral practices are really ancestor

[38] Ibid., pp. 281–282.

worship. He shows that in certain cases the word for ghost and for god is the same. From these and a mass of other data he draws a conclusion which it may be suspected he entertained prior to his examination of the facts.

"Evidence was given that by the highest races as by the lowest, ancestor-worship, similarly practised, similarly originated deities; and we saw that it even now survives among the highest races, though overshadowed by a more developed worship. *Concluding, then, that from worship of the dead every other kind of worship has arisen,* we proceeded to examine those worships which do not externally resemble it, to see whether they have traceable kinships." [39]

Worship of Non-Human Objects.—The first of these worships which Spencer has in mind is worship of idols and the allied practice of fetish-worship. Such worship is due in part, he thinks, to the tendency of the primitive mind to confuse the part with the whole and similarity with identity. It is also, however, an outgrowth of ghost propitiation; "From the corpse receiving offerings before burial, to the embalmed body similarly cared for and thence to figures formed partly of the dead man's remains and partly of other things, we passed to figures wholly artificial: so finding that the effigy of a dead man supplied with food, etc., is then propitiated in place of him. Proof was found that this effigy of the dead man occasionally becomes the idol of a god; while this continued propitiation becomes an established worship of it. And since the doubles of the dead, believed to be present in these images of them, are the real objects to which offerings are made: it follows that all idolatry, hence arising, is a divergent development of ancestry-worship. This belief extends. Objects rudely resembling human beings, and supposed parts of human beings, as well as those which by contact with human bodies have

[39] Ibid., p. 429. Italics our own.

absorbed their odour or spirit, come to be included; and so it results that resident ghosts are assumed in many things besides idols: especially those having extraordinary appearances, properties, action. That the propitiation of the inhabiting ghosts, constituting fetichism, is thus a collateral result of the ghost-theory, is shown by various facts; but especially by the fact that fetichism is absent where the ghost-theory is absent or but little developed, and extends in proportion as the ghost-theory evolves." [40]

In regard to the worship of animals it is pointed out that the notion of duality would facilitate the belief in transformation of men to animals, as in the case of were-wolves, or the reverse. Yet Spencer is able to show three possible ways in which the animal is identified with an ancestor, thus making animal worship essentially an offshoot of ancestor worship. It is natural, he argues, that animals such as snakes entering the house at night be identified with the spirits of the dead and made objects of worship. One can but wonder why mice and cockroaches are not more commonly worshiped. "Here are creatures which commonly, unlike wild creatures in general, come into houses—come in, too, secretly in the night. The implication is clear. That snakes, which especially do this, are the returned dead, is inferred by peoples in Africa, Asia and America: the haunting of houses being the common trait of snakes reverenced or worshiped; and also the trait of certain lizards, insects, and birds similarly regarded." [41] Further suggestions are equally brilliant achievements of deductive reasoning.

"The ghost, sometimes re-visiting the house, is thought also to linger in the neighbourhood of the corpse. Creatures found in caves used for burials, hence come to be taken for the new shapes assumed by departed souls. Bats and

[40] Ibid., p. 429.
[41] Ibid., p. 353.

owls are conceived to be winged spirits; and from them arise the ideas of devils and angels.

"Lastly, and chiefly, comes that identification of the animal with the ancestor, which is caused by interpreting metaphorical names literally. Primitive speech is unable to transmit to posterity the distinction between an animal and a person named after that animal." [42] For example a man of great strength and courage might be called "Tiger" with the result, according to Spencer, that when spoken of by his descendants to their children these children would assume him to have been an actual animal. The consequences of such a misinterpretation were treatment of animals as humans, food taboos and actual animal worship.

We learn also that "plant worship is the worship of a spirit originally human, supposed to be contained in the plant—supposed either because of the exciting effects of its products; or because misapprehended tradition raises the belief that the race descended from it; or because a misinterpreted name identified it with an ancestor." [43] For example, people from a forest region might be known as "children of the trees," resulting in a later misinterpretation that the race descended from trees.

The deification of the greater objects and powers in nature is subjected to the same type of ingenious philological explanation. It is assumed that the sun was confused with ancestors because they came from the region of sunrise, because given sun as a birth-name or because their brilliant attainments caused them to acquire that title.

The Origin of Deities.—Finally, Spencer considers more specifically the origin of higher deities and as usual finds an explanation in evolutionary ancestor worship. "Besides these aberrant developments of ancestor-worship which

[42] Ibid., p. 353.
[43] Ibid., p. 430.

result from identification of ancestors with idols, animals, plants, and natural powers, there are direct developments of it. Out of the assemblage of ghosts, some evolve into deities who retain their anthropomorphic characters. As the divine and the superior are, in the primitive mind, equivalent ideas—as the living man and reappearing ghost are at first confounded in early beliefs—as ghost and god are originally convertible terms; we may understand how a deity develops out of a powerful man, and out of the ghost of a powerful man, by small steps. Within the tribe the chief, the magician, or someone otherwise skilled, held in awe during his life as showing powers of unknown origin and extent, is feared in a higher degree when, after death, he gains the further powers possessed by all ghosts; and still more the stranger bringing new arts, as well as the conqueror of superior race, is treated as a superhuman being during life and afterwards worshiped as a yet greater superhuman being. Remembering that the most marvelous version of any story commonly obtains the greatest currency, and that so, from generation to generation, the deeds of such traditional persons grow by unchecked exaggeration eagerly listened to, we may see that in time any amount of expansion and idealization can be reached." [44]

The deities so developed from ancestors are at first essentially human in character but often lacking in the higher human traits. Gods of the Fiji Islanders are ferocious creatures eating the souls of men. Jahveh of the ancient Hebrews was also bloodthirsty, jealous, and deceitful and, with later developments was conceived as condemning men to eternal tortures. The tendency is, however, toward more spiritual gods less characterized by gross human traits, more universal in influence and more in harmony with refined ethical conceptions.

[44] Ibid., p. 431.

Evolution of Ecclesiastical Institutions.—Of Spencer's account of the evolution of ecclesiastical institutions only a few words may be said here.[45] He is inclined to believe in a certain priority of the medicine man using coercive methods in dealing with ghosts and demons over the priest, whose methods are more propitiatory in character.

At first religion is very largely a family affair with the task of propitiating the ancestral ghosts as the function of the eldest son, hence the desire for male offspring as found in ancient Rome and in China almost down to the present time. With more complex stages of culture there is a tendency for general interest to become attached to the ancestor of some especially powerful family and hence the priest is now the representative of a broader social group. Since political power and ecclesiastical standing are closely associated we find at first the same individuals exercising both functions in the form of a priest-king. There is such a pressure of duties, however, that often a member of the family, usually a younger son, takes up religious duties and there is consequently to some degree a separation of priestly and political hierarchies. In general, however, the same coercive methods of control are exercised by both and thus inculcate an attitude of submissiveness in the population at large. Political and religious phenomena are bound up together and this relationship is an obstacle in the way of monotheism, for political changes often bring a new god to dominance or at least to membership in the pantheon. Invasions from time immemorial have had their effect. Religion serves, however, as a strong social bond having survival value for the groups that possess it in common. Just as the mourners at the grave of an ancestor are brought together by common feeling and common devotion to an-

[45] Spencer, H.—*Principles of Sociology,* Appleton, N. Y., 1908, Vol. III, pp. 3–175.

cestral commands so are people of a nation held together by their religion.

In the early stages of civilization the separation between church and state is by no means complete and so the priests very commonly play the part of warriors and are in other ways connected with military affairs. With the divorce of church and state and the replacement of militarism by industrialism this is less common. Civil authority of the priesthood also declines and there is more complete subordination to temporal authority. This also is due to industrialism, for a society based on contract rather than status and owing its general character to control of nature by science, is less inclined to submissiveness to authority or to supernaturalism. There is an increase in non-conformity within religious systems themselves due to the same reasons. Spencer thinks that, in the past, ecclesiastical institutions have played a valuable rôle in creating a bond of solidarity and giving a discipline without which the rise of civilization would have been impossible, but he sees little save an ethical function left for such institutions to perform in the future.

Impressive as is Spencer's treatment of religion it is open to criticism on many points. His unfortunate and loose use of the comparative method, i.e., his taking facts out of their cultural setting for comparison, invalidates much of his work. His conclusions are so dogmatically stated that the demonstration of a single exception to his plan is bound to be fatal, and many such exceptions to his rigid, evolutionary scheme have been found. His method is purely deductive and facts are marshalled only to support a preconceived hypothesis. A survey of the development of Egyptian religion shows that there is no such systematic evolution as Spencer assumes. Further criticism must be postponed to a following chapter in which the evolution of religion is discussed. Here at least we may give him credit,

together with Tylor, for working out the illuminating ghost-soul theory and for sketching with a master hand a general trend of religious development that holds roughly for the world as a whole even though it breaks down in the case of particular groups. To the question, "What is religion?" he would reply, "Ancestor worship."

Durkheim's Sociological Theory

Emile Durkheim, a prominent French sociologist, prefaces his own original answer to the question, "What is religion and how does it originate?" by a criticism of preceding theories, especially the Spencer-Tylor ghost theory. As a general criticism he makes objection to the intellectualism of such a theory, in spite of the fact that he himself goes beyond Spencer and Tylor at times in attributing philosophical tendencies to the savage.

More specifically he argues that the ghost theory of nocturnal spirit wanderings is not the simplest interpretation of the facts as they present themselves to primitive man, for why would it not be just as plausible for the native to assume an ability to see at a distance while asleep through all kinds of obstacles? This suggested explanation would not account, however, for dreams in which a dead person visited the sleeper.

He furthermore points out that the ghost theory would not account for dreams in which the person lived again in the past and that it would be more natural to interpret such experiences as merely vivid memories. Here Durkheim himself falls into the sin of intellectualization for he is attributing a developed critical faculty to the savage and further is erroneously assuming that the theory is developed to explain all dreams, which is not the case but

is merely used by Spencer to show how the soul idea might have arisen.

In the third place Durkheim wonders how the savage could have been so unobserving as not to discover that the person seen in the dream had himself a quite different dream experience. Such a failure does not seem excessively naïve, especially as there is no reason to think that a discussion of dreams is a common practice. As Lowie shows, dreams are often considered private and sacred and, in the case of conflicting testimony, the dream experience would offer little basis for conviction. He tells of a priest who convinced a man of the misbehavior of his soul during its absence although memory of such misbehavior as part of the dream experience was probably lacking.[46]

Finally, Durkheim argues that most dreams are ignored and could not have excited enough interest and attention to furnish such an important belief as that of a soul or double. Here it should be noted that it would not be necessary to explain all dreams, and certainly some of them must have been so vivid as to demand some explanation. To his claim that primitive religion could not have been based on an illusion it may be pointed out that to the savage the dream is not an illusion but an immediate sense datum and hence in its effect is as real as though objectively substantiated.

Durkheim is also disposed to reject influence of nature as leading to religion, claiming that there is nothing in nature to excite religious emotion. This also must be questioned in view of known facts as to fear-provoking stimuli in the natural world, such as thunder, lightning, storms and the like, and because of the prominent place that objects of nature play in mythologies the world over.

Durkheim's Definition and Approach.—An early defini-

[46] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 110.

tion of religion making it an obligatory system of associated beliefs and practices is roundly criticized by Webb.[47] Durkheim later offers the following: "A religion is a unified system of belief and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church all those who adhere to them." [48] This definition considers, then, sacred things and a church as essential to religion and in the discussion of the origin of the sacred we have the essence of Durkheim's theory. Yet before presenting this theory it would be well to point out that in the requirement of a church Durkheim attempts to distinguish religion from magic. He holds that in the case of magic a body of votaries is lacking, for the relation of a sorcerer to his clients is that of the doctor to his patients and does not form the basis for any kind of church. The distinction still holds even when the magician works for the public good since there is no permanent bond as between a priest and his congregation. Furthermore, a fraternity of wizards does not constitute a church, for it is made up solely of priests and lacks a following.

On the basis of this definition Durkheim begins his quest for the origin of religion. He believes that he has found this origin in the totemic system of the Australian aborigines, a people whom he holds to be perhaps the most primitive in the world. We may content ourselves in presenting his theory and reserving for the moment its criticism.

The Crowd Psychology Theory of Religious Emotion.—The totemism of Australia he alleges to be practically

[47] Webb, C. C. J.—*Group Theories of Religion and the Individual,* London, Allen and Unwin, 1916, pp. 37–70.

[48] Durkheim, E.—*Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* Allen, London, n.d., p. 47.

universal, hence archaic, and a setting in which one might probably find the origin of religion. Totemism consists in a social organization according to which a tribe is divided up into clans or sibs each with its totem symbolic of the clan group. This clan group Durkheim regards as the most primitive social unit, one which naturally takes its name from some familiar plant or animal in the locality, this object merely being a symbol of social solidarity. The traits of Australian totemism appear, he says, in all great religions. It possesses a cosmogony; it involves prayer, sacrifice and a belief in the soul. An analysis shows that a thing is sacred or profane as it is included or excluded from the totemic cycle of ideas, emotions and activities. We must follow him in his analysis of the nature of this sacredness which stands in contrast to the profane. He says, "The life of the Australian societies passes alternately through two distinct phases." [49] The clans are part of the time broken up into little groups engaged in the more or less drab occupations of hunting and fishing but at intervals they are concentrated at a given point for a period of time. "This concentration takes place when a clan or a part of the tribe is summoned to the gathering, and on this occasion they celebrate a religious ceremony, or else hold what is called a corrobbori in the usual ethnological language." [50] Under social stimulation intense excitement takes place. "The very fact of the concentration acts as an exceptionally powerful stimulant. When they are once come together, a sort of electricity is formed by their collecting which quickly transports them to an extraordinary degree of exaltation. Every sentiment expressed finds a place without resistance in all the minds, which are very open to outside impressions; each re-echoes the others, and

[49] Ibid., p. 214.
[50] Ibid., p. 215.

is re-echoed by the others. The initial impulse thus proceeds, growing as it goes, as an avalanche grows in its advance. As such active passions so free from all control could not fail to burst out, on every side one sees nothing but violent gestures, cries, veritable howls, and deafening noises of every sort, which aid in intensifying still more the state of mind; which they manifest.

"And since a collective sentiment cannot express itself collectively except on the condition of observing a certain order permitting cooperation and movements in unison, these gestures and cries naturally tend to become rhythmic and regular; hence become songs and dances." [51] Special instruments known as bull-roarers are used to increase the din made by human voices. Under the stress of excitement sex taboos are forgotten and unrestricted sexual indulgence is likely to take place. As the ceremonies take place at night by the light of fires, the scenes are weird beyond description and lead to super-excitation such that the actors in the ceremonies fall exhausted to the ground.

"One can readily conceive how, when arrived at this state of exaltation, a man does not recognize himself any longer. Feeling himself dominated and carried away by some sort of an external power which makes him think and act differently than in normal times, he naturally has the impression of being himself no longer. . . ." [52]

"And as at the same time all his companions feel themselves transformed in the same way and express this sentiment by their cries, their gestures and their general attitude, everything is just as though he really were transported into a special world, entirely different from the one where he ordinarily lives, and into an environment filled with exceptionally intense forces that take hold of him and metamor-

[51] Ibid., p. 216.
[52] Ibid., p. 218.

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

phose him. How could such experiences as these, especially when they are repeated every day for weeks, fail to leave in him the conviction that there really exist two heterogeneous and mutually incomparable worlds? One is that where his daily life drags wearily along, but he cannot penetrate into the other without at once entering into relations with extraordinary powers that excite him to the point of frenzy. The first is the profane world, the second that of sacred things." [53] It is this process of social stimulation which gives the savage a sense of being possessed by a power outside of himself which is called by Durkheim the "totemic principle" since it is a power derived from participation in the totemic group. The savage, of course, does not himself recognize the source of the exaltation which he experiences. In his emotional ecstasy the most familiar thing known to him, namely, the totemic symbol or drawing of the totemic animal, is likely to catch his eye or come to mind and by the principle of conditioned emotional response his emotions are centered about it and to him the symbol seems the source of the strange power that moves him. Thus with the outward projection of the emotional experience there is developed the "totemic principle" or *mana* as it is sometimes called. The whole system of ideas as well as objects connected with the totemic group is bathed in the mana which is subjectively felt as a sense of power. That which has mana is sacred, hence with an explanation of the social generation of the totemic principle we have explained the sacred and even religion itself. Religion, the sacred, mana and the totemic principle are but symbols of society. By the process previously described the native creates a system of religious symbols, carriers of religious values, themselves illusions yet containing an ultimate reality which is eternal. This ultimate reality accord-

[53] Ibid., pp. 218–219.

ing to Durkheim is the psychic stimulation of the individual by the group. Thus society *is* God.

The Origin of the Idea of a Soul.—Durkheim further attempts to furnish a substitute for the dream theory of the origin of the soul idea. He argues that the ghost theory does not explain the origin of gods since the ghost would not have the quality of sacredness, whereas in his theory that quality of divinity is explained. He bases his argument on the fact that in Central Australia all children are believed to be reincarnations of ancestral tribesmen. "We have seen that the souls of new-born children are either emanations of the ancestral souls, or these souls themselves reincarnated. But in order that they may either reincarnate themselves, or periodically give off new emanations, they must have survived their first holders. So it seems as though they admitted the survival of the dead in order to explain the birth of the living. The primitive does not have the idea of an all-powerful god who creates souls out of nothing. It seems to him that souls cannot be made except out of souls. So those who are born can only be new forms of those who have been; consequently, it is necessary that these latter continue to exist in order that others may be born. In fine the belief in immortality is the only way in which men were able to explain a fact which could not fail to attract their attention; this fact is the perpetuity of the life of the group. . . . Since it is always the same clan with the same totemic principle, it is necessary that the souls be the same, for souls are only the totemic principle broken up and particularized. Thus there is something like a germinative plasm, of a mystic order, which is transmitted from generation to generation and which makes, or at least is believed to make, the spiritual unity of the clan through all time." [54]

[54] Ibid., pp. 268–269.

Leuba remarks, "Thus Durkheim finds the origin of each new born individual in the totemic power itself, acting through the intermediary of the ancestors. When the totemic potency animates a human or animal body, it becomes individualized; until then it may be considered as too vaguely conceived to deserve the epithet personal; it is not very different from the *mana* of the Melanesians." [55]

Leuba argues that Durkheim's notion involves a confusion between the ghost and the soul. One tribe, for example, believes that the ghosts of the dead are ultimately destroyed by lightning and yet explain birth as reincarnation. That which is reincarnated must be the soul of the ghost. He points out that this same tribe (the Arunta) say that the ancestor throws to a passing woman something which enters her body and assumes human shape. This something is apparently in the nature of a soul.[56] Furthermore the idea of immortality is found where there is no belief in reincarnation. This is perhaps the most serious objection to the Durkheim theory.

The Origin of Mourning Rites.—One other additional aspect of Durkheim's theory is worthy of mention, namely, that which explains mourning ceremonies. He says, "When someone dies, the family group to which he belongs feels itself lessened and, to react against this loss, it assembles." [57] Each person is forced to feel the sentiment of sorrow, for if any should remain indifferent it would weaken the solidarity of the group. There is of course an intensification in the group situation of any emotion that may be felt, so that the sorrow becomes actually painful. "When

[55] Leuba, J.—*The Belief in God and Immortality,* Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 2nd ed., 1921, p. 77.

[56] Ibid., p. 79.

[57] Durkheim, E.—*Elementary Forms of the Religious Life,* Allen, London, n.d., p. 399.

pain reaches this degree of intensity, it is mixed with a sort of anger and exasperation. One feels the need of breaking something, of destroying something. He takes this out either upon himself or others. He beats himself, burns himself, wounds himself or else he falls upon others to beat, burn and wound them. Thus it becomes the custom to give one's self up to the veritable orgies of tortures during mourning. It seems very probable that blood-revenge and head-hunting have their origin in this.

"We see that this explanation of mourning completely leaves aside all ideas of souls or spirits. The only forces which are really active are of a wholly impersonal nature: they are the emotions aroused in the group by the death of one of its members. But the primitive does not know the psychical mechanism from which these practices result. So when he tries to account for them, he is obliged to forge a wholly different explanation. All he knows is that he must painfully mortify himself. As every obligation suggests the notion of a will which obliges, he looks about him to see whence this constraint which he feels may come. Now there is one moral power, of whose reality he is assured and which seems designated for this rôle; this is the soul which the death has liberated." [58]

The soul, then, as a cause of pain comes to be feared and has different characteristics attributed to it from those of the living person. "Men do not weep for the dead because they fear them; they fear them because they weep for them." [59] With the feeling of solidarity that comes with mourning the need for mourning as a means of increasing that solidarity declines and equilibrium is restored. Furthermore, when the pain and anguish of mourning cease, then the soul is regarded as more kindly since the former pain

[58] Ibid., p. 401.
[59] Ibid., p. 401.

was attributed to the soul. In regard to the influence of mourning rites upon the idea of immortality Durkheim says, "Of course it is impossible to say, with any exactness what part these considerations have had in the origin of the idea of immortality. But it is probable that here the influence of the cult is the same as it is elsewhere. Rites are more easily explicable when one imagines that they are addressed to personal beings; so men have been induced to extend the influence of the mythical personalities in the religious life. In order to account for mourning, they have prolonged the existence of the soul beyond the tomb. This is one more example of the way in which rites react upon beliefs." [60]

Brilliant as this argument is, there is little evidence that the savage as a rule tries to account for the mourning rites or gives this explanation of them.

Criticism of Durkheim's Theory.—Vigorous criticism has been brought forward against Durkheim's theories, especially by A. A. Goldenweiser and Robert Lowie.[61] The general plan of attack of the former writer will be followed. Following certain general criticisms, specific ethnological, psychological and sociological arguments will be brought to bear.

As a general criticism Goldenweiser opposes the notion that nature, as such, cannot inspire religious emotion. He maintains that we do find the savage discriminating between the commonplace and that which is strange, extraordinary and filled with power and mystery. Men are always stirred by such phenomena as earthquakes, floods, comets, fire, eclipses, and the thrill of such emotion is the very nucleus of

[60] Ibid., pp. 399–403.

[61] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Religion and Society: a Critique of Emile Durkheim's Theory of the Origin and Nature of Religion,* Jr. of Phil., Psych. and Sci. Methods, Vol. XIV, Mar. 1, 1917, pp 113–124.

Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, pp. 153–163.

religion. It is quite true that the savage does not make the same line of demarcation between the natural and the supernatural that we would do. For him the ability of certain animals to change their form would seem quite natural while an automobile would certainly be considered as supernatural. Yet the concepts natural and extraordinary or supernatural are in the mind of the savage and it is this realm of the supernatural which harbors emotional thrill and religious ecstasy.

The notion that the clan is the most primitive social unit and that totemism has all the essential traits of higher religions may be attacked on ethnological grounds. Goldenweiser points out that the family is more primitive than the clan and that it is unwarranted to hold that primitive religion is necessarily associated with primitive social organization. Durkheim's contention that totemism is universal and primitive in the sense of great antiquity as an institution, does not hold. As Lowie says, "Durkheim proceeds on the assumption, now thoroughly discredited, that the sib (clan) in the typical form of the totemic sib is a universal trait of very rude cultures. As a matter of fact, it has already been shown that the simplest tribes in both the Old World and the New World lack sibs and totems. No such institution occurs among the Andamenese of the Bay of Bengal or the Chukchi of Siberia, nor has it been reported from the Tasmanians, the Congolese Pygmies, or the Bushmen. If it be objected with some plausibility that our knowledge of the three tribes just mentioned is too inadequate to permit negative data to weigh heavily, there is the wholly unobjectionable evidence from the Western Hemisphere where the sib organization is uniformly absent from all the rudest hunting tribes and in North America is an almost regular accompaniment of horticulture. The Mackenzie River Athabaskans, the Shoshoneans of the Great

Basin, the tribes of Washington and Oregon are sibless, while the sedentary Iroquois and Pueblo tribes are organized into sibs with at least totemic names, if not with a full-fledged totemism; for, as we cannot resist mentioning incidentally, the sib organization is by no means uniformly linked with totemism." [62] In view of these facts one must ask Durkheim where the non-totemic people got their religion. The only answer would be that they borrowed it from the higher totemic cultures and this is quite contrary to Durkheim's general thesis, that totemism is an archaic pattern peculiar to the rudest peoples, among whom he rather questionably places the Australians. Dr. Ruth Benedict finds that in North America a religious belief, the guardian-spirit idea, is "not only by virtue of its range far older than totemism but also turns out to be highly developed where no traces of totemism have ever been recorded. It is therefore impossible to derive the guardian-spirit belief from totemic conceptions." [63]

An additional ethnological criticism is made by Lowie when he points out that social influence upon the Australian native is by no means entirely due to the sib, for there are other groups that confer upon him equal blessings of culture and protection. Goldenweiser, like Lowie, holds that Durkheim has blundered in discovering the root of religion in an institution of slight extent and relatively slight intensity of religious values. In the latter respect totemism cannot compare with animal worship or fetishism, for several of these beliefs are more widely diffused than totemism, are more primitive and less bound up with a special form of social organization. The totemic complex,

[62] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, pp. 157–158.

[63] Benedict, R. F.—*The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America,* Memoirs of the Am. Anth. Ass., Vol. XXIX, pp. 60–63.

then, as the basis of religion falls short in regard to both universality and primitiveness.

Another ethnological criticism is directed against Durkheim's identification of the totemic principle with mana, or more accurately, his derivation of mana from the totemic principle. Much evidence is being accumulated which shows the wide distribution of the concept of mana or impersonal power among primitive peoples all over the world. While the "totemic principle" is bound to a definite form of social organization, itself of limited distribution, mana requires nothing but nature acting and man's mind acted upon. As Goldenweiser points out, a psychological derivation of mana would apply to the "totemic principle" but the reverse would not be true. Mana alone can claim universality and primitiveness.

Turning to psychological criticisms, it is clear that there are several objections to deriving the "totemic principle" from the psychic stimulation of the clan and hence assuming the reality underlying religion to be society. Durkheim's conception of society is strangely narrow for it makes society practically identical with the crowd rather than a historic culture group which is perhaps a more valid meaning of the term. Society as the basis of tradition, as furnishing standards of action, as the source of public opinion, is entirely neglected. Furthermore, given the crowd situation, it is questionable whether the emotion thus aroused would be projected outwards. In a crowd situation in a theater, a mob, a panic, a revival, there is undoubtedly an interaction, but how does the individual rationalize his participation? Not necessarily by contrasting his daily life with the crowd situation or by projecting outward his subjective experience to discover a superior and external power. On the contrary the individual may identify himself with the

crowd so that there is a common feeling and a sense of unity. Here we must not be too critical, however, of Durkheim's social psychology, for given a *pre-existing conception of spiritual power,* participants in modern religious revivals do speak of the Holy Spirit descending upon them as an external source of power. As we shall see later, Durkheim here at least has hit upon an important factor in religious experience.

Furthermore, the belief that the crowd emotion is of necessity a religious thrill is rather questionable. Neither in primitive nor in modern times do such experiences invariably create religious emotions not previously existing. Crowd psychology does not create a specific emotional state; rather it is a reinforcement of fear, joy, anger or adoration, due to a summation of stimuli and an intensification of emotional reaction with a corresponding inhibition of the higher thought processes. The specific emotion then differs with different crowd situations, and religion remains unexplained.

The sociological argument in opposition to Durkheim's theory consists in pointing out how completely the theory ignores the contribution of individuals. While religious emotion is amenable to transformations conditioned by the crowd, religious experience has been enriched, elaborated and refined by the spiritual contribution of individual persons. These individuals are of two types. In the first place there are individuals of the average type, yet who have exceptional opportunities for religious experience, for example, the Winnebago youth who goes out to fast and pray and to receive the vision which reveals the powers that are to be his for life. In the second place, there are religious teachers, reformer-fanatics, miracle workers, revivalists, founders of religions, prophets and saints. These men

seek solitude and furnish their own religious settings. The lives of many of them are striking refutations of Durkheim's theory.

It would seem that no one theory gives a complete answer to the question, "What is religion?" whether it be the animism of Tylor, the ancestor worship of Spencer or the group stimulation theory of Durkheim.

Chapter III

THE SOURCES OF RELIGION

The fundamental error in the various theories of religion that have been passed in review is the belief that a unilateral theory can afford comprehension of a given social phenomenon. This fallacy is most apparent in the writings of Herbert Spencer who constantly picks facts out of their cultural settings and crams them into a preconceived evolutionary scheme. Certainly the dream-vision theory of the origin of religion will always have a certain amount of value and few people will doubt that some gods are derived from ancestors; but to exclude other factors is unwarranted and illogical. Probably there has never been a social phenomenon derived from but a single cause, hence to blind one's eyes to alternative explanations or to seek simplicity where, in the nature of things, complexity rules is to derive a faulty mental picture of religion.

In view of these considerations it seems desirable to present a discussion of the various causes and conditions of religion that may enter into the causal complex rather than to force the facts into limited categories. The attempt will be to find as many conditioning factors as possible rather than to fit the facts to a single set of conditions. The factors influencing the religious complex may be divided into three types: the physical, the psychological and the social.

Physical Factors in Religion

In spite of Spencer's dogmatic presentation of the theory that nature gods are invariably derived from ancestors, the matter is not so easily settled. Certainly the theory held by many writers that all religions are derived from a solar myth is an extreme position. Likewise the unilateral view of Peschel that the solitude of the desert inspired monotheism shows a blindness to facts of cultural history. Nevertheless, the influence of geographical factors may not be entirely ignored.

The most superficial study of mythology and comparative religion shows the important rôle that celestial bodies have played in determining at least the pattern of religious beliefs. The question whether or not the origin of gods is to be found in the personification of the powers of nature must be postponed to a later point in the discussion. The Winnebago in their conception of the Thunderbird have to some extent personified natural phenomena and have done so more definitely in their worship of heavenly bodies such as the Sun, Morning Star and Moon, objects of worship found also among other plains Indians. Human sacrifice as practiced by the Pawnee is related to Morning Star.

Although the Ekoi have little interest in the stars, one of their two great deities is Osaw, a sky god. Talbot finds the worship of nature forces one of the principal features of the Ekoi religion. He is inclined to think that this religion is related to that of the old Minoan civilization and that their symbols of axe and tree here as in the Mediterranean civilization symbolize the union of the sky god and the earthmother.[1] The evil character of Osaw as com-

[1] Talbot, P. A.—*In the Shadow of the Bush,* Heinemann, London, 1912, pp. 13–17.

pared with Nsi is due to his control over thunder and lightning which phenomena very obviously make a deep impression upon the Ekoi mind.

In Egypt we find abundant evidence of the effect of celestial objects upon religion. Throughout the entire history of this country we find a sun god holding an important place, as a rule that of the supreme deity. Nut is a goddess of the sky, Shu an air god and, if Spence be correct, Osiris himself may be considered a moon god.[2] Thus we find that the very earliest gods of the Egyptians were nature gods and, more particularly, celestial deities.

It would be possible to cite innumerable examples of the influence of the heavenly bodies upon religion, but it must suffice here to give a few further illustrations. Among the Babylonians the more important deities are identified with the heavenly bodies. The Sumerians worshiped Snu, a sky God, Sin, a moon God, Shamash, the sun God, and Ishtar, who was also identified with the moon. As Rogers points out, "Nearly every place in early times would have a Sun God or a Moon God or both, and in the political development of the country the Moon God of the conquering city displaced or absorbed the Moon God of the conquered." [3]

Perhaps the most impressive evidence is to be derived from the so-called Indo-European peoples. As Paton says, "The most prominent feature in the religion of the primitive Indo-Europeans was the worship of the bright powers of nature." [4] In the Sanscrit, Latin, Iranian, Norse, Greek, Lithuanian, and other languages the general name

[2] Spence, Lewis—*The Myths of Ancient Egypt,* F. A. Stokes, N. Y., n.d., p. 78.

[3] Rogers, R. W.—*The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria,* Eaton & Mains, N. Y., 1908, p. 79.

[4] Paton, L. B.—*Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1921, p. 67.

for God meant heavenly. We also find similar words in these languages for the sun, moon and other heavenly bodies. "The thunder-god was worshipped by all the Aryans, but under different appellations. In India and Mitanni he was known as *Indra*; among the Celts as *Toran-nos,* Irish *Torann,* Welsh *Tarann,* Cornish *Taran;* among the Teutons as *Tonar,* O. Nor. *Thorr,* O. H. Germ. *Donar,* Germ. *Donner,* Eng. *Thunder.*" [5] The significance of nature gods among Indo-European peoples can thus be demonstrated by a wealth of philological evidence.

In China the worship of Tien or Heaven was the essential part of the state religion. Likewise in Mexico, Peru, among the Natchez and elsewhere we have solar worship playing a prominent part in the religious system of the country.

Turning now to mundane objects, we find a further source of religious stimulation. The contemplation of the ocean and other large bodies of water may have induced religious thought. Perhaps Poseidon as well as Zeus owes his origin to the awe-inspiring quality of natural objects. We find evidence of this influence in the three religions selected for special study. The Winnebago attribute guardian spirits to lake and stream, spirits who are appreciative of gifts of tobacco made by those who seek to cross.[6] In the country of the Ekoi is a lake feared and shunned by all who dwell nearby because of flitting ghosts and dread monsters who haunt its waters. It is apparent that this sacredness may have a secondary origin in animistic beliefs rather than in the awe-inspiring appearance of the lake. We cannot doubt, however, the influence of the river Nile upon the Egyptian religion. There is good reason to believe that Osiris was

[5] Ibid., p. 67.

[6] Radin, P.—*The Winnebago Tribe,* 37th Report Bureau American Ethnology, p. 289.

for some a personification of this life-giving stream.[7] It might be mentioned in passing that mountains and high places have played a part in the Hebrew and other religions.

Trees have been objects of worship throughout the entire world. While no specific mention is made of this belief among the Winnebago it is quite possible that some of the host of local spirits were attached to trees, as were the nymphs and dryads of the ancient Greeks. Among the Egyptians there is clear evidence of tree worship. A painting has been found of a tree goddess standing on a sycamore and represented as feeding the dead.[8] Tree worship is further suggested by commandments regarding the setting up of trees in the villages.[9] Trees play a prominent part along with other earthly objects in the Ekoi religion. Nearly every Ekoi village has its Juju tree containing sacred nests. The trees themselves are considered sacred to Nsi of whom they are perhaps the symbol. Trees are involved in magical rites, for by offerings to them the death of an enemy may be obtained. A mystical relation is thought to exist between certain men and their trees. A man may rise in the middle of the night to dash into the jungle in mad haste at the call of his Oji tree.[10] Perhaps the most remarkable and conclusive demonstration of the prevalence of tree worship is to be found in Frazer's monumental work, "The Golden Bough." This entire study is devoted to an explanation of

[7] Says Rameses IV to Osiris, "Thou art indeed the Nile, great on the fields at the beginning of the seasons; gods and men live by the moisture that is in thee." Breasted concludes, "It is evident from these earliest sources that Osiris was identified with the waters, especially the inundation, with the soil and with vegetation." See Breasted, J., *Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt,* Scribners, N. Y., 1912, pp. 18–23.

[8] Petrie, W. M. F.—*Religious Life in Ancient Egypt,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924, p. 198.

[9] Ibid., p. 196.

[10] Talbot, P. A.—*In the Shadow of the Bush,* Heinemann, London, 1912, p. 24.

a custom whereby the guardian of a sacred grove is replaced by one who, after breaking the golden bough, is strong enough to slay him. The golden bough is thought by Frazer to have been the mistletoe. "In the religious history of the Aryan race in Europe the worship of trees has played an important part. Nothing could be more natural. For at the dawn of history Europe was covered with immense primeval forests in which the scattered clearings must have appeared like islets in an ocean of green." [11] The oak worship of the Druids is familiar to everyone; sacred groves were common among the ancient Germans and "at Upsala, the old religious capital of Sweden, there was a sacred grove in which every tree was regarded as divine." [12] Among Lithuanians, Greeks, Romans, West Africans, Australians, and many other peoples we find traces of tree worship.

Animals are perhaps even more important in furnishing content for religious beliefs and practices. As Hallowell has shown, many primitive peoples do not make the distinction that we draw between human and lower forms of life; in fact, animals are often considered to be of greater shrewdness than humans.[13] It seems probable that the size and strength of certain beasts must have been impressive, inspiring a certain amount of awe and reverence. The prevalence of animal characters in the folk-lore of many peoples widely scattered over the globe shows the greater intimacy that exists between pre-literate men and animals as compared with our own attitudes. We are familiar with the Br'er Rabbit tales but among the Ekoi the tortoise and the lamb are endowed with unusual intelligence. Among the Winne-

[11] Frazer, J. G.—*The Golden Bough,* Macmillan, N. Y., abridged ed., 1922, p. 109.

[12] Ibid., p. 110.

[13] Hallowell, A. I.—*Bear Ceremonialism in the Northern Hemisphere,* Ph.D. Thesis, University of Pennsylvania, Phila., 1926, pp. 9–20.

bago, the hare, and among other Plains Tribes, the coyote, play a prominent part in folk-lore. In the northern part of both Asia and America bear ceremonialism is found which often includes a propitiation of the slain animal with the request that he be not offended but willing to encourage other members of his species to fall victim to the hunter's skill. The totemic complex is widely distributed over the world although not universally as once was thought. As a feature of totemism there is often found an assumed mystical relationship between men and animal ancestors.

Buffalo and other animal spirits are prominent in the Winnebago religion. Among the Ekoi we find the Goddess Nimm, who in certain aspects is a snake goddess. Among these people it is commonly believed that men have the power of turning themselves into animals. Men will not kill animals of a species with whom they are in a mystic relationship. If an animal thought to be possessed by the soul of a tribesman be killed, the hunter must hasten with a portion of that animal to prevent the death of his fellow. The prevalence of animal worship among the Egyptians was perhaps due to vestiges of totemism aided by the utility of such animals as snakes and cats in preying upon the disease-bearing rats.

The question arises as to the importance of all these objects of natural environment in the development of religion. Certainly most of them mentioned could not in themselves give rise to religious belief in the absence of other factors. Yet it may be said that, given the mental and emotional make-up of man as it exists today and has probably existed for the last twenty thousand years, the more impressive objects of nature would almost inevitably be personified. This of course is mere speculation, but such personification does not seem beyond human capacity even in the absence of pre-existing ideas of ghosts or gods. It is significant that

myth-making is part of the universal culture pattern common to all people and that in these myths natural objects are readily deified. Children often show a tendency to personify various aspects of nature although their apparently spontaneous behavior may actually reflect their culture. We may not reason from the mental reactions of a Browning, Goethe, Thoreau or Wordsworth to those of the average savage confronted by the splendor of the same natural objects. Nevertheless, we must remember that a single individual endowed with unusual sensitivity might well originate a religious belief which would later be adopted by others. As Radin has shown, individuals of philosophic mind are found among pre-literate as well as among literate peoples.[14] A desire to explain the universe plays an important rôle in religion prior to formal philosophy and modern science.

We must consider, however, the factors of natural environment as essentially static. Given man as he is they might have produced religion. Yet for the most part they have merely given content to religion just as they have to art or literature. Alone they are nothing, and the variation, modification and development of religion must be attributed to the added influence of other causes.

Psychological Factors in Religion

We may now turn from nature to man and in psychological factors we find more truly dynamic elements in religion. It is in the human personality rather than in the heavens or on the earth that we must look for the essential religious motives.

Man has been in a constant struggle with nature for the last half million years or more and in common with all forms of life he must adapt himself to his environment. Unlike the

[14] Radin, P.—*Primitive Man as a Philosopher,* Appleton, N. Y., 1927.

animals, however, he is able to create for himself an unseen environment of spirits, ghosts and gods to which he must make adjustments. He yearns for the fullness of life, for success in hunting and in war, for long life, for happiness, for freedom from disease and from other ills to which human flesh is heir. We need not assume a set of instincts that drive man to seek these varied adjustments, but, nevertheless, we must recognize that life is a struggle for the attainment of ends and that every possible means will be taken to insure success in that struggle. Given the mental development of modern man, when a failure in adjustment to a real environment takes place, there is likely to be a development of imaginary compensations. As soon as thought became possible the wish became its father.

There are perhaps three types of adjustment that man makes to the powers in the world about him; the mechanical, the coercive and the worshipful. The mechanical adjustment is the common-sense, matter-of-fact adjustment of everyday life. The savage makes his implements to be used in hunting or fishing, and prepares the skins of slain animals to provide himself with clothing. Such behavior is based upon the tacit assumption of mechanical cause-and-effect relationships in the world. This is the procedure of primitive technology and of modern science, although, as we shall see, the technology of pre-literate peoples is by no means distinct from magico-religious practices. The coercive type of adjustment is especially characteristic of magical rites. The gambler gets up to walk around the table and thus changes his luck. As will be shown later, magical rites are performed to control the weather and increase the fertility of crops. Aladdin by rubbing his lamp was able to coerce mysterious powers and beings into gratifying his heart's desire. The coercive behavior differs vaguely from the mechanical in being associated with an assertive attitude—a confidence in the power

of the wish over the world. The third type of adjustment may be called the worshipful. Here there is no assumption of rigidly controllable powers and beings. Powers or beings are assumed, but they must be approached with humility and with prayer. They must be cajoled and wooed with soft flattery and homage into granting gifts to men. The attitude here is one of reverence which is, as we have suggested, the characteristic religious attitude. Leuba, from whom this classification of behavior was partly borrowed, says, "That which differentiates religion from other forms of conduct is the kind of power upon which dependence is felt and the kind of behavior elicited by the power." [15]

It must not be assumed that the mechanical, coercive and worshipful types of behavior corresponding roughly to science, magic and religion are clearly distinct, one from the other. As will be shown, these behavior patterns merge and overlap although their differences are not completely obscured.

Emotional Factors in Religion.—Many have attempted to isolate some specific emotion, such as sympathy, a feeling of dependence, piety or adoration, as characteristic of religion. Some writers have talked at length of a religious instinct while modern psycho-analysts have attempted to define religion in terms of sex and sex desires. Dunlap approaches the psycho-analytic theory of regression when he says, "The only theory of religion which today seems to have value as a scientific working hypothesis is the theory that religion has its origin and its support in *dissatisfaction* with life, resulting from reflection on the failure of life to satisfy the primary desires of man." [16] He argues that this

[15] Leuba, J. H.—*A Psychological Study of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1912, p. 52.

[16] Dunlap, K.—*Social Psychology,* Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 1925, p. 99.

dissatisfaction leads to vicarious gratification through the conception of gods and demons who enjoy satisfaction longed for but not obtained by man and to a conception of a future life.

Both Lowie and Goldenweiser are inclined to stress the emotional core of religion; Lowie the emotional reaction to the mysterious or extraordinary and Goldenweiser the religious thrill. The latter says, "The concrete living participation of the individual in this work of supernaturalism is through the experience of *the religious thrill,* which is characteristic of all live religious and magical situations." [17] It is to be noted that this last statement is no answer to the question as to the nature of the religious emotion for it merely says that the religious emotion is the religious thrill and it is therefore tautological. It is by no means certain that any specific emotion or impulse can be isolated as the effective core of religion, although an emotional element of some kind has probably been the most constant factor in the religious complex since it first came into existence. It may be that there are traits of human nature that will make religion of some kind inevitable for the mass of people during many years to come, but such speculations lie rather in the realm of prophecy than of science.

It would be interesting and valuable to have further exact information concerning the mental life of the deaf and dumb in order to determine whether any religious beliefs develop in spite of their cultural isolation. Spencer who is eager to refute the contention of Müller that man naturally reacts in a religious way to the striking objects of nature, cites evidence to show that deaf-mutes have no innate religious tendencies. An American lady who was deaf and dumb but was instructed at a mature age alleges that "the idea that the world must have had a Creator never occurred to her, nor to

[17] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 233.

any other of several intelligent pupils, of similar age." A man having extensive experience with deaf mutes offers similar testimony.[18]

Street in a more scientific study showed that deaf-mutes do not develop spontaneously the idea of immortality.[19] Helen Keller, however, apparently developed religious attitudes with very little outside influence.

We must conclude that there is no definite religious instinct common to all men. Furthermore it should be remembered that individual differences seem to exist in regard to the emotional side of religion. Most people cannot conceive of the ecstatic experience of the mystic who seems to be exalted and brought into communion with an Infinite Being, the Ineffable. Such mystics are hardly able to describe their experiences in spite of liberal use of capital letters. Even ordinary mortals differ greatly in their responsiveness to religious stimuli. As Dunlap suggests, the reading of a creed would be likely to have more effect upon the blood pressure, rate of respiration and heart beat of one individual than of another.

The motives and emotional drives back of religion then, are those which permeate other phases of life, although, as we shall see, some emotions may be more characteristic of religion than others. Fear is one of the most important human emotions and hence plays a significant rôle in religious experience. Of the three sample religions that of the Ekoi shows the most complete expression of this emotion. Fear of evil spirits and of witchcraft haunts these people day and night as it has haunted most peoples of the world for thousands of years. One needs but to think of the

[18] Spencer, H.—*Principles of Sociology,* Appleton, N. Y., Vol. III, 1908, p. 4.

[19] Street, J. R.—*A Genetic Study of Immortality,* Pedagogical Seminar, Vol. VI, No. 3, 1899.

horrors of the Christian Hell as portrayed by preachers like Jonathan Edwards to realize the many internal stimuli to fear that man has created by his own imagination.

The emotion of love, or the tender emotion as it is called by some psychologists, is by no means absent from the emotional phase of the religious complex, even among primitive people. There seems to have been an element of love expressed in the rites of the Osage Indians. La Flesche says, "The people also learned that as a tribe they must daily appeal to Wakonda for a long and healthful life. Therefore at dawn, when they saw the reddened sky signaling the approach of the sun, men, women, and children stood in the doors of their houses and uttered their cry for divine help." [20] There was apparently a genuine sense of gratitude and devotion in addition to the self-seeking manifested. The writings of religious mystics are filled with references to the intense and intimate experience of pouring out their own souls in response to the divine love in which they feel immersed.

Sympathy is often involved and stress placed upon sympathetic spiritual communion between brethren in a faith. Among hermits and ascetics the desire for intimate communion with God excludes fellow feeling for men. The Hells as portrayed in *Kalevala,* the Finnish epic, in the *Koran,* in *The Inferno, Paradise Lost* and in the Buddhist writings show little feeling for one outside the group, the sinner or the heretic. Some religions show considerable sympathy for believers in other faiths but in general the three great monotheistic religions, Christianity, Judaism and Mohammedanism, have been most bitter toward their rivals.

Self-assertion has often been a dominant motive in religion as in other phases of life. As Dunlap points out, "In addition to positions of importance in the public gaze at-

[20] La Flesche, F.—36th Rep. Bur. of Am. Eth., p. 49.

tained by priests, medicine men, and other varieties of the clergy, and by the various types of 'church workers' in the occidental churches, there is in the more complex religions an abundance of opportunity for individuals to attain pre-eminence through the holy life; as pilgrims, penitents, dervishes, religious recluses, conspicuous church attendants, and in a still simpler way as patrons, and donors of stained glass windows, charity funds, and other appurtenances of ecclesiastical organizations." [21] Readers of Sinclair Lewis's *Elmer Gantry* will appreciate the importance of the self-assertive motive in the religious activity of the central character. This motive for religious participation is frankly admitted by "Crashing Thunder," the Winnebago whose illuminating autobiography has been edited by Radin. This Indian joined the medicine dance solely to gain prestige.[22]

On the other hand we find self-abasement an exceedingly important motive or attitude. Philosophers have proclaimed the central element in religion to be the feeling of absolute dependence which is essentially submissiveness. We find in many religions a conspicuous contempt of self. Some of the religious systems of India find nothing in man worthy of respect; even intellect is rejected in favor of trance-like contemplations.

The Christian doctrine of total depravity is a striking example of self-abhorrence witnessed by the hymnals in which are found unflattering comparisons of humans to other species with the general conclusion that only man is vile.

That play behavior may be found in religion is shown by the intimate relation of religion and ceremonialism. There is an important play element in the ceremonies of the Winnebago which bring men together to sing, dance, and

[21] Dunlap, K.—*Social Psychology,* Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 1925, p. 126.

[22] Radin, P.—*Crashing Thunder,* Appleton, N. Y., 1926, pp. 102–103.

feast as well as pray. We know of the numerous feast days among the Egyptians which furnished recreation to the participants as well as honor to the gods. Likewise among the Ekoi the secret societies, such as the Egbo society, are recreational as well as religious in motive.

Much has been written concerning the rôle of sex in religion, especially since the rise of the Freudian psychology. Thouless agrees that if the religious sentiment is rooted in a particular instinct,[23] (1) the sentiment should appear with the instinct, (2) religious language should be characteristic of that instinct, (3) religious practice should be concerned with the suppression of that instinct, and (4) there should be a tendency for religion of a highly emotional but uncontrolled type to develop into an uncontrolled normal exercise of the instinct. He finds that these tests yield positive evidence since religious conversions are most common at adolescence, religion is expressed in the language of human love, value is put upon chastity and revivals often pass into sex license.[24]

He does not, however, feel that religion is exclusively rooted in the sex instinct, for the adolescent convert has in many cases merely passed from a traditional religion to one based on personal experience. The symbolism of love used is by no means the only symbolism found in religion and although sex is often suppressed, as in the Christian religion, this is not universally true and other desires are also suppressed. Outbreaks of sex license do indeed occur but are rare and are by no means essentially characteristic of religious behavior. Thouless concludes, "To sum up the conclusions of this investigation, the evidence seems clearly to point to the sex-instinct as part of the instinctive foundation

[23] Thouless, R. H.—*An Introduction to the Psychology of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1923, p. 130.

[24] Ibid., pp. 130–134.

of religion. It lends no support to the view that this is the whole of religion." [25]

It is perhaps justifiable, however, to indicate a little more specifically the prevalence of sex symbolism in religion. The inverted triangle, the pointed oval and the crescent apparently symbolize the female, while the stable triangle, the fleur-de-lis, the spear and arrowhead symbolize the male principle. Some symbols such as the swastika represent the union of the two principles. While sex symbolism is common, religious symbols are by no means invariably sexual in nature. Dunlap says, "If we consider lilies, snow, leaves, the anchor, sowing and reaping, the path, the crown, the cross, the tree of life, Gethsemane, the Lamb of God, the purifying blood, baptism, the Eucharist, the flaming sword, the rock, the armour, the fire, the Lion of Judah, the ark of the covenant, the water of life, and an innumerable number of symbols, we find that some of these are sexual, but the vast majority refer to other desires, and only an ingenious sophistry can give a sex interpretation to them." [26]

A certain amount of sex symbolism is inevitable in view of the natural association between the idea of world creation and that of reproduction. Dunlap remarks, "We can readily understand why primitive man chose as the highest symbol of creative power the human generative organs; and why he chose sexual union as the supreme symbol, not only of the original process of creation, but also of the regeneration which gives the life to come." [27] We have already seen that the Ekoi have a symbol that may indicate the union of the sky god with the earth-mother. "In many of the fully developed religions of ancient civilization the principal gods

[25] Ibid., p. 134.

[26] Dunlap, K.—*Social Psychology,* Williams and Wilkins, Baltimore, 1925, p. 123.

[27] Ibid., p. 123.

are twain. Osiris and Isis in Egypt; Moloch and Astarte in Phœnicia; Nebo and Istar in Chaldea; Bel and Belit in Nippur; Attis and Cybele in Phrygia; Odin and Friga among the Europeans; Shive (Siva) and Durga in India." [28] While the sex element in religion is significant it is by no means dominant as the psycho-analysts would have us think.[29] The psycho-analytic concept of regression and the stress upon the psychological influence of family life are contributions which will receive later mention.

A number of other behavior trends such as curiosity and sociability might be mentioned but perhaps enough has been said to show the variety of motives involved in religious behavior. It should not be assumed that these mentioned motives, emotions and the like are definite instincts. The word instinct is now rejected as a practically meaningless term by modern social psychology. The terms used in the foregoing discussion are merely terms under which certain forms of behavior and attitudes, both largely acquired, may be classified. Furthermore, certain of the terms, as in the case of fear, may stand for data of conscious experience, known directly to ourselves and logically attributable to others, as an interpretation of their overt behavior. However, in analyzing the religion of a particular culture it is more illuminating to search out the specific desires, behavior patterns or idea-emotion systems derived from that culture than to use broad classificatory concepts such as sex, self-assertion, self-abasement, fear, sympathy and play. We find for example among the Winnebago the desires for long life, health, victory over enemies, success in hunting, offspring,

[28] Ibid., p. 125.

[29] See Moxon, C.—*Religion in the Light of Psycho-analysis,* Psychoanalytic Rev., Vol. VIII, 1921, pp. 92–98.

Swisher.—*Religion and the New Psychology.*

Cohen.—*Religion and Sex.*

and the like, merged with the religious complex. Nevertheless, in dealing with religion in general we are justified in using the broad categories mentioned.

In many cases religious systems show a projection or symbolization of a conflict of desires. Man finds in nature a struggle of winter and summer, earth and sky, high and low, good and evil, light and darkness. The Khonds of India believe that Boora Pennu, the god of light, is opposed by his wicked wife, Tari the earth goddess. The Persians conceive of a cosmic dualism between the Ormuz and Ahriman, the Egyptians of a struggle between Set and Osiris, and the Christians of warfare between God and the Devil.

There is also a common belief in a future state in which the wicked shall suffer and the good be rewarded. Such a reaction is simply one way out of a conflict, a method termed compensatory by the psychologists. For when desires are blocked by the reality of death, suffering, disappointment and injustice, imaginary compensations are developed. When mechanical means of meeting life situations fail there is very naturally a turning towards the supernatural for solace. Certainly Dunlap has expressed a profound truth when he states that religion is an expression of discontent with life.

Another way out of conflict that finds expression in religious life is known to the psychologists as regression, the turning back to a simpler level of existence when desires are blocked by stern reality. Frequently religious attitudes show a child-like dependence upon a high power and a yearning for a blissful state in which the wicked cease from troubling and the weary are at rest. Asceticism and world renunciation may be considered in many ways as regressive behavior. True, some of the ascetic rites may be active, forward-looking means to the gratification of certain desires, as when the Indian youth fasts to obtain the ear of the spirits or the Christian monk undergoes penance to insure the joys of

salvation. Nevertheless, in the Buddhist attempt of casting out of all desire and the yearning for Nirvana we have very definitely an infantile regression.[30]

The preceding discussion has shown that there is no single motive in religion and no single emotion involved. It may still be possible, however, that there is an emotional state *particularly* characteristic of the religious attitude, that is to say, one which has the most common occurrence. The analysis of the emotions involved in religious experience is bound to bring one to dangerous ground, for the only present method of approach is through introspective analysis and sympathetic examination of the behavior, motor and verbal, of others in terms of one's own subjective experience.

In spite of the volleys of criticisms that have been leveled at McDougall in recent years it is by no means certain that his analysis of emotions and sentiments, in so far as it is divorced from his instinct theory, has been greatly improved upon by any other non-behavioristic writer. The behaviorists as yet have not sharpened their methodological weapons sufficiently for any effective attack upon the problems of religious psychology.

We may agree with McDougall that awe and reverence are the principal emotions in religious life. Awe is said to be a mixture of fear, wonder and negative self-feeling or submissiveness. From earliest times, it is argued, man has experienced fear in the presence of flood and famine, pestilence, lightning, thunder, and the powerful beasts of prey. Mysterious and fearful powers were assumed to be the cause of these events and when conceived as personal they excited submissiveness and wonder. It is perhaps awe more than any other emotion which is man's reaction to the mysterious and supernatural. McDougall claims that awe of super-

[30] For the significance of regression in Christianity see, Young, K.—*The Psychology of Hymns,* Jr. Abnor. & Soc. Psychol., 1926:20, pp. 391–406.

natural powers led to rigid social control and stern enforcement of taboos, since it was thought that the community as a whole was responsible to the gods for the conduct of their members. But with the survival of certain groups, gratitude to the gods who brought success adds tender emotion to the sentiment of awe and converts it to reverence. We need not accept McDougall's argument from an assumed social evolution but his psychological analysis seems to have as much claim to validity as any other. He says, "Suppose that the power that excites awe is also one that we have reason to regard as beneficent, one that, while capable of annihilating us in a moment, yet works for our good, sustains and protects us, one that evokes our gratitude. Awe then becomes compounded with gratitude and we experience the highly compound emotion of reverence. Reverence is the religious emotion *par excellence;* few merely human powers are capable of exciting reverence, this blend of wonder, fear, gratitude, and negative self-feeling. Those human beings who inspire reverence, or who are by custom and convention considered to be entitled to inspire it, usually owe their reverence character to their being regarded as the ministers and dispensers of Divine power." [31]

We have indicated agreement with this position in the definition already given of religion. That portion of the culture pattern which all would agree upon as essentially religious has reverence as the more essential part of its emotional phase. As the pattern becomes less distinctly religious and merges into magic, superstition, ceremonialism, etc., the emotional attitude may vary through awe to fear or be replaced by the elation of the self-confident magician thrilled by his control of supernatural powers.

Before concluding the discussion of the emotional factors

[31] McDougall, W.—*An Introduction to Social Psychology,* J. W. Luce, Boston, 13th ed. 1918, p. 136.

in religion it should be stressed once more that these factors come into play at times of personal or social crisis and thus give a heightened religious experience. In time of war or other disaster the hearts of men are stirred to seek Divine guidance, protection and sanction. It is interesting to note in this connection the manner in which during the last war the patriotic and religious sentiments were united and mutually reinforced. Birth and death have always been the occasion of religious rites as have also sickness, marriage, and adolescence. The emotions aroused by these experiences are carried over to the religious sphere and reinforce a more distinctly religious emotion.[32]

It should be noted that men do not always wait for some crisis or natural development of emotional states that yield religious experience but are inclined to create the emotional state by artificial means. Among the Winnebago the medicine dance ceremony led to artificial stimulation of the emotions of the participant. The Indians in Virginia used intoxicating drinks in the initiation of their young men, keeping them in a raving condition for many days. "Gradually they were permitted to return to sanity, but not until they had been brought back to the village 'still wild and crazy,' and tested to make sure that all remembrance of their former life had been destroyed." [33]

Tribes in the gulf states used similar means and in Peru the priests induced ecstasy in themselves by a narcotic drink called "tonca." In Greece the worship of Dionysos was

[32] As Van Gennep has shown, religious experience often means the transition from a period of emotional depression into renewed vitality. Initiation is a typical example of a socialization process connected with such a transition. Matrimony, parenthood, birth and death are likewise the occasion of rites involving spiritual transitions and transformation of a similar nature. See *Les Rites de Passage,* Nourry, Paris, 1909.

[33] Stratton, G. M.—*Psychology of the Religious Life,* Allen, London, 1918, p. 109.

associated with drunkenness while in India use was made of a drink called Soma, offered to the gods and partaken of by men. Tobacco has often been used to induce abnormal emotional states. The Scythians are said to have carried on purification rites during which they threw hemp seed on red-hot stones until the men fairly shouted in their intoxication. Often the life of a divinity was felt to be present in a plant or fruit and by taking this into his own body the worshiper became possessed of the spiritual power there resident. Long continued dancing has a place in the list of means used to produce emotional states. The Bull Dance of the Mandan, the Corn Dance of the Iroquois and the Ghost Dance which spread from the Paiutes are well known examples. Among the Winnebago the medicine dance ceremony led to artificial stimulation of the emotions of the participant. Stratton mentions that, "In Guiana the priest or sorcerer was prepared for his office by violent dancing and fasting and drugging, continued over several days; when he fell to the ground as dead, he was artificially revived, and the rite continued with such severity that the mental and nervous disturbance in him was extreme." [34]

Thus we realize that the emotional factors in religion are constant elements perhaps far older than the actual beliefs in gods and spirits. Awe, inspired by mysterious power, is perhaps the basic fact in the magico-religious culture pattern, although it shades into reverence when the pattern is more purely religious.

Intellectual Factors Creating a Supernatural World. —We may now turn to the origin of the conceptual phase of religion in certain intellectual problems that present themselves even to primitive man. The significance of emotion has been indicated and we must recognize that emotion often inspires belief rather than the reverse. The besetting sin

[34] Ibid., p. 114.

of many anthropologists, namely, the over-intellectualization of mental processes of pre-literate peoples, must be avoided. We have seen, however, that along with the awe that is inspired by impressive objects and forces in nature there is presented an intellectual problem as to the origin of things, the causes lying back of natural phenomena. It has been hinted that it is only natural for man to assume a world creator somewhat like himself and to think of causes of thunder, lightning, etc., as personal since the events most intimate to him such as death of an enemy, the provision of food and protection, the making of implements, the production of children, etc., are due to the personal will and effort of himself or his fellows.

The tendency to personification is strong and the urge to explain is exceedingly powerful especially on the part of certain unique individuals. It is exceedingly unlikely, however, that man actually did create a complex supernatural world of gods, ghosts, and spirits *merely* as an answer to the intellectual problem presented to him by natural environment. Subjective dream experience played a part, also desire and emotion. The question of the single or multiple origin of gods will be taken up in a later chapter. Here we are concerned with dreams, visions and other phenomena that may give rise to the idea of a ghost or soul.

The Present Status of the Spencer-Tylor Theory.— There is no need for presenting the evidence that the idea of a soul was derived from phenomena of sleep, death, trance, possession, dreams and visions, in any detail since the arguments of Tylor and Spencer have already been reviewed. We may agree with Lowie when he says, speaking of Tylor, "His theory is avowedly a psychological interpretation pure and simple, but inasmuch as it not only explains the empirical observations, but operates exclusively with facts like death, dreams and visions, all of which

demonstrably exercise a strong influence on the minds of primitive men, it must be conceded to have a high degree of probability. I, for one, certainly have never encountered any rival hypothesis that could be considered a serious competitor." [35]

This favorable attitude in regard to the Spencer-Tylor theory by no means applies to any portion of the theory save that which derives the idea of ghosts and souls from dreams and visions. Even Tylor, though less of a dogmatic evolutionist than Spencer, attempts to derive *all* spiritual beings from souls, ignoring the fact that nature and creator gods may have had another origin and that a fetish object might contain impersonal magic power rather than a spirit. Goldenweiser, less friendly than Lowie, says, "The very idea of a double as the first form of spirit is questionable, for multiplicity of spirits or souls of individuals is so commonly encountered among even the most primitive communities that it may well be assumed that in many instances, if not in all, a plurality of souls preceded the one soul." [36] In regard to Spencer's theory of ancestor worship he says, "The ethnographic evidence decidedly contradicts the assumption that ancestor worship was the earliest form of worship, for nowhere is the cult of ancestors found among most primitive tribes; while its more developed forms do not make their appearance until relatively high civilizations are reached, such as those of Polynesia and Melanesia. Full-fledged ancestor worship, in fact, does not arise until a social basis is provided for it by that hypertrophy of the family instinct which lies at the root of the ancestral cult of ancient China and Japan. And it is, of course, quite obvious that religion seized upon man's relation to inanimate nature, to plants, and above all, to animals, without waiting

[35] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 108.
[36] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 332.

until an obliging ghost appeared in animal, plant or other material disguise." [37]

In spite of these objections the dream-vision theory stripped of association with less valid doctrines such as evolutionary ancestor worship is valuable in explaining the creation of a supernatural world. Some support for this theory is found in the fact that children, even adults, occasionally mistake dreams for reality. This is not unnatural, for after all, dreams are immediate data, "known by acquaintance," as Mr. Bertrand Russell would say, and when distinguished from what we call reality, this insight may be due to a critical attitude derived from elders. Leuba says, "What we know of children leads rather to the opinion that were a company of them, including some of the imaginative ones, left to themselves, they would probably develop a belief in invisible things and enter into some kind of relation with them." [38] He also tells of an Indian who, bitten in a dream by a snake, insisted upon treatment after awakening, and of the acceptance by Australian natives of the reality of dream experiences as adventures of the disembodied soul. Furthermore, he cites the oft-quoted example reported by Im Turn of an Indian who bore him resentment after a dream in which he had been forced to perform excessive toil, and of others who, having dreamed of being beaten, insisted on much rubbing of the bruised parts of their bodies. Of course the widespread belief that dreams are due to departure of the soul does not prove that the idea of the soul originated from dream phenomena but at least it strengthens such an hypothesis.

The rôle of the waking vision is probably equally great in leading to the soul idea and the objection often made

[37] Ibid., p. 333.

[38] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality,* Open Court, Chicago, 2nd ed., 1921, p. 54.

that such experiences are too rare to have any effect is not valid since the few unstable imaginative individuals would transmit the belief to others once it developed in their own minds. Furthermore, there is ample evidence to show that there are many areas of the world in which the vision is by no means a rare experience but rather one which almost every individual seeks to attain at some time in his life. We have already referred to the guardian spirit concept among the Winnebago but it may also be found throughout the entire continent of North America. In many cases it involves isolation at puberty, ceremonial purification and the acquisition of a name, a power or a song from a spirit in a vision. Mrs. Benedict says, "The animals and things which become guardian spirits were almost limitless, including the weather, dwarfs, the nipple of a gun, horseflies, kettles, and objects referring to death." [39] She shows that the manifestations of the concept vary greatly from place to place. "The guardian spirit may descend by inheritance, by purchase, or by adoption in three neighboring tribes, and in the fourth be obtained exclusively by torture. It may be sought by an isolated fast, or induced by a jimson weed decoction, or regarded as essentially unsought. It may be undertaken at puberty or by mature men. It may have entered into a close relationship with the social organization, or it may stand conspicuously outside." [40]

There is, however, a constant element and one that has bearing on our present discussion of the religious significance of hallucinations. Our authority states, "I have spoken of the social recognition of the vision as the fundamental and typical religious fact of North America. This is true in two senses: (1) It is a more inclusive concept than the

[39] Benedict, R. F.—*The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America,* Memoirs of the Am. Anth. Ass., Vol. XXIX, p. 11.

[40] Ibid., p. 19.

guardian spirit in areas where they are both found; and (2) it is found in areas and tribes where the guardian spirit has been reinterpreted out of existence in our common understanding of the term." [41] "The vision-complex, then, formalized into definite tribal patterns as to content and means of inducement, is enormously the largest and most basic concept of Indian religion." [42] This conclusion made on the basis of a very careful survey has some significance. It is of course possible that the ideas of ghosts and spirits arose quite independently of any vision experience but the preponderance of evidence seems to indicate that there is a causal relationship.

Other Factors in the Origin of the Ghost Soul Idea. —Leuba discusses other factors that may have contributed to the idea of a ghost or soul and two of these he places on almost the same level of importance as dreams and visions. For one thing, he suggested that under stress of great emotion vivid memory images of a dead person might be projected and interpreted as an actual presence. This was done deliberately in ancient China by fasting for three days with the mind fixed upon an ancestor. He does not suggest that such a confusion is a common thing but says, "That which I suggest is that under specific conditions, for instance death and the presence of the corpse, memory-images may be so vivified as to be taken for external realities." [43] Furthermore, he cites cases in which people have had a sense of the presence of a dead person without any perceptions, visual or otherwise, being involved. He feels that the causes just considered of belief in survival after death are supplemented by certain naïve convictions, innate

[41] Ibid., p. 28.

[42] Ibid., p. 43.

[43] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality,* Open Court, Chicago, 2nd ed., 1921, p. 48.

yearnings and by diverse observations which we may now briefly consider.

The natural endlessness of man is a point of view held by many primitive peoples. They consider that man is not naturally subject to death and explain by elaborate myths how death first entered into the world. "Life implies its own continuation. The more intensely one lives, the more difficult it is to think of destruction, and the more preposterous that idea seems when it chances to gain access to the mind." [44] The natural aversion to the cessation of life is, perhaps, one of the forces supporting a belief in the continuation of life after death when once that conception has been formulated. Leuba, however, does not think that any philosophical contemplation of the horror of death led directly to the notion of immortality, for the nature of the after life as it is usually conceived among pre-literates is not sufficiently alluring to suggest any such escape mechanism. The observation of metamorphosis among plants and animals and the waxing and waning of the heavenly bodies have been suggested as inspiring the belief in human immortality, but such philosophical observations probably came long after the idea of a soul surviving death.

Perhaps slightly more importance may be attached to the resemblance of certain individuals to dead relatives as suggesting reincarnation of the soul of the dead man. Such similarity is perhaps of less significance, in view of the fact that there is sometimes resemblance to a living relative whose soul is not yet at liberty to be reincarnated.

In a brilliant and original book, Andrew Lang has offered another cause of belief in a supernatural world; namely, the occurrence of supernatural phenomena. He argues that both anthropology and psychology have taken a dogmatic and narrow attitude toward phenomena of clair-

[44] Ibid., p. 63.

voyance, telepathy, crystal gazing and the like, rejecting evidence of a type which would be readily accepted if it fitted in with the theory of mechanical causation. He shows that certain things such as hypnotism, faith healing, etc., which were once denied existence by the scientific world must now be accepted as facts, so that science thus already has had cause to repent of its dogmatic attitude toward so-called miraculous events.

From a number of different tribes anecdotes are presented suggesting supernatural methods of acquiring knowledge, opening the gates of distance, as he calls it. A Zulu seer, for example, described with remarkable accuracy the fate of eight men several hundred miles away.[45] Such men, Lang argues, are not accepted uncritically by their fellows as possessed of a supernormal faculty but are tested by being required to locate hidden objects. Lang is inclined to think that in this respect savages have noted circumstances ignored by psychologists which do not fit into the ordinary materialistic hypothesis.

Furthermore, crystal visions are known over almost the entire world. They are used by American Indians. The Polynesian priest looks into a pool to see who has taken certain stolen goods. Similar practices are noted among the Apaches, the Zulus, the Incas, the Australians and others, as well as among contemporary civilized peoples. Among the latter, Lang thinks there is some evidence of at least thought transference, although he is rather evenly balanced between belief and disbelief in supernatural powers. He points out that a few real successes in a savage tribe would establish the reputation of the seer and says, "The phenomena are certainly of a kind to encourage the savage theory of the wandering soul. How else, thinkers would

[45] Lang, Andrew.—*The Making of Religion,* Longmans, Green, London, 2nd ed., 1900, p. 69.

say, can the seer visit the distant place or person, and correctly describe men and scenes which, in the body, he never saw?" [46]

It is agreed that the vision is important in primitive thought in leading to the idea of a soul, but its importance would be increased if the vision corresponded to events that could not be known of or foretold by ordinary means, for such a coincidence would certainly suggest the projection of a spirit. Lang does not himself believe in spiritualism but feels there may really be something to the common belief that a vision is associated with death or other crisis. Something is also made of the phenomenon known to many peoples as spirit possession which includes (1) the persistent, and consistent acting out of a new personality which calls itself a spirit, (2) the possession of knowledge and intellectual power not owned by the patient in his normal state, nor explainable on the pathological hypothesis, and (3) a change of moral character in the patient. Here, as in regard to divination by use of the divining rod or other means, Lang remains skeptical and yet open to conviction that something more than fraud or ordinary mechanical causation is involved. In general his thesis is that the earliest men may have had "psychic" powers more highly developed than in the present day and that religion had as one of its roots an awareness on the part of the savage of a supernatural not altogether based on illusion. The value of Lang's hypothesis will depend upon further developments in psychic research. As yet no discoveries have been made of telepathy, clairvoyance or "possession" on the part of mediums that are convincing to any great number of scientific men. Nevertheless, to Lang is due some appreciation for pointing out the narrowness of many scientists and stress-

[46] Ibid., p. 103.

ing the need for observation and experiment rather than dogmatic denial.[47]

Social Factors in Religion

The Family.—We may now turn briefly to the influence of social factors upon religion, beginning with the influence of the family. It is interesting to note how often in religions other than the Christian, God is referred to as the father. The frequent worship of an earthmother and of various fertility goddesses, constitutes a further extension of the parental idea. Family patterns are often projected into the heavens and the gods assembled in family groups. In one sense the Isis-Osiris-Horus group of Egypt was a symbol of an ideal family. The search of Isis for the torn body of her husband and the heroic battle of Horus with Set, his father's enemy and slayer, are portrayed in the favorite Egyptian myth.

"The Osiris myth expressed those hopes and aspirations and ideals which were closest to the life and the affections of this great people. Isis was the noblest embodiment of wifely fidelity and maternal solicitude, while the highest ideals of filial devotion found expression in the story of Horus. About this group of father, mother, and son, the affectionate fancy of the common folk wove a fair fabric of family ideals which rise high above such concepts elsewhere. In the Osiris myth the institution of the family found its earliest and most exalted expression in religion, a glorified reflection of earthly ties among the gods. The catastrophe and the ultimate triumph of the righteous cause introduced here in a nature-myth are an impressive revelation of the

[47] It is interesting to note that Leuba, a critical and well informed thinker, is forced to accept the probability of telepathic communication. See *Belief in God and Immortality,* pp. 164–165.

profoundly moral consciousness with which the Egyptian at a remote age contemplated the world." [48]

We find very commonly in religion the longing for the mother's protection and care and many yearning souls have found refuge in the arms of a Mother Church. The psychoanalysts have made much of such mechanisms. Miller argues that the normal individual goes through four phases of emotional development. The boy experiences an attachment to the mother, emulation and fear of the father, interest in playfellows and, finally, love for some member of the opposite sex. For the girl there is attachment to the mother, to playmates, to the father during adolescence and, finally, to a love mate. Often, however, there is a fixation of the child at one level, as in the case of Peter Pan who did not want to grow up but preferred to live in an unreal world of adventure with his fellows, though haunted continually by a mother image. Unlike Wendy, he was unable to go out to one of the other sex on an adult level. Miller points out that certain types of religion are forms of regression to the mother fixation. He says that, "the man to whom God is primarily a Divine Mother" makes his religion serve a selfish end, is himself dependent, evasive of ethical responsibility, desirous of protection, suggestible and lacking in broad human sympathy.[49] He sees the father type of religion, however, as quite different. "Here it is not the easy way nor yet the safe road, but the path to power that attracts. The struggles of early puberty in which the boy tries alternately to resist paternal authority and to identify himself with it, are clearly recognizable. The Puritans, the Covenanters and the Lutherans may be taken as examples.

[48] Breasted, J. H.—*Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt,* Scribners, N. Y., 1912, p. 37.

[49] Miller, H. C.—*The New Psychology and the Preacher,* Seltzer, N. Y., 1924, pp. 126–130.

God was to them primarily a source of power expressed either in their resistance of persecution or in their religious tyranny. Theirs was a God of battle—Draconic God—essentially virile, and perhaps more than any other type of Christianity, this of the Church Militant lent itself to tribal purposes." [50]

Martin, likewise, sees in religion the influence of the family operating through the mechanisms of regression, conflict, obsession, rationalization, etc. God stands for the father image but is lacking sexual characteristics and is, like the father, an object both of love and fear. The normal child egoistically desires the entire love of both parents and is shocked by his discovery of the special sex bond that unites them. The Eden story, thinks Martin, is symbolic of the acquisition of sex knowledge, and the individual like the race yearns for a return to a golden age of simplicity and ignorance. Shocked by sex knowledge, the growing child projects the father into the universe as a god who is like the father before his sexual rôle has been discovered. Martin points out that we find religious systems with a Father-God where the father is dominant in real life, as shown by Christianity, Judaism, Islamism.

Martin also undertakes to explain the sense of sin, which is an important fact in religion, in terms of family relationships. As the child approaches adolescence he begins to discover in himself the same force which childish egoism led him to abolish from the image of the parents. He feels, therefore, that his own maturity is in conflict with the infantile father image (God) through which he now adjusts himself to the world. This means inner struggle, and redemption is, in a sense, merely making it up with the father, or rather, the good father, for the father image is split into a good father in the presence of whom he feels himself

[50] Ibid., pp. 130–131.

a sinner, and an evil father (the Devil) from whom he seeks to be delivered. Martin says, "What the religious interest strives to do is to preserve intact an infantile image of the ideal father, perfect and 'pure' and sinless, and at the same time render this image tolerant and 'forgiving' of the existence in the believer of the very 'sinful nature' in himself which his infantile egoism struck out of the image of the perfect one. Hence, psychologically speaking, reconciliation with the father means reconciliation of our infantile jealousy with the fact of our own maturity." [51]

The sin in the world is primarily the projection of the sin in the believer's own heart. Martin also points out the unconscious identification of the church with the Mother. He asks, "Is it possible that the mother image so carefully repressed in all that appears in the symbolism of the experience of redemption emerges now as the Church Herself? When this reconciliation is achieved in the feeling of redemption, that which was all the while an underlying motive —return to the mother—may now emerge in disguised and sublimated form. Membership in the church is thus the symbolic realization of this wish of the childish ego—the wish to return to the mother." [52] In the wish for the restored and happy religious community in which there is security and compensation there is really an imaginary return to the mother image according to this stimulating yet unilateral psycho-analytic theory.

[51] Martin, E. D.—*The Mystery of Religion,* Harper, N. Y., 1924, p. 149. Jones in similar vein concludes that "the religious life represents a dramatization on a cosmic plane of the emotions, fears and longings which arise in the child's relation to his parents."

Jones, E.—*The Psychology of Religion,* Brit. Jour. Med. Psychol., Vol. VI, 1927, p. 207.

Flügel, J. C.—*The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family,* International Psycho-Analytical Press, London, 1921, Chapt. XIII.

[52] Ibid., p. 227.

The State.—It is obvious that the state as well as the family is reflected in religion. It is sufficient here, however, to recall the frequent deification of Egyptian kings and the attributing of royal attributes to the gods. It is well known that in the Old Testament, God shows essentially the characteristics of a tribal chief and in the New Testament the phrase "Kingdom of God" is used time and again. Frazer has given many cases in which the rôles of king and priest are identified. The king is often the magician who is able to control the weather and to insure the quality of the crops, although in his declining years he may be killed to allow his magic power to enter into a younger and more vigorous person before it has been weakened by the aging body in which it resides.[53]

Social Inheritance of Religion.—Perhaps the most significant influence of the social factor is upon the individual believer. If we knew completely the subtle psychological process by which a child appropriates the beliefs, sentiments and habits of his culture, the story of religion would, for the most part, be told. A number of writers, notably King, Robertson Smith and, to a lesser degree, Durkheim, see in ritual the essence of religion. Certainly, given certain group practices growing out of the everyday activities of men, it is easy to see how these practices would become stereotyped and ceremonial in nature and yet sometimes richer in emotional value. The young child must be greatly impressed by ceremonials and inclined to carry them on with even greater fervor upon becoming an adult.[54]

A knowledge of this process of cultural inheritance may even throw some light on religious origins for often the

[53] Frazer, J. G.—*The Golden Bough,* Macmillan, N. Y., abridged ed., 1922, pp. 264–289.

[54] Talbot gives an interesting report of the secret societies among the Ekoi children and their delight in solemn ceremonies of their own in imitation of their elders.

transmission is itself the origin of slight innovations, just as an oft-told tale is modified from generation to generation. Almost every group has its own ceremonials whether it be the Medicine Dance of the Winnebago or the initiation ceremonies of the Australian aborigines. The younger members of the group will imitate the motor habits of the adults in offering certain sacrifices, making certain gestures and the like. This is done automatically as a yawn is imitated due to a conditioned response, submissively, to avoid being conspicuous, assertively, to identify themselves with some prestige-bearing individual, or rationally, in order to attain some blessing which they have been taught to believe follows from the performance of certain acts.

It is, however, an emotional attitude that lies at the heart of the religious complex and this attitude is largely engendered in a social situation. Durkheim in pointing this out has hit upon a fundamental truth. Even in the staid and non-revivalistic sects of the Christian church a process of emotional conditioning takes place. An emotion associated with one object or situation is aroused by an object or situation that has something in common with the original emotional stimulus. From birth onwards people are of primary interest in the life of the child as a source of food, protection, reward and punishment. It is therefore natural that a crowd of people should be an emotional stimulus. Attitudes of awe and reverence originally directed toward the superior size and power of adults are aroused in the crowd situation. Sympathy, as a process of feeling with others, is made possible by common emotional experiences in the past. It is therefore inevitable that the child at church or at other ceremonies undergoes an emotional experience. The reverent or exalted attitudes of others are taken over. The presence of impressive adults inspires a certain amount of awe. Often there is music, the beating of drums, the whirring of the bull-roarer, or other auditory emotional

stimuli. Perhaps fragrant incense and rich costumes are present to appeal to other senses. Certainly the very presence of the crowd stirred together by the total situation must have a cumulative effect upon the individual so that he is strangely moved, carried out of himself and given a sense of participation in higher things. If by means of cumulative circular social responses the crowd is worked into a frenzy as in the Corrobbori or in Christian religious revivals, the effect upon a child is proportionally greater. Objects and persons that are part of the total situation become sacred because they arouse some of the emotion called out by other prior objects and by previous total situations. The stained glass windows of a church owe some of their impressiveness to the organ music with which they have been associated: the cross, statues of saints, the person of priest or clergyman, all acquire a certain sacredness, having been repeatedly a part of an awe-inspiring situation. Thus the crowd is projected into objects making them sacred and Durkheim's theory receives support from the modern principle of the conditioned response.

Not only is the social factor important in building up the religious attitude but there is also a very real desire for identification with the group on the part of mature individuals. Durkheim again has much truth on his side when he argues for a church of some kind as essential to religion. Group religious activity meets this fundamental need for establishing confidence in the universe and gaining ego enhancement. Again and again in the Winnebago ceremonies the leader of the feast refers to the strength and cheer that has been brought by the guests and his renewed confidence that their prayers will be answered.[55]

[55] A host concludes, "Your life is naturally weak and you can only be strengthened by the counsel and advice of brave men. Truly you have counciled with me and given me enough to live on. I thank you for the speeches you have delivered, for it is life to me. It is good, I greet you all." Radin, op. cit., p. 328.

The social factor like other factors is of slight importance in itself, but given the natural environment as a source of danger and mystery, human intelligence, and human emotions and impulses, we have influences that play an important part in shaping and maintaining the religious complex. It should be remembered that once religion originates, the sheer inertia of culture gives it continuity just as the ancient prayer for protection against the fury of the Northmen continues down to recent times, long after the need which brought it into existence had passed.

The Animistic World

The preceding discussion of intellectual factors peopling the world with supernatural beings, has been couched in rather general terms as was the discussion of Tylor's theory. It would be well therefore at this point to set forth some instances of the well-nigh universal belief in spiritual beings, whether ghosts, souls, spirits, demons or gods and thus gain a glimpse into the animistic world.

We may cite the variety of spiritual beings represented in the Winnebago religion, some of them local spirits, others, spirits of animals, still others holding the position of gods as, for example, Sun, Moon, Earth, Thunderbird, Morning Star, etc. Earthmaker is not only a god but the creator of all things. We have also the belief in malicious ghosts among the Ekoi, the spirits in trees and animals, the Juju objects containing more or less personal spirits. Among these people the same word is used for both ghost and soul, and the soul is more or less identified with the breath and with the shadow. Although an Ekoi is supposed to have two minds he is considered to have but one soul. It is difficult to reconcile this last proposition with the assumed possession of animals by a human soul. Not only humans

and animals but also inanimate objects such as trees, rocks and weapons are assumed to have souls, or at least astral forms which are visible in dreams. We learn that spirits are supposed to go to another world, perhaps like that of the ghost towns so often described in the folk tales, but those who have died a violent death wander around, often near their graves. It is apparent that these facts are quite typical of the animistic system as described by Tylor and others.

The Egyptians also, in spite of their Pantheon of great gods, moved in a well-populated animistic world. It is difficult to determine the exact nature of the Egyptian conception of the soul. Apparently there was some vital principle assumed to exist in man, whether called *du, khu* or *ka,* as by the older writers such as Sayce and Erman. According to Breasted this soul or vital principle was thought to be converted into a *ba,* or soul-spirit at death while the *ka* was conceived of as a guardian spirit.[56] The ghosts or soul-spirits of the dead were provided for by an elaborate system of sacrifices and offerings, in some cases with the hope that they would intercede with the gods on behalf of the donors.[57]

The dead beings were regarded as akin to gods and possessed of transcendental intelligence and power. The spirit of the Pharaoh could come from the depths of his pyramid through hundreds of feet of stone and receive the homage and offerings of priests. Statues of the dead were erected by the tombs or later in a temple separated from the tomb and were believed to be inhabited at certain times by the spirit of the deceased.

The spirits were supposed to be able to enter into the bodies of the living and thus to cause disease and death.

[56] Breasted, J. H.—Op. cit., pp. 54–59.

[57] Paton, L. B.—*Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1921, pp. 156–199.

We have an account of an officer who lost his wife and falling ill soon afterwards wrote a letter which he deposited on her grave reminding her of his kind treatment and proper observation of mourning rites at her death and reproaching her for sending the sickness upon him.[58] Countless exorcisms are recorded for driving away malignant ghosts.

It is perhaps worthwhile to indicate briefly the similar beliefs held by other peoples in order to give some impression of the universality of animistic conceptions. There is antiquity as well as universality suggested by the fact, cited by Paton, that cave-dwellers of the Neolithic age, "buried their dead in caves; or when these were lacking, made dolmens, or box-like structures of stone slabs to receive them. In the stone that covered the entrance a small hole was drilled to allow the spirit access to the tomb and egress from it. The corpse was placed in the contracted position of an unborn child, with its head resting upon its knees, thus perhaps expressing the belief that death is birth into another life. In the caves of Mentone the bones are painted red with oligist or cinnabar, probably as a substitute for blood, the idea being widespread that blood infuses new energy into the dead. In the Neolithic caves of France the skulls of the dead are trepanned. Whether this was intended to facilitate the entrance and egress of the spirit, or to make an amulet for the survivors, it bears witness to some sort of cult of the dead." [59]

The peoples speaking Aryan languages all have animistic conceptions and conceive of the soul as breath, wind, vapor, smoke, shadow, power, etc. In Greek, *psuche* like *pneuma* means breath or life and *animae* is used for spirits of the dead. *Animus* is soul and is identical with Greek *anemos,* wind. The Romans had a curious conception of the genius

[58] Ibid., p. 164.

[59] Ibid., p. 2.

or guardian spirit born with a man, who shared his experiences in life and in death; this being a very similar conception to that of the Egyptian ka. Everywhere among the so-called Indo-European peoples, including the Persians, Hindus, Slav, Scandinavians, etc., as well as Greeks and Latins, we find the same general conception of the spirits of the dead as immaterial and possessed of vaporous or shadowy forms that resemble those in which they appeared on earth. They required food, hence the placing of food and offerings on the graves, and ancestor worship. Spirits were believed to show themselves in winds, good and bad. In Greece, "the Harpies were destructive wind-spirits who wrecked ships and snatched away men's souls to Hades," [60] while among the Scandinavians, the Valkyries played a similar rôle as snatchers of souls, though in this case bearing them to a happier realm. In both India and Rome statues of the dead were kept in which to receive the spirits of the noble dead. Spirits were thought to possess trees, as is illustrated by the story of Æneas reproached by the soul of Polydorus when he uproots a tree growing from the grave. Spirits were thought to possess living men. In the Avesta of the Persians all diseases were represented as being sent by the evil being, Ahriman, while among the Greeks the keres or ghosts are described as bringing diseases to men. Pandora was the earth-goddess who released the spirits of the dead from their graves. Throughout ancient Europe there was fear of the wrath of the ancestral spirits if rites should be omitted. Here also spirits are believed to possess living men.

Dreams were thought by Greeks and Romans to indicate temporary possession by the spirits of the dead, and mediums acting as oracles were thought to be inspired by a god. Vergil says of the Cumaean Sibyl, "At length, no

[60] Ibid., p. 74.

longer submitting herself to Phoebus, the prophetess rages furiously in her cavern, if so be that she may succeed in flinging off the mighty god from her bosom. All the more he plies her frenzied mouth, subduing her wild heart, and fashions her to his will to be constraint." [61] The ravings of the insane among the Celts were supposed to have prophetic value. "Among the Teutons we find trolls, witches and wise women, all of whom were mediums controlled by spirits. They worked themselves up into the hypnotic trance by incantations, and then either fared forth on the wings of the storm to visit distant places, or were inspired to reveal hidden things and to predict the future. The Norse Völves were professional mediums who enjoyed high esteem." [62]

There are many accounts of spirits that appear to men in bodily form. "They appear in the forms that they wore on earth, or with small, thick, red bodies and horrible faces with lion's teeth. They come to blows with men, and carry them off to remote places. They assault women, and women are reported to have become with child by them." [63] Among the Persians a similar group of spirits were known as daevas, and among the Greeks those who met with an untimely death, those who met with violent deaths, and the unburied dead became horrible spirit creatures. The spirits of the dead were assumed to possess superhuman knowledge and in some cases were able to bless the living. In general, however, the effect of animistic beliefs was to spread terror rather than to inspire confidence.

Among the early Semites we find similar animistic notions. Man was conceived to consist of two elements, flesh

[61] Quoted Paton, L. B.—*Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity,* Ænead VI 45 ff.

[62] Ibid., p. 85.

[63] Ibid., p. 86.

and breath, the latter supposedly adhering in some way in the blood, thus causing a taboo upon the eating of slaughtered animals for fear that men might be possessed by the spirits of these animals. By all the Semitic peoples the soul was supposed to live on after death, those who met with untimely or unhappy ends being likely to return and take revenge upon the living. The spirits of the dead could enter into the stones placed upon the graves and could also enter into animals. "Spirits could also take possession of living men. The Arabs believed that while the soul was absent in sleep the Jinn could easily occupy its body. They caused all manner of diseases and insanity." [64] Ghosts appeared in houses and could occasionally, as in the case of Balaam's ass, be seen by animals more readily than by men. "The ancient Semites agreed with other primitive peoples in thinking that with the loss of the body the soul lost many of its powers. Disembodied spirits were conceived as feeble, intangible beings, bereft of the sense-perceptions that belong to the physical organism. The names 'breath,' 'wind,' 'shadow,' 'echo,' that were applied to ghosts suggested their ethereal nature." [65] Burial was considered a necessity without which the spirit could not rest, so that there was a motive in destroying the bodies of dead enemies.

In China we find animistic doctrines fully as well developed as in other countries. The earliest word for soul seems to have meant return, another meant stretch out and still another, breath, as among other primitive races. There seems to have been no doubt concerning the existence of some sort of life beyond the grave but the conceptions were often vague. Confucius when asked about death answered, "While you do not know life, how can you know death?" [66]

[64] Ibid., p. 203. [65] Ibid., p. 205.

[66] See Clennell, W. J., *Historical Development of Religion in China*, Dutton, N. Y., 1917, p. 47.

Nevertheless he enjoined the cult of the dead upon his disciples.

The general opinion seemed to be that the dead entered upon a higher form of existence, and utmost care had to be taken to obtain a favorable use of their power. A tablet of stone was prepared at death with the name of the deceased written on it in the belief that the spirit of the dead would take up his abode in the stone. The possession of other inanimate objects was the basis of various forms of divination. For example, a tortoise shell was held over a fire and the form of the cracks that appeared was supposed to be controlled by the spirits and to be a significant omen of the future; or lots were thrown into the air in the presence of ancestral tablets. Spirit writing, by the entrance of a spirit into a kind of stick which wrote on paper or on the sand, was in use for thousands of years.

Spirits were supposed to be able to enter into animals and a man-eating tiger was thought to be one possessed by a spirit. "Animals which inhabit graves are naturally regarded as possessed by spirits of the dead. Such are wolves, hyenas, jackals, foxes, rats, bats, owls and serpents." [67] The souls of loving couples were said to enter into the bodies of pairs of ducks of a species noted for their conjugal affection. A number of stories are cited of spirits entering into the bodies of the dead and of being reborn in new bodies. One learned man remembered a former existence which was terminated when he fell into a well at the age of nine, and during his childhood sought out a ring which he had owned during his former existence.

Not only the bodies but also the souls of living men might be possessed by spirits, according to universal belief in China from earliest times. Ghosts might enter into the

[67] Paton, op. cit., p. 25.

bodies of murderers and compel them to confess or drive them to madness. Spirits might enter into candidates for literary honors during their examination and give them superhuman intelligence or so bewilder them that they made utter failures. Sometimes a person acted as an impersonator at a feast and was supposed to be possessed by the spirits of his ancestors who spoke through him to those present. Mediums, known as *wu,* were supposed to be able to call up the spirits of the dead and be possessed by them so that they experienced convulsions, uttered prophecies, read the minds of others and performed miracles of all kinds. Not only were professional seers able to see the ghosts of the departed but such an experience might happen to anyone. Ghosts of those who were beheaded showed themselves headless. Often ability to appear was thought to depend upon the amount of vitality possessed by the ghost. It was thought that injuries to the body would mean corresponding injuries to the soul after death, hence the worst misfortune that might befall a man was to have his body destroyed or injured and the mutilation of a corpse was severely punished.

It is perhaps justifiable to describe briefly here the animistic thought of a group of pre-literate people who have been intensively studied in recent times. According to Malinowski, among the Dobu Islanders of Melanesia, "The dread of sorcery is enormous, and when the natives visit distant parts, this dread is enhanced by the additional awe of the unknown and foreign. Beside the flying witches, there are, in Dobu, men and women who, by their knowledge of magical spells and rites, can inflict disease and cause death." [68] The people of Dobu have a belief in a double soul—one shadowy and impersonal, surviving the bodily

[68] Malinowski, B.—*Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* Dutton, N. Y., 1922, p. 42.

death for a few days only, and remaining in the vicinity of the grave, the other, however, the real spirit, going to Mt. Bwebweso on Normandy Island.[69] Of the Trobriand Islanders proper he says that they are supposed to migrate at death to the island of Tuma and there they exist for a span of time, underground, according to some, but return to their own villages once a year and take part in the annual feast where they receive offerings. They are not feared and there is "nothing of the mutual interaction, of the intimate collaboration between man and spirit which are the essence of religious cult." [70] Perhaps the most striking animistic conception among these people is the belief in flying witches. "Invisible, they fly through the air, and perch on trees, house-tops, and other high places. From there, they pounce upon a man or woman and remove and hide 'the inside,' that is, the lungs, heart and guts, or the brains and tongue. Such a victim will die within a day or two, unless another witch, called for the purpose and well paid, goes in search and restores the missing 'inside.'" [71] "A much less dangerous being is the *tokway,* a wood sprite, living in trees and rocks, stealing crops from the field and from the yam-houses and inflicting slight ailments." [72] There is further a belief in jumping stones and an octopus-like monster which besets voyagers in canoes. The outstanding feature of the beliefs of these people, however, centers in magic rather than religion in the sense of belief in spirits. We shall have occasion to refer later to the magical practices of the Trobriand Islanders.

We would hardly agree with Gilmore when he says that,

[69] It would be interesting to investigate the place of origin of these people to see whether Spencer's theory that the hereafter is located in the place of origin has any justification.

[70] Ibid., p. 73.

[71] Ibid., p. 76.

[72] Ibid., p. 77.

"We may assume that 'animism' stands for a stage of culture in which man may regard any object, real or imaginary, as possessing emotional, volitional, and actional potency like he himself possesses." [73] Definite stages in the development of culture are too uncertain, yet the universality of animistic ideas is one of the most striking facts of comparative religion.

Limitations of Animism.—Before leaving the subject of animism it is necessary to point out three cautions in thinking of the animistic system. First, it should be remembered that all supernatural power need not be personal but may rather exist as a mysterious magic potency without definite human attributes. In the second place, we must hesitate in assuming that all ghosts and souls are similar concepts and all derived from the notion of a shade or double. The soul is by no means always of the same size and general appearance as the living person. It may be like a grain of sand or of almost any other size and appearance. Often there is a plurality of souls up to four or more in number.

As Leuba says, "Some of them have obvious reference to persons as they are seen in dreams and visions, others cannot by any stretch of imagination be derived from experiences of that kind; they seem rather to denote a belief in a life-potency animating living things." [74] It would perhaps be well to reserve the term ghost for the conception of the departed when similar to the living and to assume it possible that souls may have been derived from a different origin than ghosts, although the life-potency idea might put some strain upon the philosophical powers of early man. Finally, we should remember that all gods need not be derived from ghosts. In a later discussion a multiple origin of deities

[73] Gilmore, G. M.—*Animism,* Marshall Jones, Boston, 1919, p. 14.

[74] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality,* Open Court, Chicago, 2nd ed. 1921, p. 72.

will be suggested and it is sufficient here to issue a warning against unilateral and evolutionary derivations of all spiritual beings from ghosts.

Manaism

In our discussion of definitions of religion which singled out the emotional factor for especial emphasis, mention has already been made of the importance of the concept of mysterious, impersonal wonder-working power in the magico-religious culture pattern. It has also been hinted that a sketch of the animistic world with its personal spirits in ignoring this concept fails to give a complete picture of primitive religion. Some further analysis is necessary before going on to a discussion of the relation between magic and religion. In 1896 Codrington in his book on the Melanesians showed that these people had the concept of such a supernatural power which they called mana. This word has since come to have an accepted place in the vocabulary of the modern ethnologist as indicating power which is supernatural and impersonal. Belief in mana might be called manaism. "Mana itself is not an animal or human being, nor a ghost or spirit, it is just power, magical potency. Although impersonal *per se,* it manifests itself with equal facility through natural objects or beings, through man, spirits, or ghosts." [75]

The mana concept has also been found in North America. William Jones, himself of Indian extraction, has maintained that the Manitou of certain Algonquin tribes is mysterious impersonal power felt rather than known. Manitou is everywhere in nature but is sometimes confused with the objects of which it is a property. Manitou is found

[75] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 197.

in the stones used to heat the sweat lodge and the Indian cuts his flesh in order that it may enter into his body. Likewise, the heart of a brave enemy is eaten so that some of the Manitou with which it is endowed may be obtained. Furthermore, the vision experience means coming into contact with Manitou. Jones sums up his observations as follows: "It has thus been observed that there is an unsystematic belief in a cosmic, mysterious property which is believed to be existing everywhere in nature; that the conception of the property can be thought of as impersonal, but that it becomes obscure and confused when the property becomes identified with objects in nature; that it manifests itself in various forms; and that its emotional effect awakens a sense of mystery; that there is a lively appreciation of its miraculous efficacy; and that its interpretation is not according to any regular rule, but is based on one's feelings rather than on one's knowledge." [76] Hewitt has found a very similar concept in the Orenda of the Iroquois.[77]

All over the world there have been reports of the discovery of a similar concept. Boas says: "This idea of magic power is one of the fundamental concepts that occur among all Indian tribes. It is what is called Manito by the Algonquin tribes; Wakanda, by the Siouan tribes; Orenda by the Iroquois; Sulia, by the Salish; Naualak by the Kwakiutl, and Tamanoas, by the Chinook." [78] The concept has been found in Africa among many tribes. Among the Ekoi the word Njomm is often used in such a way as to imply the presence of the manaism. It will be recalled that among our friends the Winnebago the concept

[76] Jones, William—*The Algonkin Manitou,* Jr. of Am. Folk-Lore, Vol. XVIII, LXX, July-Sept., 1905, p. 190.

[77] Hewitt, J. N. B.—*Orenda, or a Definition of Religion,* Am. Anth. n.s. 4, 1902, pp. 33–46.

[78] Boas, F.—*Handbook of American Indians,* 30th Bur. Am. Eth., p. 366.

of Wakan is found. The Egyptian inscriptions refer to a magic power known as Hike which lies in the secret names of gods, is found in sacred things and is transmitted to men in amulets and magic formulae.[79]

Radin, however, attacks the mana expositors, claiming that they have read their own pre-conceived ideas into Indian religion and have misused linguistic data. He says, "I was fortunate enough to work among the Winnebago and Ojibwa, where the belief in wakanda and manito is strongly and characteristically developed. In both tribes the term always referred to definite spirits, not necessarily definite in shape." [80] He further defends the place of animism against manaism in primitive religion by concluding, "We may say, then, that from an examination of the data customarily relied upon as proof, and from individual data obtained, there is nothing to justify the postulation of a belief in a universal force in North America. Magical power as an 'essence' existing apart and separate from a definite spirit, is, we believe, an unjustified assumption, an abstraction created by investigators." [81] Radin does admit, however, that if the universal force be looked upon as an expression of emotion there is no objection to the use of the concept. It is in this sense, as the projection of the religious thrill, that Goldenweiser, at least, used the term mana and the concept will probably continue to have value in interpreting supernaturalism.

No one has used the mana concept to better advantage in explaining primitive religion than has Marett in his little book, *The Threshold of Religion.* He thinks that ani-

[79] Erman, A.—*A Handbook of Egyptian Religion,* Dutton, N. Y., 1907, p. 163.

[80] Radin, P.—*Anthropology in North America,* Stechart, N. Y., 1915, p. 276.

[81] Ibid., p. 277.

mism is too intellectual, too lacking in emotional expression to constitute the earliest form of religion. He says, "It will suffice to prove that supernaturalism, the attitude of mind dictated by awe of the mysterious, which provides religion with its raw material, may exist apart from animism, and, further, may provide a basis on which an animistic doctrine is subsequently constructed." [82] Conspicuous objects of nature, curious stones, animals, human remains, blood, may all be assumed to possess mysterious power and thus arouse awe. This attitude of mind based on the mana concept is what Marett calls animatism. He says, "Science, then, may adopt mana as a general category to designate the positive aspect of the supernatural, or sacred, or whatever we are to call that order of miraculous happenings which, for the concrete experience, if not usually for the abstract thought of the savage, is marked off perceptibly from the order of ordinary happenings. Tabu, on the other hand, may serve to designate its negative aspect. That is to say, negatively the supernatural is tabu, not to be approached, because positively, it is mana, instinct with a power above the ordinary." [83]

Marett does not posit a definite stage of manaism prior to animism but does consider the mana-tabu attitude to be more primitive than animism and to be more nearly coextensive with the supernatural. He thinks that mana implies the quality of sacredness and that the religious attitude is the attitude toward the sacred that is conducive to the welfare of the community and the individual.[84] We may agree with Goldenweiser when he says that, "The idea of supernatural power—impersonal, formless, but withal, a

[82] Marett, R. R.—*The Threshold of Religion,* Methuen, London, 2nd ed., 1914, pp. 1–2.

[83] Ibid., pp. 99–100.

[84] See his article on *Primitive Religion* in Ency. Brit.

power, and supernatural—must be coupled with spirit in all interpretations of religion. Indeed, if the signs of the times are to be trusted, may we not suggest that the more dynamic and vaguer idea will outlive its more precise and static companion?" [85]

[85] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 201.

Chapter IV

MAGIC AND RELIGION

The problem of finding a clear-cut distinction between magic and religion is one that has taxed the ingenuity of students for many years. Arbitrary distinctions have been set up, with little attempt to check them against concrete ethnographic data to see whether the criteria actually do separate two different things.

Conventional Distinctions between Magic and Religion

Frazer, who has made a unique contribution to the whole subject in his *Golden Bough,* identifies magic with primitive science and alleges that it is based upon an assumed order in the universe but differs from science in that there is a mistaken association of ideas rather than a true perception of cause and effect relationships.[1] He says that all magical practices are due to "mistaken application of one or other of two great fundamental laws of thought, namely, the association of ideas by similarity and the association of ideas by contiguity in space or time. A mistaken association of similar ideas produces sympathetic magic in the narrower

[1] This questionable identification is accepted by some recent writers, including Knight Dunlap, *Social Psychology,* p. 104.

sense of the word." [2] An example of imitative magic is pouring water to make it rain; of contagious magic, the laying on of hands to transmit health, power or virtue. Frazer argues that a magical state of thought preceded religion which arose when propitiation of superior beings was substituted for magic upon realization of the failure of the latter. The argument for priority of magic is based on the claim that magic makes less demand upon intelligence and that a stratum of magic is found underlying culture everywhere but especially associated with the lowest civilizations.

American anthropologists take violent exception to this point of Frazer's although many are inclined to agree with him that humble propitiation is a characteristic of religion which is lacking in magic. Lowie, however, points out that the Winnebago consider that in many cases the gods *must* deliver blessings in return for sacrifices although their attitude toward divinity is humble. The Thonga of Africa on the other hand humbly regard their instruments used for magical divination as sacred.

In regard to priority of magic, Lowie points out that magic is not simpler psychologically and the peoples of lowest culture do not practice magic to the exclusion of religion as Frazer claims. The Andaman Islanders, the Bushmen, the Semang, and the Australians, all worship superior beings. Lowie says, "The only inference that can fairly be drawn from the facts is that among very rude peoples magic and religion (in Frazer's sense) coexist." [3] He argues that there is no sharp distinction between the two or at best they are but two aspects of the larger whole, Supernaturalism.

Goldenweiser points out that the basis of magic is not

[2] Quoted in Thomas, W. I.—*Source Book for Social Origins,* Badger, Boston, 1909, p. 664.

[3] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 146.

so much an assumed uniformity in nature as the exercise of power. "It is the possession of power by the magician, or, to express it differently, his command or control of the powers implied in certain substances or acts, which bring success. The entire magical performance, moreover, is in innumerable instances lodged in the supernatural level, something is achieved which at least at the time and place cannot be achieved by ordinary matter-of-fact procedure, such as is involved in industry or in the wielding of tools and weapons." [4] He points out further that magic differs from primitive science in that the latter is checked up by experience. In the case of magic, if an act fails there is no change of method but the failure is rather explained by the superior power of another magician. Goldenweiser claims that religion and magic stand united in the realm of the Supernatural and that both have on their emotional side what he calls the religious thrill. Both have rites which may become mechanical and stripped of emotion but in the case of magic there is usually an element of constraint rather than supplication as in the case of religion. The implications of this view are hostile to Frazer's assumption that magic was prior to religion. According to Goldenweiser these two strands of Supernaturalism were once united but gradually separated, religion becoming more socialized and legalized and richer in emotional experience.

Marett likewise takes issue with the intellectualism of Frazer and his consequent neglect of the emotional side of magic. Marett claims that the blind rage of a savage against a symbol of his enemy such as his image, hair, or scraps of nails, when manifested by appropriate gestures and curses, is psychologically equivalent to magic. The emotional explosion gives a certain relief and it is natural to believe that the desired effect enacted on the symbol is in

[4] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 345.

some way projectively transmitted to the real object. The disappointed lover in our own culture may obtain relief by stamping on the picture of his rival and it is only modern rationalism that prevents him from believing that his enemy is in some way injured. In primitive societies the supposed victim of magic may be so suggestible as actually to die. According to Marett the spell or the curse which in the case of black magic is directed against an enemy, stands for an exertion of will which in its turn is but an expression of mana embodied in the magician and in his magic. Mana on its inner side is simply this seemingly mysterious power of accomplishing the magical act. Our jealous lover if really possessed of mana would injure not only the picture but the person of his enemy by his act of fury.

Marett argues that since assumed possession of mana explains a supernatural agency of any kind, magic does not lie far from religion. He also points out that the mana or power in the uttered "must" of the spell may be transferred to some instrument of the magician's purpose and that this instrument may then be approached by prayer rather than command. It would perhaps illustrate his meaning to assume that our lover moulds a clay image of an avenging demon, commands and then pleads with it to serve his will by bringing death upon his foe. Thus because "it equally belongs to the sphere of the occult and supernatural, and because it tends to be conceived as an affair between wills, magic, though distinct, has something in common with religion, so that interpenetration and transfusion are possible between them." [5] In another essay he distinguishes magic from religion as being evil or anti-social. Pointing out that savages themselves recognize good and evil power, he says, "Our stock antithesis between magic and religion should,

[5] Marett, R. R.—*The Treshold of Religion,* Methuen, London, 2nd ed., 1914, p. 30.

preferably, be employed to denote a similar distinction between the bad and good kinds of supernaturalism; whereas the 'magico-religious' is equivalent to the supernatural in its good and bad aspects taken together." [6]

Other writers have attempted to find a distinction between magic and religion but often as in the case of Radin without attaining any great lucidity. He says, "The distinction which we wish to make between religion and magic is a very simple one. It is concerned principally with the nature of the subjective attitude. In religion this attitude is positive and definite; while in magic it is negative and indefinite, and may be said to consist mainly in the feeling that certain facts will occur together." [7]

Durkheim holds that religion is distinct from magic in that religion is always associated with a church, which is not true of magic. We recall, however, the vision experiences of the Winnebago and realize that while the pattern of these experiences is derived from the culture of the tribe there is no more of a church involved here than in the case of magical rites such as curing a sick person by incantations. It should be noted also that an essentially religious experience, namely, the contact with a spirit by means of a vision, is the source of magic power.

Malinowski makes an heroic attempt to distinguish magic not only from religion but also from science though he is by no means entirely successful. Like Durkheim he divides the world of pre-literate man into the Sacred and the Profane. The former is the world of magic and religion and the latter the world of hunting, fishing, tilling the soil and other practical activities which could not be carried out without a belief in regularity in nature and in the power of reason, in short, without the rudiments of science. In the

[6] Ibid., pp. 99–100.

[7] Radin, P.—*Anthropology in North America,* Stechert, N. Y., 1915, p. 265.

Trobriand Islands, leadership in the garden work is in the hands of a magician and his rites are considered essential for the welfare of the crops. The magical aspect of the activity is thought to ward off the unpredictable dangers that might threaten the fields but there is also a matter-of-fact side to the work. Malinowski says, "Thus there is a clear-cut division; there is first the well-known set of conditions, the natural course of growth, as well as the ordinary pests and dangers to be warded off by fencing and weeding. On the other hand there is the domain of the unaccountable and adverse influences, as well as the great unearned increment of fortunate coincidence. The first conditions are coped with by knowledge and work, the second by magic." [8] The rôles of a man acting as both leader and magician can always be distinguished. The mechanical principles of making and sailing large canoes are well known but to control sudden storms and unknown reefs, magic must be used. It is an interesting fact that in open sea fishing, in which risks and uncertainty are greater than when the fishing is carried on in lagoons, magic is used to a greater extent. Minor ills and even certain forms of death are considered due to natural causes, "but, if a man sickens for any length of time, and his strength seems to be really sapped, then the evil forces are at work." [9] He is considered a victim of some magician.

Having thus isolated a profane world containing elements of practical knowledge which he calls rudimentary science, our author proceeds to the realm of the sacred. He points out that all peoples have rites connected with crises of life such as conception, pregnancy, birth, puberty, marriage

[8] Malinowski, B.—*Science, Religion and Reality,* J. Needham, ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 31.

[9] Malinowski, B.—*Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* Dutton, N. Y., 1922, p. 73.

and death but such rites are of two types. One birth rite may be performed to insure an easy delivery while a post-natal ceremony may be performed which is not a means to an end but an end in itself. On this difference he draws a distinction between magic and religion, "While in the magical act the underlying idea and aim is always clear, straightforward, and definite, in the religious ceremony there is no purpose directed towards a subsequent event." [10] The religious ceremony is thus an end in itself. Initiation ceremonies, for example, are very common, consisting of ordeals, instruction and revelation of supernatural beings. "They are a ritual and dramatic expression of the supreme power and value of tradition in primitive societies; they also serve to impress this power and value upon the minds of each generation, and they are at the same time an extremely efficient means of transmitting tribal lore, of ensuring continuity in tradition and of maintaining tribal cohesion. . . . Initiation is a typically religious act, and we can see clearly here how the ceremony and its purpose are one, how the end is realized in the very consummation of the act." [11] Rites at death likewise are an end in themselves, giving as they do an assurance of immortality, belief in which arose from the deep desire for life. "Religion saves man from a surrender to death and destruction, and in doing this it merely makes use of the observations of dreams, shadows, and visions. The real nucleus of animism lies in the deepest emotional fact of human nature, the desire for life." [12] Apparently Malinowski means that to the *savage himself* religious rites are ends in themselves, for by the anthropologist not only assurance of immortality but other ends

[10] Malinowski, B.—*Science, Religion and Reality,* J. Needham, ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 38.

[11] Ibid., p. 40.

[12] Ibid., p. 50.

or purposes may be seen. Still speaking of death rites our authority points out that "in all this, religion counteracts the centrifugal forces of fear, dismay, demoralization, and provides the most powerful means of reintegration of the group's shaken solidarity and of the re-establishment of its morale." [13]

Malinowski's analysis of the nature of magic corresponds closely to that of Marett already mentioned. The magic rite is characterized by the gesture and emotion indicative of some strong desire. For example, in pointing a bone to cause the death of a victim the sorcerer points the bone dart with an intense expression of fury and hatred, stabs and twists it as if boring into the wound. Such magical acts are essentially an expression of emotion but there are others in which the act imitates its end, as when the magician utters a death rattle and falls down in imitation of the rigor of death. Still other rites consist in the direct application of magical virtue inherent in a spell, as when the wind is invoked to cause it to rise. Malinowski stresses the point that the most important element in magic is the spell. A study of spells shows that they either sound like certain phenomena, such as the wind, which they are designed to produce or else express the emotion associated with the desire which is to be gratified. There is also a use of words which invoke, state or command the desired aim. Finally there is a traditional element consisting of mythological allusion, especially references to ancestors and culture heroes from whom this magic has been received. Magic is supposed to have existed from the beginning although some of it has been lost, perhaps due to an alteration of the original pattern, which change is always considered fatal to magic power. Malinowski remarks, "There is, then, the idea that between the object and its magic there exists an essential

[13] Ibid., p. 51.

nexus. Magic is the quality of the thing, or rather of the relation between man and the thing, for though never man-made it is always made for man. . . . Magic is not only human in its embodiment, but also in its subject-matter; it refers principally to human activities and states, hunting, gardening, fishing, trading, love-making, disease, and death." [14]

In general, as we have seen, Malinowski is in agreement with Marett that magic is due in its origin to a passionate emotional experience incident upon the blocking of some strong drive. He says, "In brief, a strong emotional experience which spends itself in a purely subjective flow of images, words, and acts of behaviour, leaves a very deep conviction of its reality, as if of some practical and positive achievement, as if of something done by a power revealed to man. This power, born of mental and physiological obsession, seems to get hold of us from outside, and to primitive man, or to the credulous and untutored mind of all ages, the spontaneous spell, the spontaneous rite, and the spontaneous belief in their efficiency must appear as a direct revelation from some external and no doubt impersonal sources." [15]

Malinowski, is, however, opposed to the explanation of magic in terms of the mana concept. He claims that magic is not a universal force residing everywhere but is rather a specific power residing in man gushing out with his voice in pronouncing the spell. The spell resides in the magician's stomach which is the seat of memory as well as food and hence arise many taboos as to what he shall or shall not eat. Magic virtue cannot be conveyed as is mana nor is it immanent in the universe. "The conceptions of the *wakan, orenda,* and *mana* class which include all sorts of forces and powers, besides that of magic, are simply an example of an

[14] Ibid., p. 70. [15] Ibid., p. 75.

early generalization of a crude metaphysical concept." [16] Malinowski further declares, "One thing is certain: magic is not born of an abstract conception of universal powers, subsequently applied to concrete cases. It has undoubtedly arisen independently in a number of actual situations. Each type of magic, born of its own situation and of the emotional tension thereof, is due to the spontaneous flow of ideas and the spontaneous reaction of man. It is the uniformity of the mental process in each case which has led to certain universal features of magic and to the general conclusions which we find at the basis of man's magical thought and behaviour." [17]

Having defined, within the domain of the sacred, magic as "a practical art consisting of acts which are only means to a definite end expected to follow later on; religion as a body of self-contained acts being themselves the fulfillment of their purpose," Malinowski proceeds to point out further minor differences.[18] Magic is simple, religion is complex; magic is in the hands of specialists while religion is an affair of all in which everyone takes an active and equivalent part; magic is both black and white while religion shows but little contrast between good and evil. The cultural function of primitive science is to give survival value in the struggle with nature. That of religion is to enhance all valuable mental attitudes such as reverence for tradition, harmony with environment, courage and confidence in the struggle with difficulties and the prospect of death. That of magic is to furnish a technique for meeting critical situations with confidence, to maintain poise during emotional stress, to ritualize man's optimism and to enhance his faith in the victory of hope over fear.

[16] Ibid., p. 72.
[17] Ibid., p. 73.
[18] Ibid., p. 81.

While Malinowski has made an interesting attempt to distinguish between magic and religion his argument is open to criticism on many points. His tendency to generalize concerning all magic and religion from his Trobriand Island data invalidates many of his points. His claim that religion, in contrast with magic, is an end in itself breaks down utterly in the face of the Winnebago data. Who could deny that the Medicine Dance and other ceremonies are religious in character? Yet the primary conscious purpose of such rites is the obtaining of definite material benefits in this life such as wealth, success and long life.[19] His attack on the mana concept is a wholesome antidote to extreme views. Nevertheless, the fact that mana is a general force or power does not mean that it may not be conceived of in the special form of magic virtue. The Melanesian magic may indeed have a different origin but taking data the world over it is difficult to dispense entirely with the mana concept in explaining the magic as well as the religion of pre-literate peoples.

The question arises: Is it possible to distinguish between magic and religion at all if the various writers discussed show so little agreement in their chosen criteria? Certainly no absolute distinction will ever be found but the problem is not quite hopeless for all would agree that magic and religion at least are not identical. One source of difficulty has been the failure to distinguish between different types of magic. We will discuss briefly the nature and types of magic, giving concrete examples from our own as well as other cultures and then attempt a synthetic and quantitative distinction between magic and religion.

[19] In so far as Malinowski assumes that religion alone is an end in itself the distinction between religion, art and ceremonialism becomes blurred, since both art and ceremonialism have been defined in the same terms.

Nature and Types of Magic

Following in part certain suggestions made by Leuba we may divide magic into three types, with further subdivisions in the case of one type. (1) There is a type of magic based on *assumed repetition of coexistence or sequence.* (2) A second type is based on *autistic thinking.* Forms of this are (a) *imitative magic* which identifies an association of ideas by similarity with a cause and effect relationship, (b) *contagious magic* which misinterprets an association of ideas by contiguity, and (c) *retroactive magic* which treats a cause to influence an effect which has already been produced. (3) Finally, there is what may be called *will-magic.*

Magic Based on Assumed Repetition.—Magic based on *assumed repetition of coexistence or sequence* is not so far from science save that the principle of induction is not used to check conclusions.[20] Conclusions are based upon an insufficient number of cases. For example, an Eskimo carries a ham bone and has good luck in hunting. After the single coexistence of ham bone and good luck he continues to carry his new found charm.[21] Students in modern universities have reported a more or less sincere belief that use of a certain pen insures success in an examination, due very likely to one or two such coincidences. The taboo upon lighting three cigarettes on one match may be a negative superstition originating when misfortune overtook soldiers who had been so indiscreet as to practice this bit of economy. It is probable that many superstitions, such as unlucky days, black cats, passing under a ladder, breaking a mirror, throwing away pins, may be explained on the same basis. Erman is of the opinion that many of the spells used by the Egyptians were but prayers that seemed to have been answered. It was apparently assumed that the charm when spoken, or even

[20] Russell, B.—*Some Problems of Philosophy,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., pp. 93–108.
[21] Sumner, W. G.—*Folkways,* Ginn, N. Y., 1906, p. 25.

written within a coffin, would continue to have as its sequence some favorable effect.[22] The mass of varied superstitions of the farmer concerning planting crops during a certain phase of the moon and the like probably fall under this category.

Magic Based on Autistic Thinking.—Autistic thinking, the basis of the second type of magic, has been placed in contrast to realistic thinking by Bleuler and others. It is thinking characterized by random uncontrolled associations of ideas. It is a kind of night-mindedness or dream logic. It is the mystic jumbling of things together which Levy-Bruhl describes under a "law of participation" as a stage of pre-logical thinking characteristic of pre-literate peoples.[23] There is ample evidence, however, that such modes of thought are not restricted to the uncivilized portion of the human race. An example would make this mode of thought somewhat clearer. Let it be proved by autistic thinking that the wind is blind. The wind is a breeze. A breeze is a zephyr. A zephyr is a yarn (a variety of yarn is called zephyr). A yarn is a tale. A tail is an attachment. An attachment is love. Love is blind and therefore the wind is blind. Things are assumed to be in the relations of identity, or of cause and effect, simply because they are associated together in the mind. Perhaps the only test as to whether thinking is real or autistic is the effect on actual behavior. As Wells points out, in seeking a Pittsburgh man who, we learn, has gone to Buffalo we must not think that he can be in both places at once or seek him in the buffalo range at the Zoölogical Park. To speak of selling post holes or dragging one in after crawling into it is a form of autistic thinking that is characteristic of certain forms of humor. A pun is very definitely based on autistic thinking, as, for

[22] Erman, A.—Op. cit., p. 148.

[23] Levy-Bruhl, L.—*Primitive Mentality,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.

example, the claim that there is no need to starve in the desert in view of the "sandwiches" there. After a vote upon prohibition in which it was found that all present favored license the presiding officer remarked, "there doesn't seem to be a dry 'aye' in the house." As Wells says, "It would simply be carrying the 'dream-work' a step further to represent the voters as indicating their disapproval by weeping." [24] Similar modes of thought are found in dreams as when the time 9.55 is referred to as a nickel to ten. Likewise, the mental processes of the insane are frequently autistic. A patient, for example, objects to insulting bees by calling their dwellings hives, the name of a skin affliction, and would prefer to have them called homes or rather hones, because the bees produce honey. A good example of popular autistic thinking is to blame the bad weather upon the weather man or lack of letters upon the postman. Autistic thinking is mentally following the path of least resistance.

Imitative magic is very definitely based on a form of autistic thinking, the assuming of a causal relation between similar ideas. The Winnebago magician stabs a picture of an enemy drawn upon the ground in order to produce death or sickness.[25] Similar practices are found all over the world. The Ojibway Indian pierces an image to cause his enemy pain, while a Malay makes a wax image which is burned over a fire, or he may hang the image head down and pray over it as over a dead person. To escape responsibility, however, he says that it is the Angel Gabriel who is burying the person. In Central Australia an elaborate ceremony is performed in order to increase the supply of witchetty grubs which are used for food. Men imitate the insect emerging from its chrysalis. In Scotland a man is sometimes hauled in out of the water in order to make the fish bite. Beating of Carib youths at the time the war party meets the enemy

[24] Wells, F. L.—*Mental Adjustments,* Appleton, N. Y., 1922, p. 58.
[25] Radin, P.—Op. cit., p. 259.

is supposed to result in a similar beating of the foe. In Europe peasants leap high in the fields to make the grain grow to a similar height, and a Hessian farmer is said to bind up the leg of a chair when his horse breaks his leg. Frazer cites many examples of human sacrifice in which the blood of the victim is allowed to drip, apparently with the expectation that rain would fall from the sky in a corresponding fashion. An interesting example of a taboo based on an association by similarity is the prohibition of the Malagasy warrior upon the eating of kidneys, which have the same name as "shot," the implication being that to eat them would mean getting shot. The Achinese must not use the word "clear," for otherwise the fish would get clear of the net. The Eskimo have a taboo upon playing of cat's cradle for fear that hunters would be entangled in their lines. Burning in effigy is a practice that is not far from a rite of imitative magic. Certain charms seem to owe their efficacy to an association by similarity as when a representation of a snake is used to ward off snakes. We find the mana concept involved as well as imitative magic in the case of the Micmac Indian who, after finding a stone shaped like an otter, was supposed to have a special flair, a particular mana or Keskamzit, for hunting that species of animal.[26] There is here also a certain association by contiguity in this example, for the proximity of the owner to the stone seemed to confer upon him some of its mana. In the figures of men put in Egyptian graves to provide the dead man with servants in the other world we have an element of imitative magic. To imitate a servant is to have one in the future, if only the association of similar ideas constituted a causal relation, i.e., if it really worked.[27]

Among the Ekoi certain round stones which resemble

[26] Wallis, W. D.—*An Introduction to Anthropology,* Harpers, N. Y., 1926, p. 279.

[27] Breasted, J. H.—Op. cit., p. 295.

eggs are sacred objects and are said to promote fertility. An association by similarity leads from stones to eggs which are symbolic of fertility.

Turning to another type of magic based on autistic thinking, *contagious magic,* we find examples equally numerous. In the island of Nias, when a wild pig has fallen into the pit prepared for it, the animal is taken out and its back is rubbed with nine fallen leaves, in the belief that this will make nine more wild pigs fall into the pit just as the nine leaves fell from the trees. This might be interpreted as based on association by contiguity, for the quality of nineness of the leaves is imparted to the pig which is in turn contiguous to the pit.[28] Esthonian peasants, according to Frazer, wear white hoods to make cabbages white. Here is a practice based upon an association of contiguity in space. The whiteness of the hoods is really thought to be related to the whiteness of the nearby cabbages. There is a similar basis for the practice of the Malay woman who strips herself to the waist in order to make the rice grains have a thinner husk. In Australia the mother of a boy who has undergone circumcision must not eat certain foods. Here apparently a mystic relation is assumed between mother and boy because of their contiguity in space. A similar association lies back of the practice on the part of relatives of a wounded man of greasing themselves to insure his recovery. A rite of black magic among the Wurunjerri of Australia consists in putting some of the flesh of a dead man upon tobacco which is given to the victim of the magic. Symbolically, death is brought into contact with the victim.

The practice of eating the heart of a courageous enemy in order to obtain his mana or courage is based on an associa-

[28] The distinction between associations by similarity and contiguity is accepted for convenience although it may be shown that all associations in their origin go back to contiguity in experience. See Woodworth, R. S.—*Psychology,* Holt, N. Y., 1921, pp. 399–418.

tion by contiguity between courage, heart and the eaters of that organ. All over the world are found taboos upon the use of the names of certain individuals apparently due to the fear that a knowledge of the name would in some way give the person with that knowledge power over the individual known. Here there is an association by contiguity between the name and the person himself. As Frazer has shown, the fear on the part of kings that their names may be known and thus render them victims of evil magic is the cause of drastic language modification in order to avoid the use of tabooed words. Lowie cites an interesting example of a Kirghis woman who could not use the name of her husband's relatives which happened to be similar or identical with lamb, wolf, reeds, and water. Observing a wolf make off with a lamb through the rushes on the other side of a body of water she was forced to speak of the howling one taking away the bleating one's young through the rustling ones on the other side of the glistening one.[29] It is interesting to note that even among civilized people there is often a vague aversion to giving one's name. It may be mere coincidence, but with us to have a person's name means "having his number."

The name enters into contagious magic in a more positive way through the power which is supposed to reside in a name. The Egyptians had a word *hike* standing for the magic power contained in the names of the gods by means of which they worked their deeds of power. There is a myth in which Isis obtains the name of Re by a trick and is able to pass on magic power to her son, Horus. Such beliefs seem to be explained by the mana concept together with the principle of association by contiguity. The name being part of a person, comes to possess by contiguity part of the mana or magic power with which that person is endowed. The name then used to "conjure with" in a spell

[29] Lowie, R. H.—*Primitive Society,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1920, p. 85.

or incantation comes to have the potency inherent in the will of the mana-charged person. The medicine bundles of the Winnebago and other Plains Indians, contrary to Spencer's ghost theory, seem to be charged with impersonal mana or supernatural power derived from contact with supernatural powers in a vision experience. Medicine so derived, according to the Winnebago belief, may be spread on the points of weapons to make them more effective.[30] The carrying of the claw of a bear as an amulet seems to be based on the belief that through its proximity to the bear, himself a source of power, strength and courage, the claw becomes itself charged with similar virtue which may be passed on to the wearer of the charm. The laying on of hands which occurs in the rites of the Christian religion seems to have as a basic idea the belief that mana or grace may be transmitted by contiguity. As Dunlap says, "It would be a mistake to suppose that magic is largely restricted to savage, barbaric, or 'primitive' peoples. Magic flourishes throughout all civilization, and is rampant today. Vast numbers of superstitions, such as those involved in the using of a red string to prevent nose bleed, carrying a potato in the pocket to ward off rheumatism, avoiding thirteen at the table . . . are held and praticed by 'civilized' people. The extensive patronage of palmists, clairvoyants, astrologers, soothsayers, seers, prophetesses, character analysts and psycho-analysts, and the eager interest in telepathy, spirit photographs, 'ectoplasm,' and other spiritualistic phantasies, shows clearly that so far as magic is concerned, the Hottentot, the Malay, and the Louisiana negro have little on the white man." [31] It is perhaps worth mentioning here that the sacred quality of a piece of the true cross or the bones of saints is a virtue or mana due to association by contiguity with Christ or

[30] Radin, P.—Op. cit., p.254.

[31] Dunlap, K.—*Social Psychology,* Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1925, p. 106.

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

saints who are themselves sacred in the sense of possessing mana or supernatural power. An amulet which is an image of a god is also charged with supernatural power but is assumed to have such by an association by similarity rather than by contiguity.

In an Ekoi legend a ghost is said to have cured a boil from which he suffered by transferring it to a post and here again an association by contiguity is supposed to correspond to the actual transmission of a disease. While difficult to interpret, the word *njomm,* or juju of the Ekoi, seems to stand for something that approaches a mana concept. It would seem that we are dealing with objects charged with mana by contiguity, in the case of amulets worn by votaries of certain more or less personal jujus such as Mfour or Akpambe which are identified with ugly wooden images. These amulets are made of blue cloth containing "medicine," the chief function of which is to ward off witchcraft. The use of magic medicine rubbed into the skin of a child is clearly a form of contagious magic. That generally used to give strength is made from the index finger of the Chimpanzee, and for quickness and activity large, fierce black ants are crushed.[32] It is probable that the use of bear's grease as a cure for baldness is due to the fact that the bear is an exceedingly hairy animal. A good example of contagious magic is found among the Maori. A barren woman in order to get children embraces the tree to which navel cords are attached after the custom of these people. The ideas of children, navel cords, tree and woman are associated by contiguity. The Trobriand Islander beats a canoe log with a bunch of grass known as the "heavy" bunch while reciting a spell which is essentially a command for the heaviness to leave the log. This bunch of grass is then thrown away and the canoe is beaten again with a bunch known as the

[32] Talbot, P. A.—*In the Shadow of the Bush,* Heinemann, London, 1912, p. 131.

"light" bunch while a spell is recited which, together with the beating, imparts lightness.[33]

We may now give a few examples of the third type of magic based on autistic thinking which, for the want of a better name, we have called *retroactive magic.* The classic example of this form of magic, which seems to be rarer than other kinds, is the Melanesian practice cited by Frazer of cooling an arrow in order to cool a wound. In many places it is the custom to smear with fat the knife that has caused a wound in order to insure a speedy healing of the gash. Here the cause is treated to influence an effect, namely, the wound which has taken place in the past. The Melanesians twang a bow that has been the cause of an injury with the expectation of producing spasms of tetanus in the victim's wound. It is of course obvious that such practices might be considered as contagious magic based on association by contiguity, for the weapon and the wound have been associated in both time and space, but it is, nevertheless, sufficiently distinct to merit a separate classification, for what we would consider a real cause and a real effect are involved. It is the ignoring of the time element that separates the two that gives the autistic aspect to the whole procedure.

Will-Magic.—We now turn to the final type of magic which consists essentially in the belief, and the behavior based on that belief, that an intense wish, a high degree of concentration on some end, or an intense emotional experience given its natural expression will in some mysterious way produce an effect at a distance. This type of magic occurs in combination with other types or may occasionally be found in almost a pure form. The Winnebago hunter, for example, prepares an offering for a bear which he wishes to kill, and engages in intense thought

[33] Malinowski, B.—*Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* Dutton, N. Y., 1922, p. 129.

while rubbing two sticks together, until the flame of his fire darting towards the offering shows that the attention of the bear has been attracted.[34] The experience of intense hatred may very likely, as Marett and Malinowski suggest, lead to the conviction that the gestures and imprecations in some way affect the enemy at a distance. The magical rite of pointing a bone with a gesture of fury at an enemy, together with a spell expressing a wish for his death, is found among many different tribes and seems to fit roughly into this category.

An interesting illustration of this type of magico-religious practice has been reported by Speck among the Montagnais-Naskapi Indians of Labrador. Each individual is assumed to be possessed of a soul-spirit or "Great Man" of varying degrees of power who is stimulated by drumming or singing and who is supposed to give revelations by means of dreams. Communion with the soul-spirit by silent contemplation seems to be blended with a kind of wish-magic. The power of the desire is reinforced by the soul-spirit and the longed for object or event becomes a reality. Speck writes of this wish power, "It is practiced in one form by silent communion, in which the individual concentrates his thought upon his desires and waits for his Great Man to make it a reality for him." He points out, however, that "in contrast with the modern theory of desire-power we may note that Montagnais-Naskapi wishing-thought is not so much conative as supplicative." Thus the practice is touched by the spirit of religion as well as that of magic.[35]

The creative acts of the gods seem to represent acts of wish-magic on the part of mana-filled beings. The Egyptian god Re is self-created according to some accounts and is

[34] Radin, P.—Op. cit., p. 111.

[35] Speck, Frank.—*Unpublished manuscript.* The author is indebted to Dr. Speck for the opportunity to read this interesting account based on his investigations among the Algonquian.

ordinarily conceived as the creator of the other gods. The Earthmaker of the Winnebago seems to have thought things into existence. From certain portions of the Christian doctrine we learn that the world was created by the power of the word. The power of magic rites may reside essentially in the word as Malinowski contends, yet be based essentially on wish-magic. Such magic shows clearly by its existence the truth of the remark that the wish is father of the thought. The folk-lore in European countries makes many references to wishing rings, wish charms and the like, and to good fairies who grant three wishes to their favorites. In an Ekoi myth the son of Obassi is being pursued by soldiers of his father but puts forth his magic and causes them to fall into confusion and to kill one another.

Adequacy of Classification of Magic

The question might be raised at this point as to whether the suggested classification fits an entire collection of magical practices selected at random. It is found that many practices which do not seem at first to fit into any category may be explained as the combination of more than one type of magic. For example, the Winnebago magician seeks to injure an enemy by stabbing his footprints. The footprints are symbolic of the enemy through an association by contiguity, while the stabbing is clearly imitative magic based on an association by similarity. The same applies to the magic for injuring a person by burning or injuring a lock of his hair. Here both contagious and imitative magic are involved.

The common act of injuring the image of an enemy may, however, contain an element of wish-magic expressed in the spell, hence when a footprint is stabbed by a Winnebago all three types of magic may be involved.

It must be confessed that certain magical rites do not fit easily into the categories but the difficulty may be due to

lack of detailed information concerning them and to secondary cultural influences. The Winnebago belief that a man can shoot a feather from his medicine bag through the air to cause the death of an enemy does not fit readily into the categories, nor does the Ekoi practice of drinking a magic potion in order to send out brush souls into the bodies of animals, although there seems to be an element of wish-magic involved. The belief in the evil eye which is found in Egypt and elsewhere and has persisted down to modern times can be vaguely referred to wish-magic and to magic based on assumed repetition of coexistence or sequence. Divination among the Ekoi by seed pods and among their women by burning a feather and reading the ashes to determine the future may perhaps be explained on the latter ground.

Certainly it would be an over-simplification of the facts to explain all magic on the basis of simple psychological principles. It should be remembered that autistic thinking itself is usually wishful thinking and that neither religion nor magic are independent of emotion. Free recognition should be given to the factor of tradition as stressed by Malinowski, and the association of magic with mythology for magic is part of culture, handed down from generation to generation and nourished by mythological sanction.

Furthermore, the interpenetration of animism and magic should not be ignored for among many peoples magic is derived from spirits. Among the Ekoi the instruments of divination are made to commune with the tribal gods, spells often owe their potency to the power of some divine name and the very basis of certain forms of magic, such as necromancy, the calling up the spirits of the dead, is based upon animistic pre-suppositions.

The rôle of sleight-of-hand, hypnotism, ventriloquism and the like, in originating and perpetuating the belief and practice of magic must be very great. Assuming that the

story has some foundation in the first place, the Winnebago magician who won a store from a trader by changing flour into paint and performing other marvels doubtless relied upon sleight-of-hand. The reports concerning the power of members of the Ekoi Egbo society to call up the spirits of the dead suggests the use of hypnotism. The shaman of Siberian peoples is known to be expert in ventriloquism. The contention of Lang that belief in the supernatural among primitive people may have some basis in the reality of the supernatural phenomena is as appropriate in connection with magic as with religion. It may be suggested with some cogency that the practice of the black art is assisted occasionally by the use of poisons sufficiently powerful to produce very real effects.

Finally, it may be pointed out that magic thought based on autistic and wishful thinking, blind emotion, illusion and unchecked observation has good reason for its long history as part of human culture. Successes are remembered while failures are forgotten; the able man who practices magic is likely to be successful independently of his magic, although his good fortune is attributed to magic in the absence of any scientific checking-up process. There are no doubt certain real services performed by magic. Malinowski says, "The magician, in carrying out the rites, sets the pace, compels people to apply themselves to certain tasks, and to accomplish them properly and in time. Incidentally, magic also imposes on the tribe a good deal of extra work, of apparently unnecessary, hampering taboos and regulations. In the long run, however, there is no doubt that by its influence in ordering, systematizing and regulating work, magic is economically invaluable for the natives." [36] In addition to this economic function magic gives a certain optimism in the face of uncertainty.

[36] Malinowski, B.—*Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* Dutton, N. Y., 1922, p. 60.

A Synthetic Distinction Between Religion, Magic and Other Culture Patterns

In Chapter II a working definition of religion was presented with the suggestion that the distinction between religion, magic, and other phases of culture was a matter of degree rather than of kind. We may now attempt to examine more closely this relation in the light of our recent discussion of theories and types of magic.

First, however, it is necessary to consider in general terms the ways in which things may differ. They may differ in attributes, which are simply characteristics which may be either present or absent. For example, a cat has a tail whereas a man has not. In the second place, there may be variables more readily expressible in quantitative germs. A tiger has weight in pounds which is greater than that of a domestic cat, as well as a greater length in inches. In the third place, there may be variables which are qualitative in the sense of not being expressible in units but merely in terms of an ordinal relation of greater or less. For example, fear may be present in a mental state to a greater or less degree but hardly exists as a multiple of any fixed unit. It should be noted that an excessive change in a quantitative variable or a concurrent change of several variables may give rise to a new variable or attribute which differs in kind rather than in degree. Finally, a thing may be simply a quantity or, in other words, a single quantitative variable. A pound, for example, is sixteen ounces and differs from a ton merely in the number of ounces that it contains.

We may now apply these considerations to our problem of the relation of religion to magic and other phases of culture. We argued that religion in its pure form constituted a culture pattern with an emotion of reverence, (a), a belief in mysterious powers, (b), and non-coercive behavior bringing man into relation to these powers, (c). The deviations

from this religious norm may be illustrated by the following diagram.

THE FIELD OF SUPERNATURALISM



We have in the inner circle religion in its purer form, made up of emotion, belief and behavior segments, each an attribute or a variable, as indicated in parts (a), (b) and (c) of the definition. A component of religion may vary in amount or may drop out entirely. Any one or two of the three elements, taken alone, will be religious because of their nature and their associations, but will not constitute pure religion. As the character of the emotion, belief and behavior changes the religious pattern will merge and blend with other patterns such as magic, superstitious taboos, divination and the like. We cannot clearly separate the

patterns but can merely indicate attributes and variables which predominate. As we move from the center of the circle, in segment (a) a less intense emotion of reverence is indicated, in (b), a less explicit belief in non-controllable mysterious powers and in (c), less distinctly supplicative or non-coercive behavior. When the variation is sufficient a new attribute or variable may come into existence. For example, the emotional element of reverence may merge into fear, (a_1) the change being away from pure religion as we have defined it. We may assume that among some people, such as the Ekoi, the belief segment (b) may take the form of belief in ghosts, mysterious powers of a particular type. Let us suppose that certain charms are used to drive away the ghosts, then this coercive behavior may be represented by (c_1). We now have the pattern (a_1)—(b)—(c_1) which represents fear of ghosts and their control by means of charms. If the Ekoi should develop a blasé emotional indifference to ghosts the belief and practice would remain religious but in a form weakened by the absence of the affective element.

The Medicine Dance of the Winnebago is distinctly part of their religion, since the participants experience an emotion of reverence, believe firmly in spirits from whom they may obtain aid and, finally, perform certain acts to bring them into relation with these spirits. If, however, we consider the rite of stabbing the footprints of an enemy to cause his illness, we approach an area of magic. The emotion of reverence, (a), has become hate, which may be represented by (a_2) while the general belief in mysterious powers, (b), has become belief in repetition of events (b_1), also autistic thinking, (b_2), and, finally, the behavior is coercive, as represented by (c_1).

These illustrations show the possibility of designating in a synthetic manner the resemblance and difference

between religion and its neighboring areas within the larger culture pattern. More specifically, we may turn to the relation of religion and magic as discussed by Goldenweiser, Malinowski and other writers previously reviewed. Frequently some attribute or variable has been selected and erroneously assumed to constitute a single and more or less definite mark of distinction. Each writer has seen part of the picture. Each is right, but to a degree depending upon the exact way in which the magical and religious patterns merge in a particular tribe.

It is apparent that as we go from pure religion which seems to have reverence, (a), as its most characteristic emotion, accompanied of course by other emotions and desires, to a lesser degree of reverence or to the emotion of fear, represented by (a_1), we wander to other phases of supernaturalism. If the emotion is hate, (a_2), as in the case of a rite to cause the death of an enemy, the emotional side of religion tends to become that of magic. The emotion might be love, (a_3), in the case of love magic, or perhaps elation at a coming triumph, (a_4). The section (a_n) represents specific material desires or emotional states not previously mentioned. While there is no clear-cut distinction, the emotional pattern has become more characteristic of magic than of religion.

The belief phase of religion is dominated largely by animism together with the belief in mana, as indicated in the diagram. Since mana is felt rather than intellectually conceived, the inscription is placed on the border line between the emotional and behavior segments. As in the case of the emotional segment, moving outward from the core of pure religion we find variations corresponding to criteria suggested for distinguishing magic from religion. For example, there may be a belief in the uniformity of nature, in the sense of expecting a repetition of events, according to our first type of magic (b_1). Autistic thinking, (b_2), is

likewise notably characteristic of magic. Furthermore, the conceptual phase of magic, especially wish-magic, has as one attribute the belief that wishes come true, (b_3), particularly if accompanied by certain rites. Other beliefs characteristic of magic might be represented by (b_n) as for example belief in mysterious powers controllable by man.

Turning to the behavior segment of the field of supernaturalism, we may suggest that the most important variation from religion to magic is in the element of coercion applied to the supernatural, (c_1). This is the criterion of differentiation set up by Leuba, Goldenweiser and others. It may be pointed out that the magical rites in many tribes tend to be more of a private matter than those of a strictly religious character, (c_2), this being a distinction made in dogmatic form by Durkheim. Again, there is often, though by no means invariably, an anti-social aspect to magic, subversive of the stability of the community, (c_3). This is pointed out by Goldenweiser, Malinowski and Carpenter. Malinowski stresses the antithesis between good and evil (white and black magic) which is found to a greater extent in magic than in religion. Further, it might be suggested that magic in general is performed in a more mechanical fashion, (c_4), and for more specific ends, (c_5), rather than as an end in itself. Other magical aspects of behavior may be represented by (c_n). When the behavior is negative, made up of withdrawing or avoidance responses, it is then characteristic of taboo, which is, perhaps, but the negative aspect of magic. Certain strict rules may, of course, be devoid of the magical or supernatural element.

We have seen that religion blends into magic and magic into taboo, folklore and, perhaps, into primitive science. While it is improbable that science had its origin in magic, there may be some truth in the contention of Frazer and others that the main difference is in the degree of logical association of ideas. Furthermore, ritual merges into tech-

nology, and it might be possible to show that the segment of religious emotion in the diagram merges with an outer area of art. It should be stressed once more that no clear-cut distinctions obtain in the entire field of the supernatural nor in culture as a whole. Such distinctions as do hold for one tribe may not hold for another.

Ritual

The ritualistic side of religion will receive little discussion as compared with the emotional and conceptual phases since it is more obvious and is more generally known. As we have seen, it differs from magic chiefly in the degree of coercion involved. One of the most important rites is sacrifice, a rite which may take various forms and receive various explanations. Tylor distinguishes sacrifice as a gift, an act of homage, or an act of self-abnegation, as when Abraham undertook to offer up his first-born son to Jahveh. Hubert and Mauss interpret the sacrifice as a means of breaking through to get in contact with supernatural power.[37] Probably no single theory applies. Among the Winnebago it will be recalled, the sacrifices, while made with due humility, express the hope that blessings will be bestowed. Among the Ekoi offerings are made rather for propitiation with a view to averting unpleasant consequences of neglect. The elaborate Egyptian offerings were made that the dead might be well provided for in the future life. Malinowski stresses the reverence that the savage has for food, since it is a symbol of beneficent nature and is associated with the attitude of gift-giving that pervades primitive culture. It is natural that food should be offered to the gods.

Human sacrifice has been practiced the world over, per-

[37] Hubert, H., and Mauss, M.—*Mélange d'Histoire des Religions,* Felix Alcan, 1909, pp. 1–130.

haps reaching its highest point in Mexico under the Aztecs, where hundreds of victims were sacrificed every year to the bloody and cruel god of war. Sometimes it is not the worshiper that is offered up as a sacrifice but the god himself who is eaten, or rather his symbol, in order that some of the virtue within him might be obtained. In Mexico a youth was feasted and fêted for a year and then killed, cut to pieces and eaten by the people as a symbol of the god. Communion is a common rite by which men and gods are brought together in a common meal and thus establish a mystic unity. Among the people of India human sacrifice has lasted down to recent times in a particularly cruel form in order to further the fertility of the crops. The victim is cut to pieces by a frenzied crowd who disperse to bury a piece of his body in each plot of ground. At times the bleeding and tears of victims are supposed to produce rain, according to the principles of imitative magic.[38]

As Frazer has shown with a wealth of illustration, many rites are performed not only to insure fertility but also to guarantee that natural processes such as the rising of the sun and its "return" in the spring will continue to take place. Often the processes of nature are thought to be connected with the person of a king, who is killed in order that his divine powers may pass unimpaired into a vigorous successor and thus the fertility of the soil and other beneficent natural conditions be maintained.[39]

Prayer is another common form of entering into relations with mysterious powers and beings in the world. Prayer may be made for a variety of blessings from the death of an enemy to the attainment of a blameless life for the supplicant. Modern psychology has shown that prayer has much in common with auto-suggestion and thus

[38] Frazer, J. G.—*The Golden Bough,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, pp. 434–438.
[39] Ibid., pp. 264–293.

may further, in certain cases, soundness of body and serenity of soul. At times the prayer merges into the charm and may become totally devoid of any feeling or intellectual content. Perhaps the prayer wheels of the Buddhists in certain parts of Asia best illustrate this mechanical method of doing business with the gods.

For many people religious rites are associated with a deep sense of sin. The custom of driving a scapegoat laden with the sins of the people out into the wilderness is by no means found only among the Hebrews. The sense of sin may receive expression in fastings, penance, pilgrimages, and the like. It is perhaps to some extent involved in the elaborate ceremonial washing of the Egyptian priests and the sweat bath of the Plains Indian.

Among the Plains Indians it seems to be thought that elaborate and extravagant forms of self-torture may secure the pity and favor of the gods. At the Sun Dance men hang themselves by thongs through the shoulder muscles until the flesh tears loose, or they may lie gazing at the sun with unblinking eyes.

Often torture, or what closely approaches torture, is a feature of the initiation ceremony which is one of several rites, each corresponding to a crisis in life. Teeth are knocked out or painful operations performed. Among the Indians of Guiana the initiates are starved, beaten, and tortured by the application of fierce black ants to their bodies.[40]

Hymns of praise are often sung to the gods and, together with chants and sacred dances, bring religion close to the realm of art.

Thus we have completed our survey of the realm of supernaturalism during which we have recognized certain fundamental elements. In this realm we find, with Golden-

[40] Roth, W. E.—Bureau of Am. Eth., 30th Ann. Rep. (1908–1909), pp. 309–311.

weiser, animistic faith, magical faith, faith in power and the religious thrill, all of which are fed by two important institutional adjuncts, mythology and ceremonialism.[41]

The question might well be raised: What advantages does religion offer to make it such a persistent element in human culture? Men seek in religion a control of physical nature and of their own minds and bodies but, as we have seen, many of the assumptions back of primitive religion are based on illusion. If religion be based on hallucinations, dream experiences and the like, why has it been able to survive so many thousands of years?

For one thing, failures of religion as a means of attaining ends are less readily detected than those of magic, for the gods may always see fit to refuse a request and usually the success following prayer and sacrifice is remembered while the failure is forgotten. The priest and the religious man, like the magician, may have been able to profit by their ability rather than their faith; nevertheless, religion received the credit. Certainly there are unsought results from religious belief and activity that have given it survival value. As Leuba points out, it has gratified a craving for power and has given a certain mental stimulus to men by peopling the world with supernatural beings. In its mythological aspects it has gratified man's desire to explain the world about him. It has given solace and hope in time of crisis and despair; it has reinforced tribal customs that may themselves have had survival value. Above all, it has given a bond of social unity, offered man a tradition and has furthered the coöperation which has made a puny biped the lord of all creation.

[41] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, pp. 231–234.

Chapter V

THE EVOLUTION OF RELIGION

Having made an analysis of religion in its more static aspects, our next task is to consider change and development in religion. Many writers have used the phrase "evolution of religion" and our first task is to investigate the implications and validity of that concept.

The publication of *The Origin of Species* by Darwin in 1859 began a new era in the thought of Western Europe, for scholars in all fields came to think in evolutionary terms. The progress in thought made possible by this idea was not, however, without its costs, for the concept of evolution was taken from the field of biology and applied uncritically in the field of culture. Book after book appeared tracing the evolution of this or that social institution through definite stages. Tylor, as we have seen, derived all spiritual beings from the ghost-soul observed in dreams and visions, but in spite of his unilateral derivations he was less of a dogmatic evolutionist than Spencer, who with relentless logic traced all religion to ancestor worship. The latter writer in spite of his unquestioned position as a philosopher has become almost a byword among modern critical anthropologists for his uncritical use of the so-called comparative method. Other writers have gone even beyond Spencer in arranging the evolution of religion in definite stages which may be useful in making a text-book on sociology clear to the student but do not necessarily teach him the truth.

The Evolutionary Theory of Religion

A great variety of classifications of religions with evolutionary implications have been propounded. That of Reville puts first (1) the primitive religions of nature, then (2) the animistic and fetishistic religions. The third type or stage is that of (3) national mythologies, to which class belong the religions of China, Egypt and Babylonia, as well as the religions of the Teutons, Gauls, Greeks and Romans. With the introduction of the legal factor comes (4) the polytheistic-legalic religions, such as Brahmanism and perhaps Buddhism. Finally there are (5) three great monotheistic religions, Judaism, Islamism and Christianity.[1] Jastrow makes a classification of (1) the religions of savages, (2) the religions of primitive culture, (3) the religions of advanced culture and (4) the religions which emphasize as an ideal the coextensiveness of religion with life and aim at a consistent accord between religious doctrine and religious practice.[2]

One of the fundamental fallacies in the evolutionary point of view applied to religion is the assumption that each group must pass through a definite sequence of stages. Given peoples A, B, C and D, it is argued that each passes through stages 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., and when group A is found in stage 3, it is claimed that it has already passed through stages 1 and 2 and that, if left undisturbed, will pass through stages 4 and 5. The reasoning here is grossly illogical for the sequence of stages is assumed rather than derived inductively from observation of successive stages as they occur in a single tribe. Having assumed the scheme, it is no proof

[1] Reville, A.—*Prolegomena of the History of Religion,* Williams and Morgate, London, 1884, pp. 100–101.

[2] Jastrow, M.—*The Study of Religion,* Chapt. II, Walter Scott, London, 1911.

of its validity to illustrate the various stages in different tribes unless it be shown that stage 2, as found in group A, shows a tendency to develop independently into stage 3, as found in group B.[3]

Aside from the logical objections to the evolutionary point of view in religion there are certain obstacles to it in anthropological and historical fact. Group A in stage 2 of religion is very likely to borrow stage 3 from group B rather than to develop it independently from stage 2. For example, a people might borrow temples from another people rather than evolve them independently from the tombs of their ancestors as Spencer thought. Not only may an assumed later stage be borrowed rather than evolved but stages may also be skipped, as when a people with crude animistic ideas are converted directly to Christianity or Mohammedanism, omitting intermediate stages of an evolutionary scheme. We have no reason to think, for example, that the evolution of religion has been as indicated below for groups A, B, C, and D.

5	5	5	5
4	4	4	4
3	3	3	3
2	2	2	2
1	1	1	1
A	B	C	D

If there has been a tendency at all toward what students of comparative religion vaguely term higher religions, it has been irregular for particular groups and, taking the world as a whole, it is little more than a general trend brought

[3] Ellwood traces seven stages of religious evolution, pre-animism, animism, totemism, ancestor worship, polytheism, henotheism and monotheism. *Reconstruction of Religion,* pp. 48–55.

about by diffusion as well as by independent evolution of religious forms. This vague historical development might be crudely represented as below:



The arrows indicate streams of diffusion. The world as a whole does, perhaps, show a different pattern of religion in 1920 as compared with 2000 B.C., but the religion of today is the product of a thousand different streams of cultural development in constant interaction rather than of any inner principle of growth such as that which brings forth the full-blown flower from the tiny inert seed.

It has been argued that most of the evolutionary schemes are based on pure assumption and it is also true that many are contrary to the historical facts in their assumed sequence. The ordinary practice is to take the religion of one's own culture as the highest possible type and as the culmination of the evolutionary process and then assume that it was gradually approached from origins quite dissimilar. Monotheism is frequently assumed to be a kind of far-off divine event toward which all culture moves, but recent investigations have shown that there is good reason to believe that some peoples of low material culture approach as closely to monotheism as does historic Christianity with its Trinities, its hosts of angels, of devils and of saints.[4]

[4] For criticism of evolutionary theories see Swanton, J. R.—*Three Factors In Primitive Religion,* Am. Anth. Vol. XXVI:3, pp. 358–365.

The Origin and Development of Gods

It should be emphasized that there is no reason to assume that gods or any other aspect of religion had a single rather than a multiple origin save perhaps the pleasure in reducing phenomena to the simplest possible formula. Gods, like human leaders, may well have different functions and origins in different psychological and social conditions. We may first ask ourselves: Is Spencer right in attributing the origin of gods to ancestor worship? The answer seems to be that *some* gods undoubtedly do have their origin in the worship of powerful ancestors. The mass of facts accumulated by Spencer proves this without question. In Egypt the utmost veneration is shown for the dead and the king is thought to have an increase of divinity at death. Paton says, "At first the king, and subsequently all the deceased were identified with Re and later with Osiris. They rode with him in the solar barque through the sky, descended with him into Hades during the night, and rose triumphant with him in the morning. Like the gods, they were unrestricted by conditions of space or time. . . ." [5] In addition to the kings humbler mortals distinguished for their wisdom or virtue were deified by posterity. Imhotep, an architect of the third dynasty, was deified and a temple erected on the site of his tomb. His worship spread over all Egypt and even beyond its boundaries. Divinity was likewise accorded to Amenhotep, an official of the eighteenth dynasty. Yet as Paton remarks, "Ancestor-homage never attained the proportions in Egypt that it did in China because it was overshadowed by the cult of the great gods, still it held its own as an important part of the national religion down to latest times." [6]

[5] Paton, L. B.—*Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity,* Macmillan, New York, 1921, p. 159.

[6] Ibid., p. 177.

Propitiation of ancestral ghosts is common among the Ekoi although not reported for the Winnebago. Among Greeks, Romans and Hindus there was a cult of the dead or a manes worship, as it sometimes is called. It is common knowledge that the household gods of the Romans were ancestors. In China, however, ancestor worship reaches a higher development than anywhere else in the world.

There can be no doubt of the origin of certain gods from ancestral ghosts, when actual historical records are available giving the details of a deification. Clennell tells us that "the being whom we usually call the Chinese God of War, Kuan Ti, is a perfectly historical character, a certain general, Kuan Yü, who flourished about A.D. 200, and who, after several intermediate steps of glorification, was raised to his present rank of 'godhood' by Imperial Decree of the year A.D. 1594." [7] It is of course difficult at times to distinguish between ancestor worship and hero worship. Many writers include the latter within the former type of worship. Emperors, statesmen, scholars, and other worthies were canonized in China. "This worship of ancestors has prevailed universally, always, as far as we know, in the past history of the Chinese race. They are a people who worship their ancestors, and who regard the worship of ancestors as, above all other ties, the bond which holds communities together, and the main support of morality and the decencies of family life." [8]

The degree to which ancestor worship was found among the ancient Hebrews has been a subject of much discussion. It is a significant fact that among Semitic peoples the name for ghosts is the same as for gods.[9] Paton traces a long

[7] Clennell, W. J.—*The Historical Development of Religion in China,* Dutton, N. Y., 1917, p. 23.

[8] Ibid., p. 25.

[9] Paton, L. B.—Op. cit., p. 227.

struggle between worship of ghosts and the monolatrous cult of Jahveh inspired by a long series of prophets. The hostility toward all things connected with dead as being unclean reflects this struggle, so it is claimed. Paton says, "The view of Stade, Schwally, Budde, Holzinger, Nowack, and Charles that the *teraphim* were images of ancestors cannot be demonstrated, but is nevertheless exceedingly probable in view of the facts that they were not images of Yahweh, that they represented the human form, that they were household gods, and that they were used for obtaining oracles." [10]

While there is good evidence that some gods developed from ancestral ghosts there is equally good evidence that there are nature gods who did not develop in this way. Great temples such as that at Karnak did not evolve directly from ancestral tombs. Although Osiris was once held to be a king he also was identified with the Nile and with vegetation. He and other great gods of Egypt seem to be personifications of the striking aspects of nature and there is no evidence in the long history of Egypt that they owed their divinity to linguistic confusion with a human ancestor named after the natural object, as Spencer would have us believe. The sun-god was identified with a falcon, with an aged man tottering down the west, with a great dung-beetle rolling the sun before it and with a ship sailing across the sky. That Re, the sun-god, was simply an ancestor named after the sun, is a fantastic hypothesis. It is not inconceivable that worship of spirits of the dead developed prior to nature worship and paved the way for it. Nevertheless, the natural tendency to find a personal cause for cosmic phenomena as well as for intimate experiences in a social group, seems to have been the most important cause of nature worship. Any hypothesis concerning this matter would require for its proof

[10] Ibid., p. 235.

evidence that can never be brought to light, hence remains but a guess.

Among the Winnebago most of the gods are identified with objects of nature rather than with spirits of the dead. The Ekoi identify their two great gods with the earth and the sky respectively. There is only the barest suggestion in the Ekoi myths that these gods are related to ancestral ghosts. Paton says of the spirits of the dead among Indo-European peoples, "They were not confused with the bright powers of nature, and there is no evidence that gods were developed out of ghosts, nevertheless, spirits of the dead formed a distinct class of superhuman beings alongside of nature-spirits." [11] Elsewhere he objects to the theory of ancestor worship, "because in all early and savage religions numerous nature-spirits are found whose names and characteristics are entirely different from those of spirits of the dead." [12] Müller, speaking of the spirits of Chinese religion, says: "The principal classes are the celestial spirits (*tien shin*), the terrestrial spirits (*ti ki*), and the ancestral spirits (*jin kwei*), and this is the order in which they are ranked according to dignity." [13] No one has done more than this pioneer philologist to show that a heaven-Father was worshiped by so-called Aryan speaking peoples, thousands of years ago before a differentiation of the language had taken place. The name of this deity "was *Dyaus* in Sanscrit, *Zeus* in Greek, *Jovi-s* in Latin, *Tiu* in German." [14] The oldest sacred literatures such as that of the Rig Veda, the Atharva Veda of the Hindus and the Zend-Avesta of the Persians reveal the gods as identified with natural objects

[11] Ibid., p. 114.

[12] Ibid., p. 14.

[13] Müller, Max.—*Introduction to the Science of Religion,* Longmans, Green, London, 1893, pp. 138–139.

[14] Ibid., p. 106.

such as the sun, thunder, wind and fire. A complete presentation of evidence is impossible here but justifies our considering nature gods as distinct in origin and nature from ancestor gods, although fusions and blendings of the two types have often taken place.

Creator Gods.—Does this complete our inventory of Deities? According to many writers it does not, for Lang, Radin, Schmidt, Pettazzoni and others have discovered "high gods" among peoples of low culture which might best be described as "creator gods" and constitute a further obstacle to Spencer's theory.

Lang argues that there is no necessary reason to believe that all gods developed from ghosts nor is religion as completely separated from morality as was thought by Tylor. A god can hardly have developed from a dead king in a tribe which does not have kings. While the Australians are among the lowest of races in material culture, yet they have lofty religious concepts which do not seem to have been borrowed, for customs connected with the secret rites were known as early as 1688. The name of Darmulun is too sacred to be spoken save at the Mystery Rites and only at that time may his idol be made. It is destroyed soon after its manufacture. This god encourages unselfishness, respect for old age and sex control. The claim that there has been no Christian influence at work is supported by the fact that religion and ethics are actually used to counteract the bad influence of Christianity. Among the Kurnai, for example, Christianity is thought to have made the young people selfish, hence in certain rites their stomachs are kneaded to expel selfishness and greed. The old men point to the sky and tell of Munganngaur who insists upon ethical conduct on the part of the tribesmen. Lang remarks, "From all this evidence it does not appear how non-polytheistic, non-monarchical, non-Manes-worshipping savages evolved the idea

of a relatively supreme, moral, and benevolent Creator, unborn, undying, watching men's lives." [15]

Extending his survey from Australia to other countries Lang finds further evidence of high gods among low races. Cagn of the Bushmen is conceived of as a kindly father. The Andamanese have a profoundly philosophical religion but an absurd mythology. Their god, Puluga, is "like fire" but invisible. He was never born, and is immortal. By him were all things created, except the powers of evil. He knows even the thoughts of the heart. He is angered by wrongdoing, is a judge of souls, and yet in mythology he is represented as eating and drinking and as joined in matrimony to a green shrimp.

The Banks Islanders believe in primeval, eternal beings distinct from ghost gods. The old question as to the beliefs of the Zulus is brought up and Lang argues that in the conception of Unkulunkulu there is support for his theory as well as for ancestor worship. The hazy and scanty data from Bantu and other peoples of Africa bring forth some hints of worship of a supreme being. If this were borrowed, says Lang, the worship would be more open and there would be sacrifices made, but in the absence of these and in view of other considerations he is inclined to the belief that an originally moral supreme being was crowded out by a horde of greedy ghosts and a money-grabbing priesthood. From America, Lang obtains further evidence of creator gods such as Ahone or Tirawa of the Pawnee. He thinks that neither Tirawa nor Napi, the creator god of the Blackfoot, could have evolved from ancestral ghosts, nor could Pachacamac of the Incas, although the form of the latter is obscured by animistic conceptions of ruthless and insatiable ghost gods full of the worst human qualities. Undaunted by the com-

[15] Lang, A.—*The Making of Religion,* Longmans, Green, 2nd ed., 1900, p. 184.

plexity of the subject, the lack of data and the maze of conflicting opinion, Lang delves into the Hebrew and the Chinese religions and produces evidence of original supreme beings, contaminated though they are by the animism and polytheism which arose with changing political and social conditions.

Over and over again Lang points out that there is no necessity that gods be developed from ghosts and that it is very difficult, if such development be assumed, to explain the highly moral qualities of a supreme being. How, he asks, could a righteous god have developed out of the ghost of a dirty and maleficent medicine man? Supreme gods are found where there are no kings to furnish ghosts of divine proportion and are thought never to have died. There are many myths telling how death first came into the world. Where ghost gods exist they are usually distinguished from those that never died. The inevitable association of divinity with spirit in our own culture should not lead one to assume that the savage thinks in the same terms. The question of the god being a spirit is not raised, for the deity is simply an intelligence existing long before death entered the world. Lang says, "The savage Supreme Being, with added power, omniscience, and morality, is the idealization of the savage, as conceived of by himself, minus fleshly body (as a rule), and minus Death." [16]

He bases his theory, then, upon the fact that high gods are found among peoples of low culture under such circumstances that an explanation by borrowing is untenable. He assumes a very ancient belief in supreme beings which has degenerated under the influence of mythology and later animistic conceptions. Curiously enough, in many places the god who receives the utmost reverence in the field of reli-

[16] Ibid., p. 187.

gion is made the hero of disreputable adventures in the sphere of mythology, due perhaps to a natural tendency to mud slinging directed at those in high places. Lang is not dogmatic in asserting a definite sequence but shows that it would be easy for a ghost cult to crowd out the god cult, for the ghosts in a way are more serviceable, less impartial, more subject to bribes, more approachable and more likely to be served by cunning priests. The creator gods had as supporters only such men as the ancient Hebrew prophets, who often struggled in vain against lower forms of worship. Complexity of human activities tended to give rise to gods of various departments of nature and the contact of various political groups blurred the conceptions of supreme beings into an incipient polytheism.

Lang's explanation of the origin of creator gods is simply human curiosity on the part of so-called primitive man as to the cause of things. He says, "As soon as man had the idea of 'making' things, he might conjecture as to a Maker of things which he himself had not made, and could not make. He would regard this unknown Maker as a 'magnified non-natural man. . . .' This conception of a magnified non-natural man, who is a Maker, being given his power would be recognized, and fancy would clothe one who had made such useful things with certain other moral attributes, as of fatherhood, goodness, and regard for the ethics of his children; their ethics having been developed naturally in the evolution of social life." [17]

Recently Radin has revived Lang's theory and has argued vigorously for monotheism or at least, monolatry, among primitive peoples, although he is more inclined to recognize the dual rôle of the deities as both Creators and Tricksters than to assume a stage of pure monotheism from

[17] Ibid., p. x.

which degeneration took place.[18] He suggests that monotheism is a matter of temperament and that individuals so inclined are to be found among the most primitive peoples as they were among the ancient Hebrews.

Schmidt also has taken up Lang's theory and has gone so far as to posit a general stage of archaic culture having as one characteristic belief in a high god, dwelling in the sky, eternal, omniscient, omnipotent, moral, asexual, worshiped not in temples but by spontaneous, unstereotyped prayer. Lowie agrees with Schmidt that if such a belief were found among peoples of lowest culture widely separated in space and without means of communication it would indicate a very ancient stage of culture, but is, nevertheless, inclined to oppose Schmidt's theory on the ground of fact. He points out that of tribes such as the Tasmanians and the Congo Pygmies we know little or nothing, least of all of the subtleties of their theology. The deity of the Semang he finds to be essentially anthropomorphic and by no means supreme. Biliku or Puluga of the Andaman Islanders, made so much of by Lang and Schmidt as a high god, is found by Brown to lack many of the characteristics of a supreme being. Not only is there disagreement between Brown and Man, the two authorities on these people, but there also does not seem to be any uniformity of belief among the Andaman Islanders themselves. Lowie finds no sound evidence for belief in a high god among the Bushmen and concludes that the existence of an archaic high god stage of religion cannot be substantiated.[19]

If the conclusions of Lang and his followers have not been above criticism, at least there is good evidence that students of religion must accept in addition to ancestor and nature gods a third type of deity, the creator god, who like

[18] Radin, P.—*Monotheism among Primitive Peoples,* Allen, London, 1924.
[19] See Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 132.

the other types had in all probability a separate origin. Lowie in spite of his opposition to an evolutionary stage of archaic culture is inclined to accept these three types, as does Leuba.[20]

Change and Fusion of Deities

While the three general types of deities probably have separate origins, it by no means follows that the gods fall into neat little categories or retain constant attributes. While Earthmaker of the Winnebago is a creator god in contrast with the other deities more properly called nature gods, he is not different in every respect and might well with the passage of time so alter his attributes as to become indistinguishable from them. Any study of the gods of primitive and historic religions reveals a most amazing complexity. They may be cruel and kindly, happy yet possessed of sorrows, immortal and yet born in human fashion and subject to death, objects of utmost reverence and yet the heroes of obscene tales, omniscient and yet deceived by obvious tricks. There is an explanation, of course, in the fact that the accounts are drawn from different sources and represent different moods. The projection of human arrangements into the heavens often augments the number of gods by providing them with wives and children or by making them kings over separate departments of nature. On the other hand, there may be a fusion of gods because of observed similarities or because of a perception of unity in nature. With an intensity of reverence for one god, "spiritual monogamy" as Stratton calls it, there may be of necessity a deprecation and extinction of other gods.

There is great variability in the approachability of gods. They may be very close and definite or distant and vague.

[20] Ibid., pp. 132–133. See also Leuba, J. H.—*A Psychological Study of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1912, Chap. V.

Lang has revealed a number of gods who are supposed to have created the world, after which they retired and are no longer approachable by man save perhaps through intermediaries. The concept of an Unknown God is found elsewhere than among the cities visited by Paul while spreading the Gospel throughout the Roman world.

Immortality

Immortality, while not essential to religion is, like belief in gods, practically coextensive with the world of the supernatural and has been likewise treated in evolutionary terms.

Among most primitive peoples, future life is similar to life on earth with its hunting, fishing and other mundane activities. This continuance theory of the future life held by the Winnebago and the Ekoi stands in contrast to the retribution theory, according to which the dead person reaps the reward or punishment for his earthly deeds. Tozzer is in essential agreement with Tylor when he states: "The ethical feature of retribution, a paradise for the good and punishment for the wicked, is totally lacking among savages who have not come in contact with the white men." [21] Tylor expresses a conviction that all forms of the belief in a future life evolved from animism, but he does not show the historical connections between the doctrine of continuance and the modern doctrine of retribution.

Leuba advances an interesting theory of the rise of the modern belief in immortality which is historical rather than evolutionary. He makes a sharp distinction between the primary and the modern belief in immortality which corresponds roughly to Tylor's distinction between the theory of continuity and the theory of retribution. Leuba, like

[21] Tozzer, A. M.—*Social Origins and Continuities,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 125.

Tylor, points out that at first there was no very close connection between the future life and conduct on earth. He admits the ethical test in the hereafter of the Egyptians but claims that this died out in the later history of that religion. His main point is the claim that at the beginning of historical times in the countries around the Mediterranean the belief in a pleasant future life was practically unknown. The primary belief he thinks was no product of human longing since the future life was not conceived as uniformly pleasant. It was forced on man by the facts of dreams and visions rather than as an expression of discontent and of yearning for an escape into a happier existence. With a certain level of civilization, according to Leuba, whatever joy was found in the primary belief died out due to the inability of men to conceive of a happy immortality if deprived of their earthly body. This view is strengthened by the fact that with the modern belief came a faith in bodily resurrection.

In Greece the old belief lingered on in the form of feasts of the dead, belief in Keres or evil spirits and in the conception of a dark and gloomy existence of the shades in Hades while a few were condemned to greater misery in Tartarus deeper still within the bowels of the earth. In Rome there was still a worship of the manes but in a half-hearted fashion and with a growing conviction that such rites were but superstition.

Among the Hebrews the worship of Jahveh had opposed the cult of the dead, and at the time of Job there was no joy to be had in the contemplation of a future life as a compensation for the miseries of the present. To go down to Sheol was to return never more and to have at best a vague, shadowy, and miserable existence. This conception of a dark and gloomy underworld is very similar to the Aralu of the Babylonians in which the spirits were thought to flit about in darkness with nothing but dust and mud to

eat. In Egypt the belief in a future life had become uncertain. Here and there notes of pessimism were sounded in the Dialogue of the Misanthrope and other writings.[22] In the later days of the Egyptian religion nothing better than the present life could be hoped for, and at worst, untold dangers lay on every hand.

Thus around the entire Mediterranean basin there was a decline of the old belief and a vague longing for a blessed future life. The longing received some degree of expression in the stories of the translation of living men to an immortal life of bliss. Leuba mentions Menelaus, who was transported to the Elysian fields; Ganymede, who became the cup bearer of the gods; the Babylonian Noah, who never descended into Aralu; Elijah, whirled up to high heaven in a chariot of fire, but he stresses the fact that these were living persons who never died. The Celtish myth of a pleasant land of Avalon where Arthur went to heal his grievous wound might have been mentioned as a further example of the same type of belief.

The modern belief in immortality as distinct from translation of living men to some isle of the blessed had its origin in various trends of thought. In Greece the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration of souls carried over into the Orphic cult of which the essential tenet was the belief in immortality. They assumed a divine element in human beings which by moral and ceremonial purification could be freed from earthly taint and after rebirth in higher forms could wing its way to a heavenly abode. There was also ecstatic experience within the cult which was one factor in furthering the belief in immortality. In the cult of Dionysos from which Orphism sprang the devotees engaged in wild and frenzied dancing. They rushed over the hills clad in flowing garments and, falling upon living animals

[22] Breasted, J. H.—Op. cit., pp. 176–212.

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

prepared for sacrifice, tore them to pieces with their teeth. In their excitement they believed themselves possessed by the god and under the influence of strong desire were able to believe in permanent as well as temporary union with the divine and consequent immortality. It might be added that the Eleusinian mysteries also seem to have offered hope of a happy immortality.[23]

A number of other Greek philosophers, including Plato, taught doctrines similar to those of Orphism though as a rule in a more exalted form.

Leuba is inclined, however, to stress the unique contribution of Hebrew religion to the modern belief in immortality. Beginning with worship of a cruel tribal god, there gradually develops a belief in monotheism and in a resurrection into the kingdom of god on earth. Hand in hand with the rise of monotheism goes a profound ethical development. Thinker after thinker ponders over the misery and injustice of the world, seeking to harmonize these facts with a belief in an all-powerful and kindly god. Job, preceded by certain Egyptian writers, raises the age-old question, "If a man die shall he live again?" but seems to hope for little more than a moment's glimpse of his god who will then justify his ways. Ezekiel attempts the impossible task of showing that divine justice is manifested in this life. Jeremiah, preceded by a movement towards personal piety in Egypt, sets forth the doctrine of an individual rather than a tribal relation to Jahveh. It is, however, Isaiah who voices the belief born of the agony of exile that men shall rise again to a blessed future life. Leuba, following Charles, argues that in view of certain striking differences in the nature of the belief, this modern belief in immortality was not borrowed from the Persians. He traces it to (1) the

[23] Paton, L. B.—*Spiritism and the Cult of the Dead in Antiquity,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1921, p. 100.

failure of the Jews as a nation, (2) the rise of individualism in religion and (3) increased recognition of the spiritual greatness of man. Leuba stresses the fact that the modern belief was born of emotional cravings demanding satisfaction in a future life. He writes, "The desire that arose at a certain moment and grew in intensity in every one of the nations we have considered, was not for immortality as such but for a future life which would fulfill affective and ethical cravings." [24]

More significant here is Leuba's claim that there was a sharp break, a discontinuity between the primary and the modern belief in immortality, rather than an evolutionary relationship as between a seed and a flower. He points out that a belief in ghosts, a survival of the primary belief, may coexist with the totally different doctrine of immortality embodied in the Christian religion. The discontinuity does not seem to be by any means as sharp as Leuba would have us believe when we consider all the historical connections between the primary and the modern belief, some of which he seems to ignore. His attempt to identify the Osirian hereafter with the primary belief, and the Solar hereafter with the modern belief, seems to reverse the true relationship.[25] The full development of the Osirian faith seems to have come later on. Furthermore it seems to be typical of a group of cults which flourished around the Mediterranean and gave expression to a passionate protest against a meaningless and hopeless existence and dramatized the great cycle of rebirth of vegetation. In Babylonia there was Tammuz; in Syria, Adonis; in Phrygia, Attis; in Thrace, Dionysos; in Italy, Bacchus; in Greece, Orpheus. These gods, who were sometimes associated with fertility goddesses, were the

[24] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality*, Open Court, Chicago, 1921, p. 124.

[25] Ibid., p. 126.

center of mystery cults which flourished in considerable numbers within the Roman Empire and expressed a longing for something more vital than the state religions of Greece and Rome, which had become barren of religious thrill. It should be noted that these cults are based on ancient myths and are connected with fertility rites that extend well back into ages during which the primary belief flourished.

Many historical facts are ignored which might well establish a connection between the primary and modern belief in immortality. There is some reason to believe that Valhalla is etymologically connected with the Elysian fields, and to Valhalla went, not living men, but the souls of those killed in battle in a manner essentially characteristic of the primary belief. Leuba rules out any Persian influence upon the development of the modern belief in immortality yet connects this belief with the modern conception of Hell. There is, however, some evidence that both Hell and the Devil are partly due to Persian sources, which suggests that the same may be true of immortality.[26] In the Avesta of the Persians is mentioned Yima who ruled over men in a paradise on earth but proved unfaithful and died, while his paradise became the abode of the noble dead.

It is probable that there is some connection between the two beliefs through India as well as Persia, for in the Rig Veda we learn of Yama (similarity to Yima is obvious) who gathers around him the dead who have lived nobly and shares with them the divine soma and a life of perpetual felicity. Furthermore, the similarity of the doctrines of the Orphic cult to those of Buddhism is so remarkable as to suggest borrowing.

Leuba has indeed rendered a service in pointing out that belief in immortality has no definite and orderly evolutionary

[26] Dhalla, M. N.—*Zoroastrian Theology,* N. Y. (pub. not given), 1914, pp. 269–295.

development, but has not eliminated the possibility that several streams of historical influence connect the various forms of belief in immortality.

Conclusion as to Trends in Religious Development

The preceding discussion raises the question whether it is possible at all to arrange religions or elements of religions in any definite time sequence. Is there no orderly growth of religions to higher and more complex forms? Is there no upward trend as of plant growing to maturity? The answer cannot be given in dogmatic form nor would it have much meaning if given unless the question were put in more specific form. A distinction should be made between the religion of the world, the religion of a particular country of tribal group and specific elements of religion, such as belief in immortality or in a particular magico-religious method of treating disease.

In regard to the religion of the world only the vaguest evolutionary movements can be detected to which there are striking exceptions in individual groups. It is tempting, nevertheless, to suggest certain possible trends in religion, subject as they are to many exceptions. (1) Growing spirituality is a trend that suggests itself at once. The gods of 1927 as worshiped throughout the world are less interested in the savor of burnt offerings than those of 27. They are less distinctly made in man's image than those of a few thousand years ago, in so far as we know of them. The high god theory of Lang makes this suggestion less certain but would hardly make it untrue. In individual countries there have, of course, been fluctuations. The gods of the fifth century B.C. in Egypt were less spiritual than Aton, worshiped by Iknaton almost a thousand years before.

(2) A closer association with morality is a possible trend, although here again Lang bids us pause. At the present time religion gives more ethical sanction than when throughout the world the performance of certain ritualistic acts was all that was required. We no longer offer up an animal to our gods and then go our own way to the same extent as formerly.

(3) Differentiation of religion is another possible trend. As Shotwell and others have pointed out, history shows a progressive secularization. Religion has been separated more and more from the state, the school, economic activity, and from family life. We shall have occasion to examine this movement in greater detail in a later chapter.

(4) Along with differentiation of religion from other phases of social life, seems to have gone a growth of individualism in religion. There are exceptions to this. In the Roman Empire, for example, there were innumerable cults and for the most part mutual toleration. In general, however, the relation of a man to the unseen world is more of a personal matter and a greater variety of belief is found amid culturally homogeneous groups than was usually the case in earlier times. This is in spite of a possible increase in interest in conversion and greater missionary activity.

(5) A decline in magic seems to be another trend, although here again nothing approaching a law of development is discernible. In spite of the magical rites undoubtedly practiced today, science has driven magic from stronghold after stronghold. When knowledge replaces mystery and certainty is substituted for risk, magic dwindles away. This trend by no means holds for particular countries, since in Egypt magic reached its high tide during a later period in the religious history of that country.

(6) A final trend that may be suggested is the decline of fear. During many thousands of years of human history

man has shrunk in terror from thunder and lightning, has peopled the world with malicious demons, has seen misfortune lurking in a thousand trivial incidents and has lived in terror of witchcraft and of the evil eye. Civilization has stripped the world of many of its terrors, science has thrown light into dark places and in the world today fewer children are reared in dread of fiendish and eternal torments as the penalty for harmless acts.

Considering the religion of a particular country or tribe alone, there is no rigid law of evolution to be found. It is rare to find the religious development of two countries the same. Rather, each is a law unto itself governed only by internal events, the culture of surrounding countries and historical circumstance. In Egypt, the country for which we have records extending over the longest period of time and one less affected than most by outside influences, there is no orderly evolutionary development. With political expansions and consolidations there is a rise of monotheism but also a later degeneration into gross superstition. Some elements of Egyptian religion were brought in with early invaders, others were borrowed later, while still others were the products of priests and religious thinkers; always there was a churning together, a fusion and interaction of the elements like a complex chemical reaction that never reaches equilibrium. Certainly nothing could be farther from the truth than the assumption that change in a particular religion must be an upward or progressive change according to ordinary standards. Laws of degeneration, ossification and ritualization are as plausible as laws of progress. The religions founded by Buddha, Zoroaster, Confucius, Lao-tse and Christ all changed beyond recognition by their founders. Buddha, for example, taught the non-existence of the soul, a theology that approached atheism, and a lofty ideal of service as an expression of inner righteousness. What would

he think of the Buddhism of Tibet that makes of him a god, of its Pope, a divine soul incarnate, and of its religion, a vast organization of ignorant, greedy monks who seek salvation through the turning of inscribed prayers by the wind? How different this is from the noble eightfold Aryan path of righteousness that Buddha pointed out to his followers as the means to serenity of mind!

In regard to specific elements in religion it is also true that no uniform evolutionary scheme can be detected. It is possible, however, to trace the historical development of certain elements and to establish time sequence between them with some degree of accuracy. One principle employed in such a reconstruction is that antiquity of a religious element tends to be roughly proportional to its area of distribution. Lowie points out, for example, that the belief that sickness is due to the intrusion of some foreign objects into the body of the sick person, removable by a shaman, is found almost everywhere among the Indians of both North and South America. The belief that sickness is due to the stealing of the patient's soul is found on the Northwest Coast and in a few other areas but has by no means as wide a distribution as the other belief. It seems probable that the belief in disease by intrusion is of great antiquity, while that of disease by soul-snatching is a more recent importation from Siberia where it is also found.

It is apparent that the principle of correspondence between relative antiquity and relative width of distribution depends for its validity upon the assumption that the rate of diffusion is the same in the two cases, which does not always hold. The Mohammedan religion is spread over a great area while the more ancient Zoroastrian faith is now confined to a little group of Parsees in India. In spite of qualifications, the principle has considerable utility. By tracing the history and distribution of particular elements of

religion it is possible to know something of the development of a religion as a whole, even when historical records are lacking. Kroeber compares the area of distribution of puberty rites and other ceremonies in California and is able to show the probable sequence of these elements in the development of the religion of the California Indians.[27]

The general conclusion to be drawn from the preceding discussion is that an attempt to study the evolution of religion is futile in so far as it is based on preconceptions. We must speak of change in religion rather than evolution of religion, and rely upon the historical method in tracing the origin and change of religious elements, particular religions, or religion as a world phenomenon. Obviously no history of religion can be given here. At most we can point out modes and processes of religious change.

Such change seems to depend upon two groups of factors. On the one hand, religious change may come about through external influences of fusion and diffusion. Mohammedanism, for example, has spread itself over the world and has blended with other religions by a process of mutual modification. On the other hand, there are factors of individual variation and leadership. Mohammed took the elements of Arabic religion, blended them with Christian and Hebraic elements and founded a new religion in Arabia which soon started on a career of world-wide conquest. These two factors of invention and diffusion are by no means distinct, for every invention made by an individual must be diffused to others if it is to be of the slightest importance. Also culture in its diffusion undergoes modification through a host of minor innovations hardly attributable to particular individuals and often made unconsciously, as a language is modified in its spread.

[27] Kroeber, A. L.—*Anthropology,* Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1923, pp. 293–325.

Chapter VI

RELIGIOUS CHANGE THROUGH BORROWED CULTURE

If culture diffusion be a cause of religious change, the question immediately arises whether there might not have been a single origin of religion at one time and place followed by diffusion with modification over the entire globe. The question of single versus multiple origin of religion is by far too technical and too difficult to receive adequate discussion here. There are writers like W. J. Perry who would trace the origin of religion and magic to ancient Egypt.[1] There is reason to believe, however, that the facts and arguments are marshalled to support a preconceived hypothesis.

Long ago there was a tendency to stress the intimate connection between language and religion. Max Müller after a profound study of the names of deities in various languages was inclined to the belief that three types of religious systems arose, each in association with one of the three principal linguistic stocks, the Aryan, the Semitic and the Turanian.[2] The religion of the Aryans was a nature worship, that of the Semites was tribal or nationalistic and that of the Turanians vaguely animistic. Any such connection is so vague as to be worthless from an analytical point of view. The entire assumption that cultural similarity, linguistic or

[1] Perry, W. J.—*The Origin of Magic and Religion.*

[2] Müller, F. M.—*Introduction to the Science of Religion,* Longmans, Green, London, new ed., 1893, pp. 83–144.

otherwise, between peoples implies a common origin of the associated elements of their culture is open to question, since diffusion would create similarities between peoples who had never been in contact and might bring together culture elements never before in association.

The other extreme would be to argue that religion is an instinctive thing manifested prior to the dispersion of the human species or which later developed spontaneously an unlimited number of times in various places. In view of our lack of knowledge concerning ultimate origins hidden from the light of history and even from that of archeology, in spite of its greater penetration into the distant past, to discuss the question is almost like arguing about the religion of a possible people on Mars. All we know is that religion in some form makes up part of the universal culture pattern common to all men at all times and seems to have its roots deep in human nature. In view of the imaginative trends of children, the frequent appearance of mystics, the constant presence of striking natural objects, the universal phenomena of dreams and visions and the innate emotional response tendencies such as fear and reverence with which men are endowed, it seems probable that religion would arise spontaneously even in isolated groups if not carried by man from his place of origin. We must remember, however, that complete isolation is a rare thing and that at least the form in which religion appears is largely determined by culture history.

Examples of Diffusion and Fusion

Let us turn to a few examples showing the importance of diffusion in changing the form of religious culture patterns. Of course when there is diffusion of religion from group A to group B there will also be fusion of religions unless group B is without religion or has one that is com-

pletely displaced by that of group A. The religious systems that have been described at some length show clearly the influence of diffusion.

The Ekoi have a number of elements in their religion apparently due to this process. Talbot hints that certain drawings show Minoan influence and notes the axe symbol which is used in Egypt to represent a deity. Further cultural connections with distant countries are suggested by observation of Ekoi ritual. Talbot remarks, "There seems to be a close resemblance between these secrets and the Eleusinian and ancient Egyptian mysteries." [3] Certain images show strange similarities, suggesting but of course by no means proving diffusion. Talbot relates: "In one corner of the room was a very old, roughly-carved wooden figure, holding its pointed beard with its right hand. The type of head is curiously like some ancient Egyptian burial masks discovered by my late brother-in-law, Dr. Hugh Baker, in the sand of the Egyptian oasis of Kharga." [4]

Even better instances of religious diffusion are available from the Winnebago. The presence of the guardian spirit beliefs and the vision quest doubtless links the Winnebago culture with other tribes where these elements are found.[5] In the Peyote cult we have an even more striking example and one concerning which there is considerable detailed information, thanks to the observations of Dr. Radin.[6]

Peyote is a species of cactus indigenous to Mexico the dried top of which when cut off forms a kind of button which has long been used for assumed medicinal purposes

[3] Talbot, P. A.—*In the Shadow of the Bush,* Heinemann, London, 1912, p. 40.

[4] Ibid., p. 217.

[5] Radin, P.—*The Story of the American Indian,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1927.

[6] Radin, P.—*A Sketch of the Peyote Cult of the Winnebago,* Jr. Rel. Psych., Vol. VII, Jan., 1914, pp. 1–22.

and more recently for the production of ecstatic and visionary states of mind. The use of this drug has spread northward to many Indian tribes and has aroused considerable apprehension on the part of those in charge of Indian reservations.

Before its diffusion into the United States peyote was used by the Huichol Indians of the state of Jalisco in connection with a religious festival that lasts several months. Before 1890 the use of the plant spread from the Mescalero Apache and the Tonkawaw to the Comanche, Kiowa, and Quapaw and after this date to the Pawnee, the Caddo, the Delaware, the Southern Arapahoe and the Southern Cheyenne. "By 1910 the use of peyote had spread through the plains and northwest to the Northern Arapahoe and Northern Cheyenne, Shawnee, Sac, Fox, Kickapoo, Seneca, Quapaw, Kansa, Omaha, Sioux, and Pottowattomie."[7] Later it spread to the Crow, the Utes, the Menominee, the Muskhogean and the Shoshone. The rapid spread of this practice to some thirty additional tribes in the 34 years since 1890 is due to the natural acceptability of a vision-producing drug to a people in whose culture the vision experience plays such a large part, to the reservation life and to the building up of friendly intertribal relations by the preceding Ghost Dance craze.

We are particularly concerned with the introduction of peyote eating into the Winnebago religious system. In 1893–1894 John Rave, a Winnebago Indian, of questionable moral character, in a state of depression partly due to the loss of his wife and family, partook of the drug in Oklahoma. He suffered considerably and saw horrible visions. In his fright he called out to the plant as he would to a god and his suffering ceased. Partaking further of

[7] See manuscript by W. C. MacLeod, Chap. 23. Also *The American Indian Frontier,* Knopf, N. Y., 1928.

the plant which had to him become sacred he experienced pleasant visions and was cured of a disease. According to his own account, at least, he changed from a bad to a good man. Returning home he gave of the drug to others who were also cured of their ills, if the native accounts can be accepted. He introduced the use of the drug into the traditional religious background which already contained some Christian elements, but the new cult was opposed by the conservative members of the tribe and grew but slowly. In general, Rave's attitude was that of a Winnebago shaman toward his medicine. He offered tobacco to the peyote as he would to a god. Rave was at first indifferent but later hostile to those who had opposed him. The converts were apparently chiefly attracted by the hope of cure of disease rather than by the visions produced by the drug. Those initiated into the cult were told by Rave that if truly repentant for sins they would not suffer ill effects from the drug but that if they relapsed, suffering would result. Apparently the drug produced a choking sensation which was relieved with acquiescence and hence it was natural for the members of the cult to feel that they were being urged by some divine influence.

About 1908, when the hostility to the new cult was at its height a new convert appeared in the person of Hensley, an educated Indian who brought Christian elements into the cult, among them baptism and Bible reading. He claimed that the full comprehension of the Bible was possible only while under the influence of the drug. For a time Rave accepted the various innovations without opposition.

About 1911, Hensley, who was of a neurotic, dogmatic disposition, objected violently to the appointment by Rave of a man of poor morals as one of the leaders in the ritual, and established his own branch of the cult, followed by some of the younger members who were more inclined

toward Christianity. His group, however, did not flourish nor was reconciliation effected, although more and more of the Christian elements were introduced into the original cult. Still further innovations were introduced by Clay, an Indian who had eaten peyote among the Arapahoe, although his ritual did not have enough of the Winnebago culture background to make it very acceptable.

The cult grew chiefly along family lines, members doing kindnesses for their relatives and then persuading them to partake of the drug. It came to be an interesting fusion of Christian and Winnebago elements woven together around the use of the drug which was itself a product of diffusion.

The form of the ceremonies varied somewhat but when observed by Dr. Radin corresponded to the following description. Services were held in church or in the open about once a week in 1913, when the original enthusiasm had died down to some extent. There was prayer by the founder, if present, songs rendered with the aid of a drum, confessions and reading of the Bible. The drug was eaten at intervals during the evening. Baptism was performed with an infusion of the drug and with words much like those used in the Christian service.

The cult in 1910 was organized with one leader and four principal participants, thus resembling the Winnebago Medicine Dance with its five leaders. As in the traditional Winnebago ceremonies, after each song the drum was passed to the man on the right of the singer. A fireplace of a "U" shape was prepared for the ceremony and on a mound were placed certain sacred objects, a staff, a drum, a rattle covered with symbolic drawings, a Bible and some of the peyote. Under the Christian influence the mound was called Mt. Sinai, the staff the rod of Moses, and some attempt was made to find a Christian precedent for holding the

meetings at night. Clay's introduction of the Arapahoe peyote cult injected further Christian elements. Clay got a friend of his to lead the meetings which were usually held at sunrise at which time a drawing of a cross was made upon the ground. Water was drunk at midnight, since Christ was born then, and the leader, wearing an otter skin cap, symbolic of a crown of glory, would blow an instrument in four directions, symbolizing the last trumpet.

The interpretation of the various aspects of the cult depended much upon the individual convert, being sometimes made chiefly in Winnebago and sometimes in Christian terms. The origin myth developed by Hensley to explain the origin of the peyote-eating reflected the Winnebago tradition. When the zeal for the new cult began to decline some of the converts went back to paganism and others became Christians. Often it is difficult to decide whether a particular element is Christian or Winnebago in its origin. While the baptism with peyote infusion seems Christian it resembles somewhat the old Winnebago custom of painting the body. Rave was a member of the Bear clan which used two sticks in its ceremonial and the staff placed upon the mound might be thus explained. The practice of confession seems Christian and yet the Winnebago already had the custom of testifying as to the effect of herbs. At least it is apparent that elements, culturally congenial, fused to give a new religious pattern.

From a study of the Egyptian religion also we find much evidence of religious change brought about by the processes of diffusion and fusion. There was a tendency for Amon of the Egyptians to be identified with Zeus of the Greeks, Isis with Aphrodite, Set with Typhon, and so on. The process of fusion was fostered deliberately by the Ptolemies through their artificial founding of the Serapis cult in order to establish a bond of unity between the Greek and Egyptian

elements in the population of Alexandria.[8] The task was not so difficult as might have been expected, for the practice of theocrasia or fusion of gods was common in both Greece and Egypt and there were certain similarities in their religious systems.

In Egypt the great mass of people were faithful to Osiris but to an Osiris who was merged with other deities. In the Saitic period, for example, Osiris became united with Ptah and an ancient deity called Seker in a triune called Ptah-Seker-Osiris to whom everyone looked for happiness after death. Apis, too, was said to be the life of Osiris. Manetho, a priest who wrote a rather bungling history of Egypt, identified the god of Sinope with Wser-hap, the deceased Apis bull, and in time there was a further identification with Osiris.

All over the Mediterranean region we find accounts similar to the Osirian myth of a man-god who suffers death and later enjoys deification. In Crete there is the legend of Zagreus, son of Zeus and Persephone, who was seized by the Titans and devoured, only to be reborn as Dionysos to reign over gods and men. In Syria there was the myth of Adonis and Aphrodite and in Asia Minor, that of Attis, the lover of Cybele. Both are similar to the Osirian myth but according to Legge are probably not derived from Egyptian sources.

In Greece the Eleusinian mysteries constituted the most prominent and the most sacred religious rites. Sacred objects were carried in solemn procession from Athens to Eleusis. There a sacred drama was enacted by priests, apparently showing the rape of Persephone. Then it was shown how Demeter came to the house of Celeus, King of Eleusis, and was detected in trying to burn away the mortal

[8] Legge, F.—*Forerunners and Rivals of Christianity,* Cambridge University Press, 1915, Vol. I, p. 50.

part of a child of that king. This incident is associated with Isis in certain versions of the Osirian myth. The next act of the mysteries, reserved for initiates, showed the union of Zeus with Demeter and the consequent birth of Iacchos, who was Dionysos in one of his forms. The initiates wandered in darkness and were then restored to a blaze of light and shown sacred objects. An ear of corn, reaped in silence, was perhaps the greatest mystery. Dionysos seems to have been identified with Zagreus, the hunter begotten by Zeus of Peresphone, who was torn to pieces but put together by Demeter. Resemblances here to the Egyptian myth are obvious. Both Demeter and Isis carry on a search and both collect the torn body of a god. Frazer is inclined to think that each of these myths had its origin in stories connected with the birth and decay of vegetation. Legge believes that this idea is too highly philosophical and mentions the claim of Herodotus that the worship of Dionysos originally came from Egypt. At least it is apparent that material existed for the setting up of a common religion.

Timotheos, apparently a Dionysian priest, was invited to collaborate with the Egyptian priest Manetho in founding a new religion which would have an appeal for the philosophical Greeks who had an abhorrence for the prevalent animal worship of Egypt. Apparently the Zeus of the Eleusinian mysteries was a god of the underworld and the dead, and hence brought near to Dionysos, who was identified with Hades. Legge writes: "In this double capacity Dionysos was therefore a brother, father, and spouse of his consort Demeter, of whom he was also the child."[9] Obviously further identifications were not difficult and we learn from Legge that, "It was agreed that Osiris was to be represented as the Greek Hades, Isis as Demeter, and the child Horus as Apollo.[10]

[9] Legge, F.—Op. cit., p. 47. [10] Ibid., p. 48.

Serapis, then, a man-made divinity, produced by the fusion of Greek and Egyptian cultures, was vaguely identified by the Greeks with Dionysos, Pluto and Zeus and by the Egyptians with Apis and more commonly with Osiris.

The material form of the new male god was determined by a dream of Ptolemy in which was revealed the bearded statue of Pluto, or Hades, at Sinope in Pontus. The statue of the new god was installed in the splendid Alexandrian temple known as the Serapeum and was associated with Horus and with Isis, represented as a modest matron.

The diffusion of the new cult took place with remarkable rapidity coming as it did at a time of general religious confusion. In Greece the new god not only partly took the place of Zeus under the name Zeus-Serapis but was also identified with Poseidon. In Alexandria, that meeting place of the Greek and Egyptian thought, the Serapis cult might be considered the dominant religion at about 800 B. C. and flourished long after the Christian era began.[11]

While the Egyptian aversion to all things new prevented the acceptance of the new cult in Egypt as a whole, it spread rapidly elsewhere about the Mediterranean. A Serapeum was established at Athens and Serapis absorbed other gods according to the principle of syncretism, even attaining a place in the Stoic philosophy as a manifestation of the divine essence. Serapis embodied the notion of fatherhood and protection, was connected with the hope of immortality, could be loved in a manner not possible to the Greek gods and was associated with impressive rites of initiation, baptism and purity. In Egypt, however, Christian influence

[11] It should be remembered that even the remarkable development of monotheism in Egypt may have been due in part to *diffusion* of Oriental influences.

became prominent and in A. D. 391 the Serapeum of Alexandria was destroyed by a Christian mob.

A great many other examples of diffusion and fusion of religion might be cited showing the influence of external factors. The rapid spread of mystery cults such as the worship of Isis, Mithrism, etc., throughout the Roman Empire shows the influence of strong desire and urgent need upon the acceptability of a doctrine.

The facilitation of diffusion due to subjective cravings is shown in striking fashion by the Ghost-Dance Religion that spread like wild fire among the plains Indians in the nineties. Having been deprived of their lands and made to suffer countless injuries by the whites, stunned by the sudden disappearance of the buffalo, filled with despair at the hopeless plight of a once proud race, these Indians eagerly grasped at the hope of a sudden millennium which would restore to them their lands, bring back the buffalo, rid them of the whites and reunite them with their dead friends and relatives.[12]

The religion founded among the Iroquois by Handsome-Lake, a religious prophet, is an interesting example of fusion in which a leader within the group was the instrument. Handsome-Lake during a sickness had a vision of four angels and the revelation of a new doctrine. He proclaimed a worship of one supreme being and the practice of ethical virtues such as peacefulness, probity and sobriety. The elements of Christian teaching in this deism are obvious.[13]

The rise of the great world religions has been for the most part by means of diffusion with modification. Buddhism spread from India to Burma and Ceylon, where it

[12] See Mooney, J.—*The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Outbreak of 1890,* 14th Report Bur. Am. Eth.

[13] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 230.

merged with primitive animism, and north to Tibet, China and Japan where it was modified almost beyond recognition. Mohammedanism, beginning with a handful of persecuted followers in Mecca, has been carried by conquering armies over half the world and now numbers over two hundred million adherents. Christianity has spread north and west from the Mediterranean basin until it bids fair to cross the Pacific and encircle the world. It now boasts well over half a billion people who are Christian, at least in name. War, trade and missionary activity have spread the gospel to the four quarters of the earth in a vast process of diffusion and assimilation.

The Average Individual and Culture Change

We have considered the mechanisms by which change in religion comes from some outside source by means of diffusion and fusion. In all of the cases noted, however, individuals are involved. Culture does not float in thin air but is carried by human beings and in its immaterial forms is simply the conscious life and behavior of these beings. When we examine the behavior of individuals or trace the diffusion of collective behavior we are looking at the same thing from two different angles or perhaps, in one case, through a magnifying glass so that the details of the process are revealed. While the appearance of the Peyote cult in the religious life of the Winnebago is due to the broad cultural process of diffusion, yet in another sense it is due to the activity of Rave, Hensley and the others, who served as catalytic agents furthering the fusion of diverse cultural elements. The individual, then, within a group furthers the modification of religion by external cultural influences but he also is responsible for modifications of pre-existing elements sufficiently radical to be considered as new inventions

—as actual innovations. The line between union and modification of pre-existing culture elements and actual invention is not drawn as sharply as sometimes supposed.

The individuals who produce cultural innovations may be divided roughly, for the present, into two groups, the average individual who more or less unconsciously modifies the culture which passes through him as a glass refracts light and (2) the true leader or innovator who furthers more radical departures from the customary ways. In each case, although especially in the latter, we are confronted with the age-old question of the relation of the individual to society, of the degree to which the individual may rise above his cultural environment and modify it by some non-culturally determined aspects of his personality. The problem of genius appears in the study of religion as well as in the study of other phases of culture. Iknaton produced a revolutionary influence upon Egyptian religion. Was this due to a temperament determined by some strange biological mutation, or was he simply the medium by which Asiatic influence was combined with existing Egyptian religion to produce a lofty monotheism?

But let us postpone to the next chapter the discussion of true leaders and turn to ordinary mortals within the group and their influence upon religious change. Just as a bit of gossip is modified and exaggerated as it passes from one person to another so is religious belief and practice slowly modified as it is transmitted from one generation to another or between individuals of the same generation. The Egyptian father by his increased care to provide for his father and for himself a splendid tomb set an example for his son. By turning to worship of Osiris rather than Re, and by providing himself with workers in the future life through magical means, although he but added emphasis to that which was practiced by others, he paved the way for

still further increments of change. The Ekoi who honestly claimed the ability to transform himself into an animal added his mite to the general belief in shape-shifting.

In the vision quest, so prominent among the Winnebago, as among other tribes of North America, is provided a means by which even the average individual may modify slightly the religious pattern of his group. True, the vision experiences often take on a stereotyped form. In a group holding four to be the sacred number the vision is likely to take place on the fourth day or night of the vigil. Often experiences are very similar, as when in each case the visionary has the feeling of cosmic exploration, that is, of having been shown the entire world. Among some peoples the vision is even more stereotyped, for example, the Tlingit require a vision of an otter sticking out his tongue on the part of a candidate who would become a shaman.[14] The rôle of the average person in producing religious change is likely to be greater where the vision quest is open to all, as among the Crow or Winnebago in contrast to the Indians of California who limit the quest to those who would become shamans.

There are a number of interesting examples of innovations in religion introduced by ordinary individuals as a result of vision experiences. A Crow Indian had a vision of a couple carrying a hoop ornamented with strawberries. On the basis of this vision was established a strawberry chapter of the ceremonial organization known as the Tobacco Society. Likewise, the Eagle chapter of this society had its origin in a vision in which an eagle demonstrated to the visionary a certain kind of tent. In view of the widespread distribution of the vision quest in North America and in other countries and the fact that in many cases a

[14] Benedict, R. F.—*The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America*, Memoirs, Amer. Anth. Ass., Vol. XXIX, p. 41.

sacred song and a medicine are sought for, many variations in the magico-religious culture pattern take place.

There is another way in which the so-called average individual furthers religious change, namely, by assisting in the secondary association of religious elements. Elements that are associated in the minds of individuals by similarity or contiguity come to be associated in terms of behavior just as magical rites develop on the basis of such an association. For example, among the Hidatsa tribe it is the customary thing to honor a kinsman of one's father upon any important occasion, hence when a novice joins a military society he adopts as a father a kinsman of his true father. Here we have the honoring of the kinsman, A, associated with an important occasion, B, but B is also associated with the specific act of joining the military society, C, hence a secondary association takes place between A and C through B, with which they are both associated. Again, among the Papuans an initiation, A, is associated with fattening of pigs for the initiation feast, B, but B, the fattening of pigs, is also associated in the minds and in the behavior of these people with a pig market where these animals are sold, C. Thus there develops an association between the pig market and the initiation, A and C, and these two events are united in spite of the lack of any logical connection between them. One further example may be given, that of the association among the Crow Indians of recital of war deeds, A, and the planting of the sacred tobacco, C. It is customary among these people to recite war exploits on any public occasion, B, hence since tobacco planting is a public occasion, by a kind of sociological syllogism there develops an association between A and C, the recital of war exploits and the planting of tobacco.[15]

[15] See Lowie's excellent chapter on *Association, Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, especially pp. 299–319.

Chapter VII

RELIGIOUS CHANGE THROUGH LEADERSHIP

We have spoken at some length of that convenient fiction, the average individual, and it is now time to point out that many people differ from the average in ways that are of the utmost significance in bringing about religious change.

Individual Differences and Religious Change

Lowie, following the lead of Sir Francis Galton, has shown that individuals in savage as in civilized society differ in their dominant type of *mental imagery*.[1] While pure sensory types are rare, accounts of vision experiences indicate actual differences as do accounts of dreams. Most of the experiences seem to have been predominantly in visual terms, that is, things were seen rather than exclusively heard or felt. As a rule, however, there was some mixture of types of imagery. For example, one man heard a shout and a whistle and then saw a handsome young white man appear. Here auditory experience preceded the visual. Another informant, however, experiences little but the sound of the spirit. Still other experiences were for the most part in motor terms, that is, terms of movement. More rarely, predominance of tactual imagery is suggested, as in the case of the woman who claimed to have a horse and a weasel

[1] Lowie. R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, pp. 224–231.

within her and doubtless did have abnormal internal sensations. Another man found a nest of eggs and claimed that one entered his mouth and always came out when a certain song was sung. Bushmen claim to experience tappings on their bodies which indicate that certain events are to take place.

There seem to be great differences in *suggestibility,* depending, at least in part, upon differences in temperament. Two Winnebago boys, for example, were unable to attain any vision experience in spite of the pressure put upon them and merely laughed at each other's painted faces, although this was perhaps due to the hypertrophy of their sense of the ludicrous. Crashing Thunder, the Indian whose life is reported so completely by Radin, was unable to attain a vision experience, perhaps due to the fact that he expected more than the ordinary person. Certain individuals show an amazing immunity from the prevailing superstition of those around them as, for example, certain Tongan kings described by Mariner.

There is no doubt of great differences in *intellectual ability* between men, literate or pre-literate. One of the Polynesian kings mentioned above was possessed of amazing intellectual curiosity, insisting upon learning the mechanism of a gun and in explaining it to others. Thanks to his rank, he was able to do away with certain well-entrenched ecclesiastical institutions. A Bantu leader named Rangare was fond of engaging in abstract philosophical discussions with missionaries and others. Lang mentions a native of Greenland who clearly presented the teleological argument for a god. McDougall tells of his friend, a chief among the pagan tribes of Borneo, who was possessed of extraordinary mental ability.[2] It is probable that the philosophical genius is to be found as among ourselves and plays as important a

[2] McDougall, W.—*Is America Safe for Democracy?* Scribners, 1921.

part in moulding the religious thought of his people as a St. Paul, a St. Augustine or a Spinoza.[3]

Aside from actual differences in intellectual power there may be vague differences in *emotional temperament* which distinguish individuals as to the intensity and constancy of their religious experience. Radin has referred to an intermittently religious type, and Lowie, contrasting two Crow Indians, Medicine Crow and Grey Bull, of equal ability, explains in part the greater prominence of the former by his more genuine and profound religious experience. He warns us, however, that intensity of religious emotion is no sure index of degree of influence. As we shall see, leadership depends not only on the traits of the leader but also upon the social situation in which he finds himself. It is not a personal attribute; it is a social process.

The Mystic.—The mystic, as Leuba has shown, is a personality of peculiar type, one which is a potent cause of religious change. Mysticism, the experience of the mystic, he writes, "means an experience taken by the experiencer to be a contact (not through the sense, but 'immediate,' intuitive) or union of the self with a larger-than-self, be it called the World-Spirit, God, the Absolute, or otherwise." [4] The mystic has found other means of contact with the supernatural than by a direct and business-like relationship.

The delights of mystic communion are often sought by means of artificial stimulants, wine, tobacco, various drugs, and by fasting and rhythmic movements. The dervishes work themselves into such a frenzy by wild dancing that they eagerly lick red-hot irons and stab themselves, apparently feeling little pain.[5] The longing for an enhancement

[3] Radin, P.—*Primitive Man as Philosopher,* Appleton, N. Y., 1927.

[4] Leuba, J. H.—*The Psychology of Religious Mysticism,* Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1925, p. 34.

[5] Cited by Mooney, J.—14th Report Bur. Am. Eth., 1892–93; pt. 2, Chapt. 16.

of life leads to attempts at communication with the divine and to the use of methods that give at least the semblance of success. Says Leuba, "The dreams of simple men can soar no further than the sensuous delights, the relief from painful moral effects imposed by society, and the impression of complete freedom and unlimited power bestowed upon them by narcotic drugs and other physical means of ecstasy. Therefore, they regard drug-intoxication as divine possession or union." [6]

It is true, however, that for certain individuals such as the Yogi philosophers and the Christian mystics, no such artificial methods of communication with the divine are necessary. Of the latter, Leuba says: "We shall find that in some of its phases the mystical ecstatic trance brings to the Christian worshiper also hallucinations, incomparable sensuous delights, an impression of limitless power and freedom; and, in other phases, of complete relaxation and perfect peace, and the Christian mystic also thinks of these ecstatic experiences as divine union." [7]

Mysticism has a long history and shows the characteristics of a cultural movement as well as indications of being a phenomenon of peculiar personality types. Known from time immemorial in India, it finds an early European representative in Plotinus, who is followed by a long series of men and women claiming more intimate communion with the divine than is accorded to ordinary mortals and who in some cases, for example, that of St. Francis, have had a profound influence upon religious history. Hugo of St. Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, Suzo, St. Catherine, St. Theresa and, more recently, Mme. Guyon, were all mystics, some of whom have left revealing accounts of their strange experiences. St. Paul, who may be considered in large meas-

[6] Op. cit., p. 34.
[7] Ibid., p. 36.

ure the founder of Christianity, had much in common with the famous mystics. Leuba fully appreciates the importance of these religious geniuses as agents furthering religious change. He writes: "Persons of this kind may obviously be dangerous to the stability of old institutions which have come to regard their truths as the only truths. But these god-intoxicated persons may also perform the invaluable function of innovators, revelators and inspirers." [8]

Mental Abnormality and Religion.—Many of the mystics were subject to trances or hallucinations, and approached definitely pathological mental types. This brings us to a brief mention of the enormous rôle that mental abnormalities have played in the history of religion, a story that will perhaps some day be told in full by a psychiatrist who is both historian and anthropologist.

The detailed account by Bogoras of shamanism among the Siberian Chukchi tribe shows clearly that a large proportion of the true shamans were hysterical, epileptic, homosexual or actually insane. From childhood on they are sensitive and hysterical, it is said, and they are detected as future shamans by their bright eyes and the frequent visions of spirits with which they are favored. Bashful and easily frightened, they, as a rule, do not want to become shamans but are supposed to be coerced by the spirits into the long period of struggle and preparation which is a preliminary to professional practice for priests and doctors. Bogoras says of the Chukchi, "Nervous and highly excitable temperaments are most susceptible to the shamanistic call. The shamans among the Chukchi with whom I conversed were as a rule extremely excitable, almost hysterical, and not a few of them were half crazy. Their cunning in the use of deceit in their art closely resembled the cunning of a luna-

[8] Ibid., p. 6. See Haydon, A. E.—*The Significance of the Mystic's Experience,* Jr. of Rel., March, 1922, pp. 179–89 for opposite view.

tic." [9] Some were extremely violent and it was necessary to place all knives out of their reach. A female practitioner had been insane for three years, and required care on the part of her household in order to prevent her from doing harm to herself or others. The homosexuals among the shamans enjoyed special prestige, a situation similar to that among the Crow and the Sea Dyaks of Borneo.

The animistic idea of possession and inspiration by spirits lends special prestige to the neurotic and insane as religious leaders. As we have seen, this idea had its origin in part in the existence of pathological types. All over the world the trance is considered not only a departure of the soul but also a means of supernatural revelation. Thus a long line of prophets, seers and messiahs have wrought religious changes on the basis of alleged revelations received in trance states. The famous Shawnee prophet fell into a trance and obtained an alleged revelation from the Master of Life which he preached with great success. He denounced witchcraft and preached a return to the old mode of life followed before the coming of the whites. Smohalla, a prophet, fell into trances, allowed himself to be pricked with needles, and threatened not to return from his trance if his followers should fail to obey his commands. Mohammed was said to be subject to trances and to have received in these states revelations of profound significance in the history of the world.

Never was actual madness more rampant than during the occupation of the city of Münster by the Anabaptists in the years following 1533 under the leadership of John of Leyden, unquestionably a madman with paranoid delusions. As a religious despot his most insane fancies were put into practice, the mildest of which was the practice of

[9] Quoted by Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 242.

polygamy. Finally, after a desperate defence by the fanatics the city fell before a Bishop's army and the theocracy ended with death and torture for the survivors.[10] A visit to any large hospital for mental diseases reveals a large number of inmates with delusions of a religious character. Many are the reincarnations of Christ locked within four walls, and many a poor addled mind is obsessed by a conviction of divinity. In view of the remarkable eloquence with which many patients proclaim themselves divine, one cannot but feel that many of them would have been movers and shakers of the world in a more superstitious age.

Types of Religious Leaders

Given the individual differences pointed out above, it is inevitable that certain men should stand out as religious leaders, although as we shall see, the social situation is equally important in the phenomena of leadership. Any attempt at classification of religious leaders is bound to fail of complete success, because of the overlapping of the types and the possibility of more than one rôle played by a single individual. Nevertheless, we may suggest that religious leaders fall roughly into the following five types: (1) the priest or shaman, (2) the religious teacher or philosopher and (3) the religious executive, (4) the prophet and (5) the messiah.

The Priest.—The priest or shaman, as he is called in some primitive tribes, is found all over the world and probably has existed in some form ever since a division of labor assigned to certain individuals the task of dealing with the supernatural for the benefit of all. Among the Winnebago

[10] Wallis, W. D.—*Messiahs: Christian and Pagan,* Badger, Boston, 1918, Chapt. VI.

many of the theological doctrines bear the mark of priestly hands, having altered, for example, the contract theory of the relation of men to the gods and having raised Earth-maker to his supreme position. Among the Ekoi the diviner plays an important part in determining which ancestral ghost shall receive sacrifices, and who has been guilty of bewitching his fellows.

Perhaps nowhere have priests had more influence than in ancient Egypt. It was the priests of a particular city, of Thebes, for example, who raised their local god to a higher position when political changes made it possible. The defeat of the monotheism of Iknaton was essentially due to the hostility of the priestly classes. In the Middle Kingdom the increased use of charms may have been due in part to attempts on the part of priests to line their pockets by fostering superstition. These religious leaders may be of all types. The highly educated priests of Egypt and Babylon not only engaged in profound philosophical speculation, but as early scientists mapped the stars of heaven. The half-crazy shaman of a primitive tribe throws fits in order to scare away evil spirits. While often a bulwark defending the existing order, these officially recognized religious leaders, through their attempts to bring order out of theological concepts, to reconcile divergent creeds brought together by cultural diffusion, to advance local interests and to develop new ways of deriving economic gain and social prestige from their followers, have been potent agents of religious change.

The Teacher.—The second type of religious leader we have called the teacher or philosopher and as it is a type well known, few illustrations are necessary. The most striking example among our sample religions is that of Iknaton, the imperial teacher of monotheism. He is by no means solely a teacher but is also an executive, for his rôle in

impressing his doctrine upon others was anything but passive.

The dramatic story of Iknaton related by such students as Breasted, Erman and Sayce reveals the profound influence of an individual upon his time, and yet this appearance of an apostle of solar monotheism is a reflection of the existing conditions. The remarkable campaigns of Thutmose III extended the boundaries of the Egyptian realm and ushered in vast political changes. Thought became tinged with universalism. Re, the sun-god of Egypt, was conceived as holding sway over all lands and all peoples. It was but a step to monotheism as a kind of imperialism in religion. The further influence of politics on religion is shown by the identification of Amon, the local god of Thebes, with Re when that city rose to power. It was in spite of opposition by the powerful priesthood of this god that Iknaton established a monotheistic solar faith.

Of Iknaton, the man, little is known, separated from us as he is by more than three thousand years of human history. A fanatic, no doubt, like many teachers who have moved the world, even thought by some to be insane as judged from his associates and the morbid expression which his statues bear.[11] He was an original thinker it seems and yet perhaps in part merely the meeting point of two streams of culture. Sayce is inclined to trace the influences that led to the formation of the new religion to Asia. The mother

[11] Erman, A.—*Handbook of Egyptian Religion,* p. 63. It is interesting to note in connection with this suggestion made by Erman, the following statement recorded in *Science News Letter,* July 2, 1927, p. 6:

"Discovery of a red crystalline sandstone head of the youngest of Akhn-Aton's daughters shows the same peculiar shape which has become familiar in portraits and the mummy of her father. The view that this peculiarly shaped head was not due to disease, as was at first suggested in the case of Akhn-Aton, but that it was a family characteristic, is supported by the new find, and also by the fact that the head of Tut-ankh-Amon is similar. So close is the resemblance that it is considered possible that Tut-ankh-Amon was not only the son-in-law but also the son of Akhn-Aton."

of the king was a foreigner and from her he derived ideas alien to his own culture group.[12]

While the personality of Iknaton must remain always something of a mystery, it is known that he came to power about 1375 B. C. and soon began to spread a new faith throughout his realm. The monotheism of Iknaton was built around a highly abstract conception of the sun-god as a great universal being or force, the source of all warmth and life in the world. To this god the royal reformer gave the name of Aton, and devised for him a new symbol consisting of a sun disk with rays stretching out in the form of arms. So closely is Aton identified with light and warmth and beauty in the universe, that the worship approaches a pantheism in spite of the personality attributed to Aton which had loving fatherhood as its essential attribute.

The zealous king changed his own name from Amenhotep to Iknaton so as to include the name of his god rather than that of the priests of Amon. His vast power as an Oriental ruler was used to establish the new religion throughout the entire Empire of Egypt and he built a new city as a center for the faith. This city was located at a place now known as Tell el-Amarna, and contained a magnificent temple erected with artistic innovations as radical as those he sought to introduce into religion.

Inscriptions remain which preserve for us a splendid hymn to the new sun-god, perhaps written by Iknaton himself. The universal splendor and power of Aton are proclaimed in the following poetic lines:

"Thy dawning is beautiful in the horizon of the sky,
O living Aton, Beginning of life;
When thou risest in the eastern horizon,

[12] Sayce, A. H.—*The Religion of Ancient Egypt,* T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh, 1913, p. 35.

Thou fillest every land with thy beauty.
Thou art beautiful, great, glittering, high above every land,
Thy rays, they encompass the lands, even all that thou hast made.
Thou art Re, and thou carriest them all away captive;
Thou bindest them by thy love.
Though thou art far away, thy rays are upon earth;
Though thou art on high, thy footprints are the day." [13]

In these lines there is a remarkable revelation of aesthetic and religious sensitivity. Iknaton with his passion for light and beauty and his intense awareness of divine presence may well be called a "god-intoxicated man." As is often the case, however, the intolerance of Iknaton for the religion of others was in proportion to his fervor for his own. For all his genius, he must be regarded as a despot by the lover of religious freedom. A record of his repression of the old hereditary faith is found in the countless inscriptions so altered as to erase the names of other gods, or modified by the introduction of the word Aton.

The ultimate outcome of the struggle was a complete defeat of Aton and the triumph of Amon (or Amen) and the priesthood. After the death of Iknaton inscriptions were once more changed by the vengeful priests and every attempt made to obliterate all traces of his blasphemous crusade. The power of the priesthood then rose to its crest and from 1350 to 1100 B. C., the Egyptian reached its greatest brilliance. The palatial temples of this period are almost without rival down to the present day, and the splendor of the offerings and the ceremonies was all that vast wealth could command. At Thebes, membership in the sacerdotal organization was not confined to men for a queen or princess was regarded as the wife of Amon, and in this capacity enjoyed great power, both political and religious.

[13] Breasted, J. H.—Op. cit., p. 324.

It is easy to pay high tribute to Iknaton in spite of his fanaticism and he is termed by Breasted the "first individual in history." His personality seems so little moulded by his culture that he was able to set his face against tradition and by his distinctive intellectual attitude establish for the time being a new age in religion, life, and art. The past was not to be wiped out, however, even by the hand of a king, and Iknaton took his place in front of that long line of tragic figures, the men born out of their time.

Seeking for further illustrations of this type of religious leader, the Christian would naturally turn to the history of his own religion and there find abundant illustrations. Many of the Old Testament prophets were essentially teachers leading the erring feet of the children of Israel along the narrow path of monotheism. Thanks to their teaching, Jahveh became no longer a tribal god but one whose glory was declared by the heavens themselves. It was these philosophers who found an answer in the doctrine of immortality to the problem which confronted Job, the misery and injustice of this life. Perhaps no better example of religious teaching is to be found than in the Sermon on the Mount. Paul, like Christ, was a religious teacher and one who introduced classical philosophy into the Christian tradition and transformed Christianity from a Jewish sect into a world religion. Of the early founders of Christian doctrine perhaps no one had more influence than St. Augustine with his vast learning and profound philosophical background. The achievement of Thomas Aquinas in synthesizing and giving a rational basis to Christian dogma is well known.

The Buddhist, on the other hand, would immediately think of Buddha, five hundred years before the time of Christ, sitting beneath the sacred Bo tree, meditating upon human misery and seeking some escape from the eternal cycle of birth and rebirth. To the Chinese mind would

come the thought of Confucius teaching the doctrine of reverence, piety and adherence to tradition; or of Lao-tse, halted on the boundaries of the empire and there writing his religious philosophy.

The Executive.—In relation to the *executive type* of religious leader we think at once of the active life of Paul organizing churches throughout the Mediterranean world; of popes who could dominate powerful kings in that long struggle between church and state; of Mohammed launching Islam upon its career of world conquest. A less prominent representative of this type of leader is the Ekoi chief who spread his own terror of witchcraft throughout his land and whose personal fear compelled many innocent victims to undergo a cruel ordeal. Among the Jews there is Bar Kokebas, a combined messiah and executive, who in a revolt against Rome led an army of 200,000 for two or more years and reigned practically as a king before he was conquered by the Roman legions. There is also Popè, a Tewa medicine man of New Mexico, who preached independence of Spanish rule and led a revolt that ended in driving the Spaniards out of the country and destroying for a time all traces of Spanish culture and religion. One of the most conspicuous religious leaders of the executive type of modern times was Brigham Young. As the leader of the Mormon theocracy he held practically the power of life and death over his followers. As he himself said, the latter fate was decided by a mere crook of his finger.

The Prophet.—The prophet, as a fourth type of religious leader, deserves a more detailed discussion than that accorded to the priest, the teacher and the executive types which are better known. The prophet may also be a priest, but often is not. He is the individual who serves as a mouthpiece for some divine power, giving warnings, threats, and commands, but not arrogating to himself divine attrib-

utes, nor heralding a glorious millennial change, as does a true messiah. There is often, however, no very clear distinction, for in a single individual the rôles of prophet and messiah may overlap. The data from the Ekoi and Egyptians fail to disclose any good example of the prophet type of religious leader but a goodly number are to be found among the North American Indians.[14]

Indian Prophets.—Patheseske, who appeared about 1852–1853 among the Winnebago, had visions directed against the Sioux, a tribe with whom his own people were continuously at war. Among the Delawares, deprived of their lands and smarting with resentment against the whites for the massacre of their tribesmen, one of the first Indian prophets appeared. This nameless prophet began preaching about 1762 and was associated with the Pontiac rebellion. He announced that he had been in the abode of the Great Spirit and had received a message forbidding war between the Indian tribes, the practice of polygamy, the use of alcoholic drinks, and the practice of magic, and also instructions in regard to the formation of a new ritualistic organization. He claimed to have received a prayer-stick on which were engraved in native hieroglyphics a prayer to be recited at certain times. Instructions were also given in regard to sacrifices and ritualistic cleanliness. Fire-arms were not to be used, but by following instructions and seeking aid from supernatural power the whites were to be driven from the country. The Shawnee prophet who succeeded the religious leader described above has already been mentioned, and in view of his claims to supernatural power and his more definite envisagement of apocalyptic ending to

[14] See Mooney, J.—14th Report Bur. Am. Eth., Chapters II to IX. MacLeod, W. C.—*The American Indian Frontier,* to be published by Knopf in the History of Civilization Series, Chapter on Indian Messiahs. Also Wallis, W. D.—*Messiahs: Christian and Pagan,* Badger, Boston, 1918.

the hostility of whites and Indians, he may more properly be classified as a messiah. In 1819 Kanakuk, a Kickapoo prophet, showed the influence of the Delaware prophet, especially in the use of prayer-sticks.

Smohalla was another interesting Indian prophet. Born sometime between 1815 and 1820, after contact with a Catholic mission he achieved some success as a warrior and as a medicine man. In a fight, however, with Moses, a neighboring chief, Smohalla was worsted and barely managed to drag himself to a boat in which he floated down the river, and was considered by his tribesmen as dead. After long wanderings which brought him as far south as Mexico and in contact with Mormons and other whites he returned to his people, claiming to have returned from a visit to the spirit world, a story which in view of his strange disappearance received ready credence. He preached that the early conditions of Indian life would return and that the white man would withdraw from the land. He was constantly opposed to agriculture as an indignity to Mother Earth. He was able greatly to enhance his prestige by foretelling eclipses with the aid of an almanac borrowed from the whites. Unable, however, to obtain a recent edition his astronomical predictions were cut short with some danger to his reputation. His ability to put himself in a trance-like state was due apparently to a kind of self-hypnotism like that of modern spirit mediums. He founded a cult in which Catholic and Mormon elements were blended with traditional Indian beliefs and practices, this cult being known to the whites as the "Dreamers," in view of their beliefs and attempts to enter artificially into trance states.

The Mormon Prophet.—There is no lack of prophets among peoples of other than Indian culture. Mohammed obtained a revelation which became the basis of a great world religion. The rôle of the Old Testament prophets

in developing the doctrines of monotheism and immortality is well known. It would be possible to give an interesting account of William Miller, founder of the Millerite movement of the forties, later to be mentioned; of Swedenborg, the philosophical genius who illustrates the influence of mental pathology upon human history, and of a host of other religious prophets. Space is lacking, however, for even the briefest sketch of any number of such men. It would perhaps be better to present a single example chosen from our own time with some account of the historical setting in which the prophet moved in order to illustrate the social aspect of leadership. Let the curtain rise, then, to reveal Joseph Smith, the founder of Mormonism. While a vast literature has grown up about this modern Mohammed, unfortunately, disputes in regard to both fact and opinion are numerous. In the following pages our chief reliance will be placed upon Linn's exhaustive study based upon original sources, especially those provided by the Mormons themselves, and written in a critical yet unbiased historical spirit.[15]

Joseph Smith was born in 1805 in Royalton, Vermont, of a family of farmers and peddlers who had the reputation among their neighbors of being shiftless and lacking in veracity. Joseph seems to have had little education, being barely able to read and write. He was known at the time as a ragged, lazy fellow with a reputation as a prodigious liar. The father had been interested in digging for buried treasure and for several years the son made this his chief occupation. Apparently a visit to Pennsylvania sometime around 1825 gave him the idea of crystal gazing, due to the finding of a curious stone which was used for this purpose. Later, he obtained possession of a similar stone while a well was being dug, and with the aid of this "peek-stone" he did a thriving business among his superstitious neighbors

[15] Linn, A. W.—*The Story of the Mormons,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.

in looking for lost objects with the aid of visions which he claimed to be able to see in the stone.

The finding of the gold plates which are supposed to contain the revelation which is the basis of the Mormon faith is the subject of various conflicting stories. One account has it that Joseph once told of bringing in some white sand which for a joke on his family he claimed to be a golden Bible. According to Joseph's father and others, the original story was of a dream of buried treasure and its subsequent discovery by the future prophet under the guardianship of the ghost of a Spaniard with his throat cut. Later, Smith in his autobiography tells of a revelation of the buried plates by an angel acting as a messenger from God. Smith refused to let any one see the plates, saying that a person other than himself viewing them would be stricken down. In the later accounts of his find he claimed that together with the plates were buried two stones with silver bows fastened to a breast plate, this apparatus, called Urim and Thummim, having been prepared by God for translation of the book. Linn thinks that Rigdon, who was responsible for most of the theological material in the Mormon Bible, substituted "the more respectable Urim and Thummim for the 'peek-stone' of ill-repute, as the medium of translation." [16]

Few of Smith's neighbors paid the slightest attention to his alleged discovery, the only exception being a religious fanatic by the name of Martin Harris, whose sanity was questioned in view of his claims to have seen Christ, to have visited the moon, and the like. He gave fifty dollars to Smith and seems to have been encouraged to do this by the idea that money might be made out of the new Bible. Smith started his translation of the Bible about 1827 in Pennsylvania. According to Hale, Smith's father-in-law, who con-

[16] Ibid., p. 33.

sidered the whole business a fraud, Smith translated by the aid of a peek-stone, giving out translations which were copied down by Harris. Harris, however, was at times suspicious, and demanded to see the golden plates but was put off with various excuses and when allowed to follow Smith's tracks to where the plates were hidden, could find nothing. He obtained from Smith, at last, a copy of some of the original characters and took them for examination to a scholar who pronounced them meaningless, being apparently a confusion of various ancient alphabets. He warned Harris that he was the victim of a fraud, but apparently without success, for Harris remained unconvinced and Mormon writers actually testified as to linguists' favorable comment upon the inscriptions and their translations.

Under pressure from Harris, Smith inquired of the Lord if Harris might show portions of the manuscript to others, and permission was finally given to show the manuscript to five people, including his wife. In so doing the Lord made a mistake, for that woman had complete distrust of the entire scheme and burned or otherwise did away with a considerable portion of it. Smith was far more concerned over this loss than might be expected of a mere translator. We have hints of a conference with a stranger and then a revelation is given out by Smith to the effect that he was directed to make the new translation from a different book in order that wicked persons who might attempt to point out inconsistencies would be properly confounded.

The Smith family seems to have become suspicious of Harris, and the rest of the translation was apparently carried on with a certain Oliver Cowdry as the scribe. There was considerable difficulty in obtaining a printer, since most were convinced that the entire affair was a fraud. Finally, Harris's farm was mortgaged and the printing was undertaken, although the spelling and grammar of the manuscript

were so bad that the printers insisted upon making some correction of these details. Before the task was finished it was necessary for Smith to present a revelation from God calling upon Harris to make payments to the printer.

While evidence necessary for complete proof is lacking, Linn demonstrates the probability that the Mormon Bible was in part copied from a manuscript written by Solomon Spaulding called "The Manuscript Found." [17] This imaginative individual, stimulated by the finding of certain bones in Ohio, wrote an account to show that the Indians were the descendants of a lost tribe of Jews, and gave in detail their history in this country. At one time this document was in a printing office in which Sidney Rigdon, later to be mentioned, was employed, and he was said to have made a copy of it. While the whole affair has been the subject of bitter controversy by Mormon and non-Mormon writers, there are many witnesses to testify to the remarkable similarity between the Mormon Bible and the romantic account read by Spaulding to many of his friends.

Linn believes that Sidney Rigdon had actually more to do with founding the Mormon faith than Smith himself. Rigdon was an eccentric individual of considerable learning and ability, formerly a Campbellite minister before a quarrel with the leaders of that sect. The Mormon Bible contains elements of the Campbellite teaching and the idea of a new Bible seems to have been part of their doctrine. Rigdon seems to have known of the Bible before it appeared and there is evidence of secret meetings between himself and Smith. There is reason to believe that he would not have hesitated to participate in a deliberate fraud in view of his later retranslation of the Hebrew Scriptures with Smith in order to add a prediction of the coming of Smith as the prophet. He was a person of considerable education and

[17] Ibid., pp. 50–58.

was apparently familiar with "The Everlasting Gospel," a document engraved on copper plates and found buried in the earth after a revelation by a heavenly messenger, according to the tradition of the thirteenth century. He seems to have furnished the Biblical knowledge, lacking to Smith, that together with material from the Spaulding manuscript went to make up the Book of Mormon, as the new Bible was called.[18]

Much stress is laid by Mormons upon the fact that several witnesses testified to having actually seen the plates, but even according to Smith's account they knelt in prayer and saw the plates in a vision rather than directly. Others, under close questioning, seem to have seen them only with the eye of faith. It is furthermore significant that several of the witnesses were of questionable character and some of these men so chosen by the Lord were later thrown out of the church for stealing and other offences. An amusing hoax was perpetrated upon Smith in connection with the so-called Kinderhook plates. Some men buried these plates, etched with acid, and then dug them up in the presence of Mormon witnesses. Smith studied them and pronounced the plates to be a history of the descendants of Ham.

After the publication of the Bible, which at first had very little sale, the next step was to organize a church and obtain converts. In 1829, Smith and Cowdry went into the woods and had a vision of John the Baptist appearing in a cloud

[18] Schroeder is in essential agreement with Linn in regard to the origin of the Book of Mormon. See Schroeder, T.—*Authorship of the Book of Mormon,* Am. Jr. Psych., Vol. 30, No. 1, Jan., 1919, pp. 66–72. Werner thinks that Smith was the author, his subsequent revelations proving him competent to have produced this dullest of all books. Werner attempts no systematic proof of his position, however, and fails to refute all the arguments of Linn. The outcome of the controversy, while important, is not vital to our illustration. Ses Werner, M. R.—*Brigham Young,* Cape, London, 1925, pp. 57–64.

of light, who conferred upon them the priesthood of Aaron and other powers. The two men then baptized each other and, revealing to the world the powers that had been conferred upon them, undertook to obtain converts to the new faith. They were able to convince a few people and for a time there was a revelation indicating the Lord's approval in the case of each new convert. In 1830, Smith had a revelation in regard to church organization which was very likely prompted by Rigdon. For a time Smith was generous in allowing revelations to others than himself but when Cowdry seemed inclined to use this prerogative to the danger of his own authority he had a revelation setting limits to the power of others and soon all revelations were "Given Through Joseph the Seer." The first conference of the organized church was held at Fayette, N. Y., in June, 1830. There was some persecution for the prophet was in his own country among people who knew of his background; but this persecution has probably been exaggerated. Smith had rather a cautious revelation that the Lord *in his good time* would smite any one who laid hands on his prophet. A conference of Smith with Rigdon apparently led to the moving of the church to Ohio, where converts seemed easier to obtain due to the fact that the western population was more accustomed to revivals, new sects and creeds.

In Kirtland, Ohio, Smith's revelations continued and showed that he was influenced by the millennial ideas of the time which later culminated in the Millerite movement. A revelation of 1831 announced that the "great day of the Lord is nigh at hand." [19] Strange as it may seem, Smith's revelations greatly impressed his followers, gave him a hold on them, and enabled him to use them for personal advantage. At one time he seems to have acquired $1500 from a woman convert whom he then sent away in the name

[19] Ibid., p. 109.

of the Lord, satisfied that she had been the object of a special revelation. The faith of his followers seemed proof even against failure of specific prophecies. For example, he foretold success in obtaining a printer for the Mormon Bible in Canada, but with a failure of the enterprise was able to make excuse by saying that some revelations were from the Devil, though he gave no rule by which they could be distinguished from those of God. Curiously enough, Whitmer was appointed historian of the church by means of a revelation, but later God's judgment was made questionable for he was removed as utterly incompetent. There can be no doubt but that Smith was reckless in the use of revelations, having received as many as thirty-five in the year 1831, though he was zealous in repressing such tendencies in others. A man named Roberts was tried for having a revelation that a brother should give him a suit of clothes and a gold watch and for saulting the sisters with a holy kiss.

In spite of his rôle as a seer Smith seems to have originated little of the church polity, which became more of a problem as the church at Kirtland soon had over a hundred members. Rigdon by his standing as a minister and scholar was able to influence some rather prominent men to become converts. Both he and Smith seemed inclined to discourage pathological symptoms, such as convulsions and the like, which had been common during revivalistic activities in the past in that locality. Some difficulty and suspicion was engendered at this time by the idea of a common stock of goods that was discussed. This may have had something to do with the tarring and feathering of both Smith and Rigdon at the hands of a mob.

There seems to have been some rivalry between Smith and Rigdon, and the former had a revelation stating that he should be the sole recipient of revelations. Divine in-

struction was also given that the material wants of Smith be provided for. The amazing domination of Smith over Rigdon, manifested at this time and later, was due perhaps to his knowledge of some secrets of Rigdon's life, perhaps to his greater aggressiveness. Rigdon is rebuked in a revelation as follows, "And now behold, verily I say unto you I, the Lord, am not pleased with my servant Sidney Rigdon; he exalteth himself in his heart, and receiveth not counsel, but grieveth the spirit. Wherefore his writing is not acceptable unto the Lord; and he shall make another, and if the Lord receiveth it not, behold he standeth no longer in the office which I have appointed him." [20] At one time Rigdon was temporarily deprived by Smith of his license to preach.

In 1833 Smith announced a revival of the gift of tongues, meaning that the members of the church would utter sounds which would be translated by some other member of the congregation. A speech in real Choctaw made by a sceptic was, curiously enough, translated as being a description of the glories of the new temple. A few alleged miracles were performed by Smith and others, such as cures of sick people. Some Egyptian mummies which had been on exhibition were bought by Smith and the hieroglyphics translated as being a history of Abraham. A real translation by an Egyptologist showed that the inscription thought by Smith to be Abraham sacrificing upon an altar was really Osiris coming to life. Shown a Greek manuscript of the Psalter Smith explained, "It ain't Greek at all, except perhaps a few words. What ain't Greek is Egyptian and what ain't Egyptian is Greek." [21]

There were financial difficulties in Kirtland both for Smith and for the church. Smith opened a store, while a

[20] Ibid., p. 133.
[21] Ibid., p. 141.

sawmill, lots and other property were owned by the church. A costly temple was built at an expense quite beyond the means of the Mormons at the time. Smith made a trip east in search of treasure hidden in a house, but apparently he hired the wrong house and this lapse into his old occupation ended in failure. A revelation was the basis for the establishing of a bank and the issuance of money in violation of the banking act. The currency issued was not redeemed in specie and ultimately Smith and Rigdon were forced to flee the country. At this time there was considerable dissension within the church. Smith refers to members of his flock as thieves and drunkards and reciprocal accusations of dishonesty and sexual immorality were made. The church was actually made the scene of acts of violence.

The settlement in Missouri to which Smith fled had been established previously through missionary activity among the Indians and considerable misrepresentation made of the wealth of the country. The Mormons were inclined to view the country as a promised land given unto them by God, and thus incurred the hostility of the non-Mormon residents. Acts of violence and pillage were performed on both sides and finally, in spite of certain bombastic military gestures by Smith as the leader of a Mormon force, the Mormons were forced to move to Clay County. Here a revelation as to tithing was made in 1838 and a considerable portion of the contributions seems to have found its way into the pockets of Smith and other leaders. Relations with the Gentiles were no better than in Jackson County and following an inflammatory speech of Rigdon a state of civil war ensued which seemed likely to develop into a war of extermination. Avard, the leader of the Danites, a secret order, partly police, partly assassins, was captured, and also Smith and other leaders. Smith finally escaped and the Mormons moved into Illinois. It was necessary for him to

obtain a revelation from the Lord in order to explain the failure to establish Zion in Missouri.

Smith, unwilling to relinquish his power, attempted a concentration of the Mormons at Commerce City, later known as Nauvoo. The site purchased proved unhealthful and there was difficulty in making payments, yet in spite of Smith's defects as a leader and financier, the new city had a population of some 14,000 in 1844. Part of this population was due to immigration from abroad, for missionaries had been sent out to England and elsewhere, traveling without purse or script, preaching the new gospel. In England they made some clumsy attempts at miracles and in one case a corpse about to be raised to life by Mormon elders was raised even more suddenly by a sceptic who attacked the corpse with a whip. In spite of their methods the Mormons could lay claim to some 27,863 adherents to their faith in England and Scotland.

In a revelation Smith proclaimed the need of a temple and one was built at considerable expense. A college was also founded. Smith's position was strengthened by a revelation that he "was to be a presiding elder over all my church, to be a translator, a revelator, a seer, and a prophet." [22]

Due in part to the political situation in Illinois at the time, the Mormons were able to obtain a charter for their city that gave it amazing independence of state control. Smith allowed Bennett to be elected mayor, but they later quarrelled and Bennett was driven out. For a time Smith tried to play with both political parties in the state, each eager to obtain the Mormon votes. When arrested on the charge of instigating a murder he was protected by his city court and when the old Missouri charges of treason were brought against him he was able to escape, thanks to the balance of political power which the Mormons held.

[22] Ibid., p. 236.

There is no trace of an inferiority complex shown in Joseph's attitude toward national politics. He published a naïve list of solutions for national problems, and in 1844 became candidate for the office of President of the United States, sending out a large body of his ablest followers to campaign for him. As we shall see, this campaign was cut short by the murder of the prophet.

The relation of Smith to the internal affairs of Nauvoo is of interest. The Mississippi had long been infested with bands of thieves and it seems that many of them sought advantage and protection by joining the Mormon faith. That thievery was common is suggested by the custom of calling for the restoration of stolen property on Sunday. It is an interesting reflection upon the conditions within the city that Smith felt called upon to issue a solemn protest that he was opposed to thievery. He seems to have had a very busy time, holding as he did a great number of offices, military, civil, and religious and being of necessity on the alert for a revolt against his authority. He says of men working on a public building, "If any man is hungry, let him come to me and I will feed him at my table . . . and then if the man is not satisfied I will kick his backside." [23] In 1843 Smith reprimanded Rigdon and the latter offered to resign his office, but in the end Smith magnanimously retained him. The prophet still considered himself an authority on finance, and undeterred by previous failures, again in 1842 became storekeeper.

Being a hearty and jolly fellow, he played ball in addition to clerking in the store and carrying on the manifold duties that his selection by God as his human agent involved.

There seems little doubt that Smith is responsible for the doctrine of polygyny with which the Mormons are chiefly identified in the popular mind. There was also a spiritual-

[23] Ibid., p. 263.

wife system by which individuals A and B, destined in heaven for mates, who had in some way come to be married to other persons, might enter into a relationship with each other regardless of their legal marriage. There have been claims made that Smith had taken spiritual wives before the revelation in regard to polygyny. The sister of Snow, one of the Mormon leaders, herself tells of entering into such a relation with Smith. It is claimed that he made advances to the wife of Orson Pratt, and carried his pursuit of Rigdon's eldest daughter to a point where she was forced to make complaint. The revelation in regard to polygyny was contrary to previous revelations and to the Mormon Bible and seems to have been dictated by Smith's own passions. Clayton tells of an interview with Smith during which an account was given of the revelation. Clayton wrote it down and proposed to show it to Emma, Smith's wife. Joseph agreed but remarked, "You don't know Emma." This was apparently true, for Clayton was met with a burst of righteous indignation. Linn is convinced that the revelation of 1843 proclaiming polygyny was devised by Smith to force the submission of his wife, who was in rebellion against his infidelities.

Now comes the end of a remarkable career. Some of the abler men of Nauvoo rebelled against Smith's autocracy and published a hostile paper which was suppressed by him and the printing equipment destroyed. This fanned the flame of indignation against the Mormons and the Gentiles prepared for war. A large force was collected and Smith finally gave himself up to answer a charge of riot and was imprisoned in jail at Carthage. The jail was attacked by a hostile band of militia, perhaps with the aid of the guards, and Smith was killed. Thus ended the career of the man supposed to be the mouth-piece of the God of a universe some three hundred thousand light-years in diameter. It

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

139

is amazing that a man, who to an open-minded observer seemed to have had little virtue beyond good nature, could have had such influence. Certainly, he must have had some power as a leader and a certain amount of shrewdness, but perhaps the real reason was that he was the center of the whole system. If faith in him as a prophet was lost then the entire religion must collapse like a house of cards. Apparently he had little real religious feeling, although here Werner might disagree. Without attempting to pass moral judgment upon the man, it seems the Lord chose a weak vessel indeed to fill with the Holy Spirit.

The Messiahs

Let us turn for a moment to that type of religious leader which we have termed the messiah. The history of self-designated divine leaders heralding some momentous eschatological event is a long one, as Wallis has clearly shown.[24] Even in ancient Egypt there are hints of a messianic hope. In the Zoroastrian religion there is the idea of a messiah who will raise the dead, confer immortality by means of a mystic drink, and recompense all according to their deeds.

Jewish Messiahs

Among the Jews, the people most prone to messianic movements, the idea arose immediately after the captivity. Messiahs are nourished by despair and during the darkest times the messianic hope burns brightest. At the height of the Roman oppression there were a number of messiahs such as Judas, leader of the Zealots, who was crucified about the time of Christ. The hope for a saviour was so strong that even as the temple was about to be burned a messiah gathered a great crowd in hope of a miraculous deliverance.

[24] Wallis, W. D.—*Messiahs: Christian and Pagan,* Badger, Boston, 1918.

These leaders were not so common under the prosperous rule of the Maccabees nor among the Jews in Alexandria, a city more free from trouble and oppression. In the fifth century a messiah in Crete led the Jews into the sea in the direction of the promised land and many of them were drowned. Messiahs continued to appear down to the time of the Crusades when there arose a belief among the Jews that it was time for them to join the ten lost tribes in a great movement. Messiahs appeared in France, in Cordova, and in 1160 arose David Alroy in Asia Minor, who aroused considerable enthusiasm and whose return was predicted after he had been killed. Solomon Mocho successfully predicted floods and comets and thus obtained prestige in Rome and elsewhere until killed by the Inquisition. It is interesting to note that many swore to seeing him eight days after his burning. In 1623 there was the report of the birth of a child near Babylon who talked at birth and proclaimed himself the true messiah.

Sabbatai Sevi was perhaps the most famous of the Jewish messiahs and is the hero of a romantic account by Zangwill. This person was said as a child to have learned the Cabbala rapidly and to have been beautiful of body, naturally exhaling a fragrant odor. Soon he began to preach and aroused the hostility of the Rabbis by "announcing himself openly as the Son of David and having the temerity, in proof of his divine mission, to utter the Ineffable Name, Jehovah." [25] He went to Saloniki and later to Egypt. During these travels he was met by a man who had had a vision of his messiahship. This strengthened his claims and he preached far and wide, proclaiming himself the messiah with great success. His followers went into trances, spoke with tongues and proclaimed his name. His position was further strengthened by marrying a woman who long ago

[25] Ibid., p. 59.

in spite of her questionable virtue had proclaimed herself the future wife of the messiah. The excitement among the Jews in Europe was tremendous and many sold all their property and put the money at the disposal of the man whom they regarded as their saviour. As Wallis says: "From many parts of Europe came Jews to pay not only their homage, but, what was still better proof of their unwavering confidence, their money, to this future deliverer of his people." [26] Sevi soon came in conflict with political authority and the Sultan offered him the chance to prove his messiahship by allowing three poisoned arrows to be shot at him, with death or Mohammedanism as the alternative. Sevi apparently doubted the efficacy of his supernatural powers against arrows and decided to embrace and preach Islamism. There was a remarkable tendency for his followers to cling to him in spite of this betrayal and he was succeeded by one Cardoso who also went over to Islamism. It is interesting to note that the appeal of these movements was strongest in those localities where oppression was greatest, as among the Jews of Poland. A number of sects showing traces of Sabbatarian influence existed down to recent times.

Mohammedan Messiahs

Messiahs are by no means restricted to the Jewish people, although when they arise elsewhere it may be due in part to the diffusion of the messianic idea. Among the Mohammedans there has long been a belief in the coming of a Mahdi. The first one appeared between 685 and 705. Several other messiahs arose who after establishing new rites and purifications were crucified. In 902 Abn Abdallah had political success for a time. Says Wallis, "The Mad Hakim (996-1020) most famous of the earlier Egyptian

[26] Ibid., p. 62.

Mahdi, 'disappeared' rather than died, and his reappearance is still confidently awaited by the Druses in the Lebanon Mountains and the Hauran." [27] The best known of his successors is the Mahdi of the Sudan who defeated government troops in a remarkable fashion. The rebellion was not quelled until Kitchener brought a considerable body of troops to bear. The Turkish forces who attacked the Mahdi actually believed that their bullets turned to water, and made bullets out of silver to use in an assault.

In India there were a number of messiahs. One Hakim Singh, a dirty ascetic, claimed to be a reincarnation of Jesus Christ and started a movement which was partly political in nature. In 1838 a man claimed to be an Avatar, i.e., a reincarnation and also a Mahdi and a messiah. The Mad Mullah who in 1897 led a fierce attack on the British claimed to work miracles and to be invisible at night. He retained the faith of his followers even after they had sustained terrible losses. The Bab who appeared in Persia in the middle of the nineteenth century started a succession of messiahs who made appeals to men of various religions and founded the religion known as Bahaism, supposed in 1913 to number some two million adherents.

Indian Messiahs

Messiahs have perhaps been as numerous among the American Indians as among any other people. In South America there appeared among the Beckaranta, a Guiana tribe, a messiah who gathered women and property from his followers and prophesied that the Indians were not to be driven out by the whites but were to have firearms, to have white girls for wives, and to have white skins. In

[27] Ibid., p. 95.

order to bring this about the Indians were to kill one another, but within three nights at the time of the full moon the dead would arise in their white skins and enjoy the land. "When the Indians hesitated to begin killing one another, he clubbed some of them and broke their skulls so that they fell into the troughs in which the paiwari was being made. Of this liquor mixed with the blood of the dead he drank himself and gave others to drink. Then, the passion of the Indians being fully aroused, intertribal hates made themselves felt, and some four hundred people of both sexes and all ages fell victim to a bloody massacre.

"The full moon and the night of resurrection came but those four hundred did not return to life. The people being disillusioned, the prophet was knocked down with a club, joining the ranks of the four hundred, and, like them, did not revive in proof of his prophecy." [28] Further evidence as to human gullibility is furnished by the account of the Eskimo Great Sage who caused his followers to march up a mountain bare-foot with the result that their feet were frozen.

By far the greater number of messiahs are found among the Indians of North America rather than in the southern continent. Two causes assigned by Wallis, namely, vigor of the Indian stock and Christian influence, do not seem to have operated much differently. MacLeod is doubtless nearer the truth in pointing out that in South America the Indians were assimilated into the white culture and religion while in the north they were steadily driven back, cherishing always memories of their former greatness. It may be significant that in the south the Indians were more uniformly exposed to a Catholic rather than a Protestant religion. As MacLeod shows, the existence of oppression does not mean the necessary occurrence of a messiah for no such event is

[28] Ibid., p. 147.

recorded among the Irish, "surely the saddest of all nations under the sun." This, he suggests, is due to the fact that theirs was a mystery religion.[29]

The Delaware prophet, previously mentioned, might be considered as the first recorded messiah in North America but it seems more appropriate to classify him as a prophet. There is no doubt, however, that the famous Shawnee prophet, a brother of Tecumseh, is to be regarded as a true messiah. He was held to be an incarnation of Manebozho and his words were therefore believed to be the utterances of a deity. He forbade the use of certain foods, the use of alcoholic drinks, intermarriage with whites, the making of fire with flint and steel, and, like the Delaware prophet, he opposed the practice of magic. In the latter part of his career, under the influence of his brother, he lent religious sanction to military activity against the whites. Unknown to his brother, he began a battle with the whites assuring his followers that the white men's bullets would fall harmless at the feet of the Indians and that they would have light in abundance whereas their enemies would be involved in thick darkness. During the combat he performed magic rites and inspired his courageous but deluded followers. The Indians were, however, decisively defeated, and with this discrediting of the prophet came a rapid dissolution of the new religious cult. Somewhat later there arose a Kickapoo prophet, Kanakuk by name, and among the Kiowa likewise there appeared messiahs. In 1881 a young Kiowa began to make medicine to bring back the buffalo, obtaining considerable interest and support from his tribesmen. In 1887 another prophet revived his work, claiming that the whites would be destroyed when the buffalo came back. He claimed the power to kill with a look, and ordered his tribe to Elk creek where he promised to bring down fire from heaven

[29] MacLeod, W. C.—*The American Indian Frontier,* Knopf, 1928, from manuscript.

to destroy the whites and to render his people proof against their bullets. His followers were speedily disillusioned but retained an interest in later messianic movements such as that of the Ghost Dance religion.

While Smohalla was a prophet with a messianic tinge, we must turn to the Paiute for the next true messiah. While in a mountain solitude, this messiah, Tavibo by name, received a revelation from the great spirit and shortly before 1870 was predicting a cataclysmic destruction at the end of which the Indians alone would be resurrected to enjoy a new earth. This doctrine spread over the plateau region and among the tribes of Northern California, who had suffered from white oppression. It was this prophecy which was revived by the last and most influential of the American messiahs, Wovoka.

In 1889 Wovoka, a member of the same tribe as Tavibo and rumored by some to have been his son, announced a revelation obviously showing the influence of his predecessor. The famous Ghost Dance which was the central feature of his teaching was similar to that recommended by Tavibo. It was claimed that the buffalo were to return driven before the spirits of dead Indians, resurrected to enjoy an earthly Paradise in which no oppressive white man was to be found. Like Tavibo, however, he brought no message of war but one of peace, advising the Indians to live peacefully with the whites and with each other. His message of peace was not, however, acceptable to the plains tribes suffering from the disappearance of the buffalo and rankling with the injustices which they had suffered at the hands of the whites. With amazing rapidity the new doctrine spread among the plains tribes and everywhere the Ghost Dance was performed that they might be reunited with their dead friends and that the happy future event might be hastened. Many tribes sent emissaries to visit the messiah, some of whom were pro-

foundly impressed by this ignorant and apparently mediocre employee of a white man.

Certain simple sleight-of-hand and hypnotic performances were accepted as miracles and Wovoka was accepted as a true messiah. Others remained unconvinced and it is significant that he, like many another prophet, received but little honor among his own people. Apparently the preceding movement led by Tavibo had lowered their suggestibility. Wovoka himself under the influence of Christian teaching, at times considered himself a second Christ come to a world grown old and waiting to be renewed. Yet when his teaching, more or less perverted by the plains tribes, became associated with military outbreaks, such as that of 1890 among the Sioux tribes, he was inclined to renounce this rôle. The entire movement is an interesting example of the influence which a mediocre individual may have upon religious conceptions under the appropriate social conditions.[30]

Space is lacking here to give any complete account of the surprisingly numerous messiahs in human history. It is sufficient to point out similar phenomena among the Ebionites of about A. D. 100, the Anabaptists, the so-called Fifth Monarchy Men of Cromwell's time, and the Adventists led but a few decades ago by William Miller. Wallis says of such movements, "They abound in Mohammedan countries: In Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, the Sudan, Abyssinia, and India. They are found among African tribes, in Melanesia, the Philippines, Thibet, China, and in the older Buddhistic Japan as well as in the Japan of today." [31]

It would have been interesting to render a more complete account of the long list of teachers, prophets and

[30] See Mooney, J.—14th Report Bur. Am. Eth., Chapts. IX to XV.

[31] Wallis, W. D.—*Messiahs: Christian and Pagan,* Badger, Boston, 1918, p. 246.

messiahs that have arisen among the whites in the United States. To Joseph Smith and William Miller would be added the haughty figure of Mary Baker Eddy. We would learn of the early neurotic traits of the pretty little New Hampshire girl, of her widowhood after marriage to Glover, marked by violent attacks and fugues and occasional delirium which was soothed when rocked in a large cradle. Her marriage to the dentist Patterson, cradle and all, ended in divorce. There followed somnambulistic crises, attempts at clairvoyance and spiritualism, and the march of this proud woman, suffering from physical and mental ills, from relative to relative seeking shelter only to quarrel with each in turn. A fall brought paralysis, but in 1862 she met Quimby, the star who led her to her destiny as founder of a new religion. Quimby, the faith healer, admired the handsome woman and in a few days was able to cure her so that she was capable of a dramatic ascent up the 182 steps of the town hall. She wrote enthusiastic letters, even love sonnets it is said, and attached herself to him as a kind of secretary until he died in 1866 of an abdominal tumor too malignant to be overcome by faith.

Mrs. Eddy renewed her wanderings with new energy and ambition, armed with many of Quimby's manuscripts. A failure as a healer, she taught others and with the aid of Richard Kennedy set up a clinic at Lynn. In her relations with him she was jealous and quarrelsome, finally accusing him of practicing malicious animal magnetism. The same story is repeated with another pupil who introduced her to her third husband, Gilbert Eddy, and aided her in preparing the first edition of "Science and Health." She accused her pupil of immorality, even of wizardry, and tried to revive in 1877 the witch trials of earlier days. There is reason to think that she hired the bravo who attempted his assassination, and she and her husband were fined.

After the death of her third husband in 1882 we find her a woman of 61 yet with tremendous energy and self-confidence starting her school in Boston. A periodical was issued and various courses, including one in metaphysical obstetrics, were given at high rates of tuition. Money and success soon were hers in spite of the spectacular death of a woman under treatment in childbirth and the appearance of one Dresser in 1883, armed with disconcerting letters, who told of her relation with Quimby. Interest in Quimby led to the schism of the New Thought Movement. She stood firm and, wielding papal power, forbade her pupils to read any other work on mental treatment than her own. She was acclaimed at a great reception in Chicago, fragments were torn from her dress as relics and, as with other religious leaders, the paralyzed were healed by touching her garments.

The great Mother Church was started in 1894 and remained almost completely under the control of this remarkable woman until she died in 1910, full of years and of honor, to take her place with Buddha and Mohammed as the founder of a new religion.[32]

It would be fascinating to trace the careers of Dowie, Campbell, and others who played their parts in making America one of the most fertile of all countries in the breeding of new cults. Space is lacking, however, and the subject has been splendidly treated in recent books.[33]

The Social Nature of Leadership

The entire question of leadership, religious or otherwise, is exceedingly complicated. Much ink has been spilled

[32] Janet, P.—*Psychological Healing,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, Vol. I, pp. 54–97. (Based on Milmine, etc., with recognition of reply of Wilbur.)

[33] Ferguson, C. W.—*Confusion of Tongues,* Doubleday, Doran, N. Y., 1928. Seldes, G.—*The Stammering Century,* John Day, N. Y., 1928.

in defending the thesis that the leader is merely a product of his time. On the other hand, it has been claimed that the leader is a self-determined agency for bringing about social change. Wallis writes in regard to religious innovations: "These new religions seem to show that the individual is a social system in himself capable of taking from other cultures and giving this to his own group. He, more completely than the group, embodies the religious concepts and is the source of their development." [34]

The entire history of messianic movements is an account of interactions of individuals with particular social situations. Are these individuals products of a social situation characterized by oppression and despair together with the presence of a messianic idea, culturally diffused, or do they themselves create in part the situation? No definite answer can be given, but certain propositions may be formulated which throw some light upon the problem of religious leadership.

(1) We may recognize that in some cases the leader merely introduces some element from an external culture. This was true in the case of Hensley and Handsome-Lake, the Iroquois leader, both of whom were agents for the diffusion of Christian doctrines. Often in such cases there is no particular originality.

(2) On the other hand, the leader may recombine local and cultural antecedents into a new religious invention. An extreme instance is that of Joseph Smith, or more properly, Sidney Rigdon, who recombined Biblical tradition, an historical romance and contemporary Campbellite theology to found the new Mormon religion.

(3) The individual combining local or foreign cultural elements or fusing these two may or may not be a unique individual who alone could do these things. It is a well-

[34] Ibid., p. 132.

known fact that identical mechanical inventions have often been made by two individuals at the same time.[35] For example, steam railway transportation was developed by both Stephenson in England and Stevens in this country. If Leibnitz had not invented the calculus Newton would have done so. As a matter of fact he did develop it independently. Had Wovoka never lived it is quite possible that some other messiah might have started a movement similar to if not identical with the Ghost Dance religion. The problem here is of the influence of unique biological events on cultural history.

(4) Given the cultural antecedents and individuals with the potential ability of great leaders, the need for an invention or innovation may be so lacking as to prevent its conception. It is questionable, for example, whether a messianic movement could have developed among the Plains Indians at the height of their power and prior to the disappearance of the buffalo, even if the potential leader and the cultural antecedents were in existence. We know that the Ghost Dance religion had little appeal for the Navaho tribes who were strong and secure with some 16,000 people and plenty of land and wealth.

(5) Slightly different from the preceding proposition is the possibility that there may be the leader, the antecedents, and a need, but that the innovation when conceived may fail to have influence because of the prevailing attitudes. There are many examples of religious innovations that have fallen upon unfertile soil and failed to take root. The Ghost Dance religion originated among the Paiute but had little local influence, perhaps due to the disillusionment following the Tavibo cult which the plains tribes had not experienced. It is interesting to note that in the forties a prediction by William Miller of the imminent end of the world obtained

[35] Ogburn, W. F.—*Social Change,* Huebsch, N. Y., 1922, pp. 90–102.

wide credence. Recently a man making a similar prophecy convinced no one outside his own family. Here we have the individual cultural antecedents and at least a personal need, yet an unresponsive social environment.

(6) Finally, it may be pointed out that the religious leader, although occasionally a true genius, given a favorable situation may be essentially a mediocre individual, a person with greatness thrust upon him. Wovoka was certainly personally inferior to most Indian messiahs in spite of his greater influence. Only a biased mind could attribute to Joseph Smith any unique and superlative religious genius. It should be stressed that often the subsequent followers of a religion are far superior to its founder.

(7) We may conclude, then, that a biological variation may produce a unique individual who may dominate even a hostile environment, given a minimum equipment of cultural antecedents; such an individual is by no means completely culturally determined. As a rule, however, religious change is due to an individual of ability, but not unique, who combines cultural antecedents, local or foreign, aided by an existing need and whose innovation after conception is influential, thanks to a receptive cultural situation. Leadership, then, is a social process not to be understood by a separate consideration of either the leader or his time.

Chapter VIII

RELIGION AND OTHER PHASES OF SOCIAL LIFE

The preceding discussion has shown that religion is a culture pattern which is deeply imbedded in the structure of social organization, and that social factors are important in determining the origin, form, content and continuity of religion. Durkheim, Robertson Smith, King and others have very properly thrown their searchlights on this side of the picture. These relationships need, however, some further examination.

Religion and Social Organization

There are many strands that hold the fabric of social organization together both in primitive and civilized societies; common locality, real blood-relationship, fictitious blood-relationship which is the clan bond, age, generation, sex, occupation and recreation. Intertwined with these invisible threads is religion. Sometimes it is in itself one of the strongest of all social bonds. To follow the religious thread into the web of social organization is a task beyond our province but certain interrelationships may be pointed out.

Totemism is a widely discussed and much disputed element of culture that is generally held to represent a union of social organization with supernaturalism. This curious attitude towards plants, animals, and perhaps inanimate objects, is widely distributed although not universal, as once

was thought. It is common in North America, being found in the southwest, among the Woodland tribes, and in a particularly high state of development, in certain of its aspects, among the Indians of the northwest coast. It is found in British Guiana, in Africa among the Bantu and Sudanese, and in a highly developed form throughout Australia. It is sporadic in its occurrence in Melanesia and there are traces in India and elsewhere. As Goldenweiser has shown in various studies, totemism is no uniform system of thought and practice but is rather of such variety as to make the term almost meaningless.

The elements that make up the totemic complex are (1) the tracing of descent from some animal or plant, (2) the sharing with it of certain traits, such as the cunning of the fox, (3) belief in protection by the totem, (4) the representation of the totem in art, (5) certain taboos, especially in regard to eating the totem animal, (6) the naming of the group after the totem animal, (7) the magical ceremonies to multiply the totem animal, and (8) exogamy, or prohibition of marriage within the totemic group.[1] This last trait is almost universal where anything that might be called totemism is found. Taking the name of the animal and claiming relationship with it are common, as are taboos in regard to it. Several traits may, however, be lacking in a given group while others receive especial stress. For example, magical rites to increase the totemic animal are prominent in Australia, while on the northwest coast the artistic representation of the totem reaches perhaps its highest development. The most distinctive thing about totemism, according to Goldenweiser, is its inevitable connection with a social system. The above traits, or rather, certain of them, are associated with a clan group, members of which are assumed to be blood relatives. The Winnebago,

[1] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., p. 287.

for example, are divided into twelve clans named after animals, real or mythological. The direct relationship between religion and totemism is minimized if Goldenweiser's claim be correct that, "totems are not worshipped. Animal and plant worship and the deification of inanimate Nature, are not totemism. Almost everywhere, in fact, these forms of religion exist side by side with totemism." [2]

This statement is in itself a bit dogmatic and is not intended to imply that totemism does not connect religion and social organization. Mrs. Benedict claims that the Osage Indians do have a religious attitude toward their totems and shows that while there is no evolutionary relationship between the guardian-spirit concept and totemism, yet the two are associated and the guardian-spirit concept often gives a religious character to totemism.[3] Admitting with Goldenweiser that totemism is not identical with animal worship it is possible that the latter may have developed from the former in certain cases. There is some suggestion of this development in the animal worship of ancient Egypt. Even where full-fledged totemism is lacking the clan may be the social unit connected with the religious system. We have seen that some of the ceremonies are essentially clan feasts. Both the Snake Clan and the Bear Clan feasts of the Winnebago have as their object the attainment of blessings by means of the mystic relationship between the clan members and certain animal spirits.

Religious Societies, so common throughout the world, like totemism, establish a relationship between religion and social organization, but it is not always easy to maintain a distinction between religious and social aspects of such group life. Certain Ekoi groups claim the power of transforming

[2] Ibid., p. 287.

[3] Benedict, R. F.—*The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America,* Mem. Am. Anth. Ass., Vol. XXIX, pp. 62–64.

themselves into some particular species of animal such as elephants or buffaloes. Among the Winnebago it is sometimes difficult to distinguish a purely religious society, such as that composed of those blessed by the Buffalo Spirits, and quasi-religious groups organized upon a clan basis. The War-Bundle Feast, for example, is based partly upon individual ownership of war bundles and partly upon clan ownership of these collections of sacred objects.

There are, however, religious societies which, unlike totemic groups, have no relation to a clan organization. The scalp dance of the Winnebago brings together individuals between whom no blood relationship is assumed. A tobacco society of the Crow Indians is another example, as are the shamanistic brotherhoods found all over the world. The False Face Society of the Iroquois is made up of individuals who, wearing masks and other regalia, seek to control the bodiless, headless spirits known as "faces," believed by them to haunt the woods. West Africa is a land of powerful secret societies of which the Egbo society of the Ekoi is a good example, although here the fact that Egbo means leopard gives a faint suggestion of a totemic origin. The Egbo society with its displays of horrible masked figures and its dark and secret rites is not the only religious group among the Ekoi. The women have their own cult of the Goddess Nimm with rites at which no man may be present. An entire volume could be devoted to secret societies among primitive peoples which are largely religious although partly recreational in motive.[4] It is sufficient here to point out that the churches of civilized communities also combine religious with important social functions.

The *family* as a religious group may receive but a bow of recognition, having been already discussed as a social influence on religion. In the early days of Roman history

[4] See Webster, H.—*Primitive Secret Societies,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1908.

the family as the center of ancestor worship was a religious institution and the Roman father yearned above all things for a son to carry on the family rites. In China down to recent times the worship of the spirits of departed family members was a dominant phase of religion. Family worship persists throughout the Christian world although the home has lost much of its halo.

A word should perhaps be said in regard to *social organization as based on sex* in relation to religion. It is almost impossible to generalize as to the position of women in religious life but there does seem to be some slight subordination. Positions of leadership are less likely to be filled by women although priestesses and female shamans are known. Secret religious societies, as that of Nimm, may be restricted to women but more commonly they have an exclusive male membership. In Australia and Melanesia elaborate initiation ceremonies are kept secret from the women and they are terrorized by bugaboos created by the male imagination for their benefit. Lowie is probably correct in assigning the apparently subordinate position of women in religious life to their menstrual function, which all over the world subjects them to strict taboos, such as segregation for considerable periods.

Political Organization bears as intimate a relation to religion as does family life. The effect of political expansion on Egyptian religion is seen in the monotheism of Iknaton. During the long history of Egyptian religion, however, traces of localism persisted. Many gods were local gods who rose to prominence as did Ptah and Amon with the political good fortune of particular cities. Not only in Egypt but also in Rome and among many primitive tribes the King or other political leader was considered divine.

An excellent example of the relation between religion and political organization is found in the nationalistic basis

of the Chinese religion. Here, just as the head of a family is regarded as the high priest of his household, so is the sovereign of the state the high priest of the nation, with the duty of controlling unseen powers in the interests of his people. The Chinese Emperor is known as the Son of Heaven and once a year a sacrifice is offered by him on the Celestial altar. Clennell writes, "eclipses and earthquakes, floods and pestilences were held to be the symbols by which the powers above expressed displeasure at Imperial sins, to be averted and propitiated by Imperial prayers or pilgrimages or confessions of contrition." [5] For the people, the Emperor was an embodiment of superhuman power and the Chinese Empire was also a papacy. Here Caesar and the Pope were one individual from the first. An amusing illustration of the relation of political organization to that of religion in China is shown in the system by which the Chinese government required gods to be registered, and for a time forbade them to be reincarnated outside of Tibet.

Further evidence of the interdependence of religion and political organization is found in the political character of many of the messianic movements. Popè was a Tewa medicine man and a religious leader but he led what was essentially a political revolution against Spanish domination. The entire history of messianic movements among the Indians of North America is tinged with the political motive of a yearning for freedom from oppression by the whites. The messianic movements among the Jews have in most cases had their political aspect. For these people a messiah was a means to an end, namely, political independence. Frequently a movement religious in its conception has entered into political phases. For example, Abu-Abdullah, a Berber theologian, at first confined his activity

[5] Clennell, W. J.—*The Historical Development of Religion in China,* Dutton, N. Y., 1917, p. 54.

to religious teaching and to a passionate and ostentatious protest against the wickedness of his Mohammedan fellows. His presumption more than kept pace with the growth of his popularity. He even seated himself upon the throne of the Sultan and bitterly indicted this ruler for his wickedness. With the puritanical zeal of a Carrie Nation he emptied out wine into the streets and was roused to fury by the sound of a musical instrument. The strength of his position is shown by the fact that he presumed to pull a sister of the Sultan from her horse because she did not wear a veil, and yet escaped with banishment rather than the death penalty which would ordinarily follow such an indignity. He accumulated a large military bodyguard and soon openly declared his claim to temporal power. For several years he was at the head of a state within a state while waging successful war against the Sultan.[6]

Many examples might be cited of *social classes* closely connected with religious organization. In Polynesian society, one of the most highly stratified that has ever existed, the nobles claimed divine descent and exclusive possession of a soul. The priests who, as leaders and as oracles, were sometimes called "god-box," came almost exclusively from the lesser nobility. On the other hand, on the island of Mangaia the highest noble was the priest of the highest god. The taboo system for which Polynesia is famous gave a religious reinforcement to social stratification. The chief or noble was assumed to be filled with mana which made both his person and objects which he touched taboo, that is, not to be approached lightly. One could not eat the remains of a chief's meal without risking disease or perhaps death, nor touch his head, pass close behind him, nor eat in his presence. Religion gave economic advantages to rank, for by touching

[6] Wallis, W. D.—*Messiahs: Christian and Pagan,* Badger, Boston, 1918, Chapt. VII.

a choice palm tree or tying about it a white cloth, a noble might render it thus taboo and acquire what amounted to personal ownership.[7] Again in the African kingdom of Uganda the king is to some extent the representative of his people in dealing with the supernatural and the chiefs of the various gens have charge of temples of certain national gods. The degree to which a king and his people are identified in the eyes of God is shown by the Bible story of David's statistical activity. Tempted by Satan to number Israel, this king is given by God the choice of three penalties, personal death, famine or pestilence. Preferring a vicarious punishment, seventy thousand of his people are said to have perished by pestilence for his personal indiscretion.[8]

The socio-religious system of Polynesia calls to mind the caste system of India in which, likewise, social rank is hedged in and buttressed by a multitude of taboos. Sometimes, as in California, the quest for a guardian spirit is restricted to a particular class. Often ceremonial and religious privileges are inherited like more material forms of property or may be purchased and accumulated until, rather than a plutocracy, we find a class enjoying special religious privileges.

There have been a number of examples of societies in which political organization and religious organization are identified even more completely than in China. The temporary Anabaptist theocracy at Münster has already been mentioned. An even more interesting example is that of Buddhistic Lamaism of Tibet. In this country from the eleventh century on the temporal power of Kings has been overshadowed by the Buddhist hierarchy. The Dalai Lama of Lhassa is considered an incarnation of a deity and rules over a population in which a third to one-half of the males

[7] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 81.
[8] I Chron. :21.

devote themselves to the religious life as Lama-monks. The church is supreme and until recently a stranger wandering into this priest-ridden country was in danger of torture and death.[9]

During the last century in the United States there has been an excellent example of an ecclesiastical state. The Mormon church under the leadership of Brigham Young, prior to the so-called Mormon war of the fifties, was practically in absolute control of the Territory of Utah. Economic, legal, administrative, and military functions were wedded to the ecclesiastical in a social polygyny under that able but ruthless autocrat, Brigham Young. The Mormon state repeatedly offered defiance to the Government of the United States and there were dreams of political as well as religious expansion.

Religion and Patriotism

An intimate association, psychological, social, and historical, between religion and patriotism is suggested by the preceding discussion. The association can hardly be doubted by any who witnessed the solemn farce enacted from 1914–1918, during which period nations, professing a religion of which the chief tenet is brotherly love, slaughtered each other in the name of God. The priests and ministers of every country participating sent young men out to die with the assurance that theirs was a holy cause, a war for justice and for civilization. On each side the chief ally was a Lord of Hosts strangely divided against himself in a kind of divine schizophrenia. The core of the patriotic sentiment is the idea of a country, glorious, sacred, and virtuous. Bound to this idea are emotions of assertion (denied free

[9] Clennell, W. J.—*The Historical Development of Religion in China*, Dutton, N. Y., 1917, p. 186.

outlet when linked with the idea of self), love, hatred of enemies, and reverence for a land, a people, and a glorious national tradition. There is the sweet sense of security and support derived from a common belief with one's fellows. There are many similar elements in the religious sentiment. Here, too, we have a supreme value. The ideas of a god, a faith, and a tradition furnish the core of a sentiment which has many common emotional elements with the sentiment of patriotism. Here reverence is perhaps the most important element, but there is often also a hatred of enemies of the faith and an egotistical exaltation at participation in a group of chosen people. As in the case of patriotism, emotion and conviction are deepened by the realization of similar reactions on the part of others. True, in the case of religion, belief is in supernatural beings or powers, but with more refined conceptions of a deity of a non-personal character the distinction between these two attitudes becomes slight.

The intimate relationship in social organization of religion and patriotism has already been suggested. For many centuries kings ruled by divine right and to this day men have given up their lives for God and country. Many of the ancient empires such as Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria have been justly termed military-religious. For the Jews, throughout their long history, religion and patriotism have been identified. Wherever were gathered together believers in a God of Israel there was the Jewish country. The gigantic drama of the crusades is a striking illustration of the partnership between religion and patriotism in motivating military activity. During the wars which followed the Reformation we have a blending of religious and patriotic motives to produce perhaps the most bloody, most ruthless, and most devastating campaigns in the annals of military history.

In one sense most wars are Holy Wars. In Mohammedan history, this aspect of militarism has been conspicuous. Mohammedans are not unique in this respect, however, for but a few years ago there were ministers of the gospel calling for a Holy War against the Turks in retaliation for atrocities visited upon the Armenian people. Bishop James Cannon of Virginia wrote to the Secretary of State, "A prompt and definite American demand, supported if necessary by American naval units, would probably have prevented and certainly greatly minimized the Smyrna fires and massacres.

"I believe Almighty God will hold the Government responsible for inaction while thousands were murdered and deported." In support of this plea we have the Biblical quotation, "Curse ye the land of Meroz, said the angel of the Lord; curse ye the inhabitants thereof, because they came not to the help of the Lord, to help his most valiant men." The *Methodist Recorder* favored a military demonstration, should it be necessary. "Let the American Government send, not a single second-class ship to those troubled waters, but a formidable armada, and the Stars and Stripes would then become something more than a symbol of far-away sympathy to the eyes of the Near East. Until the Christian nations assert themselves as becomes their proclaimed ideals and their professed zeal for civilization, Armenia must continue to suffer at once the curse of war that never ends and the tyranny of a nation that knows no mercy." [10] We raise no question as to the justification for righteous indignation in regard to the Armenian massacres, but it seems unlikely that the interest in intervention would have been so great had the oppressed people been of other than the Christian faith.

Often the rewards and punishments of the future life

[10] Lit. Dig.—Oct. 21st, 1922.

have been invoked to urge the soldiers of the Cross and the Crescent to face death bravely in a Holy War. Similar special privileges for the spirits of departed warriors who died bravely are believed in by primitive peoples. A pious Winnebago father quoted by Radin, declares, "My son, it is good to die in war. If you die in war, your soul will not be unconscious. You will have complete disposal of your soul and it will always be happy."

Religion has doubtless aided men to face a noble death but it has also forced them to die in delusion and to suffer hardships in the cause of economic greed, political aggrandizement, and petty disputes of doctrine.

Religion and the Aesthetic Impulse

The relation of religion to political organization, patriotism, and other phases of social life has been brought out in the preceding discussion. A similar interpenetration may be seen in the relationship between art and religion. It is interesting to note in this connection that Malinowski, as we have previously seen, conceives of religion as being an end in itself while Barnes points out that the enjoyment of art is desirable for its own sake.[11] Lowie likewise asserts that ceremonialism provides its own self-justification. In view of the readiness with which a common element is isolated by these writers we may easily assume an extensive overlapping of religion and art. It requires no citation of authority to show the blending of religious, recreational and artistic motives.

We have described religion as a culture pattern involving belief in mysterious powers, the emotion of reverence, and behavior tending to bring man into relation with these powers. Art has not only affected these various phases of re-

[11] Barnes, Albert C.—*Art in Painting,* Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1925, pp. 24–25.

ligion but has been in turn influenced by them. Obviously this separation of aspects of religion with a view to their separate discussion in relation to art is an arbitrary dissection of a culture pattern which has an organic unity for the purposes of convenience.

Art and the Belief Phase of Religion.—*Myths.* Conspicuous among the arts which have flourished in primitive cultures is that of myth-making, a practice which seems to be almost universal as far as anthropologists have been able to discover. Myth-making, being more widely distributed even than the making of proverbs, may not be due to an invention in a single locality with subsequent diffusion. Sharing the universality of religion it may be that myth-making either had a spontaneous multiple origin in various localities or else arose but once, at a time of such antiquity that there has since been diffusion over the entire world. Gayley adheres to the former interpretation and states that: "Given similar mental conditions with similar surroundings, similar imaginative products, called myths, will result." [12] Until more scientific evidence may be accumulated it seems perhaps most plausible to assume that mythology, like religion, originated as part of an original universal culture pattern developed by the interaction of man and nature. But although the birth of myths is somewhat uncertain, their subsequent influence may be traced, for we find that they are an integral part of culture and that they exert a profound influence upon the manners, customs and thought of primitive society.

Among American anthropologists there has been recognized a difficulty in distinguishing the myth from the folk tale. Boas separates the myth, the description of a pre-cosmic era in which animals had the power of talking, trees of moving, etc., from the folk tale which deals with the

[12] Gayley, C. M.—*Classic Myths,* Ginn & Co., Boston, 1911, p. 49.

ordinary world as it is today. Malinowski defines the folk tale as a "seasonable performance" and an "act of sociability," the legend as a more or less historical account, and the myth as a sacred tale which is closely interwoven with rites, ceremonies and the religious life of the people.[13] Such distinctions, however, are difficult to maintain. A myth, in the broad sense of the term, is a tale, preserved in the oral traditions of a culture, which has a social or religious significance in addition to its frequent aesthetic value.

On examining the mythology of various primitive tribes we find that the myths group themselves naturally into a more or less rough classification. In every culture we find myths about origins, about the gods, about unsatisfied desires and longings, and myths created solely for amusement, as an end in themselves.

Myths of origins deal with the creation of the earth in a more or less wondrous manner, the birth of man, the birth of a particular race, the creation of natural objects, and the beginnings of customs. The Winnebago have an account of the creation of the earth in the origin myth of the Medicine Dance in which Earthmaker comes to consciousness, weeps, and then by the force of his thought creates the earth. Among the Greeks we find one account of the River Ocean which was the beginning and source of all, as well as other versions of the creation myth which assert that men sprang from earth, from trees, from stones, and waters, and not from an original pair, as in the Hebrew account. Closely connected with the creation of man are the myths explaining the origin of his attributes. The Caribs have an interesting myth "How Pain, Misery, and Death Came Into the World." [14]

[13] Malinowski, B.—*Myth in Primitive Society,* Norton Co., N. Y., 1926, p. 28.

[14] Roth, Walter—30th Rep. Am. Bur. Eth., 1908–1909, p. 179.

We are all familiar with the story of Pandora opening the box which set free troubles upon mankind. Natural objects, such as plants, animals, and trees were explained by myths, as in the myth of how Chipmunk got his stripes, long ago when Bear scratched his back. The Ekoi have similar tales such as "Why Snake has Neither Hands Nor Feet," an account of the disobedient Snake on the farm of Obassi Nsi who was deprived of his feet and hands in punishment for eating plantains intended for guests.[15] There are many myths recounting the origins of customs, most of which end with the words, "and that is why we do this." Among the Ekoi are to be found similar myths in explanation of the position of women in the community, such as "Why Men Must Serve Women," a myth describing the life of men and women before they lived together in the same town. Eventually, according to this tale, the men decided to come and live in the town of all the women and thus were obliged to serve them always. Thus we find that primitive peoples have recounted in their myths explanations to satisfy themselves of the origin of the earth, of man himself, of his surroundings, the waters, animals, and customs. Mythology is one expression of the tremendous human urge to explain the world and reduce it to some sort of order.

Although there can be no strict line of demarcation, nevertheless, we find that in some ways the *myths about the gods, per se,* may be usefully distinguished from the purely origin-myths. Myths concerning the gods fall into two classes perhaps, those concerning the more or less benevolent aspects of the gods and those, such as the Trickster Tales, describing gods whose behavior is wholly selfish, who are unreliable, possessed of low motives, and who occasion-

[15] Talbot, A.—*In the Shadow of the Bush,* William Heinemann, London, 1912, p. 377.

ally inflict evil upon mankind. The Trickster Tales of the Ekoi describe Obassi Osaw plotting the death of Lamb and being outwitted by him. These tales, however, are not told maliciously, as might be supposed, but in a semi-humorous fashion which rather delights in picturing the gods as vulnerable beings capable of jealousy, deceit, abduction, and even death. These Trickster Tales, although they do not appear in all cultures, are nevertheless found to be widely distributed.[16] A large share of the myths deal not only with gods as such but also with the gods in relation to life after death. Osiris, for example, is a god of resurrection; Hare, the Winnebago culture hero, obtains from Earthmaker the gift of immortality for men, his brothers. Another phase of myths about the gods has to do with the deification of popular heroes, such as Hercules, whose exploits were recounted, and gained in the telling. Such heroes often attained immortality and even divine status.

We have seen that myths deal with origins, with the gods and with their relations to men. Another type of myth is less objective and more *concerned with the unsatisfied desires* of human beings. The modern psycho-analytic school has attempted to draw a parallel between myths and dreams, both, it is claimed, having their roots in the subconscious, in the one case racial and in the other individual. While it may be questioned whether a *racial* subconscious exists, it is perfectly conceivable that individual longings may be projected into myths as well as dreams. For example, among the Seneca Indians are many myths having the uncle-nephew motif. It is customary among the Seneca for the young girls to marry the older men of the tribe, for they are more prepared to support a wife than are the young men. Consequently the people love a romantic tale

[16] Boas, Franz—*Jr. Am. Folklore,* Vol. XXXII, No. CVI, Oct.–Dec., 1914, p. 394.

in which a young man, usually a nephew, finally gains the girl of his choice after overcoming many obstacles, often presented by the boy's uncle who also desires the girl.[17] Likewise in our language we have the Cinderella story, which, beginning as a fairy tale, has taken on titanic proportions in our American magazine literature. Myths of wishing rings, magic flights, fairy godmothers, and the like, all seem to reflect infantile wishful thinking.

A fourth type of myth is one which is purely *aesthetic or recreational in motive.* One of the oldest professions in the world is that of the raconteur. In nearly every culture we find records of the story teller who recounts myths of this type at various seasons of the year. Among the Seneca Indians there is a charming account of the myth-maker who sits in the great lodge in the evenings and relates stories of adventure and daring which thrill his listeners and supply the mental stimulation which they crave during the barren months of winter when the crops are harvested and there is little to do. The story teller carries two small bags, one containing tobacco and the other various small objects which "remind" him of his stories. He draws from the bag a bear's tusk and proceeds to relate the associated tale. When the evening is over and he has finished his stories, the listeners file past him and drop into his lap a small gift, a bit of tobacco or a carved nut.[18] Certain myths of this type, notably those coming down to us from classic times, have acquired a permanent place in literature. They share with other forms of art a universal appeal, regardless of differences in cultural background and barriers of time and place.

The various types of myths discussed above, aside from

[17] Parker, A. C.—*Seneca Myths and Legends,* Buffalo Historical Society, Buffalo, N. Y., 1923, pp. 122–127.

[18] Ibid., p. 50.

their aesthetic function, are intimately interwoven with the magico-religious pattern. In regard to magic it may be noted that again and again in the myths of the Winnebago, Ekoi and Egyptians, there are references to magical objects and practices. Earthmaker calls the world into existence by the power of his thought. The ghosts of Ekoi tales heal their wounds by magical means, and in Egyptian mythology Isis is portrayed as a witch eager to gain magic power by knowledge of the secret name of Re. Likewise, in the mythology of the Trobriand Islanders magic looms large. Existing magic, considered but a remnant of that which once was known, is traced back to legendary times. The magical practice gains in sanction and in assumed potency when its origin is described in myth. A number of the Ekoi myths have an explicit function in explaining some magical rite or object.

Myth is likewise associated with taboo, which, in certain aspects, may be considered as a kind of negative magic. Certain Winnebago maidens, who, while menstruating, ate of the sacred corn, were devoured by a bear assumed to be supernatural. Surely such a tale if related to successive generations would give force to this taboo. Food taboos are frequently related to the belief in human relationship to a mythical animal ancestor.

The intimate relationship between mythology and supernaturalism is evidenced by the influence of myth upon theological concepts. While we need not completely accept Lang's conception of a ubiquitous high god degraded by popular myths and folk tales, yet there is no denying the influence of myth upon the prevailing conceptions of deities. It is very common in the mythology of North American Indians to find a trickster as well as a beneficent rôle attributed to supernatural beings. As we have seen, there is reason to think Olympian deities were degraded in their

rôles as mythical heroes. Modification need not, however, always take the form of degradation. The Osirian myth tended to introduce filial piety into the Egyptian religious system and nourished the belief in personal immortality and judgment in a future life. The origin myth of the Winnebago Medicine Dance portrays the creator and supreme being as a kind and loving father. It might be suggested that myths tend to hasten the modification of theological concepts, thanks to their more rapid diffusion as compared with religious systems proper. A myth may be readily borrowed because of its intrinsic interest or aesthetic appeal, and then be unconsciously incorporated into the tribal culture with a corresponding modification of religious beliefs.

One of the chief functions of myth is the transmission of cultural tradition. As Goddard puts it, "The more subtle elements of life—moral standards, rules of conduct, beliefs concerning the ultimate origin and end of things, evaluations of man and animals, and supernatural beings—are transmitted by these fairly well formulated and persistent myths." [19]

Not only is culture, religious and otherwise, transmitted by myth, but it is also given sanction and moral force. No one has expressed this point more clearly than Malinowski, who writes, "Myth fulfils in primitive culture an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man." [20] Religious belief, then, may be reinforced and sustained as well as degraded by its partnership with myth.

Influence of Other Forms of Art Upon Religious Be-

[19] Goddard, Pliny—*Relation of Folk Lore to Anthropology,* Jr. Am. Folklore, Vol. XXXII, No. CVI, 1914, p. 22.

[20] Malinowski, B.—*Myth in Primitive Psychology,* Norton & Co., N. Y., 1926, p. 19.

lief.—Not only mythology but other forms of art have exercised a profound influence upon religious belief and have been in turn affected by such belief. It will be recalled that in Durkheim's ingenious theory symbols are considered by the savage to be the source of the mana by which he is exalted in the frenzy of the corrobbori. Decorative art, when its subject matter is religious, is often, as among the Ashanti, highly symbolic in character.[21] A highly symbolic or perhaps crude art in regard to religious subjects, such as the dream experience of the artist, may be associated with a highly developed secular art, as among the Koryak.[22]

This occasional non-realistic character of religious art does not mean that art forms are lacking in influence upon religious belief. Frequently when decorative art becomes definite and representative, supernatural beings thus portrayed take on a more specific and often anthropomorphic character. It is probable that the paintings of Michael Angelo in the Sistine Chapel not only reflected but moulded the religious thought of his time as do the modern portrayals of Christ. There is reason to think that the conception of the mythical Thunderbird entertained by the Winnebago and other plains Indians is partly due to its representation in art. This conception may be readily modified by the various individual artists who, according to their fancy, have given the Thunderbird some specific form as, for example, the shape of an eagle or a hawk. Thus not only is there a modification of belief in accordance with artistic forms, but a more striking innovation may result, since the eagle by a process of association may be elevated to a supernatural status.[23]

[21] Rattray, R. S.—*Religion and Art in Ashanti,* Oxford U. Press, 1927.

[22] Lowie, R.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, pp. 263–264.

[23] Ibid., p. 268.

Not alone by decorative art but also by sculpture and wood carving may theological beliefs be modified. Even the crudest of representations may by appropriate rites be invested with mana or sacredness. It is conceivable that, when given more specific form by the hand of the artist, a crude fetish, such as the Juju images of the Ekoi, may be accompanied by a higher degree of personification of the supernatural power. The acquirement by a statue of an upturned nose in the process of artistic reproduction may lead to the acquisition of a similar characteristic by the deity it represents. It is possible that a conventionalized representation of the killer whale on the totem poles of the Indians of the Northwest Coast, may progressively modify the usual mental image of this vague supernatural being.

Relation of Art to the Emotional Phase.—One aspect of the relation of art to religion is to be found in the close relationship between the aesthetic and religious emotion. Reverence, which we have suggested as the most characteristic religious emotion, is by no means absent in an aesthetic state of consciousness. In the Egyptian hymns to the Sun God, especially that of Iknaton, dedicated to Aton, the aesthetic appreciation of light and beauty is mingled with reverence and gratitude for the beneficent power of the solar deity. Much the same attitudes are to be found in the aesthetic pantheism of Wordsworth or Shelley. As previously suggested, the pierced images and pictures of paleolithic culture may have had a magico-religious as well as artistic significance. Art and religion were born together, thousands of years ago at the dawn of human history. As we shall see in a future chapter, there is reason to think that for some, art may be the means of satisfying human longings, a substitute for the religion with which it has so long been associated.

Throughout human history art has served as a stimulus

to religious emotion. The corrobbori of the Australian aborigines and the Ghost Dance of the American Indians are both means of furthering man's affective relation with the supernatural. The whirling dervish and the devotee of the ancient Dionysian rites are both carried out of themselves and exalted to a state of sacred frenzy. The beating of tom-toms and the solemn grandeur of an organ processional possess a common element, in that their aesthetic appeal is essentially emotional and necessarily heightens religious feeling. The early history of music is closely connected with that of the church and religion was a potent factor in its development. The Ekoi drums were so cherished by their owners that it was considered a serious offense for them to be played without permission of their owner. These drums were a valuable adjunct to the religious rites and ceremonies of the Egbo society, which looked upon the drum as sacred.

Not only music, but also nearly every other form of art has been used in arousing religious emotion. Conspicuous among these is architecture, an art which has been cultivated in nearly every civilized country. It is easy to comprehend the feelings of awe and reverence inspired by the Greek temples or the Gothic cathedrals. The temple at Karnak is one of the most stupendous constructions in the world, overwhelming in its magnificence. To the decoration of these temples sculpture and painting have lent their aid. The famous frescoes at Padua by Giotto, the beautifully rounded forms of Fra Angelico, and in fact a host of renowned paintings have found a suitable home on the walls of temples which they illumined by their art. Sculpture existing in its perfection among the Greeks was a ready partner to painting and has persisted to this day in the Catholic churches, where it has become more or less degraded. In the Greek church, kissing the "ikon" is an important part of the service. Poetry, while not specifically

connected with religion in the same way as architecture, sculpture, and painting, has nevertheless been a vehicle for the transmission of religious ecstasy, as in Francis Thompson's *Hound of Heaven,* and the medium for glorification of devotion as in Rossetti. In this connection will be remembered the Psalms of David which united poetry and music. Thus we find not only art a stimulus to religion but also religion a stimulus to art.

Art and Ritual.—The relationship of art to ritual is fully as intimate as its relationship to either the belief or the emotional phase of religion. Elaborate theories have been devised to show the origin of at least certain forms of art in religious ritual. Notable among these is the attempt of Jane Harrison to demonstrate on the basis of early culture history in Greece the origin of the drama in religious rites and festivals.[24] This excessively unilateral theory may be criticized as assuming a relationship working only in one direction. It is probable that religion and art both have their roots in that compound of organic structure and primitive behavior patterns which we know as original human nature.

In the broad culture pattern known as ceremonialism, religion is not prior to art nor are they readily distinguishable. Recreational elements are also found. If art be identified with myth the relationship with ritual is especially close. The great Egyptian festival at which the Osirian myth was enacted as a kind of passion play is a good example. In the Greek Eleusinian mysteries, drama, myth, and religion all were blended. Frequently a myth is not enacted but is related as an account of the origin of the ceremony. The Winnebago, for example, have an elaborate myth describing how Earthmaker through the friendly mediation of Hare gave to men the Medicine Dance as a means of at-

[24] Harrison, Jane—*Ancient Art and Ritual,* Holt, N. Y., 1913.

taining immortality. Ekoi myths purport to explain why the tortoise is used in sacrificial rites and why offerings are made to ghosts. It must not be assumed that a particular origin myth has always been associated with a ceremony, even as a rationalization. As Lowie and others have shown, a foreign myth acquired through cultural borrowing may be adapted as a rationalization of a particular ceremony through a process of secondary association. The reverse of this may also take place and a foreign ceremony be adapted to a local myth.

It is probable that ceremonies, like myths, by their ready diffusion may modify the religious pattern. The Sun Dance of the Plains Indians is a composite of diverse ceremonial elements, yet plays an important part in the religious as well as the recreational life of the Plains Indians.[25]

Assuming with Harrison that religion may at times precede art and recognizing from anthropological data the coexistence of art and religion in the pattern of ceremonialism, we may note that art may be primarily a servant of religious ritual. It is difficult, to be sure, to distinguish between art as a stimulus to religious emotion and as an aid to religious ritual. The use of art objects in rites of imitative magic by early cave men seems to be an employment of art as an adjunct to ritual rather than as an emotional stimulus. The same would seem to be true of the magico-religious rites of the modern Montagnais-Naskapi of Labrador described by Speck. Objects of decorative art seem to be intimately related to dream life and to religion. Speck writes, "the 'soul-spirit' requires that objects, figures, creatures, colors, and materials revealed to the individual in dreams, be represented graphically by symbols in order that their power,

[25] Spier, Leslie—*Sun Dance of Plains Indians,* Anthro. Papers Amer. Museum Natural History, Vol. XIV, 1921, pp. 451–527.

'mantu,' may be employed to secure success for the individual in the undertakings of life." [26]

Since the seat of aesthetic appreciation is in the soul, there is considerable individualism in regard to symbolic art. It is believed that the particular symbols serve as a central power bringing the objects under the dominance of the individual human spirit. Speck writes, "Work toward this end is generally done under the suggestion of dreams bestowed by the inner spirit residing in the individual. And the spirit we are told is strengthened by affording it the satisfaction of seeing his promptings obeyed whether it be in the active pursuit of gain or in the field of art work." [27] Art for these people seems to be a symbolic representation of objects seen in dreams in order to gain control of these objects and to satisfy the soul spirit of the individual. While the motive comes from the dream experiences of man, the women apparently do the actual work of decorating shot-pouches under the influence of the tribal culture pattern. Speck remarks, "Most of the actual products of the decorative industry used among the conservatives of these tribes can be explained as to design, interpretation, and symbolism by their makers if they choose to do so." [28]

Religion and Science

The antithetical relation that we assume between science and religion in these controversial days is not found to any great extent among pre-literate peoples. In ancient Mexico, as in Babylonia and Egypt, the priesthood were in possession of some knowledge that could be called scientific. The Maya calendar was probably equal in ingenuity

[26] Speck, F.—Unpublished MSS.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.

and utility to that used in Western Europe at the same date, and it is possible that a Maya priesthood took as much interest in its improvement as did Gregory and other Popes. The astronomical lore of these peoples, however, as of the ruder Indian tribes of the southwest, was chiefly utilized in determining the dates for religious feasts and other festivals.

Probably the chief reason for the absence of antagonism between science and religion in simple cultures is the lack of scientific knowledge in the modern sense of an observed and tested body of relationships regarding natural phenomena used as a means to further knowledge rather than for practical ends. Goldenweiser writes of such cultures: "Knowledge remains unsystematized. There is no deliberate synthesizing of experience, no method of inquiry, no accurate measurement. There is, in other words, no science. Knowledge therefore remains crudely experiential in its derivation and purely traditional in its mode of transfer from generation to generation." [29]

The fantastic cosmological systems of the Winnebago, Polynesians and similar peoples are confronted by no science of astronomy, geology or geography. It is a question whether true science, in the sense of tested knowledge acquired for its own sake, may be said to have arisen before the Greek philosophers appeared on the scene with speculations that culminated in the marvelous achievements of Hellenistic Alexandria. The long struggle that ensued when this revived knowledge came into conflict with medieval theology will be discussed in a following chapter.

Magic and Science

The relation between magic and science as practiced by primitive peoples, has been the subject of a great

[29] Goldenweiser, A. A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., 1922, p. 118.

deal of discussion, perhaps more than the relation between religion and science. The great English ethnologist, Sir James Frazer, has lent the weight of his authority to the thesis that magic is primitive science, and many writers have accepted this doctrine. Magic, it is argued, is an ancient system of practice based on the belief in order and regularity in the world, but mistaken associations of ideas are utilized rather than the tested cause and effect relationships of science. There is a certain plausiblity in this argument and it receives support in the historical relations of such studies as astrology and astronomy, alchemy and chemistry. It is a question, however, as to how definite is the conception in the primitive mind of a sweeping uniformity in nature as a basis for the uniformity in magical procedure. As we have seen, there is no large body of true science among primitive people in the sense of tested knowledge, which, unlike technology, is acquired for its own sake. The fact that the results of magical rites are never checked up in any critical fashion establishes a very real distinction. Furthermore, as Goldenweiser points out, the magical rites tend to be coercive, to involve a sense of control of power, to be bathed in supernaturalism, that is to say, are extraordinary and are associated with the emotional thrill. Science seems to have arisen for the most part from everyday experience or technology and from the harder-headed philosophers who adopted the observational and experimental methods.

Religion and Technology

Religion, while not closely connected with science in pre-literate or primitive society, is, nevertheless, very closely interwoven with technology and economic life as with other phases of culture. By technology is meant the customs and body of practical knowledge directed toward ends funda-

mental to group existence. Among the Todas of India, as previously mentioned, religion centers in the dairying activities. "May it be well with the buffaloes, may they not suffer from disease and die . . . may there be water and grass in plenty"; so runs the prayer associated with the dairy-ritual.[30] It is common to find gods assigned definite functions as patrons of particular arts or occupations. Nimm of the Ekoi is a goddess of agriculture, Ptah of the Egyptians was a patron of artists and artisans, and Morning Star of the Winnebago a great war-deity. Vulcan was the divine smith and Minerva the goddess of arts and wisdom, a rôle similar to that of the Egyptian Troth. Bubastis was the goddess of dancing women. In Roman times Isis was regarded as the patroness of mariners.

At times, the influence of religious conceptions upon technology is very direct, as when cures are sought through divine ministrations. Some two hundred sanctuaries of Aesculapius, the god of healing, were known around the Mediterranean to which patients resorted for medical treatment and the advice of the gods. After purification, the patient offered a sheep as a sacrifice and slept on its fleece for a night within the holy precincts. The god appeared in nocturnal visions and prescribed the mode of cure or even condescended to operate himself, for it is recorded in an inscription that the stiffened fingers of a patient were straightened by the god's own grasp.[31]

Further evidence of the interrelations of religion and technology is to be found in the common belief in a supernatural origin and sanction for various arts and crafts. A culture hero and human benefactor, such as Hare of the Winnebago, is found among many peoples and often, as in the case of Prometheus, is held to be the donor of inventions

[30] Carpenter, J. F.—*Comparative Religion,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., p. 148.
[31] Ibid., p. 180.

and crafts. Osiris was believed to have taught his people agriculture, while Isis added the domestic arts of making bread and weaving linen. The Algonquians believe in a great hero, divinely conceived, called Manibozho, who is the bestower of all gifts that support existence, the author of wisdom, arts, and institutions. Among the Mexicans, the Peruvians, and many tribes of North America, similar notions are found. We learn that the "Finnic hero, Wäinamöinen, conceived by the wind, and born (after seven hundred years in the womb) by the maiden Ilmatar, added to his gifts of fertility and fire the invention of the harp, and the teaching of wisdom, poetry, and music to man." [32]

Magic and Technology

The relation of magic to technology is even more close than that of religion. Often it is difficult to distinguish magical activity from everyday technology by the actual behavior involved or by the affective and intellectual processes with which it is associated. Leuba would identify magic with coercive behavior and technology with mechanical behavior, pointing out that in coercive or magical behavior the performer is supposed to possess in himself some mysterious power, and that, furthermore, quantitative relationships are ignored. True, the medicine man does not adjust the length of his incantations to the basal metabolism of his patient but, nevertheless, quantitative relations are considered in magical rites. It is claimed that the Khonds prolong the torture of the victim that they are offering up as a human sacrifice, in the belief that the fall of rain upon their fields during the year will be proportional to the flow of the victim's blood. In the widespread practice of injuring the image of an enemy to cause him disease or death, there is

[32] Ibid., p. 181.

assumed an almost mathematical relationship between the degree of injury to the image and to the enemy. In some cases, then, there is no difference save that the mechanical behavior gets results where the magical or coercive does not. Nevertheless, we may point out that technology is tested by experience, is more independent of the power of the performer, and more free from emotional thrill. Furthermore, magic is more likely to be utilized in a situation not controllable by ordinary means or when some element of risk or uncertainty is involved. Malinowski claims that the natives of the Trobriand Islands distinguish clearly between magical rites and matter-of-fact technological procedures. A magician may direct the building of a canoe or the planting of a garden, but his magical rôle is kept distinct from his function as an organizer and director of economic activity.

When we turn to actual practices among primitive peoples we find in some cases the magical distinct from the technological, but in others the two are so merged that it is impossible to separate them even with the aid of the distinctive criteria that we have mentioned.

The assumed control of the weather by the Bukaua magician in Melanesia is clearly magical. Into cocoanut cups filled with sap, stones are thrown so as to make them overflow in the belief that rain will flow in a similar manner. The production of thunder by the shaking of stones together is also clearly a rite of imitative magic. In connection with these rites a magic formula is recited, consisting apparently of jumbled scraps of mythology and folk-lore. It is significant that the magician is the object of certain personal practices such as purification and adherence to food taboos, apparently with a view to the protection of the magic power of which he is the repository.

The practices of healing are more difficult to classify.

As Rivers points out, there are three general beliefs as to the cause of disease among primitive peoples. Disease is thought to be due to the sorcery practiced by some human being, to the action of some supernatural beings, or to natural causes. The natural explanation is almost completely lacking among many tribes. Even among civilized peoples attitudes toward disease are tinged with supernaturalism, and to the doctor is attributed almost magical power. In Melanesia if a man falls out of a tree the accident may be regarded as due to the evil power of some sorcerer. Such interpretations are made where the causes would seem to us quite natural and obvious. Rivers points out that the most common magical theories of disease are that (1) a morbific object is projected into the body of the victim, (2) something is abstracted, perhaps the soul or the viscera, as is believed by the Trobriand Islanders, or that (3) the disease is due to the action of the sorcerer on some part of the body as if it were the whole.[33] The third method of producing disease is, according to Rivers, prominent on Eddystone Island. Here treatment consists of the recovery of a fragment of food or other object connected with the victim, by means of which the sorcerer acts upon an unfortunate person. The sorcerer may be located by divination and then either confesses at once, or is hung by one arm from the bough of a tree in order to force a confession. If he does not confess for a long time it is concluded that a mistake has been made and he is released. A second method of treatment is more distinctly of a religious character. A man with special knowledge appeals to certain spirits who are able to find the vital object, Penupenu, and restore it to the sick man.

Among the Winnebago, magic and medicine are closely

[33] Rivers, W. H. R.—*Medicine, Magic and Religion,* Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1924, p. 4 ff.

connected and, in fact, the words are used almost synonymously. The young man is urged to fast and thus obtain a vision in which magic powers are granted him, including that of curing disease. Here, as elsewhere, sickness is thought to be due to witchcraft or to the action of the deity, Disease-Giver, but more commonly it is considered in negative terms as the result of failure to seek protection from the spirits. The Ekoi attribute disease for the most part to three causes: (1) the ill will of ancestors, (2) a powerful fetish or juju, or finally, (3) witchcraft. The cause of the disease is determined by divination and appropriate sacrifices are made, or else the witch or wizard is hunted down. In Egypt the existence of charms for protection from disease shows the association of magic with medicine. In Australia magic is considered the cause of almost all deaths. Illness is attributed to the presence of quartz crystals within the body of the sick man or to the stealing of his kidney fat. The medicine man sucks the afflicted part and, thanks to his skill in sleight of hand, is able to show a quartz crystal as tangible evidence of his removal of the disease. The medicine man himself, curiously enough, is supposed to be filled with quartz crystals which give him his power. He is initiated into his craft either by a spirit who is supposed to spear him and remove his insides, or by fellow medicine men who rub him with stones, tie a hair string on his finger, and make a pretence of putting stones into a hole made under a finger nail.

The Trobriand Islanders recognize all three of the causes for disease mentioned by Rivers. Sickness may be due to the action of evil spirits, to flying witches who steal the viscera of their victims with death as a result unless aid is obtained from some magician, and finally, to natural causes. The intermixture of magic and medicine is shown fully as clearly by the remedies used by our grandmothers:

blood-root, for example, was probably used because of an association between its color and the desired effect upon the blood rather than from any demonstrable efficacy. It was not long ago that scrofula was known as the king's evil and good health was sought through the touch of a royal hand. William the Third, it is said, in consenting to this ministration remarked to his patient: "God give you health and better sense." We of modern times enjoy the better health but it is due to better sense demonstrated by critically testing our remedies rather than relying upon the aid of magic powers.

There is a host of beliefs and practices of a non-medical nature found all over the world, that connect magic and technology. Divination is one of the most ancient of all arts. It was performed by the Ekoi with the aid of pods from a certain tree; by the Romans, through the observation of animal entrails or the study of flights of birds, and by the Chinese through examination of the cracks in a heated tortoise shell. The Babylonian art of divination with the aid of the shoulder blades of animals has spread over the world and perhaps even to the Naskapi Indians of Labrador, who practice the art to the present day. We still half playfully examine the grounds in our tea cups to determine what of weal or woe the future holds for us.

Astrology has flourished from Egyptian days to the present time, and the farmer who plants his crops in accordance with the phases of the moon bears witness to the ancient union of magic and technology. Among primitive peoples the planting of crops, the launching of war parties, the search for game, are all regulated by superstitious beliefs and taboos. At times, however, it is actually the most desirable procedure that is given supernatural sanction. On the other hand, as among the Polynesians, the omens and taboos may be quite irrational according to our standards.

An inopportune sneeze, in fact, very nearly cost Mariner his life while residing among these people. In China, Taoism has at times degenerated into a crude pseudo-science called Fengshui, which determines the most favorable location for buildings or graves with reference to supernatural influences that might affect them. The doctors of this art often receive sums for their advice that would be envied by civil engineers. Thus it may be seen that throughout human history the awesome forces of the supernatural world have been invoked to aid technology in providing human beings with health and wealth and gratification of everyday desires.

Chapter IX

RELIGION AND THE SOCIAL ORDER

In view of the intimate relation of religion to other phases of human experience, such as social organization, art, and technology, it is plausible to look for a similar influence of religion upon the relations of man to man and on personal conduct in its ethical aspects. We may inquire as to the effect of religion in regulating the conduct of individual men in the interest of harmonious and efficient functioning of the group as a whole or in the interest of some controlling class. The problem then is the relation of religion to social control or to morality, if we use the latter term in a broad sense.

Many writers have come to grief in attempting to find a solution of this problem and have become hopelessly enmeshed in their own wordy arguments or have given only a dogmatic rationalization of a preconceived judgment. The difficulties seem to be three in number. First, nobody knows very clearly what constitutes religion. We have struggled with this difficulty at some length, although the results of that struggle are meagre. Secondly, nobody knows what morality is and here any general agreement is quite out of the question. Thirdly, neither of the unknowns is expressible in quantitative terms and even if both were expressible, it would be difficult to formulate a general statement of their relationship. If all societies, present and past, were definite and equivalent units and we found that

in each a certain amount of religion was associated with a certain number of units of morality, then the matter would be simple. But alas, these conditions do not exist and if they did obtain, space would be lacking to make any such quantitative survey.[1] We can do no more than point out some of the ways in which religion gives sanction to prevailing standards.

Religion Aids Custom in Making Anything Right.—Our first step must be to recognize the infinite variety of moral standards. As Sumner has pointed out, the *mores* or customs can make anything right.[2] What the people of a group think is right *is* right for that group. It is unlikely that moralists and philosophers will ever discover in the varied customs of mankind or in their own philosophical concepts any standard of right which has the same universal validity as observations through the senses of the existence or non-existence of objects.

Even the logical relationships between perceived objects such as make up the body of science are far more easily demonstrable than is the validity of many moral standards. Most men would agree that John Smith lying at the foot of the Woolworth Building after a fall from its top, is dead. Probably just as many would accept the logical proposition that he could not lie in New York and in Paris at the same time. Certainly the majority would accept the empirical proposition that a fall from a building of such height would kill any man. Whether the death of John Smith was a good thing or not there might well be disagreement. Judgments, in contrast to observations, depend on emotional reactions which vary between individuals and are

[1] Parmelee presents statistics to show that crime is more prevalent among the religious than the irreligious but economic and educational factors are ignored. Parmelee, M.—*Criminology,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1918, pp. 106–115.

[2] Sumner, W. G.—*Folkways,* Ginn, N. Y., 1906, pp. 521–532.

dependent on the culture of a given time and place. Certainly there is more agreement among men that death is shocking and happiness desirable than that olives are a delicious food or that a dress suit is the most elegant of costumes, but even here there are disagreements.

Religion may reinforce and give sanction to varied customs or *mores* which to us are repulsive. In ancient Babylonia, every woman was required to prostitute herself to a stranger before the temple of Ishtar. Thousands of widows were cruelly sacrificed at the death of their husbands in India and Dahomey. In Mexico, thousands of bleeding hearts were torn from living bodies and offered dripping to the gods.[3] Even cannibalism has found religious sanction. In the Dionysian rites of ancient Greece animals were torn to pieces and eaten by frenzied worshipers to obtain within their bodies the spirit of the god. Our very word enthusiasm comes from *entheos,* meaning, "containing the god."

It is probable that a million or more human beings have suffered death and torture in Christendom due to a placing of religious conformity above respect for life and often with the sanction of the Biblical phrases, "compel them to come in," and "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." In Palestine, according to Biblical evidence, the Canaanites burnt even their own children as sacrifices to Moloch. There is good archaeological evidence of similar violation of parental affection in Carthage under the weight of a cruel religious system.[4] It seems that the power of religious belief is almost unlimited and capable of overcoming the most deep-seated impulses and antipathies. Extreme self-sacrifice and even

[3] See Anderson, R. E.—*Story of Extinct Civilizations of the West,* Appleton, N. Y., 1903, pp. 58–62.

[4] Khun de Prorok Count Byron—*Ancient Carthage in the Light of Modern Excavation,* Nat. Geog. Mag., Vol. XLV, 1924, pp. 400–409.

suicide have often taken place at divine command or in hope of obtaining supernatural aid. Many a Crow Indian can display the stumps of fingers sacrificed for religious motives. A venerable anthropological anecdote tells of the competition between Polynesian children for the honor at sacrificing their digits. The tortures undergone by the Plains Indians at the Sun Dance when hung by hooks thrust through their shoulder muscles are equalled, perhaps, by the frightful austerities and self-tortures of some of the Christian and Hindu ascetics. It is apparent, then, that an infinite variety of behavior may receive religious sanction and that it is necessary to discuss the relation of religion to *mores* in general, rather than to those which find favor in our own eyes and which we unconsciously identify with an absolute standard of morality.

Taboo.—Customs of a negative nature which are essentially, "Thou shalt nots" invested with a dread supernatural sanction, are called taboos. As we have seen, the islands of the Pacific are ridden with taboos which regulate minute, and to our eyes, insignificant, details of life. The story is told again and again in anthropological literature of the unlucky native who unwittingly ate of a dish previously served to a king. Realizing his mistake, his dread of consequences was so great that he became sick and died within a short time. This might well have been a coincidence were it not for other similar cases of serious results following the conviction of impending and certain disaster. Taboos may be placed upon all kinds of behavior, but are especially associated with food, blood, birth, death, sex, and rank. They are often bound up with the ideas of the clean and the unclean and with purification. The Winnebago share in the widespread taboo placed upon women during menstruation, and certain food taboos are established during pregnancy, or exist permanently in regard to the totemic animal.

Rest days are but taboos put upon activity at a particular time. In the vague notion that one is more likely to be drowned while fishing on Sunday there is a vestige of former dread of supernatural sanction.

The religion of the ancient Hebrews contained a great number of taboos in regard to food and other things, which have lasted down to the present day. In Polynesia where the taboo system is so deeply rooted, practical considerations make it necessary to provide certain exceptions or methods of avoiding a taboo. Kava, the drink which is almost universally used, is immune from taboo. The sacred person of an unpopular king may be sprinkled with water to remove his sacredness so that he may then be despatched.

Among the Eskimo there are taboos in regard to killing certain animals. Since in some cases they are regarded as the fingers of the goddess Sedna cut off, according to the myth, by her father, certain rites of atonement must be performed when these animals are killed.[5] Certain rest days are prescribed. The activities of hunting land- and sea-animals are kept separate. It is believed that the breaker of a taboo has attached to his body an invisible black object which causes the animals which he is hunting to avoid him. He is supposed to make public confession of his fault in order to prevent famine and pestilence from falling upon his people. Should he fail to make known his sins it is the duty of the shaman to ascertain the violator of a taboo and force a confession.[6]

The psychological aspects of taboo are very interesting but may not be traced in detail here. It will suffice to suggest that taboos seem to represent the workings of negative mana, of negative magic, or that they consist of customs

[5] Boas, F.—*The Central Eskimo,* Sixth Annual Report Bur. Eth., 1884–1885, pp. 583–590.

[6] Goldenweiser, A.—*Early Civilization,* Knopf, N. Y., p. 38.

based upon divine command and enforced by divine punishment. Just as positive mana may be acquired by the laying on of hands or contact with the supernatural world in a vision-experience, and the power utilized to gain some ends or to confer upon the person or object the quality of sacredness, so may there be a negative mana that blasts the unwary or makes a person or object unclean.

The Bible story of the death of Uzza, who approached too closely the Ark of the Covenant, suggests that this sacred object was held to be charged with a power which might be considered a kind of spiritual T.N.T.[7] Perhaps the analogy of an electric charge would cover better both the positive and negative aspects of mana. Like electricity, it is a mighty wonder-working force when controlled, but devastating when approached too lightly. There is reason to think that in the last analysis mana is but the projection of an emotional state as an assumed fluid, substance, or quality into the person or object which is the stimulus for that emotional reaction. Prestige is but the awe and admiration that the prestige-bearing individual arouses in others, and doubtless much the same is true of the sacred.

The sacred, then, like positive mana, is the projection of awe and reverence. On the other hand, the projection of awe, together with fear and disgust, makes a person or thing evil and unclean, and by an emotional conditioning anything associated by contiguity or otherwise with the repository of this negative mana is regarded in the same light. Among the Hebrews, in Polynesia, and elsewhere, those who have touched a corpse are themselves unclean and bearers of evil influences and must undergo purification. There is reason to think that in some cases the taboo as an emotional projection is supported by results of experience

[7] I Chronicles: 13:10.

in regard to transmission of disease, decomposition of food, and the like.

Similar psychological motives and processes are shown in the rites for removal of sin. In the various scapegoat customs sins are transferred almost as if they had a material existence, thanks to an emotional reconditioning and an association of ideas. The well-known Jewish custom consisted of rites for the transferring of the sins of the people to a goat which was then driven into the wilderness. In Athens, men were whipped through the streets and out of the city, supposedly bearing with them the accumulated sins of the citizens. In Nigeria, a slave girl was drowned with a similar end in view. In Japan, in comparatively recent times, people wrote their names and year of birth on a piece of paper, breathed on it, rubbed themselves with it, and then gave it to a priest with an offering. Packed in cases, the papers were rowed out to sea in a boat and consigned to the deep together with their load of sin.[8] The sin-laden scapegoat is from a psychological point of view similar to a tabooed object. In behavioristic terms, it is a stimulus to a verbal-emotional pattern.

Taboos may also be considered a negative magic, as has been indicated in the discussion of that art. For example, the prohibition of the flesh of the rabbit to an expectant mother may be due to the desire to avoid transmitting the timidity of the rabbit to the child. A taboo among Eskimo hunters upon playing cat's cradle may be due to the assumed relation of imitative magic between playing this game and becoming entangled in the line of a harpoon.

In the Old Testament there are many accounts of taboos and prohibitions commanded and enforced by Jahveh but, of course, in many cases this is merely a divine sanction for a pre-existing taboo. The taboo upon making graven

[8] Carpenter, J.—*Comparative Religion,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., p. 207.

images seems to have been devised to constrain religious loyalty.

Gods and the Morals of Men.—There is considerable difference of opinion as to the influence of religion, especially of notions of gods and spirits upon conduct. Men like Lord Avebury, Ellis, Huxley, Tozzer, and Tylor are inclined to minimize the influence of religion upon primitive morality, while Lang on the other hand has brought to light a number of High Gods whom he regards as the guardians of morality. Data from both the Winnebago and the Ekoi tend to support Tylor's position, for in both cases the gods or spirits are assumed to be more concerned with offerings than with moral conduct. For the Winnebago in particular, the gods are simply the means of gratifying certain material wants, to be bargained with rather than served by righteousness. True, the Ekoi farmer may put a curse upon all trespassers in the name of some powerful juju or fetish, but while the measure is supposed to be effective even to the point of causing the death of the offender, the action of the supernatural agency is essentially mechanical and whatever control is exerted is through fear alone.

Nevertheless, Lang and others have made out a good case for a moral influence upon primitive peoples through their belief in a supreme being. The All Father of various Australian tribes is supposed to demand unselfishness, sex morality and adherence to tribal regulations on the part of his followers. Pachacamac of the Peruvians is represented as a good god and among the Maidu, Bushmen, Andaman Islanders, and elsewhere, has been discovered a belief in a supreme being who in many cases is a guardian of morality. True, many of these deities have another side to their character represented in mythology and often a most disreputable one, but when the controversial problem of high gods

is thrashed out more completely it is probable that some influence upon morality from this source will be acknowledged. If with the Freudians we regard these deities as the projection of a father image, the corresponding ambivalent attitude of worshipers would involve moral repressions.

Certainly in the case of people of somewhat higher culture the religious sanction for morality is beyond question. The Old Testament gives an impressive record of the influence upon conduct of the idea of a god dispensing rewards and punishments according to the righteousness or wrongdoing of his people.

In an ancient Chinese Book of Rites we find it stated that, "The object of all ceremonies is to bring down the spirits from above, even their ancestors; serving also to rectify the relations between ruler and minister, to maintain the generous feeling between father and son, and the harmony between elder and younger brother, to adjust the relations between high and low, and to give their proper places to husband and wife. The whole may be said to secure the blessing of Heaven." [9] "Act," says the Japanese teacher of Shinto, "so that you shall not be ashamed before the Kami." [10] In the prayers of the Buddhists is found a sense of sin. In the later days of Egyptian history there developed a personal piety in religion. The worshiper even though of royal rank felt himself apparently in a profound moral relationship with Amon-Re, an all-seeing and righteous deity. There can be little doubt that countless individuals during the Christian era have been bound by love and fear to a deity whom they supposed possessed both omniscience and an absorbing interest in the details of their moral life.

There are a number of diverse facts that throw light on

[9] Carpenter, J.—*Comparative Religion,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., p. 151.
[10] Ibid., p. 135.

the relation of gods to the morals of men. Cosmic dualism as found in many religions often places the gods in opposition to each other on moral grounds, and in the gigantic struggle of good and evil man is called upon to play his part. In Egyptian religion we find Osiris at war with Set, the very embodiment of evil. In Norse mythology the frost giants and Loki stand opposed to Balder and the other gods. In India the Deva and Asura stand in opposition, but perhaps the most thorough-going dualism is found in the religions of Persia. Here we find the entire universe divided between the forces of light and darkness, of good and evil, and Ormusz and Ahriman wage a titanic struggle in which the support of man is enlisted. This dualism was brought into the Roman Empire with the Mithraic, Gnostic and Manichean sects and incorporated into the Christian tradition. St. Augustine, himself a former Manichean, divided the universe between the City of God and the City of the Devil. For centuries Christian theology and eschatology has portrayed the moral struggle between superhuman powers, God and the Devil, angels and demons.

The alleged commands of gods, given through the mouths of prophets and oracles, have often had profound moral significance. The oracle at Delphi was perhaps the strongest bond between the warring Greek states, and gave a respect for oaths and treaties that might have been otherwise lacking. A similar assumed influence of supernatural powers upon morality is to be seen in the custom of trial by ordeal, found on the west coast of Africa and among the Europeans of the Middle Ages. The innocent man was supposed to be divinely protected from burning, drowning, poisoning, or death in battle. A similar conception is shown in the practice of oath-taking which is continued down to the present day. It is assumed that God would punish the violator of an oath taken in his name and the dread of

such punishment is still supposed to be potent in enforcing morality.

Finally, it may be noted that sanction for morality is given by assigning the origin of sacred books to a divine source. Of course, the fact of such an assumed authorship does not prove that morality was bettered, but does show a confidence in the efficacy of a supernatural sanction for laws, customs and teachings. The assumed Divine authorship not only of the Ten Commandments but also of the entire Bible is perhaps the most familiar example, but it is by no means unique. The famous legal code of Hammurabi was supposed to have divine sanction. The Koran is, of course, considered by Islam as divinely revealed and a more or less supernatural origin is ascribed to the Vedic Hymns, and to the Zend Avesta of the Persians. The same is true of the Classics of China, the Brahmanas, the Laws of Manu of ancient India, and in many of these books conduct is prescribed in the utmost detail.

Moral Significance of a Future Life.—Rewards and punishments in the future life are commonly considered, together with divine wrath or favor in this life, as the most potent sanctions for morality. We have already discussed the distinction drawn by Tylor between the two theories of the future life; that of continuance and that of retribution. He generalizes, probably correctly, to the effect that the latter theory, which is essentially what Leuba called the modern belief, is rare in groups of lower culture. Neither the Winnebago nor the Ekoi have any considerable modification of the continuance theory in favor of that of retribution. For them the future life is much like the present. There is, however, some stress upon adherence to tribal customs and standards, even when the doctrine of the future life is essentially that of continuance. The Winnebago who is courageous and dies on the warpath has

hope of reincarnation. The Aztecs of Nicaragua, like the Scandinavians and many another war-like people, look to special favor in the future life for the brave warriors. The happy land of the Greenlanders is reserved for valiant hunters and for women who have died in childbirth. A certain poetic justice is to be noted in the belief found in Assam that the murdered man will have the murderer as his slave in a future life. According to the Choctaw conception the souls of the departed must cross over a pine trunk from which the wicked may fall to destruction. In the Osirian judgment the dead man makes a categorical denial of some forty-two sins in order to avoid destruction and obtain entrance into the realms of Osiris. The effect of this belief upon morality was doubtless lessened by the fact that success in the ordeal came to be regarded as essentially a matter of adequate equipment with magical spells. It is difficult to estimate the influence of the retribution theory upon conduct in religions like Mohammedanism, modern Buddhism and Christianity. Certainly the vivid pictures of the horrible tortures of the lost soul in both Buddhism and Christianity must have operated powerfully to enforce at least formal adherence to accepted standards. There is ample evidence in personal confessions, accounts of dreams and visions, and in symptoms of the mentally disordered, to show that fear of damnation has preyed horribly upon the minds of both children and adults and must have affected their conduct although, doubtless, in a negative and repressive way. Often such a rigid control has been relaxed by means of a system of penances and absolution so that sin could be enjoyed at a price.

Religion and Moral Teaching.—All over the world we find moral teaching associated to some extent with religion. This is found today in both the Protestant and Catholic communities. The confirmation ceremonies

have still something in common with the initiation and puberty rites found among most primitive peoples. In addition to the constant preaching of the importance of courage, industry, piety, and respect for tribal custom to children there are elaborate ceremonies for ushering them into the full estate of manhood or womanhood and admitting them to responsible membership in the tribe. The form of the ceremony varies among different people but often includes fasting, whipping, solitary confinement, a vision quest, ordeals, burying in hot sand, circumcision and purification, accompanied by religious and moral instruction, the whole system perhaps involving an element of unconscious sex jealousy.[11] Sometimes, as among the Bukaua of Melanesia and the Australian tribes, the women are made the victims of a hoax which is revealed to the youths after their initiation. Carpenter gives an excellent description of such practices.

"All around the world the lower culture has its ceremonies of initiation, which have sometimes survived in more refined forms in more highly organized societies. They involve seclusion from the common life, for no woman must be cognisant of what takes place, severe bodily trials to test the youth's power of endurance—fasts, scourging, loss of front teeth, and tattooing (so that his status may be recognizable at once) and other forms of personal scarification and pain, under which the feeble sink, and the happiest are those who die, escaping the humiliations of the weakling's lot. Long abstinence in lonely places begets strange dreams and visions, and raises nervous excitability to its highest pitch. Strange forms appear with hideous faces and mysterious trapping; appalling sounds are heard; and it is only when the hours of terror are past that the initiated learns that the awful figures were his own kinsmen in masks and

[11] See Flügel, J. C.—*The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family,* The International Psycho-Analytical Press, London, 1921, pp. 79–87.

disguises, and the Australian is told that what he took to be the signal of Daramulun's advent was produced by the whirling of the bull-roarer.

"In the midst of these pantomimic incidents the novice dies to rise again. Perhaps he is buried in the fetish-house; or he passes through the bath into his new condition; or he is vivified by the sprinkling of blood. But he awakes to a fresh life. He must be utterly forgetful of the old; he must even sometimes feign ignorance of his parents' home and names. The elders then impart to him the customs and traditions of the tribe. He learns the rules of conduct and duties of reverence and obedience to the aged, who are thus, in tribes without formal government, placed under the protection of religion. The strain of prolonged excitement and attention fixes precept and counsel indelibly upon his memory and he knows that the penalty of betrayal will be death." [12]

Sometimes moral teaching with a religious sanction is a means of class-control rather than a means to an ordered society. Study of Australian customs raises a suspicion that part of the instruction on the part of old men is intended to reserve for this group the choicest food and the fairest maidens. A priesthood greedy for wealth and power have often dominated a country by their claims to supernatural power and wisdom and their alleged control of the welfare of men in this world and the next. At times in Egyptian history the priests were the dominant class, and it is probable that much of the religious persecution here and elsewhere was motivated by wrath at treason to ecclesiastical authority. The taboo system of Polynesia and the caste system of India are means to class-control. Often semi-religious secret societies, such as the Egbo society of the Ekoi, go beyond moral suasion to the use of violence in enforcing prescribed modes of conduct.

[12] Carpenter, J.—*Comparative Religion,* Holt, N. Y., n.d., pp. 161–162.

It is practically impossible to draw conclusions in regard to the relation of religion to morality without permitting personal judgment to creep in unawares. Certainly, religion is a powerful driving force. It has urged men into the wilderness to become half-mad devil fighters; it has motivated cruel and often disgusting tortures and austerities; it has sanctioned war, persecution, and bloody sacrifices and oppression; it has made ritual observances more important than human kindness and has darkened human lives by fear. It has caused men to strain at a gnat and to swallow a camel, to set poisonous snakes in sacredness above thousands of human lives, to follow the letter and ignore the spirit of the law.

On the other hand, we find the Truce of God established by the church among warring nobles, also countless monasteries where gentle souls found refuge from a rude world, the poor received charity and the sick ministrations of kindly hands. Religion has drawn men together in brotherhood and service and has given a discipline and sanction for moral codes which are essential to ordered group life. The works of Dante and Milton show how closely religion and morality are linked in the Christian tradition, and even the rationalists of the eighteenth century considered a god essential to a moral order. Religion is too varied, too all-pervading to be judged by a formula but it seems to many dispassionate observers that religion has in general exerted a repressive and negative control and has lent its authority to customs which oppose that full, free and complete development of human personality which is considered by modern ethics essential to a good life.

Morality is primarily a product of the interaction of men in groups, and while the customs thus developed may receive religious sanction it is not necessary for their existence. Children on the playground develop rules and regulations,

a code of honor and of morality that is free from supernaturalism. It is an obvious fact that there is a great body of scientists, philosophers, and educated people generally whose social virtue is above reproach, yet who disclaim any belief in supernatural power and for whom a personal god and a retributive future life are outworn myths.

Religion a Conservative Influence.—The preceding discussion of religion in relation to morality raises the question as to the part that religion plays in social change. Is it invariably a conservative agency? If a dynamic force leading to social changes, are these changes rational, abiding and constructive? Does religion create new social values and ideals or does it merely reflect and reinforce those already in existence? It is impossible to answer these questions without treating of the theory of causation or without a historical analysis that would carry us far beyond the aims of the present discussion. Certainly, as Russell and other philosophers have argued, the very term, "cause," is misleading.[13] There never was a single cause to any effect and in social phenomena, at least, causes and their effects have a way of mutually influencing one another. The stream of religion flows into a broader current of historical development and cannot be readily identified as religious, nor can its influence upon whirlpools and eddies be determined.

It is possible, of course to defend the thesis that religion is a barrier which tends to block the flow of events but final proof is more difficult. One can only point to exhibits A, B, C, and so on, like a lawyer, but the series is not complete and the lawyer for the defence can produce a few exhibits of his own. Even if religion were proved conservative, only a "booster philosophy" would proclaim this in itself a crime. But let us glance at a few exhibits.

[13] Russell, B.—*Mysticism and Logic,* Longmans, London, 1918.

China has been until recently one of the most static of all countries, probably due in part to her ancestor-worship. India is filled with teeming millions of people bound by a thousand ties of taboo, superstition, and caste whose longing is for release from Karma, the dread law of retributive rebirth, for annihilation of self rather than self-realization through material progress. Poisonous snakes are too sacred to kill and infected water is considered worthy of a pilgrimage. The history of Egypt shows no dynamic influence of religion; rather, it is religion that reflects political changes. Save for movements such as that of Iknaton, Egyptian religion was a looking backwards, or at least a defence of an existing order motivated by the vested interests of a body of priests.

In Western Europe, with the so-called fall of the Roman Empire before the barbarian hordes there was a further decline of culture, already deteriorating. It is possible that Christianity through its influence over the newly converted barbarians conserved some of that culture which would otherwise have been destroyed. It certainly engaged in missionary activity that effected some diffusion of civilization and made some attempt to curb that age of violence by the Truce of God. It did establish a certain moral unity in Christendom and to some extent a common speech. On the other hand, it substituted an absurd mythology for Hellenistic science, gave a static picture of an anthropocentric world, gave faith in miracles rather than experiment, encouraged cure of disease by prayer and by touching the bones of saints, forged a body of doctrine once and for all delivered unto the fathers, and directed the energies of men toward an often selfish quest of personal salvation rather than improvement of man's earthly lot.

The changes of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were due to a developing commerce with the East and consequent rise of towns, together with a recovery of Greek literature

and science through the Arabs in Spain. The Renaissance, a more backward-looking movement than often supposed, was due to the commercial prosperity of the Italian cities and to the recovery of classical manuscripts. The Reformation was also in many ways a backward-looking movement, with its faith in an inerrant Bible, its deprecation of reason, its intolerance, and its gloomy theologies of predestination and infant damnation. This religious change was due to no inner principle of growth within religion but to economic developments, the rise of nationalism, and the invention of the printing press which made possible a personal interpretation of the Scriptures. The Commercial Revolution and the "expansion of Europe," based partly upon inventions such as that of the compass, ushered in, however, vast changes in regard to wealth, standard of living, growth of cities, and enlargement of mental horizon.

During this period Catholics and Protestants joined in the torturing to death of some 300,000 witches.[14] The former set up a vast machinery for stamping out heresy by rack and flame. The Chrisitan virtues of love, humility, and obedience seem to have had little more practical expression than in the Dark Ages, and perhaps less than in the Age of Chivalry two centuries before, when love, obedience, loyalty, and service had some expression within the upper classes. With the development of commerce there was a curious change in regard to the economic virtues which received the sanction of religion. During the Middle Ages the Church had set its face against the taking of interest, the seeking of profits and the like, but with economic expansion came the Puritan virtues of thrift, industry, and business enterprise. The parable of the talents acquired a unique popularity.

The conditions leading to modern western civilization

[14] Cutten, G. B.—*The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity,* Scribner's, N. Y., 1912, p. 99.

were not religious, but scientific, and it was the work of such men as Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and, above all, Newton, that transformed the world and brought changes which carried within themselves the seeds of further change. True, the Crusades led to the growth of commerce and spread of culture from the East and, the recovery of Greek science from the Arabs was facilitated by the Mohammedan conquest of Spain, but these were indirect and incidental effects of religion. The seventeenth century presents an amazing record of scientific discovery. The epoch-making achievements in astronomy established the conception of a universal reign of law and of the solar system as a machine set in motion once and for all by a divine watchmaker. The discovery of the circulation of the blood, and other anatomical researches, overthrew the authority of Hippocrates and Galen and laid the foundations for modern medicine. Organized religion opposed many of these movements and down to the present time has encouraged men to look to the world of the supernatural rather than to science for relief from ills of the flesh, as is shown by the miracles at Lourdes, at the shrine of St. Anne de Beaupré and the flourishing of Faith Healing, New Thought, and Christian Science. The science of the seventeenth century gave rise to the rationalism of the eighteenth century and under the leadership of Voltaire, Diderot and the other Encyclopedists in Europe, and Tom Paine in America, organized religion was bitterly attacked. Then came the reaction of Romanticism in the latter part of the century and the first part of the nineteenth, but with the *Origin of Species* in 1859, certain developmental tendencies found scientific expression. The static world machine of Newton, made by a creator, was replaced by a universe of change and development that less obviously required an author of its being. While the Catholic world perhaps

suffered less of a shock from Darwinism than did Protestantism, it nevertheless set its face toward the past. The Modernist movement within the church was crushed. In 1854 the Dogma of the Immaculate Conception was presented by Pius IX; in 1864, the Syllabus of Errors which condemned almost all of the tendencies of his age; and in 1869, there was proclaimed the dogma of Papal Infallibility.[15]

This brief sketch indicates that in Western Europe the influence of religion has been for the most part conservative. There is evidence also that when changes do occur, religion slowly adapts itself to the prevailing social values, rather than creating the situation by its own internal dynamic elements. The ideals of Christianity have been in general the ideals of the times as determined by economic and other social conditions.

The relation of religion to imperialism, which is economic rather than political nationalism, is an interesting case in point. During the period of colonial expansion there was no difficulty in finding religious sanction for political expansion and economic exploitation. The Spanish Conquistadors went forth in the cause of "Gold, Glory, and the Gospel." There is good evidence that missionary activity among the backward peoples of the world has been subverted to the purposes of imperialism. It is significant, moreover, that a great Chrisitan nation would wage a war with China for the privilege of forcing the baneful opium trade upon that hapless country.

Religion, as previously mentioned, has often linked itself with narrow nationalism and chauvinistic patriotism. In the Thirty Years War, the War of the Spanish Succession, and similar conflicts religious and nationalistic motives have rein-

[15] Randall, J. H.—*The Making of the Modern Mind,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, pp. 529–534.

forced one another. Perhaps the most striking example is that of the World War during which, in spite of developing internationalism and religious humanitarianism, the forces of religion gave support to the slaughter of fellow-Christians. The Quakers were almost the only large body of Christians that refused to give up their religious ideals under the pressure of patriotism.

In regard to slavery we find an additional example of the reflection by religion of prevailing social values. True, here again we find the Quakers consistent in their adherence to the teachings of Jesus, and favoring abolition in the seventeenth century. There was aid from other sects in the nineteenth century movement for abolition, yet in the United States the Methodist and Baptist churches were torn asunder by the slavery issue. In both the North and South, Biblical justification was found for the sectional institutions and attitudes, which in turn reflected existing economic conditions. Had cotton and tobacco been grown in New England under conditions similar to those in the South, it is probable that the attitude of religious leaders in the North would have been quite different.

This brings us to the question of modern humanitarianism in general. It is often claimed that prison reform, poor relief, child welfare, industrial legislation, control of vice, health improvement, and the like are products of Christianity. The question then arises, why such movements should have taken place some nineteen hundred years after the Christian religion was founded and why organized Christianity upheld non-humanitarian practices for so many years. It may be admitted that ideals of love and service were in part latent, waiting only for a favorable opportunity to bloom forth. Nevertheless, it is probable that humanitarianism is for the most part a product of modern conditions, such as increased material wealth, democracy, educa-

tion, and improved means of communication, and that given these conditions, humanitarianism would have flourished without religious sanction or support.[16] That it is not due to specific Christian doctrines is shown by the fact that Jews have shown an equal interest in the improvement of man's lot on earth.

Radical Movements Sponsored by Religion.—It must not be concluded that religion has never supported radical or impulsive changes, for such is not the case. Whether these can be considered constructive and truly progressive is another question.

Asceticism and monasticism were in a sense radical, almost fanatical movements, which broke with the ordinary mode of life and held up as values, solitude, humility, obedience, poverty, fasting, and sexual continence. Men fled to the wilderness, leaving wives and families, devoting themselves to the pursuit of a personal salvation and inflicting upon themselves diverse tortures that left them emaciated maniacs. A number of the famous ascetics licked with their tongues the sores and ulcers of the sick and it was common to mortify the flesh by refusing to bathe. The odor of sanctity is a term which had a very real meaning in those days. At first the people fleeing from the world lived in solitude but later were gathered together in great monasteries. At one time the Benedictine order alone had not less than 37,000 monasteries.[17]

The Crusades beginning in the eleventh century, while not free from economic determinism, were impulsive, fanatical movements that at times took the aspect of a great collective madness. Fired by the eloquence of Pope Urban,

[16] See Parmelee, M.—*Rise of Modern Humanitarianism,* Am. Jr. of Soc., Nov., 1915. Also *Poverty and Social Progress,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1921, Chap. 17.

[17] Cutten, G. B.—*The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity,* Scribner's, N. Y., 1912, p. 148.

an immense mob of men, women, and children from the lower classes marched without equipment, robbing and devastating the country until they were almost annihilated in Servia. The second mob, under Peter the Hermit, indulged in similar senseless violence and was almost completely destroyed before reaching Constantinople. As Gibbon points out, some 300,000 of the early crusaders perished before a single city was rescued from the Infidels. The Children's Crusade of 1212 was an amazing example of mass madness. First aroused around Paris, nothing could restrain the fanatical zeal of the children. "They were locked up, but they escaped; they were prohibited by parents, but disobeyed; persuasions they disregarded, threats they laughed at, and punishment was unsuccessful; nothing had any effect on the mania." [18] Some forty thousand German and thirty thousand French children set forth without food or money, expecting the sea to dry up before them. Many of them setting sail in ships offered by two merchants were drowned, and thousands were sold into slavery. Says Cutten, "The total loss to Europe by the Crusades is variously estimated from 2,000,000 to 7,000,000 lives, the latter being nearer correct." [19]

In the thirteenth century there appeared the Flagellants, fanatics who went through the streets scourging themselves in the belief that they would be cleansed from sin by this baptism of blood. They showed a violent hatred of the Jews and slaughtered them by the hundred. With the decline of flagellation there appeared in the fourteenth century the "dancing epidemic." Assemblies of men and women appeared in the streets and danced for hours in wild delirium, claiming to see visions and rivers of blood which they sought to escape by leaping high in the air. The mania

[18] Ibid., p. 156.
[19] Ibid., p. 157.

spread over the Netherlands, Belgium and other countries. It is of course unfair to attribute this behavior to religion alone, for it was a product of the times and less motivated by religion than the movements previously mentioned.

The Witchcraft persecution was unquestionably a case of impulsive crowd-behavior on a vast scale that was largely motivated by religion, with appalling human misery as a result. It is interesting to note that in the case of the Salem persecution, "the juries changed before the judges and failed to convict, and the judges changed before the clergy, although before this the clergy warned the judges not to rely upon 'spectral evidence' nor upon physical effects wrought upon the accusers in the presence of the accused." [20]

It was but a few hundred years ago that eminent men of our own civilization believed as implicitly as the Ekoi in witchcraft, black magic and ordeal by torture, and the full force of legal authority was put at the disposal of superstition.

Any ill luck was likely to be blamed on some old woman with a sharp tongue. "She would then be hauled before the court, promised liberty if she confessed, stripped and examined for some mark of Satan or to be sure she was not hiding a charm about her person. Torture in some form was then applied, and a ghastly list it was. Pricking with needles under nails, crushing of bones until the marrow spurted out, wrenching the head with knotted cords, toasting the feet before a fire, suspending the victim by the hands tied behind the back and letting her drop until the shoulders were disjointed. The horrible work would be kept up until the poor woman either died under the torture, or confessed, when she was sentenced without mercy, usually to be burned, sometimes to lesser punishments." [21] Smith thinks that the

[20] Ibid., p. 102.

[21] Smith, P.—*Age of the Reformation,* pp. 656–7.

number of victims must be reckoned by the tens of thousands.[22] Withington estimates that there were 250,000 victims from 1500–1700.[23] Here again one must hesitate in finding the sole cause in religion, for all educated men of the times even though not especially religious in a pious sense, believed firmly in witchcraft and supported legal proceedings against such assumed enemies of society.

The various Messianic movements with frequent political concomitants are interesting examples of radical changes made possible by uncritical religious attitudes. It was in the middle of the nineteenth century, supposedly an age of enlightenment, that followers of William Miller, an earnest and sincere student of the Bible, awaited the destruction of the world by fire some time between 1843 and 1844. His fervent preaching, begun in 1835, was made more convincing by phenomena of falling stars and other assumed signs in the heavens. In 1840 he received support from Rev. Joshua Himes, who was to prove an able propagandist and executive in the movement. Encouraged by this support and his swelling ranks of converts as the dread year of 1843 approached, the prophet wore himself out with constant preaching. The growing excitement was further stimulated by the appearance of the great comet of 1843, regarded by many as a sure sign of the approaching end of the world. Camp meetings were held in a tabernacle in which hundreds of worshipers prepared themselves for the end and in their hysterical excitement shrieked and threw themselves on the floor in fits. The summer of 1843 passed and the believers were not yet carried up in glory in their white ascension robes. A calculation according to the Jewish calendar extended the time to March 22, 1844. The night before this

[22] Ibid., pp. 657–8.

[23] See Singer, C.—*Studies in the History and Method of Science,* pp. 189–234. For summary see Lecky, W. F. H.—*Rise of Rationalism in Europe,* p. 50.

day groups of deluded men, women, and children watched with pale faces for some sign of the coming and saw the day dawn without any realization of their hopes and fears. Strangely enough, the faith of the Millerites was only strengthened under the jibes of the scoffers and, although even the faith of Miller began to waver and Himes was more concerned with the sale of his Adventist publications than the exact date of the cataclysm, enthusiasm grew apace. Fanatical leaders rushed to the fore and the thousands of excited believers looked forward with absolute conviction to Oct. 10, 1844, as the date of the coming of Christ, the destruction of the wicked and the gathering up of the faithful into heaven. Many sold their property in their confidence that it would no longer be needed. The victims of the delusion prepared their white robes, sang their hymns and climbed to the top of trees to await the great event. They climbed down again in time in sadness and despair, to endure the injury to their pride at being so duped or to gather together with the comforting belief that the day would yet come on which their mockers would be confounded.[24]

An even more absurd movement is described in Howells' *The Leatherwood God,* a book based on historical facts. A considerable number of the inhabitants of a town were convinced that a preacher who came into their midst was God himself, and retained this belief in spite of overwhelming evidence that the object of their devotion was but a poor human. Squire Braile in describing the episode showed real psychological insight into the motives and processes involved in such messianism. The hard conditions of a new country made attractive the prospect of an easy road to salvation, and pre-existing faith in a divine coming was widespread from Biblical evidence. The ready belief and adoration accorded to the pretender gave him a belief in his own

[24] Sears, C. E.—*Days of Delusion,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924.

destiny and caused him to be carried away by the situation which he created. The followers were held together by common belief and were forced to rationalize and to invent new fictions in order to preserve their ego-feelings.[25]

A final instance of the irrational and impulsive character of many religious movements may be found in revivalism. With the founding of Methodism by Wesley in the eighteenth century there came an emotionalism in religion that was part of the romantic reaction to the rationalism of that period. The revival movement came in America at about the same time as in England, and with equal strength and similar symptoms. About 1734 there developed in this country what is known as the "Great Awakening," stimulated by the fiery and fear-inspiring preaching of Jonathan Edwards. His hearers were terrorized by his vivid picture of Hell and weeping, crying, wailing, shrieking, and fainting were common in meetings.[26]

Revivalism was carried on by Davenport, Whitefield, Barber, Nettleton, Finney, and more recently by Moody, Billy Sunday and others. The earlier meetings were attended by pathological symptoms which Davenport has well called, "Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals," and analyzed in his classic book of that title. The Kentucky revival of 1800 is most worthy of mention because of the enormous numbers in attendance at the camp-meetings and the variety of abnormal symptoms. At the Cane Ridge meeting it is estimated that 20,000 people were in attendance, all carried away by the wildest excitement. Large numbers fell down and lay motionless and at times the floors were covered with the "spiritually slain." "Some talked, but could not move. Some beat the floor with their heels. Some,

[25] Howells, W. D.—*The Leatherwood God.*

[26] Cutten, G. B.—*The Psychological Phenomena of Christianity,* Scribner's N. Y., 1912, p. 177.

shrieking in agony, bounded about, it is said, like a live fish out of water. Many lay down and rolled over and over for hours at a time. Others rushed wildly over the stumps and benches and then plunged, shouting Lost! Lost! into the forest.

"As the meetings grew more and more frequent, this nervous excitement assumed new and more terrible forms. One was known as jerking; another, as the barking exercise; a third, as the Holy Laugh. The 'jerks' began in the head and spread rapidly to the feet. The head would be thrown from side to side so swiftly that the features would be blotted out and the hair made to snap. When the body was affected, the sufferer was hurled over hindrances that came in his way, and finally dashed on the ground to bounce about like a ball. . . .

"From the nerves and muscles the disorder passed to the mind. Men dreamed dreams and saw visions, nay, fancied themselves dogs, went down on all fours, and barked till they grew hoarse. It was no uncommon sight to behold numbers of them gathered about a tree barking, yelping, 'treeing the devil.' " [27]

In connection with some of the revivals the prevailing emotionalism encouraged sex license, and the doctrine of "spiritual marriage" was put into practice as among the Mormons.

The instances cited, it is true, are extreme cases. Only a complete history of religion could give an undistorted picture. In a following chapter the influence of modern Christianity on constructive social reform will receive some consideration and we must rest content with having pre-

[27] Ross, E. A., quoting McMaster—*Social Psychology,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1917, pp. 51–52.

Davenport, F. M.—*Primitive Traits in Religious Revivals,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1905, Chapt. VI.

sented a few facts that throw light upon the religious attitude in relation to social change.

Characteristics of the Religious Attitude.—It is apparent that the religious attitude is uncritical, prone either to accept the customs and traditions of the past without question or to reach out eagerly with faith and with longing toward some bright will-o'-the-wisp. Religion tends to be conservative or fanatical. Its beliefs are unchecked by experience or sceptical analysis, and hence the greatest absurdities often have behind them the tremendous driving force of emotion.

Religion is served by rationalization, the finding of excuses for preconceived beliefs, and of justification for strong desires, and is itself invoked for the defence of non-religious motives. The religious person assumes the truth of his faith in immortality or a personal god, and seeks reasons to defend his faith. Likewise, as we have seen, religious justification may be sought for anything from slaughter of enemies to economic exploitation and sexual promiscuity. It is a striking fact that Biblical sanction can be found for almost any practice whether it be for witchcraft, persecution, the wearing of long hair, as by members of the House of David, a taboo upon buttons, as among some Mennonites, or ceremonial footwashing as among other sects. Sanction may be found also for "seeking not thine own but thy neighbor's wealth," on the part of shrewd Puritan business men.

The Christian ideals of love and brotherhood did not hamper the Puritan forefathers in their trade of New England rum for African slaves, nor in their Indian policy of ruthless extermination. The awareness on the part of the Indians of the rationalizing tendency in religion is shown in their denunciation of a massacre of converted natives.

"And yet these white men would be always telling us of their great book which God had given them. They would

persuade us that every man was good who believed in what the book said; and every man was bad who did not believe in it. They told us a great many things which they said were written in the book; and wanted us to believe it all. We would probably have done so, if we had seen them practice what they pretended to believe and act according to the good words which they told us. But no! While they held their big book in one hand, in the other they had murderous weapons, guns and swords—wherewith to kill us, poor Indians. Ah! And they did so, too. They killed those who believed in their book as well as those who did not. They made no distinction." [28]

Far away in Africa the warlike Masai say that God gave to them all the cattle in the world and if their Bantu neighbors were not so reluctant in giving up the livestock they would not be driven to recover their property by force.[29] Truly, in religion the wish is often father of the thought, and the thought a justification for the wish.

[28] MacLeod, W. C.—Unpublished MSS. quoting report of Heckewelder. See *The American Indian Frontier,* Knopf, N. Y., 1928.

[29] Lowie, R. H.—*Primitive Religion,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924, p. 290.

Chapter X

RELIGIOUS DISORGANIZATION

In the preceding chapters the nature and social significance of religion were discussed, for the most part in the light of facts from pre-literate and historic cultures. It is now time to indulge the natural tendency to find in our own culture of the present day the most significant situations and problems. It is no easy task for individuals immersed in a culture to analyze it with any degree of objectivity or even accuracy, and we cannot expect more than the crudest picture of the religion of our times sketched against a background of selected religions of pre-literate and historic peoples. What, then, are the outstanding characteristics of the present religious situation? They seem to be (1) a growing secularization, (2) materialism, (3) individualism, (4) a differentiation of religion, and (5) a decline in supernaturalism. The first three will receive but passing mention while the last two will be considered in detail.

Secularization.—If Durkheim, Malinowski, and others be correct, that human beings divide their world into the realms of the sacred and the profane, it is also true that with the advance of civilization the province of the sacred is progressively swallowed up by the profane. Every phase of the life of the peoples from whom we have drawn most of our illustrations, the Winnebago, the Ekoi, and the Egyptian, is intertwined with religious beliefs and practices. Among these peoples technology is accompanied by prayers and rites,

while in our steel mills and automobile factories slight trace of religion is to be found. The secularization of education is almost equally marked in spite of thousands of parochial and other religious schools. The Winnebago youth on the other hand, is taught that his most pressing duty is to get into satisfactory relations with the spirits. Among the Australians formal education is invested with the weird atmosphere of the supernatural.

Furthermore, the process of secularization has separated church and state to a greater extent than ever before. True, divine sanction is invoked for political measures, and Protestant denominations are active as lobbyists for prohibition and other assumed reforms, but a political leader is no longer considered an incarnation of a god. The long struggle between church and state for what actually was political power has resulted in the victory of the state, although in Mexico the battle still rages. Comparatively few countries now have state religions and, in general, religious toleration is an accepted principle although it does not always exist in practice. While prayers are still offered for the success of national arms, the leaders are not guided by visions as in the case of the Winnebago, nor is the outcome of a battle foretold by the flight of birds, as among the Romans.

The steady march of secularization which Shotwell sees as a definite trend in history is further evidenced in connection with the family. The "movies" have replaced family prayers of an evening and the modern bungalow is not equipped with household gods and a family altar. The head of the houeshold no longer plays the rôle of priest, as among the Romans or the Chinese.

Materialism.—From almost any pulpit may be heard vehement denunciations of the materialism of our age. It must be confessed that there is truth in these claims even when the personal interest of the minister in spirituality is discounted.

With the coming of the Industrial Revolution there has been a vast increase in material wealth. The possessions and opportunities of even the poor man of the present day are greater by far than those of a medieval feudal lord. The theatre, the movies, the automobile, cheap books, pleasure resorts, manifold recreational opportunities, all compete with the churches for the time and energy of the people of the present day. "Things," indeed, "are in the saddle." Even the working-man is the slave of his possessions, and the desire for further possessions and the leisure wherewith to enjoy them. While the great mass of people have perhaps been but slightly affected by materialism in a philosophical sense, their dominant interests and accepted values draw them away from the religious life. It is exceedingly difficult to obtain satisfactory statistical evidence of the effect of present-day materialism upon religious life, but the decline of supernaturalism, may be, in part, a measure of materialistic attitudes and will be discussed at length in a later section.

Individualism.—A third characteristic of the modern religious situation has been called individualism. This, too, has been an object of denunciation from the pulpit. It is, however, but a logical consequence of the Reformation and an outgrowth of the democratic spirit. The individual now makes and worships his own God and has in his own right a political and moral significance that was lacking in the days of a supreme Catholic Church and absolute monarchy. There is indeed a striking contrast between the age of the ancient Hebrews and the present time. David, a single individual, could bring upon his countrymen a frightful pestilence for his personal indiscretion in "numbering Israel." Today, each person is morally and religiously responsible for himself alone. True, the ruthless quest for personal salvation carried on by the ascetics of the Middle Ages has given place in part to a social Christianity in which men are to

some extent responsible for social welfare. Nevertheless, the individualistic ideal is relatively more prominent. This individualism has gone hand in hand with religious toleration. It has, however, facilitated the slipping-away of men from the religious fold, and perhaps also a decline in social responsibility.

Differentiation of Religion.—Hand in hand with indidiviualism has come a tendency to differentiation of religion, originating in the Protestant Reformation. Religious individualism is, in fact, but a differentiation of religion carried to its logical conclusion. The sixteenth century brought the idea of personal interpretation of the Scriptures and personal worship of God, but the leaders of the Protestant revolt, frightened by the implications of their claims, established sects nearly as intolerant and exclusive as the Catholic Church. The original idea, however, was not to be extinguished and Calvinism and Lutheranism, together with other offshoots of the original movement, have differentiated into nearly two hundred different Protestant sects. The sanctioning of a personal interpretation of the Scriptures was like sowing dragon's teeth, for an army of new sects and creeds has arisen. The military figure of speech is not inappropriate in view of the hostility that these sects have manifested to one another over trivial differences in dogma. Almost any town in the United States will show a half-dozen Protestant churches, separated one from another by theological disputes that took place a century or two ago. Many of these local churches are supported by central organizations, such as those of Methodists and Baptists, which seem more concerned with the furthering of denominational interests than the promotion of local welfare. The rivalry between different churches for the membership of prominent and wealthy citizens, portrayed in *Elmer Gantry,* is not altogether a caricature.

Not only has there been a rivalry between different denominations in the United States for membership and for influence, but also antagonism has been found in regard to foreign missions. At times it has seemed less important that souls should be saved by conversion to Christianity than that they be brought within the fold of a particular denomination. It is not uncommon for the members of one sect to regard the members of another as heretics and infidels. There are many even to the present day, to whom the word "Unitarian" is actually a term of reproach.

Causes of Religious Differentiation.—The causes of this differentiation of religion are far too complicated to trace out in detail. The effect of the slavery issue is seen in the separation of the Baptist, Methodist Episcopal and Presbyterian churches into their Northern and Southern branches. The influence of race prejudice is seen in the separate colored denominations, as in the African Methodist Episcopal church and the National Baptist Convention. The influence of national sentiment is seen in the existence of a German Evangelical Synod and, until recently, of the Welsh Presbyterian church. There have been many splits due to differences of opinion in regard to ritual, church organization, and theology. The Mennonites and the Moravians are differentiated both by their unique Biblical interpretations and their association with a particular European culture group. The Holy Rollers, who from their violent emotional behavior have acquired the name of "American dervishes," had their origin in a tumultuous revival in Wales some twenty years ago. A number of cults are due to the conjunction of a religious leader and a favorable opportunity. Mormonism had its Joseph Smith, Christian Science its Quimby and Mary Baker Eddy. Theosophy had its Madame Blavatsky and her eminent converts, Colonel Henry Steel Olcott and Mrs. Annie Besant. The latter is now herself regarded as one of the Mahatmas,

a great soul well fitted to lead men to union with the mystic Over Soul of the universe.[1]

Bahaism may be considered as a further example of differentiation but, curiously enough, it is a dissenting and heretical movement that has as one of its aims a larger religious unity.[2] It, too, had its origin in the efforts of an outstanding religious leader, in this case, Bab, who was killed in Persia, only to be followed by a series of messiahs who in turn caught up his fallen mantle. The spread of the movement has been due in considerable measure to the activity of Abdul, who travelled a great deal and spread his doctrine throughout the world. His teachings entered the United States in about 1893 and at present it is estimated that there are 100,000 followers in this country. The splendid Bahai temple being erected in Chicago entered by nine denominational portals, is surmounted by a dome symbolic of religious union. Whether the future will see in Bahaism more than a gesture towards unity remains to be seen. Certainly at present it is carried on the tide that flows toward differentiation.

A very interesting attempt has been made by McComas to explain the tendency of organized religion to differentiate into varied religious sects. He builds his argument around the recognition of individual differences due to circumstances of environment, especially childhood impressions, and, also, to differences in original hereditary endowment.[3]

He goes on to point out, however, that despite minor differences, individuals fall into fairly well defined types. German artists and musicians, for example, while differing one from another, form a type which is in contrast to that

[1] Bois, Jules—*The New Religions of America,* The Forum, May, 1925, pp. 49–60.

[2] Bois, Jules—*The New Religions of America* (III) *Babism and Bahaism,* Forum, July, 1925.

[3] McComas, H. C.—*The Psychology of Religious Sects,* Revell, N. Y., 1912, p. 21.

of Mediterranean artists. The differences consist essentially in the greater complexity and intricacy of treatment based upon a broader span of attention. A similar psychological make-up gives people a bond of common feeling that draws them together. It is the contention of McComas that religious sects are due in part to the psychological similarities of their members. It is significant in this connection that James Pratt, on the basis of a questionnaire study, finds distinct classes of religious believers: (1) those whose belief depends upon authoritative tradition, (2) those whose religious life is built upon intellectual factors, (3) those whose momentum in respect to religious life prevents them from breaking away, (4) those whose belief grows out of need and, finally, (5) those whose belief rests upon intense religious feeling and actual mystical experiences of communion with God.[4]

Dr. Jean du Buy recognizes even more definite types among Protestant sects and relates them to the traits of religious leaders. The Presbyterian reflects the spirit of Calvin and, like him, is intellectual, logical, systematic, and dogmatic, and, while lacking emotion, has strictness and severity of character. The typical Methodist has a religion of personal experience which includes a conviction of sin and an intense emotional upheaval at the time of conversion. Like Wesley, the Methodist is emotional, fervent, aggressive, and enthusiastic. The typical Baptist lays stress upon an exclusively regenerate church membership. His theological beliefs may vary from those of his fellows for he is inclined not only to a literal interpretation of the Bible but also to personal freedom in making that interpretation. Repentance and a profound change of heart are considered necessary prior to baptism. The fourth type identified by Du Buy is the Unitarian, whose religion makes an appeal to reason and conscience. He is disinclined to dogma and au-

[4] Pratt, James—*Amer. Jour. of Relig. Psych.*, 2, pp. 76–96.

thority in religion and is intellectual rather than emotional.[5] It is apparent that this classification could be condensed to an intellectual type, including the Presbyterians and Unitarians, and an emotional type, including the Methodists and Baptists.

Giddings also has ventured an analysis of the psychological basis for the differentiation of religious sects. He stands equipped with his well-known four-fold classification of personality types, the idio-motor, the idio-emotional, the dogmatic-emotional, and the critical-intellectual.[6]

Some of his findings are indicated in the following condensed table.[7]

DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONALITY TYPES BY SECTS

Type of Mind	IM	IM to IE	IE	IE to DE	DE	DE to CI	CI
Baptist, white	.....	.....	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{8}$		
Baptist, colored	.....	.....	1				
Catholics	.....	$\frac{1}{4}$	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{4}$			
Christian Scientists	.....	.....	.....	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$		
Congregationalists	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	
Friends	.....	.....	.....	1			
Jewish	.....	.....	.....	.....	1		
Lutherans	.....	.....	.....	.....	1		
Methodists, white	.....	.....	$\frac{1}{8}$	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{8}$		
Presbyterians	.....	.....	.....	.....	$\frac{3}{4}$	$\frac{1}{4}$	
Ethical Culture	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	
Unitarians and Universalists	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	1	

IM—Idio-motor DE—Dogmatic-emotional
IE—Idio-emotional CI—Critical-intellectual

[5] Du Buy, Jean—*Amer. Jour. of Relig. Psych. and Educ.*, 3, pp. 165–209. For influence of Wesley see Dimond, S. G.—*The Psychology of the Methodist Revival,* Oxford, N. Y., 1926.

[6] Giddings, F. H.—*A Provisional Distribution of the Population of the United States,* Psych. Rev. Vol. VIII: 4, July, 1901, p. 345.

[7] Condensed from McComas, H. C.—*The Psychology of Religious Sects,* Revell, N. Y., 1912, p. 97.

It is interesting to note that the distinction between the emotional and intellectual religious types is maintained.

According to McComas, the distinction receives support from additional indirect evidence. It might be expected, he argues with masculine logic, that Christian Science, being based to a greater extent upon emotion than Unitarianism, would contain a greater proportion of women. Such proves to be the case for there were, in 1900, 72.4% women in the Christian Science groups as compared with 60.8% in the Unitarian Church.[8]

Another bit of evidence is based on the assumption that wealth is in the long run associated with intellectual attitudes. It is found that the average salaries of Unitarian and Presbyterian ministers are considerably higher than those of Methodist, Baptist and similar groups. Furthermore, the former are represented to a greater extent among city populations, possibly more educated and intellectual in type than rural peoples.[9]

McComas, after some deliberation upon the problem of personality types, concludes that a three-fold classification based upon the predominance of either will, emotion, or intellect is satisfactory. His first type, then, is termed the "action type," and includes individuals who are swayed by either their own instinctive impulses or by imitation of others. This type includes not only members of the lower classes, incapable either of philosophical interest in religion or any profound emotional reaction to it, but also the practical and hard-headed business man, intelligent, but essentially a man of action rather than of thought. In the "experiential type" there is emotionality and suggestibility. Such people are carried away by revivals, are more susceptible to visions and trances and to crowd excitement. They are

[8] Ibid., p. 101.

[9] Ibid., pp. 102–104.

the people possessed by real religious enthusiasm and have the driving power which carries them past all obstacles. Theirs is the flaming inspiration of a Wesley, a Whitefield, or a Francis Asbury, even though the power of leadership of these men be lacking.

The "intellectual type" including Calvin and his ilk, like the action and experiential types, embraces a number of subtypes or variants. Obviously, no type of personality is ever found which is quite free from emotion, and the intellectual factors assume varied forms. There are, says McComas, differences in imagery, quickness of learning, spread and rapidity of association, and notably in span of attention. Deficiency in the latter trait would tend to make for narrow-mindedness and literalism.

The essential thought basis of every religion will then be colored by the predominant personality type of its adherents, and the more intellectual personality types, in spite of minor differences, will tend to adhere to a religion of richer intellectual content than other personality types. McComas' argument that the personality type is reflected in forms of religious expression and that these forms are in turn embodied in religious sects is summed up by a graphic table illustrating the distribution of personality types within the various sects. This table need not be presented here as its purport is essentially the same as that of Giddings.[10]

There is little doubt that a certain measure of truth is to be found in the theory advanced by McComas although his writing is haunted by the ghost of a discarded faculty psychology, and his account of the distribution of personality types within the various sects, like that of Giddings, is nothing more than personal opinion, presented though it is in quantitative form. Perhaps not enough account is taken of the fact that persons of uncongenial temperament born into

[10] Ibid., p. 201.

a particular sect will tend to remain in that group through sheer inertia. Again, it is a possibility that a denomination moulds its new members to a particular type rather than reflects their inborn predisposition. There is, however, doubtless some selection in that a sect, like a fraternity, draws to itself persons of similar temperament, while others are forced out. Furthermore, there may be some biological perpetuation within the group of a structural basis of personality that favors certain types of religion, although this is questionable. It is interesting in this connection to recall that long ago Galton pointed out the prevalence of at least one hereditary trait within a religious sect. He says of color blindness, "It is nearly twice as prevalent among the Quakers as among the rest of the community, the proportion being as 5.9 to 3.5 per cent." [11] He points out that no artist with a genuine love of color would have remained among these drably-clad folk. Furthermore, those who married outside the group, with consequent exclusion, were likely to have had a love of color that made Quaker practices unendurable. Galton concludes: "Hence the existing members of the Society of Friends are a race who probably contained in the first instance an unduly large proportion of colour-blind men, and from whose descendants many of those who were not born colour blind have year by year been drafted away. Both causes must have combined with the already well-known tendency of colour blindness to hereditary transmission, to cause it to become a characteristic of their race." [12]

Evidences of Religious Differentiation.—We have devoted an extended space to a consideration of some of the causes of differentiation in religion; the spirit of protest,

[11] Galton, F.—*Inquiries Into Human Faculty,* Everyman's Library Edition, E. P. Dutton, N. Y., n.d., p. 32.

[12] Ibid., p. 33.

differences in regard to polity and moral issues, race, nationality, the slavery question, the influence of individual leaders and inborn individual differences. The question arises, is this differentiation a trend that can be actually demonstrated or does it merely seem that organized religion is differentiating into varied and often conflicting forms? While no absolute proof is forthcoming, a glance at the census figures is well worth while. H. K. Carroll, who had charge of the division of the churches for the eleventh census, the first to obtain fairly reliable statistics, was much impressed with the diversity of religious sects at that time.

"The subdichotomies of petty schisms," to use Milton's vivid phrase, made difficult his task of classifying the various denominations. He points out that, thanks to religious liberty, a Christian "may elect any one of 125 or 130 different kinds (of Christianity), or join every one of them in turn. He may be six kinds of Adventist, seven kinds of Catholic, twelve kinds of Mennonite or Presbyterian, thirteen kinds of Baptist, sixteen kinds of Lutheran, or seventeen kinds of Methodist. He may be a member of any one of 143 denominations or of all in succession. If none of these suit him, he still has a choice among 150 separate and independent congregations, which have no denominational name, creed, or connection." [13] Carroll was confronted with the task of distinguishing the "Presbyterian Church in the United States" from the "Presbyterian Church in the United States of America," and of keeping separate the four different kinds of Brethren.

The next census in 1906 revealed 186 or 188 different denominations, depending on classification, an increase of some forty organizations, of which about 17 were due to the spirit of secession. The last census, taken in 1916, lists

[13] Carroll, H. K.—*The Religious Forces of the United States,* The Christian Literature Co., N. Y., 1893, p. xv.

202 denominations compared with the 188 in 1906. The net gain was 14, there being a loss of 17 and an addition of 31 denominations. There were nine consolidations during the period. Of the thirty-one denominations added, three were due to division, four to reorganization, five existed previously but unreported, five were due to immigration and fourteen were entirely new.[14] It is interesting to note that the Brethren are now divided into six rather than four brotherly groups. Obviously the statistical unit is too uncertain to permit these statistics to carry full weight but the evidence points in one direction.

There are many writers who on the basis of personal observation rather than statistics paint a gloomy picture of the present state of religious organization in this country. John Haynes Holmes points out that the theological differences between the sects are as out-of-date as the issues which divided the Cavaliers and Roundheads of Stuart England. "Their very names speak a dead language and carry the odor of a gutted candle." Nevertheless, they refuse the challenge to become one body in Christ. He concludes, "Our churches are Methodist churches, Episcopalian churches, Presbyterian churches, Unitarian churches, Protestant churches, Catholic churches, first; and Christian churches, second." [15]

Surveys have been made of single towns that disclose the clash of warring sects more vividly than a mass of statistics collected the country over, or statements of personal observations. "In one town of 800 souls in a far western state there are eight church organizations, Roman Catholic, Presbyterian, Baptist, three Lutheran, and two Methodist. There are five church buildings, all of them ugly, unpainted,

[14] Census Report on Religious Bodies, 1916, Part I, p. 14.

[15] Holmes, J. H.—*New Churches for Old,* Dodd, Mead, N. Y., 1922, pp. 24–26.

ill-kept, poorly furnished. These inhospitable eyesores have been struggling for years to maintain themselves. Not one is able to support a minister without generous donations from its parent denomination." [16]

This sordid picture of jealousy, petty strife, poverty and inefficiency is perhaps symbolic of certain trends in Christianity, especially Protestant Christianity since the Reformation. In the spirit of protest, dissension and revolt, Parrish sees one of the causes making for the collapse of Protestantism.[17]

The bickering between and within denominations has called down upon organized, or rather, disorganized, religion many a bitter indictment. The hypocrisy, the espionage, the persecution, the slander, the violence, and the increasing bitterness found in the present-day religious situation is not only disgusting to the impartial public but actually dangerous, says Mr. Aikman in a recent article.[18]

Nevertheless, before concluding that the modern tendency toward differentiation in religion will continue to the destruction of religion as an effective influence in modern life we should glance at the other side of the picture. Are there no tendencies making for unity and coöperation between denominations in the Western World?

Religious Unity.—Any consideration of the tendencies making for unity in religious life will be clarified by recognizing the distinction between organic and federal unity. The former implies the intimate blending and fusion of elements into an organic whole in which the functioning parts lose their separate identity. Federal unity implies, on the

[16] McComas, H. C.—*The Psychology of Religious Sects,* Revell, N. Y., 1912, p. 52.

[17] Parrish, H.—*The Break-up of Protestantism,* Atlantic Monthly, March, 1927, p. 295 ff.

[18] Aikman, Duncan—*Arsenals of Hatred,* American Mercury, Oct., 1924, pp. 129–136.

other hand, that the parts retain a separate and independent existence but unite for certain purposes by a system of representation in a central executive body or council. Obviously, the two types of unity differ in degree rather than in kind. The history of the United States has shown a drift toward the principle of organic unity in the political sphere with the substitution of the Constitution for the Articles of Confederation and with the decline of the doctrine of States' rights after the Civil War. Equipped with this distinction we may consider the movements toward religious unity, advancing from small to larger groups.

Local Religious Unity.—Within the local community, especially in the country, over-churching has been carried to a scandalous degree with corresponding weakness and inefficiency. A study of the country churches of Ohio in 1918 revealed an amazing condition. "Out of every hundred of these churches sixty have less than one hundred members; fifty-five less than seventy-five, and thirty-seven not more than fifty members. Two-thirds of the churches had no resident pastor, even counting in all the rural town churches, while in the open country only three hundred and sixty, or thirteen per cent of the two thousand eight hundred and seven churches, had resident pastors. The average salary paid in the denomination with the largest number of country churches was eight hundred and fifty-seven dollars and free use of a parsonage; in the denomination with the next largest number, seven hundred and eighty-seven dollars, or six hundred and eighty dollars, if a parsonage was provided." [19]

There have been efforts to meet this situation and other evils of differentiation by organizing a union church which includes members of various creeds and denominations. It

[19] Gill and Pinchot, "Six Thousand Country Churches," summarized by Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, pp. 195–196.

is a community church but not necessarily of the liberality found in the Community Church as organized by John Haynes Holmes. Some forty churches of this type have been organized in Massachusetts and apparently the movement has its representatives in all parts of the United States.[20]

Another attempt toward religious unity in the community consists in the formation of federated churches in which the members retain their denominational adherence and the pastor belongs to one of the communions but ministers to all alike. Brown states, "Of churches of this kind there are known to be between two hundred and three hundred, and when one considers the difficulties in such an arrangement, on the whole they are functioning with surprising success." [21]

A third type of church in addition to the union and the federated types may be mentioned as one of the mile stones on the path toward church unity. This is the denominational church which is recognized and supported by other denominations as the community church in a locality where other churches are unnecessary. In some of the New England states it has met with moderate success. It is apparent, however, that such instances of unity and of cooperation do not affect any great percentage of the two hundred thousand or more churches in the United States.

The federal principle is exemplified not only in church organization but also in the coöperation of the various churches of a community for social service. There is often a more or less formal and representative federation of the churches, as in the case of the New York Federation of Churches, in order to formulate and support common programs of social reform. Such federations are known to

[20] Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 207.
[21] Ibid., p. 208.

exist in many cities and doubtless similar efforts towards an organization and coördination of the work of the various churches is carried on elsewhere unknown to the statistician.[22]

Guild has formulated some of the objectives of such federations, stressing among other things religious and social surveys, prevention of overlapping and duplication of effort and the presentation of an effective religious appeal to both native and foreign-born.[23]

Denominational Unity.—Considering entire denominations rather than sects of a particular community we find here also movements both of the organic and federal type. There are undoubtedly reunions and reconciliations to record as well as schisms and conflicts. The title of one group known as the Church of the United Original Seceders is a veritable history in itself. Numerous attempts have been made to heal the breach created by race problems and to soothe the bitter feeling aroused by the Civil War. Three of the Presbyterian churches have come together in recent years, the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A., the Cumberland Presbyterian Church and the Welsh Calvinistic Methodist Church, and negotiations have been carried on among five other Presbyterian groups. The attempt, however, made to unite the Northern and Southern Presbyterians thus far has resulted in a complete failure. In the case of the Lutherans, verily a much divided denomination, three of their larger bodies united to form the United Lutheran Church. Turning to the Methodist Church, we find that the breach made by the Civil War is still too wide to be bridged, for an attempt at union came to naught when the Methodist Episcopal Church (South) failed to cast the necessary three-fourths vote in favor of the proposal.[24]

[22] Ibid., p. 216.

[23] Guild, R. B.—*Christian Unity: Its Principles and Possibilities,* Associated Press, N. Y., 1921, pp. 110–122.

[24] American Year Book, 1926, p. 764 ff.

It would seem to the person not fired with religious optimism that organic unity within the various denominations still lies far in the future. Movements toward a unity of the federal type have met with some degree of success. We find, for example, that seventeen Lutheran bodies cooperate in the work of the National Lutheran Council.[25] Furthermore, Home Mission Boards and other social-reform organizations commonly constitute a bond of unity between the various branches of a denomination.

Nationwide Religious Unity.—Expanding the field of discussion to the national sphere and the relations of the larger denominations, there are revealed equally interesting but equally limited movements toward the Christian brotherhood which has been so strikingly lacking since the days of the Reformation. In 1918 a movement was launched at Philadelphia to bring about an organic unity between the various denominations in the United States. At the invitation of a body of the Presbyterian Church the meeting was attended by the representatives of nineteen communions and it was decided upon the consent of six denominations to form a United Church of Christ in America. Even in the Presbyterian Church, however, the project met with little favor and has gone the way of many another fair dream of unity.

Greater success has crowned the efforts of our neighbors to the north. In Canada, Methodists, Presbyterians and Congregationalists have united to form the United Church of Canada. There has been some Presbyterian opposition but the provision that any church may withdraw within six months and retain its property will prevent, in the case of failure, the undignified legal battle associated with the split of the Methodists before the Civil War. It is claimed that the United Church represents 2,498,120 persons or 29.56

[25] Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 255.

per cent of the population of Canada.[26] According to a recent report the United Church is thriving in its second year and bids fair to constitute a significant landmark in church history.[27] It is interesting to note that a similar movement is on foot between the Presbyterians, Congregationalists, and Methodists of Australia and New Zealand, which is apparently meeting with similar success. In England, likewise, there have been stirrings of interest in national religious unity and important meetings have been held but as yet without definite steps being taken.

If the success of projects of organic unity within the United States has been slight, the achievements in the way of federal unity have been considerable. The most striking instance of federal unity is offered by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America which was formed in Philadelphia in 1908.[28]

In the Council some thirty bodies are represented which have, it is claimed, a "constituency" of over 58,000,000 people. The Council has sought to promote Christian unity and Christian service. It has taken an interest in world peace and in harmonious race and industrial relations as well as in many other current social problems. Not the least of its services is the publication of its useful Information Service, designed to bring facts concerning present-day conditions to clergymen and others in concise form.

In contrast to the success of the Federal Council stands the striking failure of the Interchurch World Movement, born from the emotional upheaval of the World War. There was, says Brown, a recognition of the failure of religion to prevent a world disaster and, on the other hand, an appreciation of the capacity of the modern age for moral

[26] See "Canada Blazing the Way to Unity," Literary Digest, July 14, 1923.

[27] American Year Book, 1926, pp. 764–772.

[28] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Churches of the Federal Council,* Revell, N. Y., 1916, pp. 244–264.

idealism. "Out of this double insight—of failure and of capacity—was born a great hope—the hope that the lessons the war had taught might be learned at once and for all time; that the churches, confronted by so splendid an opportunity, might meet the challenge in a spirit as splendid; might throw aside all pettiness and provinciality, pride of sect or advantage of position, and ask only what each could contribute to the welfare of the whole. This ideal of a national church, conscious of its aim and of its power, cherished now and again by some exceptional spirit, became for one brief moment the inspiring motive of multitudes of Christians." [29]

The essential motive of the movement was a desire for money, men, and spiritual power. An attempt was made to accomplish a thorough survey of the task, to carry on a campaign of education, to give leadership to the church in the field of social reform, to recruit religious leaders, and to raise funds wherewith to carry on these efforts. Space is lacking here to present an analysis of the causes underlying the failure of the movement. There were financial difficulties, apparently due to lack of business judgment and to the extravagant hopes of munificent contributions on the part of laymen. It would be interesting to know the part played by the investigation of conditions in the steel industry in shutting off the flow of funds from capitalists interested in a policy of industrial laissez-faire. Certainly, a significant cause of failure was the blindness of the leaders to the psychological effect of the coming of peace, which meant an inevitable reaction to the idealism and self-denial aroused by the war and a consequent relapse to individualism and self-seeking.

There have been, however, movements towards federal unity which, as in the case of the Federal Council, were

[29] Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 115.

slower and less dramatic but in the end more effective. A number of organizations might be mentioned which have given a certain unity and coördination to the activities of the denominations throughout the country. The Home Missions Council, the Foreign Mission Conference, the Y. M. C. A., the Y. W. C. A., the American Sunday School Union, the Religious Education Association, the American Bible Society, the Epworth League and, last but not least, the Women's Christian Temperance Union, may be mentioned among others as means of coördination and unity. It is probable that the tendency towards federal unity has been rendered difficult by the absence of national executive bodies for the various denominations. Federal organization to be effective demands centralized authority over its component members.

World Unity.—Turning to a broader stage than that of any one country, we find throughout the world some vague stirrings toward both organic and federal unity. Perhaps the most recent event is the world conference on faith and order held at Lausanne at which an attendance of five hundred representatives from some eighty-seven national churches was expected. The Catholic Church was not, however, included and has rather persistently refused to compromise with sects born from the travail of the Reformation. The object of the conference was not reunion but rather a consideration of steps toward reunion, and of the faith of a reunited church if such reunion should come to pass.

For many years since the study of comparative religion was launched there has been an interest in a possible merging of world faiths. During the last century there was a movement for religious cosmopolitanism led by F. E. Abbott, Samuel Longfellow, and others in this country. But this was speedily offset by the rising tides of sectarianism and nationalism. A step forward was made with the world's

parliament of religions at Chicago in 1893. Yet while characterized by the most amicable feelings, each delegate saw unity obtained by the absorption of other faiths into his own. In spite of talk of the fundamental similarities of Buddhism to Christianity and possibly a growing tolerance, unity seems as far away today as when in 1575 the Great Mogul Akhar established the first parliament of religions at Agra in India.

Martin is inclined to recognize a form of unity lying between the organic and federal types previously mentioned. He points out the similarities between the great world religions, such as their common spiritual sentiments, the equivalent of the ten commandments, common appreciation of the golden rule, their formulation of an ideal of life, and their common doctrine of human brotherhood. He feels that they may be united into an organization based upon coördination rather than subordination and giving greater unity than federal organization, yet preserving the unique virtues of each religion.[30] He sees in the Bahai movement a possibility of religious freedom in fellowship which must characterize the religion of the future.

In the various world conferences discussion is carried on to prepare the way for a unity at some distant time. A so-called Hall of Vision was prepared recently in England containing exhibits showing the similarity between the great world religions with a view to educating people towards this end.[31] While the evidence is all against an organic unity of the world religions it is undeniable that there is a certain amount of federal organization through missionary boards and international movements. In view, however, of

[30] Martin, A. W.—*Comparative Religion and the Religion of the Future,* Appleton, N. Y., 1926.

[31] Branford, V.—*The Hall of Vision,* Soc. Rev., XVII (Oct., 1925), pp. 264–88.

the present situation as it is contemplated by an impartial observer, it is difficult to see any great degree of unity in prospect for the immediate future. Surely Faris must be looking through rose-colored spectacles if he sees in the church more than a fervent aspiration for the moral unity of mankind and the social virtues of sympathy, understanding and brotherhood.[32]

If a greater unity develops in the religious situation to put a check upon the age-old process of differentiation, it will probably be of the federal rather than the organic type. Brown, after a thorough study of the situation in this country, has outlined the most feasible and most probable tendency toward unity upon a federal rather than an organic basis.[33]

It is, of course, futile to prophesy, but it seems by no means certain that cultural assimilation, higher education, missionary activity, social service, and the like will ever reverse the tide of differentiation. Even McComas, while eager and optimistic for unity, feels that innate differences oppose any step beyond the grouping of persons of the same type into one or the other of six religious divisions. He says, "These bodies, the Catholic as one great division, the Afro-American churches as another, the Methodist and Evangelical Association as a third, the Baptist and their affiliated bodies as a fourth, the Presbyterian and its affiliated bodies as a fifth, and the Unitarian and the Universalist constituting the sixth, would have within their walls over thirty-one million members. Such a vast church, or rather such vast churches, could sway the world." [34] We can but await the verdict of time.

[32] Faris, E.—*The Church as a Prophet of Unity,* Jour. of Rel., Vol. VII, May, 1927, pp. 277–283.

[33] Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 186.

[34] McComas, H. C.—*The Psychology of Religious Sects,* Revell, N. Y., 1912, p. 227.

139

Chapter XI

THE DECLINE IN SUPERNATURALISM

While it may be stated with some confidence that the modern period in Western civilization is characterized by a decline in supernaturalism it is difficult to put this proposition in exact form or to prove it by objective and quantitative evidence. Supernaturalism is a vague term that might be variously defined. It has been well said that superstition is the other person's religion, and here supernaturalism might be substituted for superstition. Certainly the grosser forms of supernaturalism have diminished. We less frequently pray for rain, offer sacrifices at the times of floods to avert divine wrath or believe in witches and vampires. It is not generally considered sacrilegious to insure a church rather than trust to divine protection, as was thought by characters in Ibsen's *Ghosts*. No longer is the lightning's flash the thunderbolt of an angry god, and thunder the tones of his voice. He speaks no longer from the burning bush and walks no more with man in the garden in the cool of the evening. National policy is not decided by the entrails of sheep or the words of a soothsayer.

We do have, however, thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of people believing in an imminent second coming of Christ and bodily resurrection. Millions accept the miracles of the Bible and believe implicitly in a special creation a few thousand years ago by an anthropomorphic deity who still interests himself in the daily lives of his followers,

records their good and evil actions and interferes with the natural order of events in answer to their prayers. Certain modern shrines bear witness to the widespread belief in supernatural healing, as does the popularity of Christian Science, Faith Healing and many other medico-religious cults.[1]

There are still countless magical attitudes in connection with disease and its treatment.[2] The bones of the saints are not yet stripped of magical virtue. Each year some quack reaps a golden harvest by playing upon the essentially superstitious credulity of people longing for a short cut to health and happiness. We find that in occupations where some element of unusual risk is involved, charms and omens are still given credence. The soldier, the sailor, the gambler, the fisherman, the actor, and others still turn to the supernatural to protect themselves from the unknown and the unpredictable. The losses and sorrows brought by the World War gave a stimulus to spiritualism and people sought by the aid of mediums, ouija boards and table-rappings to pierce the veil and peer into regions beyond the material world of science. The readiness with which Oriental cults spread in this country shows that the will to believe is still strong. Randall makes the point that supernaturalism is as strong as ever but that its relative importance has declined with the presence in our modern industrial civilization of such numerous and varied demands upon time and energy. He writes, "There is much reason to doubt whether, after all, the modern age as a whole is much more indifferent to the appeal of religion than the centuries past. The so-called Age of Faith when every man gave lip-service to the Church and took wise precaution against

[1] Paulson, Alice—*Religious Healing,* Ment. Hyg., Vol. X:3, July, 1926, pp. 541–595.

[2] Maddox, J. L.—*The Medicine Man,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.
Fishbein, M.—*Medical Follies,* Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1925.

the perils of a future life, probably contained not much larger a proportion of genuinely religious souls." [3]

Despite these qualifications and counter-tendencies it seems that the trend has really been toward a decline in supernaturalism as that term is generally understood, meaning belief in mysterious powers not belonging to the everyday world. In so far as these powers are considered as not controllable by man, supernaturalism is practically identical with the working definition of religion previously given, but taken in a slightly broader sense would include magic as well. But is the present status of supernaturalism merely a matter of opinion or can some objective test be applied? Certainly one cannot ascend a high mountain and thence survey the minds of one's fellow-men and compare their attitudes with the attitudes of ages gone by. It is possible, however, to gather certain indirect quantitative evidence, although interpretations of this evidence may differ.

Church Membership and Attendance.—The first and most obvious criterion of supernaturalism is church membership, although here no identification of supernaturalism with superstition is implied. Carroll presents figures from denominational sources showing an increase of Protestant membership from 1880 to 1890 of 42% while during the same period the population increased by only 24.86%. The increase in the strength of the Catholic Church, despite heavy immigration, seems to have been only about 30%. It is estimated that the total number of religious adherents in 1890 was 56,992,000 out of a population of 62,622,250 and that there were at that time some 5,000,000 persons either hostile or indifferent to religion.[4] McComas claims that while in 1850 there were but 149 church members for

[3] Randall, J. H.—*The Making of the Modern Mind,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, p. 521.

[4] Carroll, H. K.—*The Religious Forces of the United States,* Christian Literature Co., N. Y., 1893, p. xxxvi.

every 1000 persons, in 1906 there were 391 members per thousand.[5] It is not clear just where he gets his figures for 1850, since Carroll, the director of the census of 1890, states that in 1850 and 1860 only data in regard to churches, church accommodations, and value of property were collected, and other census authorities issue warning against using the figures before 1890 for purposes of comparison, in view of uncertainty of data and variability of the statistical units.[6] The official census figures for religious membership in 1906 are 35,068,058, representing an increase of 13,368,626 or 61.6% over the membership in 1890.[7] This means that in 1890 about 34.4% of the population were church members while in 1906, assuming the population to be midway between that of 1900 and 1910, about 42% were church members.

According to the census of 1916 the religious membership was 41,926,854, an increase of only 6,858,796 or 19.6% over that of 1906. Assuming that the population in 1916 was midway between that of 1910 and 1920 we find that about 42.5% of the population were church members, practically the same proportion as in 1906. It is interesting to note the slower rate of increase during the last period, and furthermore that the rate of increase of Catholic membership was not so great relatively as would be expected in view of the heavy immigration during this period from southern Europe. Brown remarks, "From 1906 to 1916, the period covered by the government Census returns, the Catholics had a growth of 10.6 per cent while the various Protestant bodies grew from 17.4 to 28.2 per cent." [8]

[5] McComas, H. C.—*The Psychology of Religious Sects,* Revell, N. Y., 1912, p. 48.

[6] Carroll, H. K.—*The Religious Forces of the United States,* Christian Literature Co., N. Y., 1893, p. xi.

[7] Census Report on Religious Bodies, 1916, Part I, p. 29.

[8] Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 72.

For more recent figures it is necessary to go to the reports of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America which are probably less accurate than those of the census and possibly use units differently defined. The report for 1921 shows a church membership of 46,242,130 which means, if the census estimate of population in 1921 as 106,418,234 be accepted, that 43.5% of the population were church members.[9] The total membership for 1923 is estimated by the Federal Council to be 47,461,558 [10] and this figure considered in connection with the estimated population of 110,663,502 [11] for 1923 would indicate that about 43% of the population were church members. Absolutely nothing, however, can be concluded from this apparent decline in view of the uncertainty of the statistical evidence, which is bound to vary with the method of enumeration. We find, for example, that other estimates show the number of communicants to be 46,189,962 for 1924 and 47,090,734 for 1925.[12] Nevertheless, we find a report prepared by Dr. H. K. Carroll for the Interchurch Conference admitting an annual loss by the Protestant churches of 500,000 members.[13]

It seems that during the period of at least comparatively accurate statistics, church membership has increased rather than declined, although the tide may now have turned. According to statistics collected with great labor by Dorchester from the scattered reports of evangelical bodies, the same trend characterized the earlier period in this country. He finds the ratio of evangelical communicants to the population to be as follows:

[9] For figures from which the percentage was calculated see Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* p. 66, and *World Almanac,* 1925, p. 255.

[10] *World Almanac,* 1924, p. 207. Also Lit. Dig., April 28, 1923, p. 32.

[11] *World Almanac,* 1925, p. 255.

[12] American Year Book, 1926, pp. 771–772.

[13] Lit. Dig., August, 1927, p. 27.

1800 one in 14.50 inhabitants.
1850 one in 6.57 inhabitants.
1870 one in 5.78 inhabitants.
1880 one in 5.00 inhabitants.
1890 one in 4.53 inhabitants.[14]

There is reason to think, however, that church attendance could not have increased at quite this rate, for elsewhere he shows that in 1850 61% of the population had church accommodations, in 1860, 60% were so favored, in 1870 there were 56% and in 1890, 69%.[15]

The statistics cited are interesting and perhaps contrary to the popular impression but are likely to be misleading unless subjected to a more exhaustive analysis than can be attempted here. The proportion of communicants apparently increased steadily from 1800 on but recently at a declining rate and may now be slightly lower than a few years ago. In 1890 about 34.4% of the population were church members, in 1906 about 42%, in 1916, 42.5%, in 1921, 43.5% and in 1923, 43%. The most obvious factor to keep in mind in interpreting such figures is a possible change in age distribution which would give a larger proportion of adults and hence increase the number who could become church members without corresponding increase in religious attitudes. This factor will explain at least part of the relative increase in church membership without our invoking any increase in religiosity, for in 1880, 38.1% of the population, in 1890, 35.5%, in 1900, 34.4%, in 1910, 32.1% and in 1920, 31.7% were under 15 years of age, hence less likely to be church members.[16] It is hardly a sufficient explana-

[14] Dorchester, D.—*The Problem of Religious Progress,* Revised Ed., Eaton and Mains, N. Y., 1900, p. 694. There is no reason to think that the increase of these bodies was offset by a decline in the case of other religious bodies for which statistics are not given.

[15] Ibid., p. 701.

[16] *World Almanac,* 1925, p. 264.

tion, however, and changes in sex ratio, methods of enumeration, listing of the dead or inactive as members and immigration of people more likely to be church members must be kept in mind as well as the fact that church membership is at best but a rough index of supernaturalism.

An intensive study of the religious situation in one town shows the complexity of the problem and the necessity for taking many factors into account. Professor Bossard in his excellent analysis shows that while in 1890, 52.3% of the population of Allentown over 15 years of age were church members, in 1917 the proportion had risen to 59.7%.[17] During this period the population over 15 years of age increased some 215% while Protestant church membership increased only 174%. This is due, however, as Professor Bossard shows, to the heavy Catholic immigration which increased membership in that church by 710.3%. If this extraneous factor be ruled out by comparing Protestant membership with the native-born population over 15 years of age for the period 1890 to 1910 it is discovered that Protestant membership increased 111% as compared with 100% for population.[18] Professor Bossard concludes, "The church has been holding its own during these twenty-seven years, and has possibly increased its grip upon the masses of the city." [19]

Other criteria than church membership suggest themselves in connection with a possible decline in other-worldliness. Comparisons of church seating capacity might be worked out systematically but would hardly repay the trouble. Sunday school membership might have some significance but probably not more so than church membership. The statement made by John Haynes Holmes is interesting

[17] Bossard, J. H. S.—*The Churches of Allentown: A Study in Statistics*, Allentown, Pa., 1918, p. 71.

[18] Ibid., p. 76.

[19] Ibid., p. 72.

in this connection. He claims that "only sixty per cent of the people of America have anything to do with the churches, either Catholic or Protestant, and that three children out of every four in the country never receive any religious instruction of any kind!" [20] The fact that he is including very young children makes the last statement less significant.

More valuable than these indirect criteria of religiosity would be statistics of church attendance, but comparative statistics of this kind are difficult to obtain. Bossard found that at the morning services there was an attendance corresponding to about 25.7% of the members of Protestant churches, and in the evening services, an attendance corresponding to 33.7% of the members, not an excessively low figure in view of occupational duties, sickness and the like. More valuable for our purposes is a recent study made by Dr. C. Luther Fry for the Institute for Social and Religious Research of New York City showing a striking decline in church attendance. An intensive study of Windsor County, Vermont, showed from 1888 to 1921 a decline in average attendance at Sunday service from 3,456 to 1,843. In proportion to the Protestant population the decline in church attendance during the last 33 years was therefore 52%.[21] It would be interesting to know whether this decrease in church attendance by one-half is typical of the entire country and the part that the radio has played in producing empty pews.

The Questionnaire Study of Religious Belief.—In problems involving attitudes of human beings the simplest, the most direct and as yet the most satisfactory method is that of the questionnaire. In spite of rationalization, prevarication, lack of personal insight, the operation of secondary motives, the danger of unfair sampling and the like, the

[20] Holmes, J. H.—*New Churches for Old,* Dodd, Mead, N. Y., 1922, p. 14.
[21] Literary Digest, April 28, 1923, p. 32.

best way of knowing what people think and feel is to ask them. The use of the questionnaire method is not to be so much criticized as its abuse at the hands of uncautious investigators. During the war an attempt was made to study religious attitudes among young men in the American army, with the aid of this method but without perfect control of the conditions.[22] A census taken among 25,607 men at camp Devens disclosed only 586, or about 2%, who failed to express a religious preference and it was estimated that a majority up to 90% had some connection with the Christian Church.[23] It is apparent that this is simply using the indirect criterion of religious membership with the added uncertainty of the questionnaire method. The secondary evidence of chaplains and others in response to questions is practically worthless. The chaplains and Y. M. C. A. men who presented glowing accounts of the soldier as a hymn singer probably had very little knowledge of him in his more typical activities. Accounts of the proportion of dead bodies found with some religious object such as scapular or prayer book are more objective but the attitude of most of the investigators makes necessary a heavy discount for wishful thinking. The picture of the religious life of the average American young man drawn by Dr. Brown would be regarded by many veterans with a somewhat sceptical eye. "Sincerely and simply religious, a believer in God and in prayer, even when he forgets one and omits to practice the other, he is an admirer of unselfishness and loyalty to great ends, which he has not yet succeeded in associating in any definite way with the religion which has been preached to him as a matter of individual salvation. He respects the Church and feels a vague attachment to it; and while he does not see how it bears very directly on his

[22] *Religion Among American Men: As Revealed by a Study of Conditions in the Army,* Association Press, N. Y., 1920.

[23] Ibid., p. 10.

personal life, or has any very definite message to him on the matters in which he is most interested, he is ready to turn to it for inspiration and comfort in the greatest crises of his life." [24]

Recently a questionnaire study has been made in England which is much more specific, hence much more valuable although open to the defect that people of certain views might have been more likely to make reply than others. The questionnaire study was conducted by the *London Nation and Athenæum* and the *London Daily News* and reported in the former periodical.[25] The writer has taken the liberty of putting the results in percentage terms so that their significance may be more readily grasped.

The results are interesting but show, in view of the greater scepticism of the *Nation* readers, that the results vary with the different reading groups in the population. It is obvious that the readers of *The American Mercury* would make replies different from those of readers of the *Sunday School Times* and neither would represent perfectly the attitudes of the population at large.

Leuba's Study of Belief Among Scientists and Students.—In this country the investigation of Professor Leuba is the best known and is probably the only one satisfactory from a statistical point of view up to the time at which it was made. It has been often cited by Fundamentalists as convincing proof that college teachers were undermining the faith and morals of the young.

One part of the investigation consisted in a questionnaire addressed to two groups of American men of science, each including about five hundred men. About fifteen per cent of the scientists returned the questionnaire blank and about ten per cent failed to reply but in view of the large number who

[24] Brown, W. A.—*The Church in America,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, p. 23.
[25] London Nation and Athenæum, Oct. 16, 1926, pp. 75–76.

EVANGELICAL SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY

Question	1849 Nation Readers			14,043 News Readers		
	Per Cent Yes	Per Cent No	Per Cent Doubtful or No Reply	Per Cent Yes	Per Cent No	Per Cent Doubtful or No Reply
1. Do you believe in a personal God?	40	55	5	71	26	3
2. Do you believe in an impersonal purposive, and creative power of which living beings are the vehicle, corresponding to the life force, the elan vital, the evolutionary appetite?	38	48	14	34	45	21
3. Do you believe that the basis of reality is matter?	27	58	15	22	59	19
4. Do you believe in personal immortality?	44	48	8	72	23	5
5. Do you believe that Jesus Christ was divine in a sense in which all living men could not said to be divine?	36	62	2	68	30	2
6. Do you believe in any form of Christianity?	51	43	6	75	20	5
7. Do you believe in the Apostles' Creed?	21	71	8	53	36	11
8. Do you believe in the formulated tenets of any Church?	25	69	6	52	38	10
9. Are you an active member of any Church?	36	62	2	62	35	3
10. Do you voluntarily attend any religious service regularly?	43	55	2	71	27	2
11. Do you accept the first chapter of Genesis as historical?	6	91	3	38	53	9
12. Do you regard the Bible as inspired in a sense in which the literature of your own country could not be said to be inspired?	28	69	3	64	33	3
13. Do you believe in transsubstantiation?	4	94	2	10	86	4
14. Do you believe that nature is indifferent to our ideals?	59	24	17	41	35	24

failed to answer because of physical reasons such as sickness, death, or absence the results stand as fairly valid. The names were selected objectively from *American Men of Science* and recognition made of greater or lesser degree

of eminence. The sub-group of greater scientists consisted of those who had a star beside their name to indicate that they were considered among the thousand leading men of science in the country. Two different forms of the questionnaire were given to the two groups of five hundred scientists but since the second was merely the first slightly modified for greater clarity the first form alone need be presented here. In each division there were 300 lesser and 200 greater scientists. In the following table the two divisions of 500 scientists will be combined, since the results for the separate divisions did not differ greatly. This body of intellectuals will be referred to in the table as natural scientists (N. S.) and a distinction will be made between lesser natural scientists (L. N. S.) and greater natural scientists (G. N. S.). Some two hundred historians (H) were also questioned and separated with the aid of competent persons into the lesser historians (L. H.) and the greater historians (G. H.). Professor Leuba also selected objectively from membership lists a group of sociologists some of whom were professors and others otherwise engaged. The former were divided into a group of 25 lesser sociologists (L. S.) and a group of 23 greater sociologists (G. S.). All of the sociologists (All S.), both the professors and non-professors taken together, numbered 197 persons. Finally, a list was prepared containing the names of 107 psychologists, 57 being regarded as lesser psychologists (L. P.) and 50 as greater psychologists (G. P.). The following table may now be presented to summarize the facts which are scattered through many pages of Leuba's book in such a random fashion as to be elusive to the ordinary reader.[26]

The figures in each case indicate the percentage of a given group subscribing to a particular proposition.

[26] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality*, 2nd Ed., Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1921, pp. 219–280.

BELIEFS OF NATURAL SCIENTISTS, HISTORIANS, SOCIOLOGISTS AND PSYCHOLOGISTS (IN PER CENT)

	(NS)	(LNS)	(GNS)	(H)	(LH)	(GH)	(S)	(LS)	(GS)	(P)	(LP)	(GP)
A. Belief in God:												
1. I believe in a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer. By "answer," I mean more than the subjective psychological effect of prayer	42	48	32	48	63	33	46	29	19	24	32	13
2. I do not believe in a God as defined above	41	.....	.....	.....	13	34						
3. I have no definite belief regarding this question	17											
B. Belief in Immortality:												
1. I believe in personal Immortality for all men. . . . conditional Immortality, i.e., Immortality for those who have reached a certain stage of development	51	59	37	52	68	35	55	52	27	20	27	9
2. I believe neither in conditional nor in unconditional Immortality of the person in another world.												
3. I have no definite belief regarding this question.												
4. I desire personal Immortality intensely or moderately	73	(84	68 [p	hysical	scient	ists])	.....	.....	.....	53		
Not at all	27	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	.....	47		

Certain additional facts which could not be condensed in the above table may now be presented. First, as to the similarity of results from the two groups of natural scientists, we find that 45% of the first division and 38% of the second were believers in God and that 55% of the first and 46% of the second division were believers in immortality. Among the greater men of the second division there were 25% disbelievers in immortality and 44% were agnostics or doubters. In regard to belief in God, however, their convictions were stronger, for 53% were definitely disbelievers and 21% were of doubtful opinion. In the second place, the returns show a larger proportion of disbelief among biological scientists as compared with physical scientists. Leuba states: "The figures are, for the believers in God: physicists, 43.9 per cent; biologists, 30.5 per cent; and for the believers in immortality, 50.7 per cent against 37 per cent." [27] The facts combined with the low percentage of believers among psychologists suggest that those best informed regarding human behavior are most sceptical in religious matters. It is also striking to find that the greater scientists are uniformly inclined to disbelief. There is every reason to believe that not only the natural scientists but the historians and other intellectuals questioned were representative of their respective groups.

It is possible still further to condense the above results by taking a weighted average of the percentage of believers among natural scientists, historians, sociologists and psychologists. We find that among this general group of intellectuals who of necessity have great influence upon their fellows and upon the beliefs of the younger generation only about 42% believe in God and a trifle less than 50% in immortality. It is hardly conceivable that such results would have been obtained a few centuries ago or even dur-

[27] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality,* 2nd Ed., Open Court Publishing Co., Chicago, 1921, p. 253.

ing the earlier part of the last century. Here surely is impressive evidence of a decline in supernaturalism.

Another study, also conducted by Leuba, is of equal interest. In response to a questionnaire given to all the members of various classes in nine different colleges of high rank, 927 answers were received concerning belief in God. About 97 per cent of the students were between eighteen and twenty years of age, and 289 were men while 638 were women. The four questions were so worded as to demand a statement of belief rather than a mere yes or no and these statements were then classified by the investigator so that the results might be expressed in statistical terms. While not wholly objective, the method in the hands of an impartial worker like Professor Leuba is more valuable in giving a picture of the religious beliefs of college students than the collection of acceptances or denials of propositions which, even if comprehended, may be interpreted in different ways. The questions were as follows:

"1. Do you think of God as a personal or impersonal being?
2. What difference do you make between a personal and an impersonal being?
3. Describe as fully as you can, how, under what image, or images, you think of God. Distinguish here between what in your description is for you merely an image, a form of speech, and what is the reality.
4. What difference would the non-existence of God make in your daily life?" [28]

The answers to the questions as quoted in full in certain cases by the investigator show wide variation in the beliefs of the students and include conceptions of the divine that extended from the most childish anthropomorphism to lofty and poetic pantheism. The results were as follows: About

[28] Ibid., p. 186.

56% of the men and 82% of the women expressed a belief in a personal God while some 31% of the men and 11% of the women conceived God as impersonal. Apparently only two or three per cent of the students expressed disbelief in all conceptions of God, yet Leuba's conclusion is significant. "Considered all together my data would indicate that from 40 to 50 per cent of the young men leaving college entertain an idea of God incompatible with the acceptance of the Christian religion, even as interpreted by the liberal clergy." [29]

In regard to the importance in the personal life of the students of belief in God we find that 32% of the men and 17% of the women declared the non-existence of God would make no difference in their lives. If doubtful cases be included the percentages rise to 43 and 22, hence a considerable percentage, especially of the men, show a moral independence of the belief in God.

The investigation of belief in immortality was made in a single college rather than in nine different institutions, hence is not based on an equally representative sample but, since ninety per cent of the students answered the questionnaire, the results are valid for that college and for other colleges of equal rank which attract a similar type of student. The questions investigated the existence of belief in immortality, its influence on individual life, and the grounds upon which the belief was held. The striking fact brought out by the study was the decline in belief in the later years of college life, although the seniors seem to have renewed their faith or to have been originally more religious as compared with the junior class which was regarded in the college as exceptionally independent and intelligent. Among the freshmen about 80% were believers and 15% disbelievers and among the sophomores, 76% were believers. Turning to the juniors we find 60% believers and 32% disbelievers and

[29] Leuba, J. H.—*The Belief in God and Immortality,* p. 202.

for the seniors, 70% believers and 24% disbelievers. Curiously enough there was striking inability to assign reasons for belief in immortality. Some 51% of the believing freshmen, 49% of the sophomores, 45% of the juniors and 40% of the seniors stated that they had never assigned any reason for their belief in immortality. It would seem that students are more likely to be naïve than to be corrupted by the doctrines to which they are exposed in college. In regard to estimates of effect of belief in immortality on personal life, the great majority believed that it would be considerable. Belief does not seem, however, to be a direct outgrowth of moral and personal needs for there were 25% of those who could not declare a belief in immortality who nevertheless desired it.

While the results are not as striking as in the case of the intellectuals it is significant that 35% of the juniors and seniors in a Christian college are unable to profess a belief in immortality. It is conceivable that the religious tradition has crumbled during the last ten years so that a study today in the same college would show an even larger proportion of disbelief.

Bain's Study of Student Belief.—A study has been made recently, although unfortunately not in the same college, which shows just such a decline. Professor Bain carried on at the University of Washington, a study of the religious beliefs of two hundred students, 122 of whom were girls and 78 boys, the majority in each case being underclassmen. The results are given in the following table.[30]

[30] Bain, R.—*Religious Attitudes of College Students,* Am. Jr. of Soc., Vol. XXXII:5, Mar., 1927, p. 764. A decline is suggested by the results of a questionnaire study by Professor G. H. Betts of 500 ministers and 200 seminary students reported in the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin for Apr. 13, 1929. For belief in hell the comparative percentages were 53% to 11% for students, for belief in Heaven 57% to 11%, for belief in the devil 60% to 9%, for innate depravity 53% to 13%, for compatibility of evolution with belief in God as a creator 61% to 94%, for Virgin Birth 71% to less than 50%.

RELIGIOUS ATTITUDES OF 200 COLLEGE STUDENTS

Questions	All		Female		Male		Senior Men	
	Number, Students	Yes, Per Cent	Number, Students	Yes, Per Cent	Number, Students	Yes, Per Cent	Number, Students	Yes, Per Cent
1. Is God a Person?	192	15.1	115	15.7	63	15.9	16	7.1
2. Is God an impersonal Force?	182	67.6	106	62.3	61	67.2	16	66.6
3. Does God interfere in the world by providences, miracles, etc.?	192	42.2	113	44.2	60	38.3	16	37.5
4. Was Jesus Very God?	192	34.4	110	41.8	68	30.9	16	37.5
5. Was Jesus a manifestation of God?	190	62.6	110	62.7	63	57.1	16	50.0
6. Was Jesus Human only?	194	35.6	111	35.1	68	38.2	16	62.5
7. Was Jesus born of a virgin?	187	66.8	109	68.8	64	67.2	16	66.6
8. Was the Bible verbally inspired by God?	192	18.7	113	27.4	63	6.4	16	6.6
9. Is the Bible a general inspiration from God?	190	69.5	113	69.9	66	66.7	16	53.3
10. Is the Bible a historical account?	196	85.7	115	84.3	66	83.3	16	91.7
11. Is the Bible a mythological account?	197	62.9	112	62.5	68	57.4	16	72.8
12. Do you believe in the resurrection of the body?	184	32.0	108	35.2	60	31.7	16	28.5
13. Do you believe in the eternal life of the spirit?	187	76.5	102	81.4	65	64.6	16	66.6
14. Do you believe that personality, memory, etc., persist after death?	178	30.3	104	28.8	61	34.4	16	53.8
15. Do you believe in reward and punishment after death?	188	40.4	103	45.6	55	49.1	16	35.7
16. Do you believe in abstaining from work on Sunday for religious reasons?	194	31.4	114	36.8	68	22.1	16	18.7
17. Do you favor laws compelling Sunday observance?	198	27.3	115	32.2	69	15.9	16	25.0

While some of the questions were a bit perplexing to the student, 90% were familiar with 90% of them, and 94% said that they would have answered the questions in the same way a week later. Some of the questions were similar to those asked by Leuba, therefore a comparison with his results may be included in a summary. (1) The senior men, like Leuba's upperclassmen, tended to be more liberal in their views than the other students, the exception being their belief in regard to immortality. (2) The proportion believing in a personal God was only a fifth as compared with the earlier study, the actual figures being 15.1 as compared with a non-weighted average of 71.4%. (3) Belief in personal immortality was also less for while 76.5% believed in the eternal life of the spirit only 30.3% believed in the persistence of personality as compared with the non-weighted average of 72.6% of believers in personal immortality among Leuba's students. (4) There is little difference in the views of men as compared with women, which is in contrast with Leuba's findings of vastly more liberality among men. The Washington men students are, however, a trifle more liberal than the women, except in regard to immortality. The girls, on the other hand, are more consistent and we do not find 38.2% believing that Jesus was human only and yet 67.2% holding that he was born of a virgin, as among the men. The women do not, however, entirely belie their reputation for inconsistency.

We might add the fact that about 16% of the Washington students regarded baptism as a superstition, if further evidence were needed to show that traditional Christian doctrines received moderate acceptance among this group. The slighter inclination to supernaturalism as compared with that of the students studied by Leuba may be explained by inherent differences in the school, by a greater deviation from

orthodoxy in the West as compared with the East or by a change in religious attitudes during the last decade. It may be pointed out that these considerations which are set forth by Bain are not mutually exclusive and that probably a general decline in supernaturalism is not the least important factor.

Prevalence of Superstition.—Before concluding that supernaturalism is gradually being banished by the light of scientific rationalism it behooves us to turn once more to questionnaire studies of college students and others to see if there be not another side to the picture that reveals not only supernaturalism but actual superstition. One of the earliest studies of superstition among students was made by Professor Peters.[31]

Unfortunately, however, her findings are not expressed in quantitative form except in regard to superstitions concerning the number 13, which belief she finds among all but 10 of the 280 girls questioned. Her list of superstitions is, however, interesting in its magnitude and variety. It includes such beliefs as that a jinx may spoil one's luck, that wood should be knocked, that flowers on a bed mean a funeral, that breaking a mirror or seeing a black cat means bad luck, in contrast to possession of a horseshoe or a four-leaf clover, that tearing a dress means losing a friend, that an itchy nose indicates a quarrel or money, and that the baying of a hound heralds a death in the family.

Dresslar's study attempted a more exact statement of results showing that a large number of superstitions were common among students, about 45% of these superstitions having some effect on conduct. The average number of superstitions was about 8 per person.[32]

[31] Peters, I. L.—*Superstition Among American Girls,* Ped. Sem., Vol. XXIII:4, Dec., 1916, pp. 445–451.

[32] Dresslar, F. B.—*Superstition and Education,* University of California Publications in Education, Vol. V, No. 1, July, 1907.

Gould, following in the footsteps of Dresslar, carried on an investigation of the superstitions of 377 Scottish college girls, using the same method so that a comparison could be made with the former study of 875 normal school students in California.[33] He asked the students to name all the superstitions they could remember and then to add a plus mark if affected in their conduct, a minus mark if not affected and a question mark if the effect of a superstition was vague and uncertain. He concluded from the results that about 94% of the girls were affected in some degree by superstition. A great number of superstitions were given, 967 of which he regarded as different although often the difference between them was slight. The average number of superstitions per Scottish girl was 15.4 as compared with 8.2 for the American girls and 48% of them were considered to have some effect upon conduct as compared with about 45% for the California girls. Many of the beliefs were similar to those in this country, as, for example, the conviction that ill luck would follow meeting with a cross-eyed woman, or walking under a ladder. Some 206 of the Scottish superstitions were also mentioned in this country, suggesting a common cultural heritage perhaps dating back to a time when men wandered in a blacker cloud of superstition than at the present day.

The investigation of superstition among students at the University of Oregon made by Professor Conklin was based on a slightly different method but disclosed equally interesting results. Usable answers were obtained from 557 students in psychology classes during the years 1913–1917, 267 of the students being male and 290 female. In contrast to previous studies, a distinction is made between superstitions at the time of the study and those previously held,

[33] Gould, R. L.—*Superstitions Among Scottish College Girls,* Ped. Sem., Vol. XXVIII, Sept., 1921, pp. 203–48.

but on the other hand, belief and practice were grouped together. It was found that 40% of the males and 67% of the females, or 54% of the total group, admitted superstitious belief or practice while an additional 1% confessed a "queer feeling" in certain situations. It is interesting to note that of the 45% of students who denied having superstitious beliefs or practices, 61% admitted having had superstitious beliefs or practices in the past. This means that 73% of the males, 90% of the females, or 82% of the students disregarding sex, have been subject to superstitions at some time in their lives. Certain of the superstitions may be mentioned in the order of frequency of occurrence. Knocking on wood is mentioned by 31% of those answering the question, four-leaf clover by 26%, dreams prophetic by 20%, number 13 by 13%, opening umbrella in house by 11%, fortune-telling (cards, tea-cup, palm) by 11%, sleep on wedding cake by 10%, black cats by 9%, post coming between two walking by 8%, picking up pins by 8%, Friday or Friday the 13th by 7%, walking under a ladder by 7%, breaking wishbone by 5%, wishing on stars by 4%, moon over shoulder by 4%, premonitions by 4%, breaking mirror by 3% and hoodoos, jinxes and charms by 3%.[34]

It is possible to calculate the number of superstitions per person by dividing the number of mentions of superstitions by the number of individuals giving the answers. For the males it proves to be 2.04 and for the females 2.69 and for both taken together 2.47. It would seem that the female of the species is the more prone to superstition, or at least more honest in confessing her beliefs. There seems a difference in kind also, for "the superstitions of the women are concerned chiefly with domestic and social affairs

[34] For a more complete list see Conklin, E. S.—*Superstitious Belief and Practice Among College Students,* Am. Jr. Psych., Vol. XXX, Jan., 1919, p. 90.

and the intimately personal; while those of the men are concerned with sports and the business activity of life." [35]

A question was asked concerning the origin of the superstitions, and, while the answers to the question cannot be accepted as giving the true origin, they do throw light on some of the conditions furthering and perpetuating superstition. A considerable number of the superstitions seem to have been recently developed and sometimes pertain, curiously enough, to objects brought into existence by the rationalistic advance of knowledge. Magic clings at times to the back of its conqueror, science. In the case of about 19% of the students answering the question, an assumed verification of a relationship is given as the cause of the belief. A boy, for example, notes that he and others with a gymnasium locker number 13 meet with athletic misfortunes and becomes convinced that bad luck follows any association with this figure. Often the students splendidly innocent of laws of induction or probability generalize from a single coincidence. While some 84% attributed their superstitions to social contacts with elders and others, Conklin is impressed with an illogical and emotional attitude of mind which, in spite of education, predisposes these young people to mystical and superstitious interpretations. Truly, these studies among persons of our culture who are in the upper fifth of the population with respect to education and intelligence would be illuminating to Levy-Bruhl and others, who assume that the savage is afflicted with a pre-logical mentality totally different in kind from that of civilized folk.

Unfortunately, once again we have been forced to shoot a little to one side of our objective, which is not the absolute amount of supernaturalism but its extent at present as compared with the past. A crumb of evidence is revealed by

[35] Ibid., pp. 101–102.

Conklin in another article and is quite contrary to what would have been expected.[36] An early study reported some 500 returns to a questionnaire regarding three superstitious beliefs: the unluckiness of 13, Friday and seeing the new moon over the left shoulder.[37] Only 10% of the men and 20% of the women were affected by these superstitions in contrast to the 40% and 60% among the Oregon students. Here the small number of beliefs investigated and the possibility that a particularly sophisticated group was studied must be kept in mind before concluding that supernaturalism is on the increase rather than on the wane.

As Tozzer has shown, even the Harvard student who has an excellent reputation for sophistication is not free from superstition. Themes written on the subject of personal superstitions indicated many such beliefs in connection with the risky business of examinations. Summarizing his findings among these and other students Tozzer writes: "Certain boys did not shave on the day of a test (perhaps the Samson complex); other students, including girls, wore certain clothes that were thought to be lucky. A special neck-tie was often reserved for this time of tribulation. The same relative seat in the examination rooms, lecture notes under the pillow on the night before a test, a visit to morning chapel, are only a few practices which are in the census. An examination must never be said to have been easy. Several men reserved a suit of clothes for examinations, and have worn them at every major test taken during their four years at college." [38]

Athletes who, like soldiers, sailors, gamblers and actors

[36] Conklin, E. S.—*A Further Word on Superstitiousness,* Am. Jr. Psych., Vol. XXXII:1, Jan., 1921, pp. 158–159.

[37] Proc. of Am. Soc. for Psychical Research, Vol. I, No. 3, 1887.

[38] Tozzer, A. M.—*Social Origins and Continuities,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 227.

are subject to a certain amount of risk, seem especially prone to superstition. They wear certain clothes, tap the home plate a certain number of times with the bat, avoid the hoodoo and carry various charms. "It was found," says Tozzer, "that from 70 to 75 per cent of the undergraduates studied carried out certain acts or refrained from carrying them out in the hope that something good would follow or something evil would be prevented. About 25 per cent of the persons examined carried about their persons or had in their rooms 'lucky' objects; pocket-pieces, coins, amulets. A part of these, at least, were strictly analogous with the fetish of the savage. Contrary to common belief, college boys seem in general to be more given to superstitious practices than their academic sisters." [39]

It would be interesting to investigate somewhat more thoroughly the psychological attitudes back of such belief and practice. Doubtless the superstition is in many cases identical with that type of magic which is based on an assumed repetition of coexistences or sequences. A practice works once and in defiance of the law of induction, it is assumed that it will work again. Again and again this is brought out in the Harvard themes. Save for the hasty conclusion, the procedure is that of science. It is probable, also, that in certain cases an object such as a fountain pen is conceived of as charged with magic force or mana. In one theme it is in fact stated that a copper penny is used only on rare occasions so as not to exhaust its magic power. Nevertheless, due recognition should be made of cases in both pre-literate and civilized societies in which unconscious habit or the play spirit is the motivating force.

Science Supplanting Supernaturalism.—It is difficult to find a definite proof for a proposition so vague as that which we tentatively set up, especially in view of

[39] Ibid., pp. 226–227.

the conflicting and usually indirect evidence. In the last analysis even quantitative facts must be interpreted according to the personal equation, perhaps the taste of the student. If we focus our attention upon facts of church membership there seems no great evidence, at least to very recent times, of any decline in supernaturalism and the studies of church attendance are still to scanty for any general conclusion. The studies of superstition show the amazing persistence of age-old systems of thought even among the educated classes in Western Civilization. Furthermore, the shrewd observer of our culture by personal contact and with the aid of the press and radio cannot but be impressed with the fact that millions of Americans believe in instantaneous creation of the world by an anthropomorphic being, in a personal devil, a literal Hell, and miracles that would tax even savage credulity. Some are still convinced of the flatness of the earth. As Edman has pointed out, we superstitious moderns are still swayed by the magic of names and still seek short cuts to the control of nature and the attainment of health and happiness. Gland operations, the libido, popular psychoanalysis, mind healing, spiritualism, will-power, all have their vogue among those who are impatient with intelligence, the slow methods of research and criticism and long to escape from reality into a world moulded to their desire.[40] There are still many superstitions relating to health and disease which seem to flourish as luxuriantly now as in the past.[41]

On the other hand, the studies of religious attitudes among scientists, students and the public show a frequent rejection of a personal god, immortality and other doctrines of traditional supernaturalism. Unfortunately the preva-

[40] Edman, I.—*We Superstitious Moderns,* Century Magazine, Vol. CVIII: 2, June, 1924, pp. 188–195.

[41] Pendleton, A. M.—*Superstitions Arising from Ancient Laws of Hygiene,* Jr. Soc. Hyg., Vol. X, May, 1924, pp. 361–62.

lence of present beliefs cannot be compared quantitatively with those of the past. Nevertheless, a general survey of our times yields a picture which, placed beside the scene painted by historians, supports the questionnaire studies in pointing to the conclusion that there has been a marked decline in supernaturalism.

Gone is the burning hell preached with such vigor by Jonathan Edwards, later mocked by Robert Ingersoll, and now regarded by the vast majority of educated men in the Western World as a barbarous myth. Gone too, is the devil with his horns and tail, reeking of brimstone and leering over the shoulder of those whom he would tempt to destruction. No longer as a cultural ghost of the great god Pan does he constitute the center of a widespread devil-worshiping witch cult which, according to Miss Murry, actually flourished during the Middle Ages.[42] By a strange irony of fate, the Devil when cast down to oblivion has tended to drag down God himself. Just as belief in good spirits logically exposes man to the terrors of demons and vampires, so likewise does questioning the existence of evil spirits imperil the good. Imps have gone and now the plea to the childish observers of Barrie's play *Peter Pan* to believe in faries and thus save the life of Tinker Bell seems of less avail. In accepting the conclusion that at least the animistic form of supernaturalism is on the wane we must recognize that the bright fancies of elves and fairies, nymphs and dryads, born of human imagination in its quest for beauty long ago in the childhood of the world, are likewise doomed. Such dreams must join the dark shapes of horror and of darkness banished from the world by the stern decree of science. It is not hard to understand the mood of Poe in writing his sonnet to science.

[42] Murry, M. A.—*The Witch-Cult in Western Europe,* Oxford University Press, N. Y.

Science! true daughter of Old Time thou art!
Who alterest all things with thy peering eyes.
Why preyest thou thus upon the poet's heart,
Vulture, whose wings are dull realities?
How should he love thee? or how deem thee wise,
Who wouldst not leave him in his wandering
To seek for treasure in the jewelled skies,
Albeit he soared with an undaunted wing?
Hast thou not dragged Diana from her car?
And driven the Hamadryad from the wood
To seek a shelter in some happier star?
Hast thou not torn the Naiad from the flood,
The Elfin from the green grass, and from me
The summer dream beneath the tamarind tree?

Accepting, then, that a marked decline in supernaturalism has taken place, the question arises, "Why this change?" The answer is simple and obvious—it is Science that has altered all things with her peering eyes. Its direct effect in Western European Civilization was to undermine what Santayana calls the "Christian Epic," to replace a crude Babylonian cosmology with a universe measurable only in millions of light years, and to deal a fatal blow to the ancient and comfortable anthropocentric point of view. Indirectly it has had an effect by creating the modern industrial civilization in which man's attention is diverted from the other world and in which his wants are satisfied by the research laboratory rather than by prayers to gods.

Chapter XII

SCIENCE AND RELIGION IN HISTORY

Much has been written in recent times concerning the relation between science and religion, and the usual attitude has been to conceive of the relation as an eternal warfare, a kind of cosmic dualism of light and darkness, science being identified in accordance with the viewpoint of the writer. Always the issue is much blurred and confused by the fact that both terms are used in varied ways. Many a book has been written effecting a reconciliation by the simple process of changing definitions.

Science has been variously defined, as a method, as a body of organized knowledge, as accurate description, and as verified knowledge. For our purposes it is perhaps justifiable to attempt a definition somewhat more complex and abstract. We will consequently consider science as a growing but harmonious system of concepts having mutual implications developed by organizing data from an assumed outside world or from conscious personal experience according to certain logical processes, with subsequent verification by reference to new data.

The distinction between science and technology is important at this point. Technology, for example, the art of making pottery, is a system of concepts having mutual implications, but (1) it is developed for a practical end rather than for the joy of reducing phenomena to a system of concepts, (2) it is more specifically connected with manual

activity, and (3) it is usually narrower in scope than even a particular science which is bound to other sciences by common concepts and mutual implications.

Supernaturalism vs. Science in Pre-Literate Groups

The conflict between science and religion is a more recent and local opposition than has usually been assumed, for science according to the above definition is almost lacking among pre-literate peoples. True, among some tribes there is a good deal of knowledge of botany and most peoples are aware of the relationships between natural phenomena such as change in temperature, position of heavenly bodies, and the prevalence and condition of plants and animals. A certain month may, for example, be known as the salmon month, and in some cases, as among the Maya people, an admirable calendar based on relationships of the heavenly bodies has been worked out. In general, however, as we have previously argued, science is lacking. Certainly among neither the Ekoi nor the Winnebago do we find science as previously defined, carrying within itself the method for acquiring new conceptions to fit into the scheme and for testing the implications or laws by experiment and observation. It is primarily technology which flourishes in primitive society, working hand in hand with magic and religion, especially the former.

And why, it may be asked, is there no conflict between technology and religion? The answer seems to be found in the fact that the checking-up process of technology is merely a matter of selection of certain habits due to their survival value, rather than the highly conscious critical analysis which precedes the adding of another stone to the temple of science. In the second place, the concepts of a technology are not organized over a field sufficiently broad

to bring them into logical conflict with religious conceptions. The organized concepts of the science of meterology do not exist in the mind of the savage to oppose his magical belief that the drops of blood from the victim of a human sacrifice will produce rain. He offers his sacrifices and in time it rains. He baits his traps with certain foods and catches certain animals. His interest in verification of his technology is not sufficiently strong to make him check up upon his magic. It is quite possible that in many cases technology is simply magic which happened to work.

Mythology perhaps approaches as closely to primitive science as does technology and it is interesting to note that Wissler groups Mythology and Scientific Knowledge together as part of his Universal Culture Pattern.[1] However, mythology is not science even though it may furnish elaborate cosmologies to gratify the curiosity of primitive man and to reduce his world to some sort of system and order. There is no verification of mythological concepts by new sense data, and the scientific method of gathering and organizing material, which is an integral part of science, considered as a system of concepts, is quite lacking. Mythology approaches primitive philosophy rather than primitive science.

Philosophy, however, which has been clearly shown by Radin to flourish among pre-literate peoples, has no better claim than mythology to be regarded as science.[2] Science, unlike philosophy, does not seek to grasp ultimate origins or ultimate reality. It is often narrower in scope but most important of all, it is possessed of a method of attack which gives unity to all science and which has as its essential element the checking of results with the aid of new sense data. Philosophical systems must be logically coherent but need not be verified by experience. As Pearson points out: "The

[1] Wissler, Clark—*Man and Culture,* Crowell, N. Y., 1923, p. 74.
[2] Radin, P.—*Primitive Man as a Philosopher,* Appleton, N. Y., 1927.

scientific method is marked by the following features: (a) Careful and accurate classification of facts and observation of their correlation and sequence; (b) the discovery of scientific laws by the aid of the creative imagination; (c) self-criticism and the final touchstone of equal validity for all normally constituted minds." [3]

In view of the lack of any such method we must conclude that true science does not exist among pre-literate peoples and hence there can be no conflict with religion on the basis of the well-known principle that it takes two to make a quarrel.

Science and Religion in the Ancient World

In view of the high level of civilizations in Egypt and Mesopotamia it might be thought that science would first develop there and come into conflict with religion. Such does not seem to have been the case. In Egypt there were vast temples, gigantic pyramids, and men possessed of a working knowledge of geometry and astronomy. In Babylonia, eclipses were recorded and predicted, the sidereal year was closely calculated, stars were catalogued, planets were placed in their correct order, instruments such as the astrolabe were constructed, there was apparently some knowledge of optics, and in arithmetic the value of the position of the digits was known.[4] Despite these and other achievements it would seem that it was technology rather than science which flourished, and always in subordination to religion. It was religion rather than science which furnished the prevailing cosmology and there was no grow-

[3] Pearson, Karl—*The Grammar of Science,* 3d Ed., London, Adam and Black, 1911, p. 37.

[4] Draper, J. W.—*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science,* N. Y., Appleton, 1887, pp. 13–14.

ing body of facts and relationships verified by experience to challenge the dominant religious systems of these countries.

While we must admit the incompleteness of our historical knowledge of ancient civilizations, especially of Crete, India and China, it nevertheless seems probable that the beginning of science as we have defined it is to be found among the Greeks. They alone were possessed of abstract intellectual curiosity and of the method of study which makes possible the rearing of the edifice of science. They were first in the scientific idea if not in scientific practice, according to the authoritative statement of Charles Singer.[5]

There is reason to think that the progress of science is affected by the prevailing philosophical attitudes and, in the absence of any sacred literature, these attitudes were favorable in Greece. While Karl Pearson and his followers assure us that science makes no assumptions as to the reality or orderliness of the world beyond the barrier of sense impressions, yet the assumption by the Greeks of the existence of natural law or *Physis* in the Universe was favorable to the development of science. The early Ionian philosophers such as Democritus developed a naturalistic philosophy which is generally associated with scientific progress. Some of these philosophers as, for example, Anaxagoras, were denounced along with Euripides and Æschylus as heretics by those still retaining belief in the host of gods dwelling on Olympus much after the fashion of men below. There was, however, no organized religious persecution.[6]

The fact that the Greeks had developed the spirit and method of science is shown by the attitude of a writer of the Hippocratic school in regard to epilepsy, often termed the Sacred Disease. He says, "As regards the disease called

[5] Singer, C.—*Science, Religion and Reality,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 92.

[6] See Marvin, F. S.—*The Living Past,* 4th ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1920, Chapt. 4.

Sacred, to me it appears to be no more divine than other diseases, but to have a natural cause from which it originates even as do other diseases. Men regard its nature as divine from ignorance and wonder, since it is a peculiar condition and not readily understood. Yet if it be reckoned divine merely because it is wonderful, then instead of one there would be many sacred diseases."[7] He goes on to attack the charlatans who cloak their ignorance with religion and inconsistently seek to cure by quack remedies what they attribute to the gods. He insists of all diseases, including epilepsy, that "All have their antecedent causes which can be found by those who seek them." His attack is better understandable when it is realized that along with scientific medicine there flourished in Grece much medical jugglery and superstition of which the "temple sleep" previously mentioned is a good example.

The philosophic support of science lessened with the coming of Socrates and Plato, whose interest was ethical rather than scientific. While Plato had a reverence for the virtues of mathematics, his doctrine of ideas tended to distract the attention of men from the observation of nature and his cosmology was, in general, exceedingly bizarre. Aristotle, in contrast to Plato, had an intense interest in accurate observation, classification, and analysis and was imbued with the spirit and method of science. It is unfortunate that his erroneous astronomical speculations and his works on logic became the cornerstone of medieval thought while his excellent work in natural history was for the most part ignored. Thanks to his pupil, Alexander, he was possessed of specimens and scientific information from various parts of the vast area conquered by that military genius.

It is perhaps true that the Alexandrian conquests made

[7] Cited by Singer, C.—in chapter on ancient medicine in *Science and Civilization,* F. S. Marvin, Ed., London, Oxford Press, 1923, p. 47.

possible a higher development of science than would have taken place in Greece proper. In the third century B.C. Alexandria was the scientific center of the ancient world and represented the high water mark of the Greek scientific genius. Under the beneficent rule of the Ptolemies the Museum was established for the perpetuation, increase, and diffusion of knowledge. In addition to lecture rooms and laboratories there was a magnificent library, estimated to have contained from 400,000 to 700,000 volumes. Under these favorable conditions scientists arose whose names are reverenced to the present day and whose work was not improved upon for almost two thousand years. The work of Euclid is still studied in almost every high school in the country as a model of accuracy and a standard of exact demonstration. Archimedes, who must be classed with the Alexandrian scientists, developed solid geometry, discovered the principle of hydrostatics which still bears his name, discussed the principle of the lever, and invented the endless screw and the burning glass. Eratosthenes made a remarkably accurate estimate of the size of the earth and wrote on the subjects of geology and geography. The Alexandrians "had correct ideas respecting the doctrine of the sphere, its poles, axis, equator, arctic and antarctic circles, equinoctial points, solstices, the distribution of climates, etc." [8]

Apollonius wrote a remarkable treatise on conic sections. Hipparchus developed theories of the movements of the heavenly bodies and made a catalogue which included 1080 different stars. In the brilliant constellation of scientists shines Ptolemy, who wrote the great synthetic treatise on astronomy which maintained its ground for fifteen hundred years. Further achievements are mentioned by Draper. "In

[8] Draper, J. W.—*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science,* Appleton, N. Y., 1887, p. 29.

the Museum of Alexandria, Ctesibius invented the fire-engine. His pupil, Hero, improved it by giving it two cylinders. There, too, the first steam engine worked. This also was the invention of Hero, and was a reaction engine, on the principle of the eolipile. The silence of the halls of Serapis was broken by the water-clocks of Ctesibius and Apollonius, which drop by drop measured time. When the Roman calendar had fallen into such confusion that it had become absolutely necessary to rectify it, Julius Caesar brought Sosigenes, the astronomer from Alexandria. By his advice the lunar year was abolished, the civil year regulated entirely by the sun, and the Julian calendar introduced." [9]

Unfortunately, the splendid flame of science in Alexandria was doomed to flicker and die and the works of its scientists to be buried under the dust of two thousand years. It is not our task to point out the causes of the decline of Hellenic science but at least it should be shown that they were numerous.

For one thing, Hellenic science never took a practical turn, but rather remained a diversion of philosophers and, perhaps partly due to the slave system, never established a technology that could increase the production of wealth. The Roman conquest in general was unfavorable to science. The library in the Museum was burned during the siege of Alexandria by Julius Caesar although partly replaced by a collection presented by Mark Antony to Cleopatra.[10] The Roman attitude was legal and political rather than scientific. Galen alone perhaps can merit the title of scientist and he, for all of his accurate observations, was imbued with the teleology that hampered scientific medicine down to recent times.

The philosophical developments in the Roman Empire

[9] Ibid., p. 31.
[10] Ibid., p. 21.

were not favorable to science. Neo-Platonism encouraged an attempt at union with the Absolute by means of contemplation rather than observation of nature. The mystery cults of the Orient gave a further impulse to mysticism. Stoicism while teaching a doctrine of natural law in the universe tended to fatalism and resignation rather than investigation, and soon became connected with astrology, which in turn nourished a host of charlatans and quacks. Formal learning in Rome with its stress upon logic and rhetoric became dry, barren, and utterly devoid of any intellectual curiosity or spirit of mental adventure. The Jewish tradition had always stressed the personal and divine control of the phenomena of nature rather than natural law, and the attempt at a reconciliation of the two points of view by Philo in Alexandria resulted in the Logos doctrine which gave philosophical opposition rather than support to science. It must of course be remembered that the intellectual degradation of the later Roman Empire was increased by the disorganization following the barbarian invasions.

The Influence of Christianity on Science.—Certainly the Christian religion was inimical to science in that it stressed providential control of nature, set up the authority of the Scriptures containing a mythical cosmology, and turned men's minds to a future blessed state for which their brief existence here below was but a preparation. With the setting up by Augustine of the dual conception of a City of God and a City of the Devil it was inevitable that science be relegated to the latter, and thus arose the horror of science on the part of all pious Christians for centuries to come.

Superstition once more raised its head. Relic worship flourished, calling into existence countless pieces of the true cross and veritable bones of saints. Ancient Isis worship merged into the worship of the Virgin Mary. Says Draper:

"Heathen rites were adopted; a pompous and splendid ritual, gorgeous robes, miters, tiaras, wax-tapers, processional service, lustrations, gold and silver vases, were introduced. The Roman lituus, the chief ensign of the augurs, became the crozier. Churches were built over the tombs of martyrs, and consecrated with rites borrowed from the ancient laws of the Roman pontiffs. Festivals and commemorations of martyrs multiplied with the numberless fictitious discoveries of their remains. Fasting became the grand means of repelling the devil and appeasing God; celibacy the greatest of the virtues. Pilgrimages were made to Palestine and the tombs of the martyrs. Quantities of dust and earth were brought from the Holy Land and sold at enormous prices, as antidotes against devils." [11]

With Christianity the official religion of the Empire, Alexandria became a very different city from the one ruled over by the early Ptolemies. Theophilus, the bishop of Alexandria, exhibited certain symbols of pagan worship with the result that the pagans started a riot and then took refuge in the Serapion. This edifice, according to Draper, contained 300,000 volumes as an addition to the 400,000 in the Museum. The Emperor, "despatched a rescript to Alexandria, enjoining the bishop, Theophilus, to destroy the Serapion; and the great library which had been collected by the Ptolemies, and had escaped the fire of Julius Caesar, was by that fanatic dispersed." [12]

A few years later occurred a further example of religious intolerance in the murder of the learned woman philosopher and mathematician, Hypatia, instigated by St. Cyril, the nephew of Theophilus. Draper has given a vivid account of this act and of its significance. "Hypatia and Cyril!

[11] Draper, J. W.—*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science,* Appleton, N. Y., 1887, p. 49.

[12] Ibid., p. 54.

Philosophy and bigotry. They cannot exist together. So Cyril felt, and on that feeling he acted. As Hypatia repaired to her academy, she was assaulted by Cyril's mob—a mob of many monks. Stripped naked in the street, she was dragged into a church, and there killed by the club of Peter the Reader. The corpse was cut to pieces, the flesh was scraped from the bones with shells, and the remnants cast into a fire. For this frightful crime Cyril was never called to account. It seemed to be admitted that the end sanctified the means.

"So ended Greek philosophy in Alexandria, so came to an untimely close the learning that the Ptolemies had done so much to promote. The 'Daughter Library,' that of the Serapion, had been dispersed. The fate of Hypatia was a warning to all who would cultivate profane knowledge. Henceforth there was to be no freedom for human thought. Every one must think as the ecclesiastical authority ordered him, A.D. 414. In Athens itself philosophy awaited its doom. Justinian at length prohibited its teaching and caused all its schools in that city to be closed." [13]

It must be admitted that while the Christians were indirectly responsible for at least part of the destruction of the library at Alexandria, the Mohammedan religion showed an equal capacity to injure science. During the Mohammedan conquest of the seventh century an Alexandrian Greek made request that the remainder of the library be spared, but the Khalif's answer to his lieutenant was, "If the books agree with the Koran, the Word of God, they are useless, and need not be preserved; if they disagree with it, they are pernicious. Let them be destroyed." It is claimed that it took six weeks to consume the books by using them to heat the baths at Alexandria.

While it will be suggested later that the repressive effect

[13] Ibid., pp. 55–56.

of Christianity upon science was not as heavy as has often been supposed, yet for centuries this religion as a whole and its various sects were committed to a policy of intolerance. It may be that the usually tolerant Roman Government was merely intolerant of intolerance in its persecution, under Diocletian and others, of the intolerant Christians. Says Bury: "About ten years after the Edict of Toleration, Constantine the Great adopted Christianity. This momentous decision inaugurated a millennium in which reason was enchained, thought was enslaved, and knowledge made no progress. . . . The profound conviction that those who did not believe in its doctrines would be damned eternally, and that God punishes theological error as if it were the most heinous of crimes, led naturally to persecution. It was a duty to impose on men the only true doctrine, seeing that their own eternal interests were at stake, and to hinder errors from spreading. Heretics were more than ordinary criminals and the pains that man could inflict on them were as nothing to the tortures awaiting them in hell. To rid the earth of men, who, however virtuous, were through their religious errors, enemies of the Almighty, was a plain duty." [14]

Science and Religion in the Middle Ages

However caused, there can be no doubt of the intellectual degradation of Western Europe from the decline of the Roman Empire through the tenth century. St. Augustine set the authority of the Scriptures above the evidence of one's senses and this tradition was followed in the mass of misinformation and superstition that passed for science during the Dark Ages. The gullibility of Pliny in compiling his *Natural History* is surpassed by Isadore of Seville, thanks

[14] Bury, J. B.—*A History of Freedom of Thought,* Holt, N. Y., 1914, pp. 52–53.

to his piety and desire to find a moral or theological implication in every bit of misinformation accumulated by himself or others.

It is hard for us who in our scientific superiority look down upon the Orient to realize that during the Dark Ages the rôles were reversed. While clinging to their faith, the Europeans could not but admire what they knew of the splendid Arabic civilization of their times. With amazing suddenness the Arabic invasion, associated with the burning of the library at Alexandria and other acts of obscurantism and intolerance, was followed by intellectual curiosity and achievement. The crude cosmology of the Koran was soon replaced by Hellenic science and Al-Mamun gave the order for the computation of the size of the earth which was made with remarkable accuracy, a figure of some 24,000 miles being obtained. He made Bagdad a great center of learning, although in thus sponsoring science he was merely carrying on the tradition started by others before him. The Arabs used the scientific method of experiment and observation. In mathematics they made remarkable contributions, developing algebra, introducing the Indian method of numerical notation and furthering trigonometry. In the field of astronomy they made star catalogues, calculated eclipses and developed new instruments. In chemistry, physics, medicine, and agriculture their achievements are too numerous to mention. Their educational institutions offer a remarkable contrast to those of Western Europe at this time. The Fatimite Library at Cairo contained 100,000 volumes, the great library of the Spanish khalifs eventually numbered 600,000 volumes and it is said that there were seventy public libraries in Andalusia.[15] Draper states that: "Cardinal Zimenes delivered to the flames, in the squares

[15] Draper, J. W.—*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science,* Appleton, N. Y., 1887, p. 113.

of Granada, eighty thousand Arabic manuscripts, many of them translations of classical authors." [16]

Religion and the Revival of Science

It was perhaps the contact of the West with the Arab culture as much as any one factor, that furthered the revival of science in Europe. Some contact took place of course during the Crusades and through the trade that sprang up with the East following these great military-religious movements. Later in the twelfth century there was further culture contact in Spain and Sicily. Even as early as the tenth century documents began to show Arabic influence. In the writings of the learned Pope Sylvester II may be found such an influence and to this influence was due his introduction of Arabic numerals. Contact was established at Salerno and translations of Arabic works were undertaken, in many instances by Jews. Other notable translators were Alfred the Englishman and Gerard of Cremona (1114–1187).

Meanwhile, in Europe came the rise of towns, the founding of universities, and the growth of Scholasticism. The Scholastics attempted to arrange all things below the *primum mobile,* the outermost crystalline sphere surrounding the earth, according to theological dogma and Aristotelian logic. There was, however, some mysticism, much of which harked back to Plato. In the thirteenth century, with the recovery of all Aristotle's writings and the vigorous intellectual life within the newly founded Franciscan and Dominican orders, there were some influences leading to a scientific revival. While Albertus Magnus, the learned Dominican, made some careful observations in his work on natural history, yet in general, men were more inclined to "fall up and down in their own conceits and fancies," to

[16] Ibid., p. 104.

borrow the phrase from Francis Bacon, than to adopt the arduous method of research.[17]

An exception is to be found in Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Bishop of Lincoln, who did notable work in optics, and his pupil Roger Bacon, likewise a Franciscan. Roger Bacon not only saw the need for an experimental method but was himself an experimenter and a contributor to optics, astronomy, geography, mechanical science, chemistry and mathematics. Bacon was not altogether an isolated phenomenon for further advances were made by other men, especially in the field of medicine.[18]

Contrary to popular impression, the church does not seem to have made any strenuous and conscious attempt to crush science at this time. True, the natural death of Peter of Abano (1250–1318) alone saved him from the Inquisition. This terrible institution of oppression, established in 1242, seems to have been devised to seek out heretics who might threaten the political security of the church or lessen its revenues. The horrible persecution of the Albigeois in Southern France took place at the instigation of Innocent III and under the direct leadership of Simon de Montfort when the Count of Toulouse refused himself to extirpate heresy within his domain. The struggle ending in 1229 in the complete humiliation of the Count of Toulouse seemed to establish a principle in which the church was vitally interested, namely, that a sovereign held his realm under the responsibility of crushing any spiritual treason to the church that might occur within his domain. The real struggle of theology with science came later when astronomical discoveries aroused the clergy to the menace that beset their most cherished dogmas.

[17] Singer, C., in *Science and Civilization,* Ed. F. S. Marvin, Oxford University Press, 1926, p. 138.

[18] Ibid., pp. 142–144.

Humanism and the Renaissance did not play any direct part in bringing about a revival of science, for they were movements looking backward to the literature rather than to the science of classical times. They did, however, attack the barrenness of the Scholastic teaching and thus paved the way for direct observation of nature. There were, however, scientists of considerable attainments during this period. Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464) made experiments on a growing plant, had notions of the movement of the earth, sought reform of the calendar and, being unable to reconcile his scientific views with theology, took refuge in the assumption of religious knowledge through intuition. Cardinal Bessarion (1389–1472) and Regiomontanus (1436–1476) were interested in mathematics and astronomy and Pomponazzi (1462-1525) taught a naturalistic philosophy. The supreme genius of the period was, of course, Leonardo da Vinci (1452–1519) who touched and illuminated every field of science but, being ahead of his time, had little influence upon the history of thought. He had a firm grasp upon the experimental method as shown by the following statements: "Whoever appeals to authority applies not his intellect but his memory." "They say that that knowledge is mechanical which issues from experience, and that is scientific which is born and ends in the mind. But, as it seems to me, those sciences are vain and full of errors which are not born of experience, mother of all certitude, and which do not terminate in observation, that is, whose origin or middle or end does not come through one of the five senses." [19] Here we have an explicit statement of the necessity of sense data and of reason, logical and mathematical, in building the structure of science. This is an anticipation of the methodological viewpoints of Galileo,

[19] Quoted in Randall, J. H.—*Making of the Modern Mind*, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, p. 220.

Descartes, and Francis Bacon who, while he wrote eloquently of the scientific method, failed pitiably in its application and attacked those who did apply it successfully.

In spite of the fact that modern science was not born of the Renaissance there were favorable influences at work, such as naturalism in art, the study of medicine and the development of instruments and methods for use in engineering and technology. Furthermore, classical documents of a scientific as well as literary nature began to be read, and Hellenic science, buried for so many centuries, was the direct inspiration of the work of men like Copernicus, Galileo, and Strevinus.

Religion and the Rise of Modern Science

The birth year of modern science, according to Singer, is 1543; the year which saw the publication of the great work of Copernicus on the revolution of the heavenly bodies and that of Vesalius on anatomy.[20] By this time the religious authorities were well aware of the danger to their position in the new doctrines, and direct persecution began, although more frequently of the thinkers and the outspoken advocates than of the research workers themselves. While the earlier Inquisition was not specifically directed against science, Singer states, "There can be no reasonable doubt that in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the activities of the officers of the Inquisition were directed to the suppression of scientific views that were held to be dangerous to the faith." [21] It is well known that in fear of persecution, Copernicus delayed for many years the publication of his book showing the revolution of the earth around the sun, and, when published in 1543 at the entreaty of Cardinal

[20] Singer, C.—in *Science, Religion and Reality,* Ed. J. Needham, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 127.

[21] Ibid., p. 121.

Schomberg, an introduction presented the theory as a cautious hypothesis. It is perhaps well that a copy of the *De Revolutionibus* was not brought to Copernicus until he lay on his death-bed, for it was condemned by the Inquisition as heretical and placed on the Index of forbidden books. The date 1600 is memorable for the public burning of Giordano Bruno for his acceptance of the Copernican view, his preaching of an infinite universe, and his rejection of orthodoxy for a mystical pantheism. In the same year the publication of the work of William Gilbert, *On the Magnet,* ushered in the experimental era. There were other fatal persecutions at this time, including the burning of Vanini in 1619.

The story of Galileo is too well known to require detailed treatment here. Influenced by Euclid and perhaps by the Pythagorean and Platonic faith in the virtue of numbers, this genius turned to mathematics and physics. Following his work on falling bodies and stellar parallax he made a telescope in 1609 and with it discovered new stars, the mountains of the moon, the satellites of Jupiter and, still more important, the phases of Venus. He soon became involved in a controversy with a powerful Jesuit rival concerning his observation of spots on the sun, and the growing opposition of Jesuits and academic Aristotelians culminated in 1616 in an admonition to Galileo to abandon his opinions or at least to refrain from discussing them. For a number of years Galileo remained silent although he made a futile attempt to obtain tolerance for the new doctrines from his former friend, now Urban VIII. In 1630 he obtained permission to publish his great work, *Dialogue on the Two Chief Systems of the World,* under certain very severe restrictions. The book represented a very stupid person as defending the old point of view that the earth revolved around the sun. The enemies of Galileo persuaded the

Pope that he was the person being thus caricatured. The theologians were stirred to fury by the book, and the aged Galileo, one of the greatest minds of his age, was forced to kneel under threats of torture and death and recant his heretical views and to conclude with the following words, "I abjure, curse and detest the said errors and heresies, and generally every other error and heresy contrary to the said Holy Church, and I swear that I will never more in future say, or assert anything, verbally or in writing, which may give rise to a similar suspicion of me and that if I shall know any heretic or any one suspected of heresy, I will denounce him to this Holy Office, or to the Inquisitor and Ordinary of the place in which I may be." [22]

Thus we have the principle established for the time being that the truth in regard to the nature of the universe is to be determined by appeal to ecclesiastical authority rather than by the observation of nature. The triumph of theology was not, however, destined to endure for long despite the fact that the books teaching the heliocentric view remained on the Index until well into the nineteenth century. Kepler (1571–1630), building on the exact observations of Tycho Brahe, established his famous laws showing the true nature of the movements of planets around the sun, and Descartes, while somewhat intimidated by the church, renounced authority as a guide to truth and presented a coherent philosophical system. The year 1642 which saw the death of Galileo was the birth year of Isaac Newton, the intellectual giant who bestrode like a colossus a century of scientific genius. Without bothering to consider theological opposition he developed the first great physical synthesis and established the reign of law throughout the known universe. While the verbal battle continued down into the latter part of the nineteenth century, becoming especially violent at the time of Darwin,

[22] Ibid., pp. 137–138.

there was little coercion of the scientist by force after the seventeenth century. That there are signs of a reversion to primitive methods will be apparent when we turn presently to the Fundamentalist movement in this country.

Historical Accounts of the Struggle Between Science and Religion

Many writers such as Draper, Lea, Lecky, and others have traced the struggle of science and religion, but the monumental work on the subject is *The History of the Warfare of Science with Theology,* by Andrew D. White.[23] We are perhaps justified in turning briefly to this famous book before raising certain mild objections to the usual treatment of the relation between religion and science.

The first chapter, "From Creation to Evolution" shows that the prevailing conception of God in the Middle Ages portrayed him as a powerful anthropomorphic being who made the Universe with his hands out of nothing or called it into existence with his voice. The two accounts of creation in Genesis, one giving a single day and the other six days, caused the theologians much trouble. Peter Lombard declared that it was both instantaneous and in six days, Aquinas that the world was formed instantly and then separated in six days, Luther that creation took six days but by a miracle was also instantaneous. There was also confusion as to the time and the person, but we have the assurance of Dr. Lightfoot that creation was performed all at once by the Trinity on Oct. 23, 4004 B.C., at 9 A.M. Unfortunately for this solution, some two centuries later it was shown that a high civilization was flourishing in Egypt at that time. There were, however, glimmerings of the

[23] White, A. D.—*History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,* 2 Vol. Appleton, N. Y., 1897.

idea of evolution among the ancient Greek philosophers such as Anaximander and Anaximenes and, with the revival of science, the doctrine had a steady growth in the cosmic sphere with Kant and Laplace, and in the biological sphere with Buffon and others. The prevailing theological teachings concerning animals and man were, however, for centuries incredibly absurd. God was conceived as an enlarged Nuremberg toy-maker moulding animals and man out of clay with his own hand. Fossils were discarded models of his works or else objects placed in the strata to bring to naught human curiosity. It was argued that the predatory traits of carnivorous animals were due to man's sin in the Garden of Eden, but this view proved difficult to reconcile with the discovery of carnivorous animals with their prey inside them harking back to a time prior to man's appearance on the earth. The presence of noxious animals such as flies was a problem but Luther explained that they were sent by the devil to vex him. With the belief in a special creation of a fixed number of species it was difficult to see how the ark could accommodate them all. But what were such difficulties to the compilers of pious bestiaries who believed in the phoenix, and the basilisk who killed men with his glance, in crocodiles who wept over their victims, and dragons who warred with elephants to cool themselves in their blood? With the rise of modern biology and the discovery of many new species it became impossible to explain the wide distribution of animals, especially the larger African fauna, by Augustine's hypothesis that angels transported the animals from Ararat to the various countries in which they are found. Thanks to a tinge of the evolutionary concept in the ancient Hebrew-Babylonian tradition, it was possible for theologians to seek a way out of their difficulties in the notion of secondary creation, as that of scorpions from crabs, and in the conception of a perfecting principle, but in so

doing they were themselves occasionally denounced by other theologions as heretics.

Linneus raised some question as to fixity of species but was violently opposed and relapsed into conformity. Buffon, who had caught the idea of variation of species, was made to feel the full power of the church, for by the Sorbonne he was forced to retract everything contrary to the narrative of Moses. Thus as ever, the "sacred deposit of truth committed to the church" was not to be questioned. There was questioning, however, by Treviranius, Saint Hilaire, Lyell, Wells, Wallace, Darwin, Huxley, Galton, Tyndall, and Haeckel in spite of opposition by conservative scientists like Cuvier and Agassiz, and, of course, the theologians. The final effort of theology in the nineteenth century to stem the rising tide of evolutionary doctrine is vividly described by White. The *Origin of Species* came among the orthodox like a plough in an ant hill, and the denunciation of Darwin was passionate and embittered beyond description. He was proclaimed an "Apostle of Dirt Worship" and a "Persecutor of Christianity." One pious reviewer, ignoring Darwin's thirty years of labor, naïvely remarked that Darwin "might have been more modest had he given some slight reason for dissenting from views generally entertained." In time, however, the clergy of England turned to reconciliation and, with White, found in science conceptions, far more noble than those of the past, which opened the way to an argument from design infinitely more beautiful than any ever developed by theology.

In the sphere of geography White finds a similar story of ignorance, oppression, conflict, and final defeat of theology. He shows that the ancient Egyptian conception of a flat earth covered by a heaven supported by pillars or mountains with waters above was taken over in the early Christian tradition. It was such a view which inspired in

the sailors of Columbus a fear of falling off the edge of the world into hell below. There was violent opposition on the part of Augustine, Isadore and St. Boniface to the concept of antipodes, and Calvin violently attacked Servetus who asserted that Judea was barren, in denial of the Biblical statement that it was a land flowing with milk and honey.

The warfare of science and theology was perhaps most bitter in regard to astronomy. By the Middle Ages the prevailing cosmological system was that of Aristotle and Ptolemy, with Christian modifications, the point of view being perhaps best set forth by Dante in his writings. The earth was surrounded by transparent spheres to which were attached the sun, planets and stars and within the earth was Hell where resided Lucifer, ruling over the fallen angels. In Dante we find portrayed the various levels of Hell, Purgatory and an Earthly Paradise. According to the medieval conception, between the spheres were placed three hierarchies of angels, including Seraphim, Cherubim, Dominions, Powers, Principalities and Archangels, governing the movements of the stars and executing the commands of the Divinity who resided in the Empyrean.

We have already traced in part the substitution of the heliocentric for the geocentric system with the revival of the ancient Pythagorean notion by Copernicus after reading a reference to this doctrine in Cicero. A few additional details as presented by White may be mentioned, however. It should be noted that the opposition did not come solely from the Catholics. Both Luther and Melanchthon attacked Copernicus and in many Protestant Universities the professors were made to promise not to teach Copernican ideas. An interesting example of the logic of the theologians who persecuted Galileo may be cited. "Animals, which move, have limbs and muscles, and the earth has no limbs or muscles and therefore it does not move." The victory of

the church over Galileo had as one of its unfortunate consequences the intimidation of Descartes to such an extent that he abandoned his plan to write a Treatise on the World. That he was wise in postponing some of his work is shown by the fate of Campanella, who wrote an apology for Galileo and underwent torture seven times. It is also significant that the Catholic Church had committed the infallibility of the Pope to condemnation of all books which affirmed the motion of the earth. In an attempt to squirm out from under the implications of this fact apologists claimed that Galileo was punished only for his contumacy toward the Pope, but this argument was refuted by the original papers. It is also claimed that the persecution arose because of a quarrel between the Aristotelians and the experimentalists but surely this is a petty matter to call out an infallible decree. Papers taken from Paris to Rome were suppressed and the evidence distorted but L'Epinais obtained the original documents and presented the facts of the case. The desperate attempt to prove that Galileo was condemned not by an infallible Pope but by a Pope acting as a man was brought to naught by the fact that Galileo had been required to abjure his heliocentric view by a written order of the Pope. One man was inclined to put the blame upon God who had put words in the Bible which were opposed to science. It should be emphasized that the Protestants cannot point the finger of scorn at the Catholics for their part in the affair, for the Protestants continued their obscurantism and at least verbal persecution down into the nineteenth century. White stresses the point that it was not religion but theology which stood opposed to science. "It is because they have mistaken the dawn for conflagration that theologians have so often been foes of the light."

White next traces the transition, "From Signs and Wonders to Law in the Heavens." For centuries it was

believed that eclipses were the omen of some great calamity and that a comet was a sign flung by an angry God to a sinful generation. Even the learned Bodin considered it a wandering soul bringing disaster to men. Superstition was perhaps worst in Germany, where Luther declared, "What ever moves in the heavens in an unusual way is certainly a sign of God's wrath." Even in the seventeenth century professors were sworn not to teach that comets were natural phenomena and much was made of the prophecy: "Nation shall rise against nation and kingdom against kingdom and great earthquakes shall be in divers places and famines and pestilences and fearful sights and great signs shall there be from heaven." The comet of 1577 caused great terror but Tycho Brahe said that it was more distant than the orbit of the moon and from this time on there was increasing scepticism. This point was of great importance, for if the comet were beyond the orbit of the moon then it would crush the crystal spheres of the medieval theory. Kepler confirmed the conclusion of Brahe, Halley showed the recurrence of comets in 1682, and in 1686 Newton showed that comets are controlled as are the planets.

The theological explanations of geological phenomena likewise showed great absurdities. Fossils were assumed to be models for God's finished animal creations, earthquakes were attributed to Adam's fall, bones of mastodons were said to be the bones of giants mentioned in the Scriptures, and other remains were attributed to the Flood of Noah. With the rise of geology, culminating in the work of Lyell, the vast age of the earth was demonstrated, but a final effort was made by theology with the claim that the devil had made a chaos of the universe and when God straightened it all out after six days of labor, the fossils remained as a result of the devil's effort to distort creation.

Theology undertook to determine the antiquity of man

with its usual dogmatism but with no great consistency, for some two hundred computations made with the aid of an infallible Bible all gave different results. The great authority of Archbishop Usher, who alleged that man was created 4004 B.C., gave considerable agreement, however, upon that date. We are assured that, "to preclude the possibility of a mistake the unerring Spirit of God directed Moses in the selection of his facts and the ascertaining of dates." Alas! for theology—investigations soon showed that high civilizations flourished in Egypt, Assyria, and Babylonia at the assumed date of creation. The ancient stone implements of prehistoric races were called "thunder stones" and assumed to have been used in driving out Satan. The archeologists and ethnologists showed, however, that they were associated with the bones of animals long extinct, in ancient geological strata, and were used as weapons by the early inhabitants of Europe. Furthermore, rather than a "Fall of Man," the anthropologists and historians showed from a study of implements, institutions and language that there had been a gradual development in man's estate.

One of the most effective chapters in White's work is entitled, "From 'The Prince of the Power of the Air' to Meterology." The belief in a firmament above the earth, filled with water which was occasionally allowed by angels to fall upon the earth in the form of rain, was very common. Augustine supported such crude conceptions by the statement, "Nothing is to be accepted save on the authority of Scripture, since greater is that authority than all the powers of the human mind." It was thought by many that sinners and blasphemers were likely to be struck by lightning and as late as 1870 a drought was attributed by the Bishop of Verdun to Sabbath-breaking. One of the most baneful of all superstitious beliefs was that of a diabolical agency in storms. Aquinas said it was a "Dogma of faith that demons

can produce wind, storms, and rain of fire from heaven." Luther shared this belief but said that the first chapter of John when read was effective against thunder storms. Other methods of control of the weather were prayer, exorcism, "conception billets," containing a magic formula and buried in the fields, the use of cakes of wax blessed by the Pope, and the ringing of consecrated bells to drive away storms. The most serious aspect of the superstition was the belief that witches, like demons, had power to bring harm upon men. In 1437, Pope Eugene IV urged greater severity in dealing with witches. In 1484, Pope Innocent VIII sent forth the Bull exhorting men to hunt down the witches, which was, perhaps, the cause of more bloodshed than any other human decree. Thousands of women were tortured horribly and in their agony replied in the affirmative to suggestions made to them. One woman admitted that while coming home from a Witches' Sabbath she was dropped to earth during confusion arising from bells sounding Ave Maria. Learned men such as Bodin defended the doctrine with great energy and it is possible from recent evidence, that along with the superstition, hysteria, and suggestion there were actual cases of the persistence of pagan rites. In time a few sceptics arose in the land. One, an eminent judge in charge of the torture, saw the folly of the whole procedure but was himself accused and horribly tortured until he confessed all of which he was accused, only to be strangled and burned. The conditions were fully as bad, if not worse, in Protestant Germany in the fifteenth century than in Catholic countries. In England, James I believed firmly in the menace of witchcraft, and accepted the confession of one poor victim who, with his legs crushed and wedges driven under his finger nails, stated that storms were due to several hundred witches who put to sea in a sieve. The witch persecution in this country on a small scale is, of course, known to every school

boy. It was an American, Benjamin Franklin, who tumbled the "Prince of the Power of the Air" by experiments with a kite. It was seen that lightning rods were effective in some degree and the embarrassing question arose again and again as to why God allowed his own temples to be struck with great damage by lightning.

White in his discussion of the transition from "Magic to Chemistry and Physics" implies, rather questionably, that the Alexandrian science was crushed by Christian dogma with its stress on the value of tradition rather than observation. There is no doubt, however, that Vincent of Beauvais and others of his time in their writings achieved a monument to human error. Aquinas gathered up the known facts of science and showed to his and succeeding generations how they were and must be subordinated to theology, and thus diverted scientific research into the collecting of legends and poorly authenticated facts. Science tended to be identified with black magic and hence came under the ban. White makes much of the persecution of Roger Bacon and the consequent delay in the development of modern science. Singer, however, points out that Bacon was jealous and irritable but lacking any trace of consciousness of opposition to religion. He was misunderstod rather than recognized as a menace. Says Singer, "It seems probable, however, that the opposition to him was neither an opposition to his actual scientific achievements nor to the effects of these achievements on religion. The opposition was based on a misunderstanding of his method of interrogating Nature." [24] Perhaps the forthcoming translation of a Baconian manuscript by Newbold and Burke will clarify the problem.[25] Cer-

[24] Singer, C.—in *Science, Religion and Reality,* Ed. J. Needham, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 124.

[25] Newbold, W. R.—*The Cipher of Roger Bacon,* University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1928.

tainly there is no doubt of the hostility of theology, at least indirectly, to the development of physics and chemistry. Valentine, who discovered the true cause of asphyxiation in mines, dared not publish his results and down to the eighteenth century such deaths were attributed to devils.

In the matter of diseases, both physical and mental and their treatment, theology has almost invariably supported superstition at a tremendous cost in human misery. The ancient idea of devils or the wrath of God as the cause of disease was revived after Hippocrates and Galen, and miracles flourished on every hand. St. Augustine specifically ascribed the diseases of Christians to the work of demons who were especially prone to attack the person but recently baptized. There was considerable theological opposition to anatomical studies, for the body was considered holy and it was necessary to preserve it intact for resurrection. The Lateran Council forbade medical practice without calling in a priest, and the prevailing attitude of the clergy is shown by the remark, "Where there are three physicians there are two atheists." A suspicion of sorcery attached to scientific research with the result that surgery was given over to barbers and charlatans. Medicine was further held in abhorrence since the Jews practiced it. The utmost confidence was placed in relics, fetishes, sacred pools, and the touch of some royal hand as a means of curing disease. It was claimed that certain relics were so powerful that beggars by contact with them were cured against their will and thus were deprived of an easy livelihood. Charles II touched thousands of victims of scrofula and was said to have produced many cures.

Up to the time of Vesalius and later there was danger in the study of anatomy and for many years the church set its face against the practice of inoculation against disease. Such men as practiced this, it was claimed were "endeavoring

to baffle a Divine Judgment." As late as 1721, Dr. Boylston was persecuted for inoculating his son, although in this act he was supported by some of the clergy. The Catholics rendered noble service during an outbreak of ship fever in Montreal but during the smallpox epidemic of the same year they resisted vaccination with the result that great numbers of them died while the Protestants who accepted vaccination for the most part escaped. There was great opposition to Simpson in 1847 for his use of chloroform to lessen the pangs of childbirth. It was claimed that he was attempting to remove "one part of the primeval curse on woman," but he cleverly cited Scriptural precedent for his act, pointing out that the Lord put "a deep sleep on Adam" before extracting the rib. It was common to attribute pestilence to the wrath of God, this being true of the Black Plague which took a toll of 25,000,000 lives in Europe, and also of the Plague of the seventeenth century. The prevalence of epidemics may be explained in part by the frightful sanitary conditions which were made worse rather than improved by theological influence. Filth was considered holy. Simon Stylites was unspeakable and St. Sylvia washed only her fingers. Anthony was glorified by Athanasius merely because he never washed his feet. An epidemic always brought penance, sacrifice, and gifts to the church. It was well said that, "Pestilences are the harvests of the ministers of God." The Jews were often attacked as a cause of plagues and in Strasburg some 2000 were burned for this offense. Accusations of this kind were not, however, confined to Jews, for, following the Bull of Innocent VIII in 1484, which infallible authority attributed disease to witches, torture and executions became common. It is claimed that during a single century in Germany alone there were 100,000 victims of this horrible superstition. Mental disorders, perhaps more than the physical, have

nourished the belief in witchcraft as their cause. Many hysterical and demented persons who showed peculiarities of behavior or actually accused themselves, suffered from the tremendous pronouncement, "Thou shalt not suffer a witch to live." Many of the insane who were not accused as witches were, nevertheless, beaten and chained in order to injure the devil within them, and this state of affairs continued down to the time of Tuke and Pinel.

The development of comparative philology and comparative mythology broke down a number of theological conceptions. The taking of interest so violently opposed by the church, save by the Jews who were sure to be damned anyway, with consequent discouragement of saving, gained sanction with the Commercial Revolution and the development of political economy. Rationalizations of the changed economic order were made despite the declaration of Clement V that any who denied that taking interest was a sin was "a heretic fit for punishment."

With the transition from "Divine Oracles to the Higher Criticism," the very foundations of orthodox theology were cut away. The Christian, like other sacred literatures, developed out of a chaos of myth and legend, and was so modified as to reflect the people possessing it at their best. Once assembled, however, this literature was regarded as a divine creation, absolutely true in every part. Frequently subtle, allegorical, and mystical interpretations were made in order to explain acts of trickery, cruelty, and injustice on the part of Jahveh of the Old Testament. In the phrases, "Compel them to come in," and "He that believeth not shall be damned," was found sanction for the inflicting of untold misery upon fellow human beings.

The beginnings of scientific criticism began with Erasmus who detected inconsistencies between the Hebrew and the Vulgate. He was followed by Aben Ezra who found

questionable the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, since in these books is the boast that no man had been able to find the tomb of Moses. With Hobbes, Spinoza, Euchhorn, Herder, Kuenen and others the forces of criticism gathered strength. In spite of the reactionary Oxford Movement the tide could not be stemmed, and with the completion of the work of Wellhausen, vast structures of theology were reduced to shapeless ruins. White concludes that the sacred literature of the Bible, is, "a revelation, not of the Fall of Man, but of the Ascent of Man—an exposition, not of temporary dogmas and observances but of the Eternal Law of Righteousness—the one upward path for individuals and for nations."

Critical Comments

The reader should not be allowed to accept the impression given by White's work and other conventional discussion of science and religion, without being exposed to certain qualifications and reservations.

(1) The exact source of the opposition to science is often not defined as precisely as might be desired. Certainly, White is wise in drawing a distinction between theology and religion, although it is by no means certain that there is a hard and fast distinction. But what is meant by the proposition that theology is the opponent of science? Is it meant that theological ideas are incompatible with those of science, that theologians as human beings are opposed to scientists and their works, or that the church as an organized ecclesiastical institution is hostile to science and scientists? There are perhaps still other possibilities but at least it has been suggested that one must be on guard against accepting *theology, science* and *religion* as mere catch words. Assuming for the moment that the church may be identified with religion and theology, one must be cautious

in attributing to the church the responsibility for all that happens during its period of control. Draper argues vigorously that for a thousand years Europe was under the control of the Catholic Church and that it was therefore responsible for the low state of civilization, especially with respect to science.[26] Certainly this correlation was no accident, yet one should remember that it is easy to blame the President for business depressions and for bad weather, and the postman for failure to bring letters that we desire. Likewise it is easy to blame the church for conditions arising out of ignorance, isolation, political disturbances and the like.

(2) It is perhaps well to stress as a special point that the original decline of Hellenic science was not due to Christianity, although there is no denying its unfavorable influence. Says Singer, "Despite the spread of philosophy based on science, the observational activity of antiquity was slowly dying from about 100 B.C. In A.D. 200 it expired with Galen. The decay of observation, as we have seen, was the result of internally acting causes. In origin it had nothing to do with Christianity, which was not yet in a position to have its full effect on pagan thought." [27] Bury writes, "It is possible that the knowledge of nature would have progressed little, even if this distrust of science on theological grounds had not prevailed. For Greek science had ceased to advance five hundred years before Christianity became powerful. After about 200 B.C. no important discoveries were made. The explanation of this decay is not easy, but we may be sure that it is to be sought in the social conditions of the Greek and Roman world. And we may suspect that the social conditions of the Middle Ages would have proved unfavorable to the scientific spirit—the

[26] Draper, J. W.—*History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science,* N. Y., Appleton, 1887, Chap. X.

[27] Singer, C.—in *Science, Religion and Reality,* Ed. J. Needham, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 114.

disinterested quest of facts—even if the controlling beliefs had not been hostile. We may suspect that the rebirth of science would in any case have been postponed till new social conditions, which began to appear in the thirteenth century, had reached a certain maturity.

"Theological prejudice may have injured knowledge principally by its survival after the Middle Ages had passed away. In other words, the harm done by Christian doctrines, in this respect, may lie less in the obscurantism of the dark interval between ancient and modern civilization, than in the obstructions which they offered when science had revived in spite of them and could no longer be crushed." [28]

(3) There is reason to think that part of the hostility of religion to science after the Middle Ages was due to special historical circumstances. Much truth is to be found in the statement of Dean Inge, "It was I believe, the terrible Wars of Religion that made the fatal rift between religion and science which we are now trying to close. It was a really disastrous accident that the greatest problem which the Christian Church has ever had to face was thrust upon it when it was distracted by an internecine conflict. That problem was the destruction of the geocentric view of the universe by the discoveries of Copernicus and Galileo." [29] Another circumstance that tended to bring religion into conflict with science was the association of religion with political power, either that of the church itself or that of a country possessing a state religion. Heresy has in Western Europe been identified to a considerable extent with treason, with the result that any activity tending to undermine established authority has been repressed with especial vigor.

[28] Bury, J. B.—*A History of Freedom of Thought,* Holt, N. Y., 1913, pp. 65–66.

[29] Inge, W. R.—in *Science, Religion and Reality,* Ed. J. Needham, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 356.

(4) As is implied in the preceding paragraph, caution must be exercised in reasoning from the relation between Christianity and science to the relation between religion in general and science. Christianity has rigid dogmas, a Scripture based on assumed divine revelation, interpretations of nature as part of this Scripture, a priesthood, and finally, an elaborate ecclesiastical organization. Furthermore, growing out of these general conditions combined with the special doctrine of exclusive salvation, there has been a spirit of intolerance. There is no cause for wonder that Christianity has been opposed to science. Not all of the so-called higher religions have these conditions and but few of the religions of people of simpler cultures have them. The Winnebago, for example, have no coherent system of dogma, no Scripture, although myths with cosmological components are supposed to be revealed and, finally, no exclusive or highly organized priesthood. As Radin has shown, there is no rigid tradition and they make no attempt to limit freedom of thought, even that of a sceptical nature, although ridicule may be directed at the person who takes an unconventional position. When the Peyote Cult was introduced by men who denounced all the old beliefs no attempt was made by the Winnebago to persecute them.[30]

(5) Again, it must be recognized that men within the church have at times made contributions to science. Pope Sylvester II, Bishop of Lincoln, Roger Bacon, Albertus Magnus, Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa, Cardinal Bessarion and even Copernicus himself may be mentioned. This line of argument has been vigorously pursued by John Walsh, but in the spirit of justification and refutation rather than of unbiased inquiry.[31] Still it is undeniably true that modern

[30] Radin, P.—*Primitive Man as a Philosopher,* Appleton, N. Y., 1927, pp. 45–70.

[31] Walsh, J.—*Popes and Science,* Fordham University Press, N. Y., 1908.

science has not been furthered to any great extent by men within the fold of the church although scattered examples such as that of Gregor Mendel might be cited. Furthermore, an analysis of the scientific output of present-day denominational as compared with non-sectarian institutions of learning would probably show that of the former to be almost negligible.

(6) As a final comment it may be noted that many eminent men of science have been sincerely religious. Copernicus was essentially a pious and conservative individual who had profound faith in the simplicity and purposiveness of nature, perhaps due to Neo-Platonic influences. Kepler was a mystic who thanked God at each step of his work for the success which had been accorded him. Says Randall, "In Kepler this faith in the simplicity, harmony, and mathematical order of the universe is thoroughly Pythagorean in its mysticism. His first book, the 'Mystery of the Universe,' sought the definite mathematical relations in the world that were the revelation of the Divine Spirit. The universe is the image of the Trinity: the central sun is the Father, the surrounding sphere the Son, and the geometrical relations between them and the spheres of the planets constitute the Holy Spirit." [32] There is every reason to think that Galileo was a sincere Catholic, although his religious beliefs seem to have had little influence over his scientific speculations.[33] His opposition was to the methods and attitudes of Aristotelian colleagues rather than to the basic tenets of the faith.[34]

Newton, for all his scientific genius, was essentially devout and undertook various theological speculations with

[32] Randall, J. H.—*The Making of the Modern Mind,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, p. 236.

[33] Ibid., p. 234.

[34] Mayer, J.—*Astronomy and Authority,* Sci. Mo., March, 1926, pp. 228–38.

SCHOOL OF THEOL

earnestness and no little naïveté. The inscription on his tomb informs us that, "He diligently investigated the different refrangibilities of the rays of light and the properties of the colors to which they rise. An assiduous, sagacious, and faithful interpreter of the Nature, Antiquity, and the Holy Scriptures. He asserted in his philosophy the majesty of God. And exhibited in his conduct the simplicity of the Gospel. Let mortals rejoice that there has existed so great an ornament of the human race." The mathematician Pascal may well be termed not only a philosopher but also a saint.[35] Faraday, throughout his long life remained a member of an obscure Protestant sect. Dalton, who laid the foundations of the atomic theory, was a Quaker. Maxwell, one of the greatest mathematical physicists of the nineteenth century, was religious. This was eminently true of Pasteur, to whom mankind is perhaps indebted above all other men. Says Smith, "Pasteur was a religious man, born and bred in the Roman Catholic communion and remaining in it all his life, but I have never discovered in him any great liking for ecclesiastics. Their methods were not his. He always insisted on the absolute freedom of the scientific man to investigate truth in every direction without reference to consequences, and untrammelled by any religious or philosophical notions." [36] The list might be multiplied indefinitely but at the risk of laboring the point. Millikan mentions men like Kelvin, Raleigh, Walcott, Osborn, Conklin, Merriam, Coulter, Noyes, Angell, Breasted and Chamberlin as examples of scientists who have found science compatible in one way or another with religion.[37] He has himself found what approaches re-

[35] Lloyd, A. H.—*The Mathematician Pascal as Philosopher and Saint,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XX:2, Feb., 1925, pp. 139–152.

[36] Smith, E. F.—*Pasteur the Man,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XVI:3, 1923, pp. 269–279.

[37] See Lit. Dig., July 14, 1923.

ligious inspiration in the study of the structure of the universe.[38] The same is apparently true of Pupin, who in his discussion of "creative coördination" has approached the conception of Deity.[39]

It might seem appropriate at this time to consider in detail the various attempts to effect a reconciliation between science and religion and to draw some conclusion as to their ultimate relationship. However, it seems more advisable to consider first the recent revival of the bitter conflict between science and religion and the present status of organized religion before allowing ourselves to venture upon the dangerous ground of philosophy and prophecy.

[38] Millikan, R.—*Science and Life,* Pilgrim Press, Boston, 1924, pp. 38–64. *Evolution in Science and Religion,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927.

[39] Pupin, M.—*The New Reformation,* Scribner's, N. Y., 1927.

Chapter XIII

THE ATTACK ON MODERN SCIENCE

When one looks back upon the violent controversy which arose in the last part of the nineteenth century following the introduction of the Darwinian theory and notes the victory of science and the acceptance by educated men of the theory of organic evolution throughout Western Civilization, the events of the last few years in the United States seem incredible. It is as if we were transported back some thirty years in time to find such ancient issues revived for serious discussion. Unfortunately the Fundamentalists are not content with discussion, in fact, they want as little of it as possible save among their own number, and with earnest intent propose to ban the teaching of evolution throughout the land. Certainly the menace to freedom of teaching and of research is not inconsiderable. Let us examine a few of the episodes in the Fundamentalist crusade and then make suggestions by way of explanation.

Christian Fundamentalism

In one sense Fundamentalism is as old as the hills but as an active movement recognized by that name it dates back only to the World War. According to Shipley, "Fundamentalism is a word coined by the Rev. Dr. Curtis Less Laws, in 1921, and the 'Christian Fundamentals' as understood by Laws, Massee, Straton, Riley, Norris, and Funda-

mentalists generally, are the following five minimum basic doctrines:

1. The inerrancy and infallibility of the Bible.
2. The Virgin Birth and the complete Deity of Christ Jesus.
3. The resurrection of the same body of Jesus which was three days buried.
4. The substitutionary atonement of Jesus for the sins of the world.
5. The second coming of Jesus in bodily form, according to the Scriptures." [1]

Riley, the President of the World's Christian Fundamentals Association, adds several points not covered in the above.

1. "We believe that man was created in the image of God, that he sinned, and thereby incurred not only physical death, but also that spiritual death which is separation from God; and that all human beings are born with a sinful nature, and, in the case of those who reach moral responsibility, become sinners in thought, word, and deed.
2. "We believe that all who receive by faith the Lord Jesus Christ are born again of the Holy Spirit and thereby become children of God.
3. "We believe in the bodily resurrection of the just and the unjust, the everlasting felicity of the saved and the everlasting conscious suffering of the lost." [2]

In view of this dogma of an inerrant Bible, Riley quite logically argues that it is not the privilege of man to select his doctrines, as do the Modernists to whom the Fundamentalists stand forever in antithesis. He modestly attributes

[1] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 29.
[2] Quoted in Lit. Dig., June 25, 1927, p. 30.

to Fundamentalism the founding of the church, the conquest of Deism, the emancipation of women, the establishment of the home, the abolition of slavery, and the fostering of charity, education, freedom and virtue. This bit of self-adoration need not be taken seriously but it is necessary to point out certain purposes and implications of the Fundamentalist movement which are amply demonstrated by the events and activities of the last few years.[3]

(1) The fundamental tenet of the Fundamentalist faith is the conviction that truth is attained by revelation rather than by the slow and arduous processes of observation and experimentation. In its glorification of ignorance of all save that which is revealed and in its confidence in a short cut to truth, Fundamentalism is allied with what Jordan has called Sciosophy. He writes: "It is not derived from tested and verified human experience, because life is short and humanity demands quick returns. It recognizes no relation of cause and effect, for these are mere human devices. Instruments of precision, logic, mathematics, the telescope, the microscope and the scalpel, are not needed in sciosophy. Its processes are instantaneous and intuitional, while all scientific testing is slow and laborious." [4]

(2) In the second place, Fundamentalism means adherence to a set of unchanging dogmas once and for all time inscribed within a sacred book which is to be the infallible guide of all men regardless of social and economic changes that may befall them. This is a striking contrast with science, which is made up of concepts ever elaborated into new and all-embracing harmonies.

(3) In the third place, the Fundamentalists are committed directly or indirectly to the reëstablishment of the

[3] Jordan, D. S.—*The Nature of Sciosophy and Science,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XXIV:2, Feb., 1927, 143–151.

[4] Ibid., pp. 143–151.

union of church and state which in the past has put reason in chains, made religious non-conformity subject to political and economic disabilities, and hampered the development of science. The Rev. Samuel Small expressed this aim very clearly when he declared, "I want to see the day when the church shall be the arbiter of all legislation, national, state and municipal; when the great churches of the country can come together harmoniously and issue their edict, and the legislative powers respect it and enact it into law." [5] It is rumored that regardless of the principle of religious freedom incorporated in the Constitution, Bryan contemplated an amendment making Christianity the official religion of the United States. Again and again we find in the Fundamentalist writings the demand that candidates for office be required to pass a religious test. That the dream of a Fundamentalist theocracy has blinded the eyes of pious writers to the principle of religious liberty is clearly apparent.

The Evolution Controversy

The central issue of the quarrel of Fundamentalism with science and with Modernism within the churches has been the matter of organic evolution. William Jennings Bryan, who perhaps more than any other man has been successful in stirring up opposition to modern science, devoted the last few years of his life to combating the concept of organic evolution and opposing evolutionary teaching in the schools. Bryan was able to make capital out of an address by Bateson questioning the Darwinian explanation of the evolutionary process but in which it was expressly stated that, "Our doubts are not as to the reality or truth of evolution but as to the origin of species, a technical, almost domestic

[5] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, quoted p. 22.

problem." [6] Unfortunately a minor disagreement over this domestic problem furnished ammunition to the Fundamentalist.[7]

The controversy that raged in the columns of the *New York Times* is interesting in showing the futility of discussion of certain matters and making clear the point of view of the Fundamentalist. Bryan proclaims the entire doctrine of evolution to be speculation, sexual selection a joke, and natural selection nothing more than a guess. "Is it not strange a Christian will accept Darwinism as a substitute for the Bible when the Bible not only does not support Darwin's hypothesis but directly and expressly contradicts it?" He states on his own authority that the earliest forms of life among the rocks are like the species today and that with millions of examples nothing imperfect is found, nothing in the process of change. He cites Bateson's address and cries, "Is it not more rational to believe in the creation of man by a separate act of God than to believe in evolution without a single particle of evidence?" The contempt he feels for these absurdities has no bounds. "The eye according to the evolutionists was brought out by the 'light beating upon the skin,' the ear came out in response to 'air waves,' the leg is the development of a wart that chanced to appear on the belly of an animal, and so the tommy-rot runs on ad infinitum and sensible people are asked to believe

[6] Bateson, W.—*Evolutionary Faith and Modern Doubts,* Science, 55: Jan. 20, 1922, pp. 55–61.

[7] Ritter, W. E.—*Osborn vs. Bateson on Evolution,* Science, 55: April 14, 1922, pp. 398–399.

Osborn, H. F.—*William Bateson on Darwinism,* Science 55: Feb. 24, 1922, pp. 195–197.

Keith, A.—*Is Darwinism at the Dusk or Dawn,* 19th Cent. 92: Aug., 1922, pp. 173–182.

William Jennings Bryan on Evolution, Science, 55: Mar. 3, 1922, pp. 242–243.

it." "Evolution," says Bryan, "seems to close the heart to some of the plainest spiritual truths while it opens the mind to the wildest of guesses advanced in the name of science." Such guesses, argues Bryan, undermine faith in the Bible, in miracles, in the supernatural, in the virgin birth of Christ, and in his resurrection. "Theistic evolution puts God so far away that he ceases to be a present influence in this life." That God could have worked through the process of evolution is admitted by Bryan, but that such was the divine plan he declares to be an unsupported hypothesis. Since Darwin admitted that on the great questions of life and death he must remain agnostic, Bryan by a turn of the meaning of words claims that Darwin was made agnostic by his theory and that the teaching of the theory in the schools is bound to have an even more striking effect with its impact on the plastic mind of youth. "Christians," he says, "do not dispute the right of any teacher to be agnostic or atheistic but Christians do deny the right of agnostics and atheists to use the public school as a forum for the teaching of these doctrines." Again, "as religion is the only basis of morals it is time for Christians to protect religion from this most insidious enemy." [8] Granting that Mr. Bryan is sincere in these remarks we have a significant revelation of a childish but comprehensible point of view.

The Rev. S. L. Tyson of Princeton with a natural indignation against one who is making religion ridiculous declares that Bryan is silly beyond words, that the conception of an infallible Scripture has been abandoned for the last hundred years and suggests that Mr. Bryan himself would hesitate to compare the first and the second chapters of Genesis. He concludes, "A Pagan who has worked out a belief in Christianity is more pleasing to Almighty God than a perfectly orthodox Christian who has never thought out

[8] N. Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1922, Sect. 7 pl.

any belief for himself. . . . We are charged to love God with our minds." [9]

Mr. Austin Hay reviews Bryan's book, *In His Image,* deploring the tendency to oppose science and religion rather than to use science in the support of religion.[10]

Professor Osborn now enters the lists and takes up the cudgels in defense of evolution. After paying his respects to the sincerity of Mr. Bryan and admitting the possibility of confusion on the part of a layman, he increases that confusion by defending natural selection as the true cause of evolution. He does, however, stress the general agreement as to the fact of evolution in spite of the divergent theories as to how the process came about. He appeals to Bryan to study the archives of nature and thus become an evolutionist, declaring that "Evolution by no means takes God out of the universe, as Mr. Bryan supposes, but it greatly increases both the wonder, the mystery, and the marvelous order which we call Natural Law pervading all nature." He points out the moral principle in the universe that nothing can be gained without effort, the ethical principle of evolution that only the best have the right to survive, and the spiritual principle that order and design are to be found "in the daily myriad of miracles to which we owe our existence." Osborn then wastes on Mr. Bryan an excellent little summary of the anthropological and ethnological evidence for the evolutionary origin of man and for his antiquity on this earth.[11]

Professor Conklin is less patient with the emotional bias and intellectual frailties of Mr. Bryan. He denies that Bryan is willing to accept the truth or to be other than blind to the mass of biological evidence. He declares that

[9] Tyson, S. L.—N. Y. Times, Feb. 27:1922:13:8.
[10] Hay, Austin—N. Y. Times, Mar. 5:1922:B:5:1.
[11] Osborn, H. F.—*Evolution and Religion,* N. Y. Times, Mar. 5:1922:7:2.

evolution is no more a guess than the law of gravitation and remarks, "Apparently Mr. Bryan demands to see a monkey or an ass transformed into a man, though he must be familiar enough with the reverse process." At the end of a brief educational effort Conklin concludes: "All the evidence of evolution drawn from morphology, physiology, embryology, paleontology, homology, heredity, variation, etc., speak for evolution of man as much as for that of any other organism. If evolution is true anywhere it is true also of man." He reminds Bryan of the outcome of past efforts of religion to obstruct science and of the universal acceptance of evolution in not one but many fields by all competent thinkers and concludes, "In the face of all these facts Mr. Bryan and his kind hurl their medieval theology. It would be amusing if it were not so pathetic and disheartening to see these modern defenders of the faith beating their gongs and firing their giant crackers against the ramparts of science." [12]

The educational efforts of these men are quite lost on Bryan for he resorts to an absurd caricature of the evolutionary process and defies the scientists to make a monkey out of him. To the *New York Times* he gives thanks for bringing two professors down out of their ancestral tree around which they usually curl their tails and look "down on the plain common people who instead of claiming aristocratic ape ancestors are content to believe that they were made in the image of God." He further attacks the intellectual snobbishness of the intellectuals, their evasion of the issues and their evil influence. "There ought not to be any doubt of the baneful influence such teaching will exert on young men and women trained in Christian homes and taught to regard the Bible as the Word of God." [13]

[12] Conklin, E. G.—N. Y. Times, Mar. 5:1922:7:14.
[13] Bryan, W. J.—N. Y. Times, Mar. 14:1922:14:6.

In an article by F. P. Lebuffe, S.J., we find ingenious sophistry and superficial knowledge, together with a certain subtlety which is totally lacking in Mr. Bryan. With calm and contemptuous superiority he proceeds to rationalize away all of the evidence for evolution of man which he considers from an alleged purely scientific point of view, "to be one of the ranking hoaxes of all times." He questions the logic that makes resemblance of animal forms an evidence of common ancestry and states, "It is manifest that man, the apes and the half apes cannot be arranged in a single ascending series of which man is the term and culmination." He states that the scientists in despair of linking up man and the apes have assumed an hypothetical ancestor on the evidence of a jaw found in Egypt. He proclaims, "The mountains are in labor and there is brought forth a laughable mouse." In reply to Osborn's claim of a flood of evidence he states that in the Museum of Natural History there are but five cases containing a few pieces of skulls, the Trinil apeman, a hodgepodge of bones belonging to no one creature, the Heidelberg man, merely a jaw, and the Piltdown man, a hoax. He cites learned opinions of early writers that the Neanderthal remains were of an old Celt, an old Hollander, an old Frieslander and, last but not least, a Mongolian Cossack of the year 1814. He slily distorts Huxley's statement that the Neanderthal bones could not be regarded as intermediate between men and apes, and accuses the scientists of fraud in restoring skulls. He declares, "You schematized and made them progress. But didn't Haeckel cut off a monkey's tail to have a missing link? Think of paying taxes for the upkeep of a building wherein are depicted such phantasmagoria." Lebuffe then proceeds to confound Conklin by pointing out the differences between the man and the apes, stressing man's upright position, fewer ribs and continual production of ova by women.

He furthermore, very shrewdly, points out that cranial capacity is no index of intelligence and that alleged prehistoric races had a cranial capacity greater than that of modern man and supra-orbital ridges that resembled more closely those of a white man than a negro. He groups the appendix with the glands of internal secretion and argues that since the glands have been shown to have a purpose, may not the same be true of the appendix. In regard to blood tests, he proclaims that since "the milk of asses is nearest the milk of human females we might just as logically claim milk relationship with asses." Haeckel's law of biogenetics is pronounced a fraud, the embryological argument proclaimed long since discredited. The paleontological argument is attacked, with the aid in each case of names of scientists writing before the general acceptance of evolution, or whose statements he takes out of their setting and distorts to suit his purpose. Lebuffe can understand the indignation of Kentucky at the teaching of Darwinism but considers a repressive law undesirable since such teaching is beneath contempt. He agrees with Ruskin that, "Darwinism has a mortal fascination for all vainly curious and idly speculative persons, and has collected in the train of him every imprudent imbecility in Europe, like a dim comet wagging its useless tail of nothingness across the steadfast stars." [14]

It may be noted that the line of argument followed by Lebuffe is essentially that of McCann in *God or Gorilla,* his sensational book in defense of obscurantism. It is claimed that there is no missing link, that museum collections are based on falsehoods, fakes, and distortions of the truth and that the reconstructions of remains show an evolutionary bias. Garbled statements of scientists are played one against the other with a shrewd cunning, even with

[14] Lebuffe, F. P.—N. Y. Times, Mar. 19:1922:8:2:1.

intelligence worthy of a better cause. At least we have demonstrated that in the conflict of science with religion intelligence is no protection against error.

Bryan cannot be accused, however, of any great subtlety or intellectual acumen on the basis of his contributions to the newspaper controversy. He bewails the tyrannical autocracy that would exist were the professors allowed to teach what they pleased at the expense of the tax payers. Implying that Conklin prefers monkey to mud he states, "I prefer mud. Everything I eat comes from mud. The flower grows from mud. I know all about mud. What has the monkey ever done for Professor Conklin that should cause so much affection for it? When a professor of science pushes a minister off the side-walk he should be taught a lesson in comparative importance. It is time for the spiritual leaders of our nation to defend the calling of the man who deals in eternal things." [15]

Professor Spangler does not hesitate to fight Mr. Bryan with his own weapons and informs him, "Your ancestry was just the same as mine and I assure you that your embryological development was the same except for one point. I do not know whether your tail degenerated before birth or was amputated after birth. You should take the trouble to inform yourself on some of the common facts that prove evolution to be the truth as well as to learn how to interpret the Bible according to modern views of Christianity and the natural laws of the universe." [16]

Not only the scientists but also the Modernists are viciously attacked by the Fundamentalists, as is shown by the remarks of one McPherson. He declares, "If these evolutionists, the botanical baboon boosters to which Dean Robbins and Dr. Fosdick belong, are consistent, they will see

[15] Bryan, W. J.—N. Y. Times, Apr. 3:1922:16:2.
[16] Spangler, R. C.—N. Y. Times, June 13:1922:8:1.

that they form new churches and that above the doors of such there appear in large letters, 'Only those permitted to worship here who believe themselves of beastly origin.' " [17]

These quotations are given at some length at the risk of being wearisome because they are psychological documents reflecting better than any description could do the attitudes of our age. We see clearly that the Fundamentalist group is a psychological crowd with all of the crowd traits so admirably pointed out by Martin.[18] We are perhaps justified in presenting a few additional quotations to show how decidedly the Fundamentalist crowd is a "creature of hate," and how real the menace of an actual revival of persecution.

Fundamentalism and "Christian Love"

A correspondent of the *Greensboro Daily News* declares, "Take the evolutionists, infidels and no-hell teachers out somewhere and crucify them, head downward, and we will have a better country to live in and, instead of these evolution and easy-way ideas, teach people the Word of God to go by, and all will be well." [19]

The Rev. A. Northrop of Kansas City proclaims, "Worse than an assassin who kills the body is he who shatters the faith of youth," and goes on to say that, "rape fiends are burnt, but they are saints in comparison" (with the teachers of modern evolutionary science).[20] Billy Sunday informs us that "if a minister believes and teaches evolution, he is a stinking skunk and a liar." [21]

[17] N. Y. Times, July 24:1922:10:1.

[18] Martin, E. D.—*The Behavior of Crowds,* N. Y., Harpers, 1920.

[19] Sprading, C. T.—*Science versus Dogma,* quoted by Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 40.

[20] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 154.

[21] Sprading, C. T.—*Science versus Dogma,* pp. 144–5, quoted by Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 251.

The *Pasadena Broadcaster* writes editorially, "When a teacher in the public schools or colleges talks evolution, take him out and put him with this class that he claims to be the offspring of. Southern California has a number of fine zoos and we believe as Dr. Riley, that it would be better to have them take away the eyes from the physical body of the children of today than to blind their spiritual eyes with such rot as is being taught over this land of ours." [22]

According to Shipley, a Fundamentalist of San Francisco writes to a daily paper, "All two-legged monkeys deserve to be exterminated from the face of the earth as common pests." [23] A number of other examples might be cited from the daily press and from the collections of Americana appearing in the *American Mercury,* but enough have been presented to show that the conflict of science with religion may arouse as great bitterness as in the past and may now, as then, find vent in overt religious persecution.

The War against Evolution

It is claimed that there are some 25,000,000 Fundamentalists in the country who stand ready to oppose the teaching of evolution, although this figure can be nothing more than a guess. Of their effective organization there can be no doubt. According to Shipley, one of the two most active organizations is the "Supreme Kingdom," founded in Atlanta in 1926 under the leadership of E. Y. Clarke, a former official of the Ku Klux Klan, with the avowed purpose of driving the Modernists out of the schools and out of political office. The other organization, the "Bible Crusaders," is financed in considerable measure by a wealthy business man, George F. Washburn, and the specific aim is

[22] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, pp. 279–80.

[23] Ibid., p. 280.

to agitate for the passing of laws forbidding the teaching of evolution in the tax-supported schools. Shipley writes, "There are many other anti-evolution associations, such as the Bryan Bible League, the Fundamentalist's Association, the National Anti-Evolution Society (with headquarters in St. Louis), etc. The entire membership of the Seventh Day Adventist, Lutheran, and several other denominations, is strongly and actively anti-evolutionist. Much anti-evolution work is also being done by the World's Christian Fundamentals Association, but this is largely in co-operation with the Bible Crusader and Defenders of the Faith—probably the secret ally of the Supreme Kingdom." [24]

The achievements of the Fundamentalists in the various states may be briefly summarized, following in part the survey made by Shipley. We may divide the states into seven categories corresponding roughly to the success of Fundamentalism in each group:

1. States with anti-evolution laws passed by both houses,
2. States with a law passing one house but failing in the other,
3. States in which a bill is defeated by vote in one house, failing to reach the other,
4. States in which there is either a resolution in legislature opposed to evolution, or active hostility by the Governor,
5. States in which repression is exercised by the Boards of Education,
6. States in which a bill is prepared but fails to be voted on in either house,
7. States in which there is no bill or other significant opposition to the teaching of evolution.

[24] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, pp. 49–50.

(1) Turning to the states in which anti-evolution laws have passed, we find the outstanding example to be Tennessee. On March 13, 1925, the Butler Bill was passed in the House by a vote of 71 to 5 and in the Senate by 24 to 6, following agitation by Mr. Bryan and opposition to evolutionary teaching at the State University. This bill made it unlawful to teach in any tax-supported school any theory "that denies the story of the Divine creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has descended from a lower order of animals." The penalty was to be a fine of from $100 to $500 for each offence.[25]

John Scopes, an obscure teacher, was arrested on May 9, 1925, to provide a test case of this law and after the famous Dayton trial was fined $100 on July 21, 1925, for its violation. On January 15, 1927, the constitutionality of the law was upheld by the Supreme Court of Tennessee, although the decision against Scopes was reversed.[26] The following companion documents are illuminating.

In 1633 one Galileo was indicted by the Inquisition, the indictment setting forth:

"Whereas you, Galileo, son of the late Vincenzo Galileo of Florence, aged 70 years, were denounced in 1615 to this Holy Office for holding as true the false doctrine held by many . . . namely, that the sun is immovable in the center of the world and that the earth moves and

In 1925 one Scopes was indicted by a Rhea county (Tennessee) grand jury, the indictment setting forth:

"That John Thomas Scopes, heretofore on the 24th day of April, 1925, did unlawfully, willfully, teach in the public schools of Rhea county, Tennessee, which said public schools are supported in part and in whole (sic) by the public school fund of the state, certain theory and theories that

[25] Ibid., pp. 193–194.
[26] Ibid., p. 234.

also with a diurnal motion:" . . . deny the story of the Divine Creation of man as taught in the Bible, and did teach instead thereof that man has descended from a lower order of animals" . . .[27]

In Mississippi, thanks to the efforts of the Bible Crusaders a similar bill was passed in the House of Representatives on February 8, 1926, by a vote of 76 to 32 and in the Senate, on February 24th by a vote of 29 to 16. Signed by the Governor on March 11th, the teaching of evolution became a crime punishable by a fine not exceeding $500. Protests were made by the head of the State University and others but they were unable to stem the Fundamentalist tide, urged on as it was by the resolutions passed by the Baptist Conference of McComb, Mississippi, pleading with the legislators to save the younger generation from atheism and infidelity.[28]

In Oklahoma for several years an amendment to a textbook bill provided that no book teaching the Darwinian theory should be adopted by the state. This amendment was passed 87 to 2 in the House in February, 1923, and by the Senate, 16 to 12 in March. When this clause was quietly repealed by a law that went into effect in June, 1926, great agitation arose for a strong anti-evolution act. Such a law was barely defeated in the House on February 25 by a vote of 46 to 30.[29]

(2) Turning to the states in which an anti-evolution bill passed one house we find that Louisiana had one of the narrowest escapes. The final bill passed the House by a vote of 52 to 43 but was neatly shelved by the Senate, appar-

[27] From Shipley, p. 236, after Meeman.

[28] Ibid., p. 62; also Lit Dig., Apr. 3, 1926.

[29] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, pp. 334–337.

ently by a vote of 17 to 15. In South Carolina, "the cult known as Darwinism" was to be prohibited in all state-supported public schools and institutions of higher learning by a proviso attached as a rider to the general appropriation bill. The mode of coercion was withdrawal of funds from any school permitting such teaching. The rider passed the Senate but was stricken out by a joint committee of the legislature.[30]

Texas has been the scene of struggle between science and dogma. The temper of the Fundamentalists is shown by a resolution passed in a Texas Baptist Convention without a dissenting vote: "Resolved, that the trustees of the institutions of learning controlled and fostered by the Baptist General Convention of Texas are hereby instructed not to employ anyone who denies the Deity of Jesus Christ or the inspiration of the Bible, or who holds to the Darwinian theory of evolution or any other theory of evolution that contravenes the teaching of the Word of God, to any official position or to teach in any of the schools controlled and fostered by the Baptist General Convention." [31] Texas is also the hunting ground of the Rev. J. Frank Norris, who has turned his church bulletin, the *Searchlight,* into a sensational newspaper through the columns of which he assails the devil, the atheists, the colleges where they are bred, and the professors who corrupt the mind of youth. A favorite sport of his consists in turning his church into a court room in which various colleges are tried and convicted of teaching evolution.[32] Thanks to the agitation of Bryan and Norris a "Monkey Bill" passed the lower house March 9, 1923, by a vote of 71 to 34 but the measure died in the Senate. A

[30] Ibid., p. 116.

[31] Slaten, A. W.—*Academic Freedom, Fundamentalism and the Dotted Line,* Educ. Rev., Feb., 1923, pp. 65–74.

[32] Hartt, R. L.—*Down with Evolution!* World's Work, Oct., 1922, pp. 605–614.

second bill in 1925 failed to make progress. There has been, however, considerable modification by publishers of texts for use in the "Bible Belt." By a resolution of the authorities of the University of Texas no atheist was to be employed at that institution of higher learning.[33]

In Arkansas, Baptist organizations passed unanimous resolutions against evolution and in some cases petitioned the legislature to pass an anti-evolution law. In January, 1927, a bill was introduced carrying an especially heavy penalty, a fine of $200 to $1000, each day of teaching to constitute a separate offence. After several hours of discussion and severe opposition a vote was called for. According to Shipley, "It was 48 for the bill and 49 against it—a majority of one! Then Representative Arthur Jones of Little Rock changed his vote to 'yes' and another member did the same, thus giving the bill a majority of three. The House cheered." The bill was tabled in the Senate although it is claimed that at one time there was a majority in favor of the measure.[34]

(3) We may now turn to the states in which an anti-evolution bill was killed in one house of the legislature, failing to come to a vote in the other. In Kentucky, following upon an agitation which culminated in an address by William Jennings Bryan before a joint session of the legislature, three bills were introduced at different times to suppress with varying degrees of rigor the teaching of evolution.[35] [36]

[33] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, pp. 171–77.

Teaching of Evolution in the Baptist Institutions of Texas, Science, May 12, 1922.

[34] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 169.

[35] *Proposed Legislation Against the Teaching of Evolution,* Science, 55: March 24, 1922, pp. 318–20.

[36] Denney, J. V.—*Agitation Against the Teaching of Evolution,* Science, 55: June 23, 1922, p. 669.

The Ellis Bill is of chief interest since it was by far the most drastic and also came nearest to passing. This bill, which savors of the Inquisition, provides for a fine of $50 to $5000 or a jail sentence of ten days to twelve months for any "teacher, principal or superintendent or other person connected directly or indirectly with such school or institutions who shall knowingly teach or permit to be taught Darwinism, Atheism, Agnosticism or theory of evolution in so far as it applies to the origin of man." [37]

The controversy was of course violent, and on March 9th the final struggle took place in the House where the bill was opposed by President McVey of the State University and Rev. Powell. A Mr. Gaines, speaking for the bill, was applauded and cheered by the laughing spectators in the gallery. One of his stunts was a division of the sheep and the goats, placing Dr. McVey, Dr. Powell, and various zoölogy books on one side, and the Bible, the Declaration of Independence and himself on the other. He scattered the books about and finally threw one of them to the floor and trampled it under foot. Representative Waggoner stated that he was ashamed of that day in the legislature and declared, "this bill smacks of intolerance and the shadows of the Dark Ages are settling about us. . . . There have been times today when those on both sides of this discussion were about ready to place their opponents on the rack and torture them." Mr. Ellis, the author of the bill, told with emotion of his son's loss of faith at the University of Kentucky. When the roll was called the vote stood 38 to 36 for the bill, which meant its defeat, as 40 votes were required for passage. As Mr. Meyers was about to announce this result the proponents demanded that the absentees be called. The vote then stood 40 to 39 for the bill. The opponents demanded a recapitulation and during the

[37] N. Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1922.

ensuing interval were able to muster two members to the one added to ranks of the anti-evolutionists, thus causing the vote to stand 41 to 41. Representative Bryce Cundiff, who had declined to vote on the ground that he was a Hard Shell Baptist who believed that what was would be anyhow, said he would have to discard his religion and vote "No." Thus the bill was defeated and one of the first and most dramatic battles of the war on modern science was won for the cause of freedom of thought.[38] Another attempt in 1926 was foiled with little difficulty.[39]

A bill introduced in Georgia in 1923 made it illegal to even approve of the theory of evolution. While receiving the approval of the Committee on Education the bill never, apparently, was voted on in either house. An anti-evolution amendment to the appropriation bill, however, was voted down overwhelmingly in the House in 1925.[40] The Board of Education of Atlanta, however, temporarily forbade the teaching of evolution. With the defeat of Walker, the Fundamentalist Governor who at one time issued a proclamation setting aside a Prayer Day for rain, the general situation has become less unfavorable for the teaching of evolution.

In Alabama an anti-evolution bill was introduced in 1923 but suffered defeat after a warm debate. Another bill was introduced in 1927, but died in committee when an informal poll of the House showed that 80 out of 105 members were opposed to the measure.[41]

In 1927 a bill was introduced in Missouri following a violent assault upon the teaching of evolution led by the

[38] Miller, A. M.—*Vote on the Evolution Bill in the Kentucky State Legislature,* Science, 55: March 24, 1922, pp. 316–17.

[39] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 121.

[40] Ibid., pp. 128–29.

[41] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, pp. 140–144.

Rev. James E. Congdon of Kansas City. The bill was greeted with laughter in the legislature and a live monkey was facetiously paraded about as an object lesson. In spite of the keen sense of the ridiculous displayed in the House and a humorous amendment offered to the bill it was defeated only by a majority of 82 to 62.[42]

In West Virginia, a bill for which Bryan pleaded on the floor of the legislature was defeated by the majority of the lawmakers in 1923. An attempt was made to introduce a bill in 1925 which provided a prison sentence as the penalty for teaching evolution, but this was reported unfavorably by the Education Committee. Still another attempt in 1927 was preceded by a resolution which was voted down 57 to 36.[43]

As early as 1922 Bryan started an agitation against the teaching of evolution [44] in Minnesota, but a recent bill failed of passage.[45]

A bill was killed in the Maine legislature in 1927 but apparently never had any strong support.[46]

(4) Turning now to states in which there was either a resolution in legislature opposed to evolution, or active hostility by the Governor, we find two which fall into this rather rough and arbitrary category. In Florida, thanks to the agitation of Bryan and others, a joint resolution was passed by the Florida Legislature disapproving the teaching of evolution and in 1925 a bill was introduced which, however, apparently never came to a vote.[47]

[42] Ibid., p. 160.

[43] Ibid., p. 150.

[44] *Academic Freedom in Minnesota,* Sch. and Soc., 17, Feb. 24, 1923, pp. 215–16. See also article, *Shall Moses or Darwin Rule Minnesota Schools,* Lit. Dig., Jan. 13, 1923, pp. 31–32.

[45] Shipley, M.—*The War on Modern Science,* Knopf, N. Y., 1927, p. 315.

[46] Ibid., p. 301.

[47] Ibid., p. 138–39.

In North Carolina there has been a violent evolution controversy although as yet no bill has received very serious consideration in the legislature. Governor Morrison, however, took it upon himself to oppose the teaching of evolution and got the State Board of Education to remove as texts two books which contained evolutionary doctrines. Furthermore, 47 out of the 111 members of the House voted for the Poole resolution which opposed the teaching of evolution in the schools. The Fundamentalists might have had greater success save for the opposition of such institutions as the University of North Carolina and Wake Forest College.[48]

(5) In another group we find the states in which some degree of repression has been exercised by the Boards of Education. There seemed to be some pressure exerted by the local school boards in Ohio. In Indiana, in 1925, the township trustees of at least one county threatened to discharge a teacher holding Darwinian ideas.[49] During the same year a Kansas school board ordered an offending book burned,[50] and in a number of other localities the opposition to evolutionary teaching has also been violent. In Colorado, a High School principal was discharged for his evolutionary views and there is evidence of considerable intimidation.[51]

The oppressive rôle assumed by the Board of Education has perhaps been more striking in California than in the states just mentioned. Fundamentalist organizations petitioned the State Board of Education in 1925 with the result that a resolution was passed that evolution might be taught as a theory but not as an established fact. A protest against the use of certain text-books resulted in a list of these books being referred to a committee of university presidents for

[48] Ibid., pp. 87–110.
[49] Ibid., p. 317.
[50] Ibid., p. 327.
[51] Ibid., p. 338.

examination. Such a shifting of responsibility soon became unnecessary, however, for in 1926 the Assembly by a majority of 44 gave the Board the right to eliminate any material which they saw fit from the school texts used in the state.[52] After tremendous agitation by Fundamentalist groups an attempt was made to enact into a law the ruling of the Board that evolution should not be taught as a fact. The liberal forces within the state, however, had become thoroughly aroused and the bill was killed in committee on March 15, 1927. During the controversy the Fundamentalists received Presbyterian support, which in other states tended to be scanty. While there was Catholic opposition to evolution, Catholics were not involved in the attack to the same extent as the Protestants. The sinister implication of any attempt to make teaching correspond to special religious doctrines is shown by the partially effective attempt of the Christian Scientists to have certain material removed from text-books. Logically, the next step would be similar demands by Mormons, Theosophists and other religious groups.

(6) Turning to states in which bills were prepared which failed to reach a vote in either house, we find Delaware, New Hampshire and North Dakota on the list and also the Philippine Islands. In each case the bill had slight support and little significance as an index of the strength of Fundamentalism in the respective localities.

(7) The remaining states have a clean slate with respect to the teaching of evolution save for a few minor episodes and include Virginia, New York, Montana, Connecticut, Michigan, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Massachusetts, Iowa, Nebraska, Utah, Arizona, New Mexico, Washington, Idaho, Nevada, Wyoming, Illinois, Vermont, Rhode Island and Pennsylvania.

[52] Ibid., p. 245.

(1) Thus we find three states, Tennessee, Mississippi and Oklahoma, which have passed evolution laws, the first two having laws still in effect. (2) There are four states, Texas, Louisiana, Arkansas, and South Carolina which passed laws in one house. (3) In seven states, Maine, West Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, Kentucky, Missouri and Minnesota, bills were defeated by vote in legislature. (4) In two states, North Carolina and Florida, there have been either resolutions in legislature opposing evolution, or hostile action on the part of the Governor. (5) In five states, Ohio, Indiana, Kansas, Colorado and California, the repressive action of school boards has seemed worthy of mention. (6) In three states, New Hampshire, Delaware and North Dakota as well as the Philippines, anti-evolution bills have been prepared but have not received a vote in legislature. (7) The remaining half of the 48 states have furnished no battle ground for the struggle of religion and science.

It is difficult to prophesy future developments in the warfare of Fundamentalism on science. A Modernist, Dr. Albert C. Dieffenbach, feels that Fundamentalism has won the fight, that dogmas which have been the bane of Protestantism are again triumphant and that the Modernists have lost their leaders. It is claimed that dogmatism is in control of 90 per cent of the people in the denominations and that Fundamentalism has won control of churches with a total membership of more than 30,000,000.[53] Slosson, on the other hand, writing as a scientist rather than a churchman, and interested in scientific freedom rather than the virility of Protestantism, is more optimistic. He points out that the anti-evolution bills brought before twelve state legislatures during the winter and spring of 1926–27 all failed, half of them not even reaching a vote. It is further noted

[53] Dieffenbach, A. C.—*Religious Liberty*, W. Morrow, N. Y., 1927. See Lit. Dig., Nov. 26, 1927, pp. 26–27.

that the Tennessee Supreme Court gave no very clear decision, so that a certain liberty in teaching is still possible. There also has arisen opposition within the Methodist and Baptist churches to the anti-evolution program. With the failure of legislation there may be efforts made, however, in small localities, to prevent the appointment of teachers who would teach evolution.[54]

It is probable that the coercive opposition to science has reached its high water mark and will steadily recede. If science is not completely throttled, if education remains more than a name and if the present means of cultural communication are not destroyed, the retreat of dogmatic religion which has characterized the last thirty years will continue. Doubtless each successive generation will contain a smaller and smaller proportion of aggressive Fundamentalists.

Let us now examine some of the conditions and circumstances which may explain in part the present-day struggle of religion against science.

Causes of Modern Warfare against Science

While it is impossible for us to attempt any complete analysis of the Fundamentalist movement some half-dozen tentative suggestions may be offered.

(1) It may be noted that Fundamentalism is a product of a marginal culture, that is to say, a culture relatively isolated in space from a center of cultural diffusion and a culture recently modified in respect to time. Western Europe may be considered the culture center from which evolutionary doctrines were diffused. Just as the impact of a stone in a quiet pond sends out ripples in all directions where flow is possible, so the waves of Darwinian doctrine spread to Continental Europe and to the north-eastern part of the

[54] Slosson, E. E.—*Legislation Against the Teaching of Evolution,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XXIV: 5, May, 1927, pp. 473–477.

United States. Thanks to channels of migration and of culture communication connecting the Eastern with the Central and Western States in the North, the evolutionary culture complex diffused rather quickly to these areas. Such was not the fate of the Eastern and Central States of the South since they were isolated in part by the Appalachian Mountains and by the political and economic circumstances connected with the Civil War. In regard to temporal aspects it may be noted that many of the Southern States in which Fundamentalism has its strongest hold were settled comparatively recently compared with the Eastern States and, while older in civilization than the West, they have been in less direct culture contact with the East. The significant fact, then, is that the evolutionary culture complex has but recently diffused to the South. Its waves are now crumbling the sand castles of Protestant dogma in that region while in less marginal cultural areas such structures were either washed away or replaced by edifices of sterner stuff decades ago. Were it not for the evaluational implications the above interpretation might be summarized by echoing the statement of the man on the street in a Northern city to the effect that certain of the Southern States, "are twenty years behind the times."

An objection may be raised to the above interpretation on the ground that centers of Catholic strength are to be found close to the center of diffusion of the evolutionary culture complex. It is perhaps sufficient answer to point out that some conflict did take place but subsided, leaving the church but little affected, thanks to its great age and strength, its wisdom in avoiding a direct conflict, its character as a "mystery religion" based on rites and sacraments, and its refusal to lean upon the broken reed of an infallible Bible.

(2) As has been previously hinted, the stronghold of Fundamentalism is an area of poverty and ignorance. The

poverty is partly due to the effects of the Civil War and partly to the nature of the natural resources. However caused, it makes difficult the attainment of adequate educational facilities and, it may be argued, the resulting ignorance in turn breeds poverty. An examination of a list of states ranked in order of their per capita wealth by the National Industrial Conference Board on the basis of 1925 figures reveals a striking fact.[55] The eleven states at the bottom of the list arranged in ascending order of per capita wealth are Alabama, Mississippi, Georgia, South Carolina, Arkansas, Kentucky, Oklahoma, North Carolina, Tennessee, Louisiana and Texas. Reference to our preceding survey shows that these are the very states in which the most strenuous efforts were made to throttle the teaching of evolution. It is interesting to note that the percentages of illiteracy among the white native-born of native-born parents in the above states are: Alabama, 6.4, Mississippi, 3.6, Georgia, 5.5, South Carolina, 6.6, Arkansas, 4.6, Kentucky, 7.3, Oklahoma, 2.4, North Carolina, 8.2, Tennessee, 7.4, Louisiana, 11.4, Texas, 2.2. The figure for the United States population taken as a whole is only 2.5.[56]

While the story told by these few statistics is impressive it is not the whole story, for it no doubt occurs to the reader that Fundamentalists are to be found in states neither poor nor afflicted with a high rate of illiteracy.

(3) We must recognize the influence of the war and the conspicuous development of crowd behavior and crowd thought which followed and was perhaps caused by that conflict in which propaganda was shown to be mightier than the machine gun. Men have always banded themselves together to release their inhibitions, to exalt their egos, to share their common delusions, and to hate their foes, real or imaginary, but with the development of modern means

[55] Lit. Dig., Dec. 31, 1927, p. 50.

[56] *U. S. Census,* 1920.

of communication, they have become even more prone to such behavior. The American people rose in their might to hate the Germans, then the Bolsheviks, the pacifists, and all who were thought to menace White-Protestant-Americanism. It is perhaps unnecessary to assume a psychological theory of stored-up hatred to see a genetic relation between these various movements. When men are used to joining in such a crowd as is constituted by a nation at war, or by the Ku Klux Klan, it is easy for them to embark upon a Fundamentalist Crusade to drive evolution from the schools. Obviously, little shift of position was necessary for men to turn their interest from the Klan to Fundamentalism.

(4) This brings us to the fourth suggestion, that much of the motive power of Fundamentalism is to be found in its leaders. There is reason to question the sincerity of some of them, for crude economic motives may be detected here and there. One cannot but wonder whether Aimee Semple MacPherson would work quite so arduously in the Lord's Vineyard were it not for the substantial monetary concomitants of her labors.[57] The same might be said for Clarke. Direct egoistic motives are of course obvious. Such are to be found in Bryan, Norris and others. It is significant that the South abounds in half-starved evangelistic preachers, as ignorant as the flock which they presume to lead and yet eager for gain and for notoriety. Professional evangelists are of course to be found in the North and often not lacking in prosperity. In Mr. Bryan, according to Smith, we find a distrust of human nature, optimism as to divine guidance, and a glorification of emotion as over against intellect.[58]

It is this last suggestion that is extremely significant, for

[57] Comstock, Sarah.—*Aimee Semple MacPherson,* Harpers, Dec., 1927, p. 11.

[58] Smith, T. V.—*Bases of Bryanism,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XVI: 5, May, 1923, pp. 505–13.

the exaltation of faith over reason is the essence of Fundamentalism. Says Bryan, "Religion is a matter of the heart, and the impulses of the heart often seem foolish to the mind." And again, "I fear the plutocracy of wealth, I respect the aristocracy of learning, but I thank God for the democracy of the heart. It is upon the heart level that we meet, it is by the characteristics of the heart that we best know and remember each other." Bryan and his followers find the ways of the heart pleasant ways and smooth to the feet withal. Such ways are not harassed by strange ideas; all is familiar and habitual. Above all, the agony of thought is banished, for effort is replaced by faith. Acquaintance with other writings of Bryan makes it impossible to accept his respect for the aristocracy of learning. Rather he and his followers are compensating for their own ignorance and emotionalism by sneering at the intellectuals. It will be recalled how Bryan sneered at Conklin and Osborn during the controversy in the New York *Times*. He had been blocked again and again in his political ambitions by the urban intellectuals and it is only natural that he should lead a compensatory revolt of the poorly educated folk of the rural districts against those whom he liked to regard as intellectual snobs.

(5) It should be recognized that the intellectuals or at least the scientists are perhaps somewhat at fault for the distrust of intelligence felt by the millions whose "warm hearts throb throughout the country." There has, perhaps, been a divorce between head and heart because the scientists have gone too far ahead of the common people, the people of Mr. Bryan and Mr. Riley, to command their confidence and their support. "Walk from the people and you walk into the night," is an old saying which has elements of profound truth. While it is unfortunately true that popularization often means vulgarization, yet it is probable that the scientist for his own safety and freedom will have to take

some pains to maintain contact with the mass of people on whom, in a political democracy with a system of education supported in large part by taxation, he is more or less dependent. It is also perhaps regrettable that the domestic disagreements of the scientists concerning the *method and process* of evolution should have been allowed by them to be interpreted as lack of unanimity as to the *fact* of evolution.

(6) Finally, a certain tribute should be paid to moral earnestness as a factor basic to the Fundamentalist movement. There are many sincere Fundamentalists who are firmly convinced that dogmatic religion is necessarily linked with morality, thus sharing with Bryan his lack of confidence in human nature. The changing *mores* are viewed with great apprehension and are attributed to a decline in the old faith. When rumors of the social life at the universities drift back to the small towns it is natural to connect the wildness of the younger generation with growth of atheism. When an Association for the Advancement of Atheism seeks a charter and is rumored to have some influence upon undergraduate thought in the colleges, it is inevitable that the conservative religionists should show concern that is not dissipated by the fact that a charter was refused to this organization.[59] Neither does the refusal of a charter to the American Anti-Bible Society remove all apprehension on the part of those who identify acceptance of Biblical guidance with morality.[60] Doubtless the recent report that High School students laugh at the minister, and have rarely any intention of entering that profession will confirm many people in their sense of alarm in spite of the absurdly unscientific way in which material was gathered for this report.[61]

[59] Lit. Dig., Nov. 14, 1925, p. 34.

[60] Lit. Dig., Oct. 8, 1927, p. 34.

[61] Flowers, M.—*What Young America Is Thinking,* World's Work, Aug., 1927, pp. 437–447.

The Fundamentalists, then, are worried at the morality of this "jazz age" and identify sound morals with sound religion. They erect a structure which is an organic whole and which for them either stands or falls as a unit. Religion, morality, citizenship, for them constitute a dike barring the flood of atheism, immorality and crime. Once a hole is made, nothing can stop the rushing waters from enlarging it until the whole structure disappears in crashing ruin. They have placed themselves in a position which can only end in disillusionment, for they have connected their most cherished ideals with dogmas that sooner or later must perish before rationalistic criticism.

There is, however, a grain of truth in the stand they have taken against the Modernists who so glibly reconcile evolution and religion. They are right in realizing that one retreat of religion before the hosts of science leads to another, until God becomes cosmic energy rather than a Divine Father watching over human affairs and approachable by prayer. They want a personal God, an immortal soul, a super-rational sanction for conduct, and fear the loneliness of a universe of infinite time and space ruled by impersonal forces heedless of man's longings and man's despairs. Furthermore, there is some validity to their claim that they should not pay taxes to have cherished and sacred beliefs destroyed. Their program is blind and in either failure or success of its realization will work harm upon them. Yet the Fundamentalists know what they want and there is no disputing the clarity of their purpose, however much one may question the desirable effects of its attainment upon others and upon themselves. If they want to strangle science, the goose that has laid them many a golden egg, it is their affair, although other beneficiaries have equal right to struggle to keep so valuable a bird alive.

Chapter XIV

RELIGIOUS REACTIONS TO THE MODERN WORLD

The Effect of Science on Religious Groupings.—The steady march of scientific discovery and invention has created a new heaven and a new earth, an industrial civilization differing in a thousand ways from the simpler societies in which the religion of the Western World took form. It was inevitable that there be some adjustment on the part of religion to the new conditions, and part of that adjustment we have traced in the preceding discussion of the conflict between science and religion. Likewise, we have discussed the trend towards religious differentiation but without stress upon the rôle of science as a cause of schisms and realignments among religious organizations. We must now face the task of considering specifically the differential theological reactions to the new age of science.

Obviously an unlimited number of theological groupings might be made, but we may content ourselves with the fivefold classification suggested by Randall.[1]

Catholics

First, we have the Catholic Church, old and wise, still standing firm after nearly two thousand years of wars and conquests, having watched nations rise to glory and sink to

[1] Randall, J. H.—*The Making of the Modern Mind,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, p. 522.

decay and having faced the vast changes, economic, social and intellectual, brought by the passing years. With the rise of rationalism in the eighteenth century, a readjustment was necessary on the part of the church. This adjustment could take the form of resolute opposition, an attempt to find a new basis of intellectual harmony or a shifting of interest to mundane problems created by the new industrial order. The Catholic Church showed all of these reactions, but that of opposition was predominant.

When John Newman turned his marvelously subtle mind from the service of the Oxford Movement within the Anglican Church to Catholicism he was able to point the way to a justification of an unchanging church. Always convinced from childhood of the presence of immaterial reality about him, he refused to admit that difficulties in justification of the orthodox faith should logically lead to doubt that these difficulties could be answered. He pointed out that no one even knows of the real nature of substance or matter and that since religion deals with matters beyond the range of verifiable experience it must of necessity make pronouncements which are mysterious to the human intellect. While he does not attempt to prove the existence of God he considers his faith justified on the basis of probability. Thanks to the voice of his conscience, he has as much awareness and certainty of God as he has confidence derived from his senses in the uniformity of nature. Just as scientific knowledge is derived from sense data organized by the intellect, so is religious knowledge based upon the inner feelings of the heart intellectually interpreted. He is keenly aware of the lack in Protestantism of any principle of authority since the Bible itself was selected by a council of the Catholic Church. His certainty, then, of God's existence, and his conviction that man's misery must mean that the human race has been cast off from his presence led to his

belief in a miraculous revelation and an infallible church erected to guard the faith and guide an erring people to salvation. He argues that the Catholic Church is the true and growing church since it preserved the central religious idea, the continuity of its principles, and slowly assimilated new truth. It showed logical sequence, stages anticipatory of those to follow and, finally, conserved not only its antecedent thought but also its chronic vigor.

It is not claimed that Newman determined in any sense the Catholic reaction to the modern world, but at least he gave a philosophic justification for a policy of opposition that is typical of many such apologetics.[2]

While the Catholic Church has not come in violent conflict with evolutionary thought, insisting as it does merely upon the introduction of an immortal soul somewhere in the biological process, it has insisted upon its authority in matters of faith and morals and has opposed most modern intellectual tendencies. Under Pius IX was proclaimed the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception in 1854. In 1864, the *Syllabus of Errors* was presented and in 1869, the new dogma of Papal Infallibility in official decrees dealing with faith and morals. In the *Syllabus of Errors* there is condemnation of naturalism, rationalism, freedom of choice of religion, non-secretarian education, the separation of church and state, and of the contention, "that the Roman Pontiff can and ought to reconcile himself to, and agree with, progress, liberalism and contemporary civilization." [3]

Under the more enlightened leadership of Leo XIII there arose, however, a group of liberal thinkers within the church such as Loisy, Blondel, Leroy, Schell and Tyrell who

[2] Shafer, Robert—*Christianity and Naturalism,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1926, pp. 70–120.

[3] Randall, J. H.—*The Making of the Modern Mind,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, pp. 529–532.

accepted Biblical criticism and evolution and demanded more freedom within the church from absolute authority. Under Pius X this movement known as Modernism met with a crushing denunciation, Loisy and Tyrell were excommunicated and the principle of authority was declared supreme. Thus for the present, the Catholic Church has taken its stand officially opposed to many of the tendencies and implications of modern science but doubtless harboring many members who discreetly hold to Modernist views.

Fundamentalists

The second group which may be identified is that of the Fundamentalists. The reaction of this group to modern science is very similar to that of the Catholic Church and the similarity of their attitudes to those of the Catholics perhaps justifies calling them with Hartt, the Non-Papal, in contrast to the Papal-Fundamentalists.[4] The Fundamentalists rely upon authority, although in their case the Bible rather than the church, and like the Catholics favor a reunion of church and State. Both set their faces sternly against the implications of modern science, although on the part of the Fundamentalists with less dignity than in the case of the Catholic Church with its venerable age, its ancient ritual and its ability to command love and respect even from its children who are torn by doubts and fears born of contact with modern science.[5] It is Non-Papal Fundamentalism which has been described in connection with the recent conflict of science and religion and therefore this group requires no further analysis at this point.

[4] Hartt, R. L.—*The Disruption of Protestantism,* The Forum, Nov., 1925, p. 680.

[5] Baldwin, S.—*The Crucifixion of the Catholic Mind,* Atlantic Monthly, Aug., 1927, p. 178.

Liberals

A third group, characterized by a more receptive attitude toward the intellectual drift of modern times, may be called the Liberals. It is hard to over-exaggerate the significance of the liberal movement within the various denominations; in fact, it has been appropriately referred to as a "New Reformation." In almost any church throughout the country may be found men sitting in the same pew who are as far apart as the poles on every important theological doctrine. It is unlikely that men can long remain as pew mates who differ more in regard to the Virgin Birth, Divinity of Christ, Resurrection of the Dead, and other matters than do the most widely separated religious sects. Science has inserted a wedge which will surely split the Protestant denominations asunder and, for the time being at least, make more obvious what Parrish calls, "The Chimera of Church Unity." [6] The situation will for a time be painful, for not only the local churches but also organizations like the Y. M. C. A., the Christian Endeavor, the missionary societies, the Sunday School boards, the sectarian charitable organizations and the theological seminaries will be torn in greater or less degree. Hartt prophesies with considerable plausibility that there will be litigation. "Property is at stake—land, buildings, and enormous trust funds. Who shall have them—the Fundamentalists or the Liberals?" [7]

It is significant that at the present time Liberal ministers are preaching to congregations that are half Liberal and half Fundamentalist with the result that they are constantly

[6] Parrish, H.—*The Chimera of Church Unity,* Harpers, Nov., 1927, pp. 661–670.

[7] Hartt, R. L.—*The Disruption of Protestantism,* The Forum, Nov., 1925, p. 680.

forced to evade issues, to conceal their true opinions with consequent loss in constructive leadership and in self-respect. With a clean break of the Liberals and the Fundamentalists, the former will be free to attempt a rational adjustment of religion to modern science.

The Liberals have already attempted this adjustment of Christianity to the modern world and in some cases have made such a radical adjustment that it constitutes a transformation of, rather than a development from, earlier forms. In general there is a tendency to acceptance of Biblical criticism which demonstrates the hopelessly contradictory statements and accounts and reduces the Bible to a body of mythology, poetry, history, law and ethics written by different authors at different times. Of beauty, of inspiration and of lofty ethical teaching there remains much for the Liberal, but of revelation, little or none. It follows from this attitude that miracles are rejected and stress laid upon divine inspiration of religious leaders rather than on revelations made to them.

The old doctrines of special creation are rejected in favor of evolutionary concepts and of belief in divine will working through natural law. The entire universe is conceived as the expression of some great Cosmic Force surging upward toward perfection and harmony. The Liberal finds an aid to the Christian faith in evolution, for it solves in part the age-old problem of evil in a world made and controlled by a good and omnipotent God. If evil exists it is because the evolutionary process has not yet carried the world and man close to that "far off Divine event towards which the whole Creation moves."

Dean Inge like many other Liberals accepts the doctrine of creative evolution and sees purpose in all nature, hardly as conceived by those arguing from design for the existence

of God, but a creative force continually producing forms, not previously existing.[8]

The venerable doctrine of divine immanence dating back to ancient Egypt and perhaps to the mana concept of preliterate men is revived in various forms. It is especially argued that the soul of man with its capacity for love, devotion, and moral choice is divine and is the culmination of a divine process. From this point of view everything is miracle and nothing is miracle, Jesus was human and yet divine in his preëminent humanity. All nobility in literature, in the life of man, is divine and partakes of immortality as does beauty in nature. Occasionally the Liberal point of view approaches the pantheism of Spinoza and the panpsychism of Fichte.

The reaction of a certain group of Liberals is essentially aesthetic. In the group of Modernists among the Catholics, in the High Church Party of the Anglican Church, in the writings of men like Santayana and Renan, we find combined with an antipathy for supernaturalism a profound appreciation of the splendor, the dignity, solemnity, and beauty of religious rites and ceremonies. The most sceptical and rationalistic of men cannot but be impressed by the dim light from arching stained-glass windows, the sonorous chants intoned in a half-forgotten tongue, the perfume of unseen censers, the stately march of white-robed priests and by soft music stealing down the aisles of some cathedral. Comte was well aware of man's emotional cravings when he gave such a large place to ritual in his *Religion of Humanity*. Dean Sperry points out for civilized peoples as does Malinowski for the Trobriand Islanders the function of ritual independent of belief as a means of dealing with the crises of life. According to Sperry, religion is, "The formal

[8] Inge, W.—in *Science, Religion and Reality*, J. Needham, Ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 367.

organization of the constant major episodes of common human experience into a social whole," and the first and last end of the church is "the organization and the conduct of public worship." [9] Worship may be practiced for its aesthetic value long after belief has fled.

Another aspect of the Liberal point of view is the stress upon moral idealism, the amelioration of misery here below and the establishment of the Kingdom of God on earth. This trend toward a social Christianity is not entirely restricted to the Liberals and therefore will be discussed later as a general movement.

Before turning to a brief mention of the last two groups in the present religious situation we may ask the question, "Are the Liberals content with their present faith?" The answer, for some of them at least, is "No." The challenge of science to the old doctrines has come so suddenly and on so wide a front that it would be amazing if all who rank as Liberals had attained complete serenity of soul.[10] Liberals were forced of necessity to reject the God described so vividly by Mark Twain in *The Mysterious Stranger*. "A God who mouths justice and invented hell . . . mouths mercy and invented hell; who mouths morals to other people and has none himself; who frowns upon crimes, yet commits them all; who created man without invitation, then tries to shuffle the responsibility for man's acts upon man, instead of honorably placing it where it belongs upon himself; and finally with altogether divine obtuseness, invites this poor, abused slave to worship him!" Nevertheless, on the part of many there is a vague longing for the Friend behind phenomena. Unlike Winston who has seen the "noose of Darwin" press the "neck of orthodoxy" and has yet escaped

[9] Sperry, W. L.—*Reality in Worship,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1925.

[10] Haydon, A. E.—*Modernism as a World-Wide Movement,* Jr. of Rel., Vol. V, Jan., 1925, pp. 1–13.

to find God in the life process and in the universe, beauty, hope, and a moral order, many remain lonely and afraid.[11] One of these is the biographer, Bradford, as he himself confesses in a recent article.[12] God for him has become so distant that worship is meaningless and both the labored rationalizations of the theologians and the cheery gospel of social salvation give but hollow satisfaction to his personal craving. An anonymous writer in the *Atlantic Monthly* gives a similar account of his spiritual yearnings and his conviction of the failure of Liberalism.[13] He points out the amorphous character of Modernism, the divergences within it, its failure to take a stand against the war, its tendency to live on the stored-up capital of the associations that cluster around traditional Christianity, its evasion of vital issues and the emptiness of its social gospel. Of this last he says, "I have no desire to minimize its past achievements or future possibilities. But out of much experience I am compelled to assert that this social gospel, at least in America, has made little impression upon the working class, among whom Christianity had its origin; that it has made no original contribution to social theory; and that it has not so much reinterpreted Jesus to our time as weakened the staggering challenge of His teaching to a generation which finds His utter unconcern in the processes of production and distribution well-nigh incomprehensible." Still another writer in a similar vein urges the ambiguity of the Christian teaching even when stripped from secondary dogmas and, in view of the simple age for which these teachings were intended,

[11] Winston, R. W.—*The Noose of Darwin and the Neck of Orthodoxy,* Jr. Soc. Forces, Vol. III: 1, Nov., 1924, pp. 111–117.

[12] Bradford, G.—*Darwin the Destroyer,* Harpers, Sept., 1926.

[13] *The Modernist's Quest for God,* Atlantic Monthly, Feb., 1926, p. 228 ff. Also Lit. Dig., Feb. 20, 1926, p. 32.

is not surprised at the frequent conflict between profession and practice of even liberal Christianity.[14]

Religious Radicals

A fourth group which differs only in degree from the Liberals might for the want of a better name be called the Religious Radicals. Within this category would fall certain Unitarian groups, the Positivist Religion of Humanity, the German Monists, the Ethical Culture Societies and perhaps the Hicksite Quakers, as well as radical individuals either within more conservative denominations or quite without formal religious affiliation. Their doctrines as a rule tend to resemble those of the Liberals save that their break with traditional Christianity is more nearly complete.

The religious sceptics and the indifferent are not included in the above groups for they have no unified faith and require no further discussion here.

Future Relations of Religious Groups

The question now arises as to the probable future relations of the Catholics, the Fundamentalists, the Liberals, the Radicals and the group of sceptical and indifferent individuals. Certainly the Fundamentalists have, in general, a strong opposition to Papal control and yet they have much in common with the Catholics. Both groups accept a dogmatic theology and the principle of authority and both favor, at least by implication, a union of Church and State. It is conceivable that in time the prophecy made by Hartt will come true and a drift of Fundamentalists into the Catholic fold will take place.[15] Certainly, in view of the identification

[14] Powers, H. H.—*A Question for Christians,* Atlantic Monthly, Apr., 1923, p. 458 ff.

[15] Hartt, R. L.—*The Disruption of Protestantism,* Forum, Nov., 1925, p. 683.

of the Fundamentalists with the Ku Klux Klan in many places and the Klan's hostility to the Catholics, such a tendency will not be manifested immediately. There is reason to think that a movement to quite a different extreme is more likely. The "all or none principle" of the Fundamentalists will inevitably drive individuals who cannot swallow certain monstrous absurdities which acceptance of a literal interpretation of the Bible would demand, into the ranks of agnosticism and atheism.

In spite of the power of the Fundamentalists, the Liberals have education, wealth and dignity on their side and, once the break is made with the Fundamentalists, are likely to join forces with the Religious Radicals to form a more or less unified liberal body of considerable strength and prestige. The separation from the Fundamentalists will allow a more frank expression of liberal views and a further growth in the direction of liberalism. There will be not only an approximate similarity of views to those of the Radicals but there will also be a strong bond of moral idealism and a common interest in social reform. Thus there is the prospect of three strong religious groups, the Catholics, the Fundamentalists, and the Liberals, maintaining their existence in spite of the ever-growing numbers of the sceptical and indifferent. A complete merging of the Catholics and the Fundamentalists is incredible for it would mean a reversal of a historic process in a manner which rarely if ever occurs. The separation of the three groups upon the basis of well-defined issues might create better feeling, for members of one group would be less inclined to regard others as heretics or enemies working from within.

Nevertheless, there is no reason to depart from the scepticism in regard to religious unity which marked the preceding discussion of religious differentiation. There is no denying the chaos of the present time or the probability that

within the general groups of Liberals and Fundamentalists there will be distintegrating sectarian differences for many years to come.

The reaction of all four of the religious groups which have been distinguished above to the modern world includes an inclination of interest toward moral and social problems; in a word to social Christianity. This type of reaction is especially marked among the Liberals and Radicals and constitutes one of the chief bonds of solidarity between them.

Chapter XV

SOCIAL CHRISTIANITY

In one sense social Christianity as a body of thought and a mode of life goes back to the early years of the Christian era. An outstanding feature of modern social Christianity is the attempt to revive these ancient ideals of brotherhood, love and service. Even during the Middle Ages despite the mighty ecclesiastical organization that overshadowed the simple teachings of Jesus there was some interest in charity and service to the poor and oppressed.

The Rise of Social Christianity

In the middle of the nineteenth century the profound misery of the English working classes which came in the train of the Industrial Revolution stirred men like Maurice and Kingsley to a promulgation of Christian Socialism. In the United States a similar movement took place a few decades later. It was anticipated by the interest of prominent ministers in the slavery question and was furthered by the decline of orthodoxy and the rise of new social problems with the industrial revolution that came after the Civil War. Seeley advocated a return to the principles of Christ. Washington Gladden early came to the idea that the true function of the church was a social one and expressed the conviction that Christian rules should be applied to all phases of life, including political and economic problems. Gladden was interested in philanthropy, temperance and the spreading of the Christian spirit as the regenerating force in society. The

voluminous literature of the period produced by the busy pens of a considerable number of clergymen stressed the necessity for a return to the religion of Christ and the importance of right living rather than mere ritual. Again and again we find criticism of the lack of social teaching to be found in sermons. Says O'Brien, "Thus the clergy and the church 'went in for' social reform, etc., not only because of the inward recognition of the need for and desire to ameliorate conditions but because current criticism both within and without the ranks pointed out the inadequacy of remaining aloof, and the Christianity of positive activity." [1]

In 1907 appeared a book by Walter Rauschenbusch, *Christianity and the Social Crisis,* which constituted for many followers a veritable handbook of the social gospel. This writer sees the beginnings of social Christianity in the Hebrew prophets which were followed by Christ's own teaching of social morality as superior to ritual. In primitive Christianity he finds the ideals and incentives for a social reconstruction of the modern social order. For him these ideals were merely obscured for several centuries by the growth of other-worldliness, asceticism, sacramentalism, and ecclesiastical dogma. In the present crisis resulting from the Industrial Revolution with its depression of a large mass of workers, physical deterioration, unequal distribution of wealth, crumbling of political democracy and tainting of the moral atmosphere, social Christianity is necessary to prevent disaster. He sends forth an appeal to the Christian Church to raise the banner of the social gospel and to lead mankind to the promised land of a mildly socialistic Kingdom of God on earth.[2]

[1] O'Brien, J. F.—*The Socialization of the Church,* Jr. Soc. Forces, Vol. II: 5, Sept., 1924, pp. 700–702.

[2] Rauschenbusch, W.—*Christianity and the Social Crisis,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1914.

In a later book he is even more specific in his demand for reconstruction of our modern economic system based as it is upon ruthless competition and characterized by extreme inequalities in the distribution of wealth.[3] In the writings of Harry F. Ward we find enthusiastic acceptance of the teachings of Rauschenbusch. Ward echoes the plea for social reform, coöperation, unity, and a return to the simple ideals of Jesus.[4] Sherwood Eddy, Kirby Page and a host of other enthusiasts are crusading to save the world from capitalism, militarism, injustice, and oppression. Along with these radical leaders must be noted a number of liberal churchmen influenced in greater or less degree by social Christianity.

Nature and Aims of Social Christianity

In view of the lack of any identity of point of view among the apostles of social Christianity, it is difficult to present any clear statement of the aims of the movement. Certain of these aims, however, are incorporated in the statement of social principles in a report presented to the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. Here we find a demand for justice regardless of social rank, protection of the family by a single standard of morals, uniform divorce laws and the like, full development for every child, abolition of child labor, protection of women in industry, prevention of poverty, protection against the liquor traffic, health protection in industry, protection against unemployment, provision for old age, right of organization for both employees and employers but with means of conciliation and arbitration, one day of rest in seven, reduction of hours of labor, and a living wage. Finally, there is

[3] Rauschenbusch, W.—*Christianizing the Social Order,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1919.

[4] Ward, Harry F.—*Social Evangelism,* Missionary Educational Movement, U. S. and Canada, N. Y., 1915.

demanded "a new emphasis upon the application of Christian principles to the acquisition and use of property, and for the most equitable division of the product of industry that can ultimately be devised." [5] The task of the church is interpreted by Macfarland partly in the light of social Christianity and he is stirred by a glorious vision as he proclaims, "When the task is completed and the Church becomes the conscience, the interpreter, and the guide of the social order, and when the spiritual authority which she possesses is translated into one common tongue and her voices become one mighty voice, the gates of hell shall no longer prevail against her, and she will be no longer weak and helpless before the haggard, sullen, and defiant face of injustice, inhumanity, and heartless neglect, and she will be able to take care of all her children—and her children are humanity." [6]

The question arises in the mind of the student of religion contemplating a program of social Christianity as to how mundane and how devoid of supernaturalism a religion may become and still be a religion. Does Christianity after the projection into the universe of certain social ideals of love, service and brotherhood as supreme values and the striving for the realization of these ideals in society still merit application of the term religion? Certainly it is a far cry from an animal sacrifice on the part of an Ekoi tribesman in propitiation of an ancestral ghost, or from the vision-quest of a Winnebago youth to the agitation on the part of some idealist for a child-labor amendment. Leuba, for one, would deny that consciousness of supreme values is a religious attitude, thus standing in opposition to writers like Höffding, Ames and King. Otherwise, he argues there

[5] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Progress of Christian Federation to 1922*, Revell, N. Y., 1921, pp. 83–84.

[6] Ibid., p. 24.

would be an, "identification of morality with religion, as well as the obliteration of the radical distinction that exists between magic and religion." [7] Magic practiced for the group would then become identical with religion and furthermore, the elimination of the conception of a personal superhuman power, which for Leuba is the very core of religion, would render the term religion meaningless. For exact thinking it would be necessary to devise another word to indicate a system of thought and feeling with reference to such a superhuman and personal power. There is much cogency in Leuba's objection to admitting into the sacred sphere of religion a social Christianity which has dispensed with the idea of a personal and approachable God.

Nevertheless religion is separated from allied spheres quantitatively rather than qualitatively. It is a matter of degree. Orthodox religion shades into social Christianity and into the Comtean worship of humanity by imperceptible gradations. These culture patterns have much in common. In regard to the belief phase we find that an ideal of Christian love implies almost as much objective reality as the formless *elan vital* of the philosophers, although less than the Winnebago conception of Earthmaker, Thunderbird and other spirits. Certainly the doctrine of divine emanation differs but slightly from the belief in a non-personal power *wakan* on the part of the Winnebago Indian. On the emotional side there are also similarities, for the reverence of the social Christian for his sacred cause resembles that of the Winnebago for his guardian spirit and for the instructions and powers which have been conferred upon him during his vision experience. Finally, there are similarities in the behavior or ritual phase, although perhaps less marked. If we will but call to our mind a picture of a

[7] Leuba, J.—*The Meaning of "Religion" and the Place of Mysticism in Religious Life,* Jr. of Philosophy, Vol. XVIII: 3, Feb. 3, 1921, p. 57.

Winnebago Medicine Dance ceremony, with the blanketed tribesmen sitting around the lodge singing their songs, making their prayers and constantly assuring one another of the efficacy of their efforts to obtain blessings, we are haunted by a vague sense of familiarity. Perhaps it is merely that we are reminded of a gathering of social Christians exhorting one another to stand firmly for the sacred cause which cannot fail if men will but become touched with the spirit of love and press onward from reform to reform until mankind is at last blessed with a Kingdom of Heaven on earth from which human ills are forever banished. The degree, however, to which social Christianity resembles culture patterns which are undeniably religious depends upon the type of social Christianity under consideration. We can, perhaps, usefully distinguish between Catholic, Fundamentalist, and Liberal social Christianity.

Catholic Social Christianity

As previously hinted, for all the conservatism of the Catholic Church, in its reaction to the modern world it is not without leanings in the direction of social Christianity. From time immemorial the church has concerned itself with the practical expression of the principles of justice and charity. According to Father Ryan, "The discouragement of slavery and serfdom, the insistence upon risk and labor as the chief claims to economic rewards, the doctrine of the just price, the regulations and ideals of the guilds concerning labor organization, good workmanship, reasonable hours, provision against sickness, etc., were the medieval expression of the traditional doctrine." [8]

Shortly after Bishop Ketteler set forth a program of

[8] Ryan, J. A.—*The Teaching of the Catholic Church,* The Annals of the Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, p. 76.

social legislation in Germany, Pope Leo XIII issued his great encyclical *On the Condition of Labor.* In this document he condemns socialism but asserts the guidance of religion in economic matters as a sanction for justice and responsibility and the necessity for more than a lip service to Christian principles. More specifically, he advocates a living wage, right of organization, state intervention to protect some group or class otherwise defenceless, and encouragement of ownership so that there may be a wider diffusion of wealth. In view of the prestige and unity of the Catholic Church such pronouncements doubtless have a certain moral effect although the equally sincere and dignified efforts toward peace made by the Pope during the war were of no avail. It should be noted that in spite of the disapproval of socialism indicated in the encyclical and in the *Syllabus of Errors* there is a strong socialistic movement within the Catholic Church.

In America, Catholic movement toward social Christianity is chiefly furthered by the activities of the National Catholic Welfare Council under the leadership of Father Ryan and others. The program of this body is based on principles set forth by the bishops who administered the National Catholic Welfare Council and a Pastoral Letter dealing with industrial relations.[9] In general there is advocated the right to a living wage, the right of labor organization, the desirability of arbitration, the establishment of works councils, social legislation, including minimum-wage laws and social insurance and a partial restoration of the Guild System. The Welfare Council has engaged in educational work of various kinds, has protested against open-shop agitation and has occasionally investigated particular

[9] McGowan, R. A.—*The Program and Activities of the National Catholic Welfare Council,* The Annals of the Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, pp. 130–133.

industrial disputes. Ryan has buttressed his plea for a living wage with a valuable study of wages in relation to cost of living.[10] Recently Catholic principles similar to those mentioned above have been vigorously set forth with special reference to the recent Colorado coal strike.[11]

It is not our purpose to indulge in extensive evaluations of any religious group or movement, since such evaluations must of necessity be made with reference to purely personal standards. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine whether a movement should be identified with ideas, activities, or individuals and whether the ideas, activities, or individuals selected for comment are typical of the entire movement. Nevertheless, it is perhaps permissible to raise a few questions as to the ultimate efficacy of Catholic social Christianity.

The demand for a living family wage always suggests the question of the size of the family that should be so provided. In view of the Catholic attitude in regard to birth control it may be questioned whether their legislative program will have great effect upon the elimination of poverty. There is perhaps some truth in the claim that the Catholic attitude in regard to sex matters is tinged with obscurantism. It is difficult to conceive of Catholic social Christianity making any great sacrifice of conventional ethics for the sake of even a constructive social reform. It is by no means certain that Catholic social work and Catholic social reform programs have a sound scientific basis but, as we shall see, that does not always distinguish Catholic from other varieties of social Christianity. Finally, Catholic influence upon politics is not always thrown in favor of the most constructive measures, and greater enlightenment of both voters and leaders is necessary before any far-sighted

[10] Ryan, J. A.—*The Living Wage,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1906.
[11] Lit. Dig., Dec. 17, 1927, p. 31.

social programs will be effectively furthered. The Catholic reaction to the proposed child-labor amendment is perhaps a case in point.[12]

Fundamentalist Social Christianity

It is possible to identify a Fundamentalist variety of social Christianity, although it is not easy to distinguish it from that of the Liberals, since both Liberals and Fundamentalists are to be found within the same denomination. In general the Fundamentalist conception of the Kingdom of God on earth is a stern Puritan theocracy in which virtue is a product of coercion. While admitting the possibility that prohibition may be justified despite its close approach to a type of repressive sumptuary legislation, yet it is contended that in the entire temperance movement the Fundamentalist social Christians have shown great readiness to coerce their fellows by law into the paths of virtue. It is hard to overestimate the pressure which was brought to bear in favor of prohibition with the establishment in 1917 of united temperance organizations, the National Temperance Society and the Commission on Temperance of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America. They had great influence with the federal authorities in determining policies in dealing with troops and were able to capitalize effectively the popular interest in wartime health and fitness.[13]

As Pezet has clearly shown, the temporal power of Fundamentalist social Christianity at the present time is very great.[14] The Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition

[12] Sargent, Kate.—*Catholicism in Massachusetts,* The Forum, Oct., 1925, pp. 521–532, and Nov., 1925, pp. 730–742.

[13] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Progress of Church Federation to 1922,* Revell, N. Y., 1921, pp. 89–94.

[14] Pezet, W.—*The Temporal Power of Evangelism,* The Forum, Oct., 1926, pp. 481–491.

and Public Morals is claimed to represent fifteen millions of people whose interests are furthered with the aid of a separate building and the presence of several members of the board in legislature. The board issues clipsheets concerning matters of morals to some twenty thousand ministers and then, according to Pezet, lobbies for the opinion which it has itself created. He remarks: "The Board admits that it exercises influence with regard to legislation bearing upon public morals. Within this category we find the Board active and interested in Prohibition in all its aspects and endless ramifications; in Sunday closing laws; in censorship of moving pictures, theaters, books, and periodicals; in the drug traffic; in gambling; in education; in child labor; in white slave traffic; in marriage and divorce. In all such matters its point of view is the Methodist point of view, and the opinions it expresses are the opinions of Methodists, shared only by Presbyterians, Baptists, and some other Evangelical sects." [15]

The Methodist Board is not the only active religious minority. The Anti-Saloon League also has quarters in Washington and boasts in an official circular that it is the strongest political organization in the world. Unlike the Methodist Board, it does not work in the open and is inclined to resist any investigation of its activities. After all, the Methodist Board and the Federal Council in their lobbying activities are only doing openly and frankly what most of the innumerable interest groups throughout the country are doing. It merely should be recognized that such activity means a partial restoration of the temporal power in violation of the tradition in which the country was founded. Furthermore, the tendency of Fundamentalist social Christianity is repressive rather than constructive.

The Methodist Board has indulged in a campaign

[15] Ibid., p. 487.

against tobacco, and in some states repressive legislation is already in effect. Laws against gambling are to be found in many states and are by no means limited to the repression of commercialized gambling.[16] A number of Fundamentalist organizations such as the Lord's Day Alliance are making ceaseless efforts to increase and strengthen the Sabbath blue laws. For them the solution of modern social problems consists in reviving a taboo established by a primitive people three thousand years ago. Some forty-four states have Sabbath laws, the strictest of which are to be found in Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Arkansas and Kansas, while Montana, Oregon, California and Arizona are almost entirely free from such legislation. An advocate of such legislation concludes that about twenty states have a comparatively well observed Sunday.[17]

Vice crusading has been a typical activity of the Fundamentalist social Christians. While one must recognize the evils of commercialized vice and admit the sincerity of the majority of the Fundamentalists it may be questioned whether either hysterical exposures and raids or even repressive legislation such as the Mann Act, with its endless possibilities for blackmail, will ever eliminate the oldest profession in the world. Many of their social work programs have been tinged with the uplift spirit and the desire to impress upon others a particular set of attitudes and values rather than to handle certain social situations in a professional and scientific manner. The uplifting, soul-saving attitude brought to bear in the army both during and after the war caused no little resentment. The Fundamentalists are unquestionably prone to impulsive crowd behavior in their social movements.

[16] Booth, E.—*A Texas Chain Gang,* Amer. Mercury, Nov., 1927, pp. 306–315.

[17] Wayne, W.—Lit. Dig., Sept. 12, 1925, pp. 32–33.

Liberal Social Christianity

Turning to Liberal social Christianity we find more substantial achievements to their credit in such fields as (1) industrial relations, (2) international relations, (3) race relations, (4) social welfare, (5) political well-being, (6) organization of social and recreational life, and (7) missionary activity.

(1) The church has come in recent years to claim a moral authority in regard to industrial relations and this claim has met with some degree of acceptance on the part of both employees and employers, although there is still much suspicion and hostility. Protestantism has a tradition of individualism but this individualism has been transformed into the recognition of the worth of the individual personality. Says Johnson, "This change of interpretation is the natural outcome of wholly unofficial but virile and influential movements with which are connected the names of such great religious leaders as Charles Kingsley, Frederick W. Roberston, Frederick Denison Maurice, Canon Barnett, Washington Gladden, Josiah Strong and Walter Rauschenbusch." [18] This point of view finds expression in the "Social Creed" of the Federal Council previously summarized and is given further expression in the report on "The Church and Industrial Reconstruction." Here we find affirmed the intrinsic worth of personality, the organic unity of human society, and the motive of service, even as applied to property.[19]

Similar affirmations of moral authority are to be found in the report prepared by the English Archbishops, the statement of twenty British Quaker employers, and the Lambeth

[18] Johnson, F. E.—*The Teaching of the Protestant Church,* The Annals Amer. Acad. of Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, p. 82.

[19] Ibid., p. 83.

Conference held in England in 1920. A churchman writing in a symposium on industrial relations and the churches lays especial stress upon the rôle of the church as a source of moral authority. While the church cannot create machinery for the state or propagandize for any particular class or program, he feels that it can impress a sense of personal responsibility upon both employers and employees and define moral issues.[20]

Harry F. Ward likewise stresses the point that the church is the teacher of ethical standards and the voice of moral judgment as well as the herald of a new order. In its application of ethical standards to particular situations the authority of the church must be inherent in its judgments. The quality of these, thinks Ward, will soon be assured by the presence of trained religious leaders and the comparatively detached position of the church.[21]

While employers have resented the interest of the church in industrial relations, as shown by the attempt to prevent members of the American Federation of Labor from speaking in the pulpits of Detroit churches,[22] certain of them, at least, have come to accept the moral authority of the church. One employer proclaims that every phase of industry has a moral aspect in respect to which the church should function. It is the church alone which has the moral authority to teach and control where the state fails to insure stability. He says: "The power that can lay its edicts on man's conscience alone can save him in that hour when the elemental traits of human nature break through the crust of civilized

[20] Morehouse, F. C.—*A Churchman's View of the Church's Function,* The Annals of Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, pp. 90–95.

[21] Ward, H. F.—*The Function of the Church in Industry,* The Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, pp. 96–100.

[22] Information Service, Dept. of Research and Education of Federal Council, Vol. V: 41, Nov. 6, 1926, p. 1.

conventions. That power is the Church, the great moral teacher of mankind, which should have an active function in all divisions of society, and not least in that field where so many men and women spend their lives." [23] A number of manufacturers have expressed approval of the work of the Federal Council.[24] Leaders within the working class have likewise expressed approval, although it is difficult to say how representative they are of the mass of workers at large. According to Voll, labor is appreciative of its defence by the church from injustice, materialism and exploitative capitalism.[25] Muste, on the other hand, has detected a certain amount of suspicion and hostility on the part of labor toward the church, but feels that the reports of religious bodies have tended to establish greater confidence.[26]

Investigations of particular industrial situations have often added the weight of facts to the moral authority of the church and impressed public opinion in no small degree. Notable among such investigations are the report on the steel strike in 1910 by the Federal Council, the report on the Denver tramway strike and the investigation of the steel industry by the Inter-Church World Movement. It is probable that the subsequent reduction of working hours in the steel industry after the failure of this movement was in part due to the unanimous protest of Protestant, Catholic and Jewish organizations.[27]

[23] Callahan, P.—*An Employer's View of the Church's Function in Industry,* The Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, pp. 105–107.

[24] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Progress of Church Federation to 1922,* Revell, N. Y., 1921, p. 258.

[25] Voll, J. A.—*Labor's View of the Church's Function with Regard to Industrial Relation,* The Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Sci., Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, pp. 108–111.

[26] Muste, A. J.—*Labor's View of the Function of the Church,* The Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, pp. 112–116.

[27] See *Religion's Broadside Against Steel,* Lit. Dig., June 30, 1923.

A number of investigations have been carried on by individual leaders of Liberal social Christianity, for example the especially vigorous analysis of the entire social situation by Sherwood Eddy.[28] The entire group associated in the publication of *The World Tomorrow,* a magazine which is the organ of at least one branch of the social Christianity movement, has been more or less active in investigation and publicity. The Federal Council, although less Liberal, for many years has been active in the collection and publication of facts having to do with the industrial situation.[29]

Other activities in the field of industrial relations may be referred to as educational. Many churches have become a center for the discussion of industrial problems, and in New York a Labor Temple has been devoted to the education of adult workers, as has a Labor College in Denver also sponsored by the church. The industrial branches of the Y. M. C. A. and the Y. W. C. A. have held many conferences and by their work in the plants have perhaps tended to bring employers and employees into better relationships.

(2) Turning to the part played by Liberal social Christianity in international relations, we may note the very able attacks on militarism and imperialism launched by Kirby Page and his group.[30] We find also a considerable number of pacifists among the more radical participants in the social Christianity movement. The more conservative group, as represented by the Federal Council, has been active in promoting friendly relations with other countries through conferences, reports and the like. Especially notable is the work of Rev. Sidney L. Gulick in investigating the relations of the United States with Japan in regard to immigration

[28] Eddy, S.—*Religion and Social Justice,* Doran, N. Y., 1927.

[29] Tippy, W. M.—*Policy and Program of the Protestant Churches,* The Annals Amer. Acad. Pol. and Soc. Science, Vol. CIII: 192, Sept., 1922, p. 128.

[30] Page, K.—*Dollars and World Peace, War: Its Causes, Consequences and Cure, etc.,* Doran, N. Y., and the World Tomorrow, Vol. IX, 5, Oct., 1926.

and naturalization. There was a good deal of peace agitation on the part of the World Alliance and other bodies with religious affiliations before America's entrance into the war. According to Macfarland, "Wireless messages were sent by American Christian leaders to the German Chancellor, Foreign Minister, and to Christian leaders in Berlin, urging such a statement on the part of Germany as would make possible a conference of the nations. Had there been compliance with these earnest persuasions, it might not only have prevented participation in the war by our own nation, but might have secured justice and peace without further prolonged bloodshed." [31] After the declaration of war, a statement was prepared proclaiming the principles of justice, love, and mercy and pledging the aid of the church in carrying on relief, in repressing the liquor traffic and the social evil and in maintaining freedom of speech. While it may be questioned whether all these noble principles stood the test of the war hysteria, yet there is no doubt of the large part played by the churches in sending relief to countries stricken by war and famine.

(3) Liberal social Christianity has been active in the promotion of harmonious relations between the races. There has been considerable interest in maintaining the friendship of the Oriental peoples, perhaps due in part to desire to further missionary activity. Among Negroes, Indians, Mexicans, and immigrant groups welfare work and home-missionary activity have flourished. A number of publications dealing with race relations have appeared under the inspiration of social Christianity which have doubtless been of some influence.[32]

[31] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Progress of Church Federation to 1922,* Revell, N. Y., 1921, p. 159.

[32] Oldham, J. H.—*Christianity and the Race Problem,* Doran, N. Y. See also, "Who Is My Neighbor?" published by the Inquiry Concerning a Christian Way of Life, etc.

In general there has been opposition on the part of both Liberals and those more conservative, to lynching and mob violence. Recently the Northern Baptist Convention and the National Council of Congregational Churches denounced lynching,[33] and by the Baptist convention of Alabama there was similar condemnation of midnight flogging.[34]

(4) In general, the influence of Liberal social Christianity has been cast in support of welfare movements for child-labor regulation, public health, recreation, education, social settlements, social hygiene, prevention of accidents and unemployment, social insurance and the like. We learn from Macfarland that with the development of the Federal Council Commission on the Church and Social Service, "Close relationships were established between the Commission and such organizations as the Playground and Recreational Association of America, the National Child Labor Committee, the American Association for Labor Legislation, the National Conference of Charities and Corrections, and other similar social organizations." [35] Charles Stelzle, who has been very active in preaching the social gospel, points out, on the basis of a study of 1012 social workers, that 92% of the associated charity workers, 88% of the social settlement workers and 71% of the general social workers were church members.[36] In a more recent statement, however, Stelzle writes, "A recent study of more than one thousand of the most prominent social workers in America indicated that fully ninety per cent were originally members of the church, but large numbers of these are now utterly out of sympathy with it, because of the constant

[33] Information Service, July 16, 1927.

[34] Lit. Dig., Dec. 17, 1927, p. 32.

[35] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Progress of Church Federation to 1922,* Revell, N. Y., 1921, p. 86.

[36] Stelzle, C.—*American Social and Religious Conditions,* Revell, N. Y., 1912, p. 176.

onslaught and lack of sympathy of many church leaders toward the activities of these social workers." [37]

(5) It is difficult to evaluate the influence of Liberal social Christianity upon political life but doubtless the general tendency is, when well informed, to oppose graft and corruption, to favor Bureaus of Municipal Research, city planning, recreational facilities, criminal justice, voting machine laws, good schools, libraries, museums and the like.

(6) In the organization of social and recreational life Liberal social Christianity has found a sphere of activity which is regarded by many leaders as of supreme importance. John Haynes Holmes, for example, sees vast possibilities in the community church which fills this function.[38] Most liberal denominations have gone in for discussion groups, forums, clubs, dramatics, movies, lectures, athletic teams, etc., in an attempt to retain a hold upon the younger generation in spite of the manifold attractions of modern industrial civilization. The church forum has been regarded as of particular significance in the social and intellectual life of the community.[39]

(7) In regard to missionary activity little need be said, although it may be suggested that the influence of Liberal social Christianity has been to shift the emphasis from conversion of the heathen to an interest in the social, economic and political welfare of non-Christian peoples. Certain comments upon missionary activity will be made later.

The Proposed Union of Sociology and Religion

An interesting aspect of Liberal social Christianity is its tendency to enter into a Holy Alliance with sociology.

[37] Stelzle, C.—*Is the Church Slipping—and Why?* World's Work, Sept., 1927, p. 512.

[38] Holmes, J. H.—*New Churches for Old,* Dodd, Mead, N. Y., 1922.

[39] Coleman, G. S.—*The Contribution of the Open Forum to Democracy in Religion,* Jr. of Rel. II, Jan., 1922, pp. 1–15.

The overtures have not come altogether from the side of religion, for a group of writers falling into the vague category of sociologists have espoused the social gospel with no small degree of ardor. By far the most prominent of recognized sociologists so concerned is Professor Ellwood. His books announcing the marriage of Christianity and sociology created a great deal of discussion, especially among churchmen.[40] He proclaims the existence of a crisis in religion and the necessity for a new reformation by means of which religion may become adjusted to science and to democracy. There is a need, he feels, in modern society for some sort of religion to give faith in the world and a stability to the moral order. The religious revolution which is imminent must lead either to atheism or to a socialized and rational form of Christianity in harmony with the modern world. The guidance of the new social Christianity must be in the hands of scientists, especially the sociologists. Comte, one of the founders of sociology, established a precedent for this when he sought a support for Christian ethics in science. Furthermore, the concepts of modern sociology, such as socialization, love as a driving force, likemindedness, primary group ideals, harmony of the individual and the group, and the creative force of sympathy, all tend to bring science into rapport with religion. Ellwood therefore contemplates the vision of a social order in which love is the motive force using intelligence and science as the instrument for attaining its ends. Sociology, then, is the means to be used by an ethical religion for the redemption of the world and the vindication of its own ideals. Howerth approaches the same idea on the basis of a Wardian rather than a Comtean sociology. He sees as the culmination of telic progress in the control of nature, the guidance of man and society by

[40] Ellwood, C. A.—*The Reconstruction of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, and *Christianity and Social Science,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.

essentially religious ideals realized with the aid of science. Says Howerth, "Obviously, there will be no general unity of purpose until through a new education the social possibilities of unified and intelligent effort begin generally to appear. But in him who glimpses these possibilities and perceives that they are based upon scientific facts and laws, there is awakened an enthusiasm for ordered social progress and a sense of duty that are essentially religious. The religion of orthodoxy is fast losing its hold. Many of the religious beliefs drawn from the limited knowledge and active imagination of primitive man are destined to disappear. But here, in a purely scientific view of nature and of art, and of the relation of intelligent man to the world of nature, and the social possibilities that grow out of such a relation, are the elements which might be made the basis of 'a new religion,' the religion of science, the religion of humanity, a religion which of itself should be satisfying to the truly emancipated soul." [41]

The question arises as to the effect of Ellwood's mating of sociology and religion upon each of the partners to the union. The effect upon sociology is likely to be baneful. Ellwood himself in the interest of domestic harmony is forced to retain certain elements of supernaturalism in the combination in order to obtain a super-rational sanction for religion.[42] It is generally recognized, however, that science functions best when coupled with a deterministic philosophy. Surely the rather feeble grasp that sociology has upon a place among the sciences is not strengthened by any such procedure as is suggested by Ellwood. It has been often whispered in sociological circles that the curse of sociology

[41] Howerth, I. W.—*Nature and Art,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XVII: 5, Nov., 1923, pp. 472–88.

[42] Ellwood, C. A.—*The Reconstruction of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, pp. 135–160.

is the "ministerial mind," and this type of thought and attitude is certainly not decreased by wedding sociology to religion.

Science we have defined as a harmonious system of mutual implications based on sense data gathered and organized by logical and mathematical processes and tested by reference to new sense data. It deals with co-existences and sequences of phenomena and not with values. Chemicals A and B unite under certain defined conditions to form x units of compound C. Data merely exist or do not, or exist in some variable quantity or degree, and are related to other data. To say that courage and virtue make a good man or that faith and service will bring the Kingdom of God is not to state a scientific proposition. Here we are dealing with concepts based not on sense data available to all normal men but with emotional reactions which differ with different persons or, in other words, with judgments passed upon ill-defined sense data. The moralist may say that x units of C is bad, the artist that it is beautiful, the religionist that it is holy, but for the scientist, it merely is. It may be admitted that in certain cases the distinction between observations and judgments, between concepts and values, is difficult to determine and often a value may be readily translated into an intellectual concept. For example, it may be claimed that every respectable science excludes, in so far as possible, judgments in favor of observations. Here the term "respectable" implies a value, but it becomes a concept negotiable in intellectual trade if it is explained that by "respectable" is meant having a place on the programs of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Let us return from this brief digression to see whether there is real danger of substituting judgments for observations by uniting religion and sociology. In a magazine called *Social Science,* the official organ of a social science "honor

society," we find the first article, which discusses the possible need for a new religion, concluding, "Christianity, in the sense of the actual and full application of the life, spirit, attitude, and principles of Jesus, is, I believe, big enough for the task." The second article concludes, "This is God's challenge to us! This is humanity's challenge to us! Through the abundant provisions of God's grace it can be met! We just must meet it!" Following a meditation on the meaning of life and two really objective discussions of religious thought, we find an interesting scientific conclusion, "We live in a divinely ordered universe. The supreme Orderer is our Creator and universal Father. Therefore under cosmic being and unity I trustfully put these hypotheses, A great and good God; the reign of law; the divine method of evolution; a redemptive purpose; and eternity. This is the path along which imperfect and groaning existence is struggling, waiting, hoping, for redemption into the perfect." We next learn the interesting sociological fact that the Book of Jonah "reaches the loftiest heights of Old Testament thought about God. . . . The biggest thing in the book is the biggest thing in the whole Old Testament, the love of God which is big enough to take in the whole work of human beings and also the 'cattle.' " An objective article on religious toleration is followed by one which concludes, "This, then, is our present religious opportunity. There never has been a time when the mental state was so favorably set for the Kingdom. In our thinking the moral authority has been established. In our thinking the field of life as falling under the authority of the moral has been established. It only remains for religion to arise and assert her authority to possess her own." The next article yields another scientific generalization, "The rediscovery of Jesus and his message, which is the outstanding feature of the religion of the present generation, we may hope, will result in a new enthusiasm for the Kingdom of God; not a future

state of happiness for a few 'saved' individuals, but a perfected society on earth for all men, a kingdom of peace and righteousness and joy."

Following a little eulogy of the virtue of cheerfulness we find an article on religion in social work deploring the passivity of religion but insisting that, "Social work would bring about good will on earth by using every human and divine resource. Social work cannot work without religion." The next article pleads for the meeting of spiritual needs by social work agencies, the use of church members as workers and alleges, "Your cases need to get tied on with a definite loyalty to some worthy institution. There is none better than the church. The social worker should keep the fires at his own heart's door warmed at the power-house of religious worship and service." From an article on the minister and social service we learn that the minister should not be too much of a sociologist but nothing is said concerning the reverse proposition. In an article on the religion of business we find the following bit of realism, "In conclusion it must be said that underlying every business man's faith, as also undergirding his desire to render service through his business, his willingness to co-operate to worthy ends, his insistent adherence to the application of the Golden Rule to every situation, his optimistic spirit, and his cherished aspiration to aid in the development of character, there is a firm and abiding recognition of God." An editorial is devoted to the subject, "What's the Matter with the Church?" and finds such answers as "Too much man and too little God," "Increasing worldliness on the part of some preachers and many laymen," "A lack of prayer and of reverence," "Putting first things second and second things first," "A growing loss of reverence for the Bible as God's book," and the like.[43]

[43] Social Science, Vol. II: 2, Feb., Mar., and Apr., 1927.

In indulging in the quotations given above there is no attempt to identify Ellwood's attitude with those expressed in the quotations. The purpose is merely to show the degree to which personal values may clothe themselves with the name of science. Yarros has recognized the common tendency for religious leaders to make associations that enable them to draw prestige from science to support their own values.[44] With the introduction of values and judgments as an integral part of science the way is open for all of the various forms of bias which Herbert Spencer outlined so clearly many years ago.[45] The wish is the father of the thought in sociology as elsewhere if but given opportunity for such parentage. To desire intensely progress, uplift, morality, welfare, moral guidance, immortality, a higher standard of living, or a reconciliation of science and religion often means bias in viewing and analyzing the facts as they exist and a readiness to go beyond things proven to things hoped for. Rationalization, "thobbing" and wishful thinking already flourish in sociology and it would seem that too close a union of religion with sociology could but increase this tendency. Ogburn has shown in the light of the newer psychology how subtle desire and prejudice may be in their effect upon sociological thought.[46]

The effect upon religion of a union with sociology is hardly the cause for concern, although here, too, there is possibility of self-deception and muddled thinking. Pious wishes remain but pious wishes even though uttered in the name of sociology, and churchmen often lull themselves into complacency by a lip service to science. Occasionally, statistical reports in the interest of some preconceived re-

[44] Yarros, V. S.—*The Trend in Religious Thought,* Open Court, Vol. XXXIX, Sept., 1925, pp. 554–63.

[45] Spencer, H.—*The Study of Sociology,* Appleton, N. Y., 1873.

[46] Ogburn, W. F.—*Psycho-analysis and the Subjective in Relation to the Social Sciences,* Pub. Am. Soc. Soc., Vol. XVII, pp. 62–74.

ligious opinion are issued that serve admirably as horrible examples for elementary classes in statistical method.

Criticism of Liberal Social Christianity

Comments concerning Liberal social Christianity as a possible adequate reaction of religion to the modern world of science may be grouped under five headings: (1) imperfect adjustment to science; (2) lack of valid standards; (3) lack of unity and authority; (4) Fundamentalist adhesions, and (5) its reflection rather than control of the economic situation.

Imperfect Adjustment to Science.—The imperfect adjustment of even Liberal social Christianity has already been hinted at in pointing out the tendency of churchmen to take over the vocabulary rather than the spirit of science. Even in the liberal groups various forms of bias are retained and there continues to be egotistical identification of the personality with certain causes and movements. There remains a vast amount of maudlin sentimentality, as is apparent from the quotations previously cited, and an utter lack of any scientific precision in the use of words. Justice, spirituality, righteousness, service, etc., are merely impressive mouthfuls of air until they are more exactly defined. It would do many a social reformer good to turn to Plato and become aware of the difficulties in defining the word "justice" which he uses so glibly.

The support by Liberal Christianity of social work and welfare programs does not show any real appreciation of the scientific attitude. Bishop Fiske has recently made public his growing awareness of this fact. There is, he feels, too much talk, the character of much of the welfare work is uncertain as to its real value, the leadership and the methods of work are inefficient, the uplifting soul-saving

attitude is retained and there is a smug complacency over the most insignificant of achievements.[47] The complexity of social problems and the consequent need of research is often not recognized. It is easier to drop a coin into the blind man's cup than to investigate the causes of pauperism which have a way of functioning in closed circles. Poverty is a cause of ignorance, low wages, large families, poor health, general inadequacy of personality, etc., and these things are in turn causes of poverty. There is often a lack of sense of proportion in social programs supported by Liberal Christianity. A barefoot child may cause more concern than thirty thousand fatal industrial accidents and two feeble-minded orphans may excite more compassion than ten million men slain in a world war. There is likely to be an ineffective choice of means to ends and a blindness to truly effective but roundabout methods. The lack of coöperation of the church with scientific social work has, as Stelzle pointed out, alienated many social workers.

It should not be concluded, however, that Ellwood's dream of science as a means of giving expression to the motives and attaining the goals of social Christianity, is totally incapable of realization. There is no reason why values and judgment cannot enjoy the aid of science, provided that certain standards of distinguishing between observations and judgments be recognized. A bacteriologist may have a humanitarian fervor and yet follow a strictly scientific method in his search for the cause of the disease which he longs to control. Among Liberal social Christians this occurs, but is rare; is possible, but without realization as yet of that possibility. It would seem that the only chance for religious leaders to use science effectively is for them to adopt the rôle of technologists and merely apply the facts

[47] Fiske, C.—*The Confessions of a Penitent and Puzzled Parson,* Scribner's, Dec., 1927, pp. 656–664.

to values but leave the scientist to gather the facts and study things as they are in their own tough-minded fashion.

Lack of Valid Standards.—The lack of valid and generally acceptable standards is another difficulty which makes questionable the immediate reconstruction of the social order by liberal religion. Most of the Liberals like Rauschenbusch, Mathews, Fosdick, Brown, Peabody, Page, Eddy, Ward, etc., are inclined to find the ultimate ethical standards in the teachings of Jesus. They proclaim a transformation from a religion about Christ to the religion of Christ. One cannot but wonder, however, whether any clear-cut ethical teachings attributable to Jesus can be found in the Bible or in any other document once the preconceptions of the student be laid aside and methods of historical criticism be wholeheartedly accepted. It is not hard to find contradictions in the New Testament account of his teachings as glaring as that between the Old Testament accounts of creation. Resort is had to the old-fashioned allegorical, symbolic and spiritual interpretations but the thought will not down that the social Christians born in an age of democracy, humanitarianism and of social protest are reading the values derived from their own culture into the words of Christ. Furthermore, no one knows what the words of Christ were, for as Conybeare and other students have shown, the New Testament is made up of documents written long after the death of Christ which were copied, in part one from another, and contain a vast amount of material added to enhance the apparent supernatural power of Jesus or to make an appeal to some particular group.[48] Of course, the more generally recognized Christian virtues were old at the time of Christ, having been proclaimed many years before in China and elsewhere.

There is a question, then, whether the vague standards

[48] Conybeare, F. C.—*Myth, Magic and Morals,* London, Watts & Co., 1910.

of conduct known to many peoples of various times and places as well as to Christ are sufficiently definite to serve as a guide in this complex modern world. The problem of pacifism is an interesting case in point. Who could go to the Bible in 1917 and find a clear-cut answer to this problem of participation or non-participation? Some found sanction for war and others against it. The church as a whole in the absence of a valid and generally acceptable standard, held conventions, passed resolutions, established a day of prayer which brought no guidance and then went to war.

The question also arises whether, assuming the social teachings of Jesus to be definitely known, they would be applicable to a complex industrial civilization. Wells, it will be remembered, has advocated the periodic revision of the Bible to meet changing conditions.[49]

It is frequently urged that the church should make the ethical standards, but the question arises, out of what? If the teachings of Jesus have no force or sanction outside of their own intrinsic merit, are vague and possibly ill adapted to modern conditions, by what right do religious leaders presume to set up ethical standards? Obviously, these sceptical premises would not be granted by all. The question remains, should not ethical standards be set up on the basis of sound knowledge of economics, sociology, political science, history, anthropology, psychology, mental hygiene and the like.[50] Should they not be based on a far greater knowledge of science than the ordinary religious leader possesses? Surely the average intelligent doctor, especially if a psychiatrist, is in a position to know infinitely more about sex ethics

[49] Wells, H. G.—*The Salvaging of Civilization,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1922, Chap. IV.

[50] See Barnes, H. E.—*The New History and the Social Studies,* N. Y., Century, 1925, pp. 519–565.

than even the liberal minister with his Hebrew, his theology and his occasional smattering of sociology. Perhaps in the future the liberal minister will receive more adequate training for moral leadership in the modern world.

Lack of Unity and Authority.—Lack of unity and authority would be an obstacle to Liberal social Christianity even if its leaders were adequately trained. The denominational differentiation that has taken place since the Protestant Reformation has weakened the prestige of the church and the liberal exponents of the social gospel are so few numerically that they can claim but little of the remaining authority left to the Protestant church. Even the statement issued by the Federal Council in 1921 protesting against the use of the open-shop slogan to break up labor organization had little effect though it was theoretically the voice of twenty million people. Long ago, Benjamin Kidd in a famous book set forth the thesis that religion provides an irrational or rather, ultra-rational, sanction for the subordination of individual self-interest to the interests of the social organism and to social progress.[51] Recently Brasol has revived this idea, pointing out that religion stresses duty, opposes egocentric motives and lessens social friction.[52] It is hard to see how Liberal social Christianity can provide any such sanction, having discarded for the most part supernaturalism, having appealed to a rationalism which ultimately undermines most standards save that of enlightened self-interest, and having not yet attained to any great unity of purpose or organization.

Progressive and radical movements generally lack the solidarity and perfect understanding of those which are reactionary. Just as Marx and Bakunin were at swords' points

[51] Kidd, B.—*Social Evolution,* N. Y., Macmillan, 1894.

[52] Brasol, B.—*The Elements of Crime,* Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1927, p. 112.

and trade unionists and communists now repeatedly clash, so the Inter-Church World Movement was split into warring factions and went on the rocks. There were leaders who could endorse a mild program of coöperation between the church and social work, such as that advocated by Cutting,[53] but who could not swallow the economic heresies of Harry Ward. Ward feels the need of unity of purpose even though he has not always contributed to it. In contrast to Ellwood he holds that social science is not an adequate means of guidance and recommends more study of the social teachings of Jesus. He holds, perhaps rightly, that religion needs something that will motivate it, a creative consciousness that will bring to men a conviction of sin in regard to the present social order.[54] We may admit the need but doubt the immediate attainment of unity and authority on the part of Liberal social Christianity, although the break of the Liberals with the Fundamentalists will free their hands to be clasped anew in a common purpose.

Fundamentalist Adhesions.—It must be recognized, however, that such a break is not yet attained and Liberal social Christianity retains Fundamentalist adhesions. Proposed social legislation is often of a repressive rather than a constructive nature. The sincere efforts made toward world peace have been curiously touched with supernaturalism similar to that of Ekoi tribesmen praying for protection against storms. Shortly after the outbreak of the World War a day of prayer was established on October 4, 1914, and again in 1917 and 1918. In the field of industrial relations it may be noted that the agitation for "One Day's rest in Seven" indicated a religious as well as a humanitarian motive. Says Macfarland, "The Commission of Sunday

[53] Cutting, R. F.—*The Church and Society,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1912.

[54] Ward, H. F.—*Social Science and Religion,* Jr. of Rel., Vol. VI, Sept., 1922, pp. 476–89.

Observance reported to the 1916 Council in similar vein, bringing its review up to date. Its resolutions, which were adopted, included an earnest protest against the enforced employment of 4,000,000 of the people seven days a week, deplored the growing neglect of public worship on the part of professed Christians, reaffirmed the convictions of the Council regarding 'One Day's Rest in Seven' urging this especially upon the Federal Government, and protested against commercial amusements on Sunday." [55]

In Home Mission activity there is considerable concern with proselyting as well as with health, education and economic well-being of Negroes, Indians and others. Curiously enough, Buddhist missionary activity in this country causes considerable uneasiness which would hardly be the case were the missionary program purely social.[56] One may wonder how our friends the Winnebago would dance their medicine dance under the influence of even liberal Christians. Much might be said concerning foreign missionary work even of the modern liberal and social type, but it is sufficient to note that a competent observer is sceptical of the ultimate benefits of such activity.[57] Imperialism in religion is a cause of friction, the missionaries tend to be followed by true economic imperialists and the killing of missionaries causes many concessions to be forced from the Chinese. They lost their sea ports and were unable to prohibit opium. Often as a culmination of missionary activity the natives have Bibles but no lands, as in South Africa where five million blacks have only about twelve per cent of the land. It is almost inevitable that a missionary be in one sense a political agent, for he must get a recommendation from his government and

[55] Macfarland, C. S.—*The Progress of Church Federation to 1922,* Revell, N. Y., 1921, p. 100.

[56] Ibid., p. 113.

[57] Cornelius, J. J.—*An Oriental Looks at Christian Missions,* Harper's, April, 1927.

practically promise political aid. Indian students in missionary schools are forbidden a part in politics and Chinese Christians are under the protection of foreign powers. There is a growing fear of loss of their national culture on the part of the people of the East and a realization that the missionary writers magnify the moral evils of the East and paint only the bright side of Western culture. Undoubtedly the internationalism of Kirby Page would have greater support among Liberal social Christians if they were in less intimate association with the Fundamentalists.

Reflection of Economic Situations.—A final obstacle to Liberal social Christianity is the tendency of religion to reflect rather than to control the economic situation. Frequently the social interest of the liberal Christian consists in fraternizing with and lending moral support to the business man of the Babbitt type. Says Bishop Fiske of this tendency, "Our conception of God is that he is a sort of Magnified Rotarian." [58] Stelzle in a recent article in answer to the question as to why Labor deserts the church, replies that the workingman does not believe in the sincerity of the modern church. He sees the class prejudice, the smugness, the blind fear of radicalism, the lack of spirit of democracy and of any real passion in its program.[59] Certainly it is difficult to answer the worker who proclaims that the pastor inevitably reflects directly or indirectly the point of view of the business men who pay his salary. Perhaps the most notable example of an attempt to mould religion to fit this age of Rotary and Kiwanis is supplied by a business man, although similar attitudes have been shown by the clergy themselves. Bruce Barton in his book, *The Man Nobody*

[58] Fiske, C.—*The Confessions of a Penitent and Puzzled Parson,* Scribner's, Dec., 1927, p. 660.

[59] Stelzle, C.—*Why Labor Deserts the Church,* World's Work, Nov., 1927, pp. 53–58.

Knows, has given the modern world a picture of Christ as an "executive," an "outdoor man," a business genius who picked up twelve men from the bottom ranks and forged them into an organization which conquered the world. He considers Jesus one of the greatest of all advertisers, one who set forth every great principle of salesmanship. It is implied that by following in similar fashion the principle of service the great business leaders of the present day have attained their success.[60] This conception of Jesus as an efficiency expert has been criticized, however, in the religious press and secular critics have referred to the book as "The Man Whom Nobody but Bruce Barton Knows." Nevertheless, the partnership of even liberal Christianity with business and its acceptance of business values is a widespread phenomenon. This is brought out in a striking manner by Sprague in a recent brilliant article.[61] He points out that at a convention of credit men a number of sermons were listed on the program, including one by the Rev. S. Parkes Cadman on "Religion in Business." At the convention of the Associated Advertising Clubs this clergyman again gave an address, and in the Church Advertising Department were discussed such subjects as "Spiritual Principles in Advertising," "Advertising in Building a Bible Class" and "Advertising the Kingdom Through Press-Radio Service." "Each night cabaret entertainment was furnished the convention delegates from half past eleven to two. Part of the Atlantic City Beauty Pageant was also presented." [62]

It is claimed by Sprague that an alliance of religion and business is found in a large proportion of the 15,000 conventions that take place annually in the United States.

[60] Barton, B.—*The Man Nobody Knows,* Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1925.
[61] Sprague, J. R.—*Religion in Business,* Harper's, Sept., 1927, pp. 431–39.
[62] Ibid., p. 431.

The movement is traced back as far as 1907, when in his own locality the Chamber of Commerce gained the active support of the ministers in a campaign to raise a fund with which to seduce a shoe factory away from another town. The opening of the new plant was accompanied by religious services, thanks to which it was hoped that the enterprise would result in financial profit. Unfortunately, the company lured away quite willingly by a subsidy had obsolete machinery and soon went into bankruptcy.

The causes of the union of religion with business are found in the demand for dividends by stockholders, the use of machinery tending to overproduction of commodities and the consequent use of high pressure selling methods to dispose of the goods. The use of emotional appeals including that of religion was furthered by the excitement of the World War, during which the Ministerial Alliance and the Chamber of Commerce worked shoulder to shoulder. Under conditions of severe competition, says Sprague, it is necessary to sell gold plated andirons not only as a necessity but as an article whose purchase is a moral duty. The manufacturers of andirons tell the purchaser of the rare spiritual atmosphere conferred upon a home by their especial brand of andirons. The makers of aluminum ash trays must now find some way of making an emotional appeal for the purchase of aluminum rather than brass or china trays. It is well, therefore, to advertise a nationally known preacher at their convention and to identify themselves and their product in some way with religion and morality. Sprague has anything but enthusiasm for the offspring of this marriage of religion and business. The ultimate effect upon religion is sure to be a loss of dignity when it acquires a press agent and takes over business methods wholesale. For example, a new pastor is advertised like a prize fighter. "If you don't believe he is a real knockout come and see. Big Stuff and Hot Stuff."

The effect upon business is not, as some think, to introduce Christian principles such as the Golden Rule as a practical guide to conduct. The principles are not taken too seriously, for in spite of addresses on law and order at some 6000 conventions, drinking parties by young executives who want a good time at the companies' expense are always in order. Certainly the crime rates and the frequency of fraudulent failures indicate no particular moralization of business. The effect is rather to give the businessman a religious sanction for seeking his own self-interest disguised as virtue and service.

It will be recalled that the discussion of the relation between religion and social change in a previous chapter pointed to the conclusion that religion is either a conservative influence or else lends sanction to impulsive and irrational movements. Should we brand this conclusion as false now that we have surveyed the achievements and limitations of Liberal social Christianity? While we may agree with Tufts that religion gives a certain reinforcement and fervor to social effort we may still deny that its influence taken as a whole is progressive and insist that the more constructive social programs are carried on in the scientific and professional rather than the religious spirit.[63]

[63] Tufts, J. H.—*Religion's Place in Securing a Better World Order,* Jr. of Rel., Vol. II, Mar., 1922, pp. 113–28.

Chapter XVI

RELIGION IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE

We have noted that science has been ever advancing, forcing religion before it into various adaptations, whether of Fundamentalist reaction or of Liberal social Christianity. No religion and no philosophy can hope to rest secure without misgivings and doubts if it does not recognize and make adjustment to the picture of the universe presented by modern scientists. If we would pierce at all the mist that hides the future of religion we must first contemplate the vast panorama of the universe drawn for us by the mighty hand of science.

The Naturalistic Universe Pictured by Science.—The conception of the universe introduced by Copernicus was so revolutionary, so blighting to an anthropocentric and teleological point of view that its significance has not yet been fully grasped. Randall writes, "it swept man out of his proud position as the central figure and end of the universe, and made him a tiny speck on a third-rate planet revolving about a tenth-rate sun drifting in an endless cosmic ocean." And with Descartes he tells us, "Purposes gave way to mathematics, human will and foresight to immutable and inflexible mechanical order. Throughout the whole vast windy stretches of infinity, in stone and plant and animal, nowhere in this universe was there another being like man, nowhere a being who felt and suffered, loved and feared and hoped, who thought and knew. Man was alone, quite alone, in a vast and complex cosmic machine. Gone were

the angelic hosts, gone the devils and their pranks, gone the daily miracles of supernatural intervention, gone even was man's imploring cry of prayer." [1] Further developments in science emphasize man's insignificance. The solar system has its origin in a cosmic accident, the passing of a star close to the sun, impelled by the resultant of a million forces, drawing out from it the world stuff that was to gather into the globe that seems so vast and solid now after a billion years of growth and transformation. It is not vast, however, rather it is a fraction of a speck in infinite space, separated by billions of miles from the nearest star. Its own star, the sun, is but a grain of dust in the great swarm of similar stars that make up a universe some 300,000 light years in diameter. And beyond this, so distant that it would take a beam of light a million years to traverse the yawning chasm of bleak and empty space lie nebulae, other universes perhaps equally large and equally without purpose or heed for human longings and human fears. The stars are flaming crucibles in which dancing electrons are combined and recombined as the elements take form in a process of cosmic alchemy. Certain of the ninety or more elements which make up the earth as well as the rest of the universe combine according to the laws of their own being. Gaining greater complexity, the aggregations of atoms and molecules made possible, in fact inevitable, by conditions of temperature, light and the presence of other compounds such as water, take unto themselves atoms and molecules and reproduce similar aggregations of atoms. For countless ages these aggregations of atoms, these organisms, grow and breed and die and acquire more complex forms. There comes the capacity for suffering in response to cold, starvation, fear, loss of mate or offspring and to the final rending of the

[1] Randall, J. H.—*The Making of the Modern Mind,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926, pp. 226–227.

body that ends the struggle and gives over the body substance to another organism. Out of this ceaseless struggle, out of this ebb and flow of life, there emerges at last Man, an organism walking erect with brain cells which in their chemical interaction are accompanied by a brighter glow of cerebral phosphoresence known to him as consciousness. His greater capacity for misery is put to full use for his days are filled like those of his brute fellows with misery of hunger, cold and bodily ills. To this is added cruelty and oppression of fellow-men, baffled longing, fear of dark powers of evil and always the grim fact of death. No wonder that man creates some person in his own image to whom he can direct his prayers and whose assumed existence gives some meaning to life and some sense of security. Men are but automatons; a black crime or an act of sublime heroism are both as inevitable as the bursting of a rusty boiler. All is inevitable. The present "is big with the future," is potential in the network of antecedent causes. Given the passing of a star by the sun a few billion years ago, the teeming industrial civilization of today followed as inevitably and naturally as night follows day.

In one sense all men are condemned criminals. The fire of genius must burn out and saint and sinner alike yield up their bodies to the soil and to the air. The loftiest thoughts, the profoundest philosophy, the ecstatic response to beauty, the most enduring love, all are but concomitants of the long and never completely reversible chemical reaction known as life. The human race and its civilizations as well, it would seem, stand condemned. The heavens disclose dark masses of matter, the débris of exploded worlds or perhaps the raw material of worlds as yet unborn. A contracting sun may yet engulf the earth in fiery ruin, for stars before now have blazed forth and disappeared. And then there may be another passing star to undo the work of its predecessor, or

a slow freezing of the earth in the dim light of a dying sun. There will be left, then, not even a formless cosmic spirit brooding in the darkness of interstellar space.

Such is the picture drawn by naturalistic science offering as little hope or solace to man as the cosmic drama sketched with master hand by Bertrand Russell: "The endless praise of the chorus of angels had begun to grow wearisome (to God); for, after all did he not deserve their praise? Had he not given them endless joy? Would it not be more amusing to obtain undeserved praise, to be worshiped by beings whom he tortured? He smiled inwardly and resolved that the great drama should be performed.

"For countless ages the hot nebula whirled aimlessly thru space. At length it began to take shape, the central mass threw off planets, the planets cooled, boiling seas and burning mountains heaved and tossed, from black masses of cloud hot sheets of rain deluged the barely solid crust. And now the first germ of life grew in the depths of the ocean, and developed rapidly in the fructifying warmth into vast forest trees, huge ferns springing from the damp mould, sea monsters breeding, fighting, devouring, and passing away. And from the monsters, as the play unfolds itself, Man was born, with the power of thought, the knowledge of good and evil, and the cruel thirst of worship. And Man saw that all is passing in this mad, monstrous world, that all is struggling to snatch at any cost, a few brief moments of life before Death's inexorable decree. And Man said: 'There is a hidden purpose, could we but fathom it, and the purpose is good; for we must reverence something, and in the visible world there is nothing worthy of reverence.' And Man stood aside from the struggle, resolving that God intended harmony to come out of chaos by human efforts. And when he followed the instincts which God had transmitted to him from his ancestry of beasts of prey, he called

it Sin, and asked God to forgive him. But he doubted whether he could justly be forgiven, until he invented a divine plan by which God's wrath was to have been appeased. And the present was bad, he made it yet worse, that thereby the future might be better. And he gave God thanks for the strength that enabled him to forego even the joys that were possible. And God smiled; and when he saw that Man had become perfect in renunciation and worship, he sent another sun thru the sky, which crashed into Man's sun; and all returned again to nebula. . . .

" 'Yes,' he murmured, 'it was a good play; I will have it performed again.' " [2]

The Reaction Against Naturalistic Science.—This naturalistic philosophy bred and nourished by modern science has not been accepted without a reaction based partly on a horror of life in a universe without meaning, purpose, or hope and partly upon sincere intellectual conviction of the inadequacy of the mechanistic picture. It has been pointed out with considerable cogency that science is based on philosophical assumptions, that it is by no means free from dogmatism and that the blind acceptance of its teaching constitutes a new age of faith.[3] Aliotta summarizes concisely certain aspects of the reaction against naturalistic science: (1) The theory of evolution shows that new qualities may arise in the process of time which are not determined by the laws governing simpler phenomena. As Bergson has argued, reality is no longer a closed system but an irreversible creative process. (2) The theory of evolution also has shown that the instruments of thought are themselves a product of evolution which have survival value in a particular situation. They are, however, relative to the situation and lacking in universal validity. It might be

[2] Russell, Bertrand—*Philosophical Essays,* Longmans, Green, London, 1910, pp. 59–60.

[3] Davis, J. L.—*The New Age of Faith,* Viking Press, N. Y., 1925.

argued that naturalistic science is but a by-product of a particular stage of mental evolution. (3) Again, the very notions of time and space that are basic concepts in modern science seem to be derived from personal experience. Space may not exist without the mind that conceives of it any more than a sound exists without an ear to hear it. (4) Recent developments in mathematics have led to a questioning of fundamental postulates and axioms. It is possible, for example, to work out other systems of geometry than that of Euclid based on assumptions, but equally non-demonstrable and hence equally valid. The essential tools, then, of modern science rest upon conventions. (5) The naturalistic system of scientific thought is based on repetitions and reversibility of phenomena, but it is discovered that forms of energy are not completely interchangeable nor can transformations be completely reversed. Work that goes to produce heat cannot be completely recovered by using that thermal energy to do work. It would seem that the transformation of the universe in a certain direction can not be reversed as in the ordinary mechanical system. An ultimate state of equilibrium is conceivable for the universe even if an ultimate goal attractive to man be lacking. (6) In the fields of physics and chemistry new developments are undermining old concepts and substituting relativity for finality. Materialism, in the old sense of a fixed amount of indestructible matter as an ultimate reality, is replaced by a theory of energy. Atoms, rather than being regarded fixed and permanent entities, may now be ranged in an evolutionary series. Physics is being recognized as a closed system of concepts which may form several equally valid pictures of the universe, depending upon what assumptions are made and what contacts are established with conscious observation. It may be noted that the sense data which serve as the raw material for science will vary when collected by a

man hurtling through space at the speed of light rather than by a man with his feet firmly planted upon this little planet.[4]

(7) In the field of biology as a result of the labors of Driesch and other neo-vitalists it is now difficult to explain the regeneration of amputated portions of organisms by physical and chemical laws. Vitalism still lives under varied forms; the teleology of Inge, the emergent evolution of Lloyd Morgan, the *élan vital* of Bergson and various other entelechies and life urges.

(8) Aliotta points out the collapse of the attempt at mathematical formulation of psychic phenomena. "Psychic facts are qualitatively different, and therefore cannot be directly measured with regard to each other. The law of the conservation of quantity has no significance in the spiritual life, but is rather a perennial creation of new qualities. Every moment of our interior life has, in its concreteness, its own original physiognomy, which evades all generic schemes of quantitative formulae." [5]

The recent developments in physics and chemistry have implications that may be considered hostile to mechanism and behaviorism. It is claimed that consciousness, if it exists at all, is merely the functioning of the nervous system, but the nervous system is made up of atoms, the atoms of electrons, and the electrons of energy. It is, therefore, not difficult for a philosopher to identify mind with energy and to set up a new panpsychism beside those of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Fichte and Butler.[6]

Perhaps the most common reaction to naturalistic sci-

[4] See Eddington, A. S.—*The Domain of Physical Science,* in *Science, Religion and Reality,* J. Needham, Ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, pp. 187–218.

[5] Aliotta, A.—*Science and Religion in the Nineteenth Century,* in *Science, Religion and Reality,* J. Needham, Ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, p. 159.

[6] See Prince, M.—*Three Fundamental Errors of Behaviorists and the Reconciliation of the Purposive and Mechanistic Concepts,* Ped. Sem., XXXII, Mar., 1925, pp. 143–64.

ence with its picture of a vast and meaningless universe is subjectivism of one variety or another. If man's quest for some satisfying reality be baffled by the bleak stretches of interstellar space and the aimless whirling of blazing suns it is but natural that he should turn his gaze inward to find such reality within his own mind. Philosophical idealism with its questioning of even the existence of an external reality has offered a refuge for many a longing soul. The illative sense of Newman or its equivalent is proclaimed an inner guide to truth, much in the spirit of Pascal's cry: "The heart hath reasons that Reason cannot know." In the radical dualism of Ritschl there is a definite break with intellectualism as well as with the particular doctrines of Christianity and a turning to the ultimate reality of the religious consciousness verified by revealed truth. Unfortunately, science refuses to recognize "No Trespass" signs and undertakes to study the religious consciousness as it would any other mental phenomenon. In the philosophy of Blondel there is no dualism, no distinction between pure and practical reason but rather the pragmatic view that truth and reality are created by ourselves through activity. Science itself is but a means to action and rests like religion upon an act of faith. Even order and regularity in the universe cannot be demonstrated, for the very principle that repetition of events implies further repetitions has only the past workings of that principle to support it. Any proof of the law of induction is based upon the law of induction and hence the whole rests upon assumption. Concluding that the admission of objective reality of any kind is based upon moral needs, Blondel traces the will and its needs for fulfilment through several stages of amplification until at last he finds God and the dogmas of the Christian religion as justifiable hypotheses.

The pragmatists do not separate the individual from the

world but rather regard personal experience and objective reality as parts of a single process. Nevertheless, there is an element of subjectivism in their philosophy in spite of its virile stress upon effort and upon consequences, which leaves a place for religion and offers a refuge from the cold world of naturalistic science. As James points out, we are motivated in considerable measure by abstract ideas which yield no sense impression, such as beauty, goodness and the divine. At least it is impossible to disprove the objective reality of such Platonic ideas. He writes, "It is as if there were in the human consciousness a sense of reality, a feeling of objective presence, a perception of what we may call 'something there,' more deep and more general than any of the special and particular 'senses' by which the current psychology supposes existent realities to be originally revealed." [7] This sense is of course more vivid in those of mystical temperament, for example, in a certain girl brought up by anti-Christian parents. She read the Bible and enjoyed immediately a mystical experience in which she seemed to be in the very presence of a Divine Being to whom her heart went out in supreme love.[8] For such a person the experience is a genuine expression of the truth, although opposed by a rationalism which demands statable abstract principles, definite facts of sensation, definite hypotheses based on such facts, and definite inferences logically drawn. James finds in mysticism, with its qualities of ineffability, sense of revelation, transciency, passivity, etc., a suggestion of other kinds of consciousness and new orders of truth. Science may give little support for an animistic or personal interpretation of the universe but, writes James, "The reason is that, as long as we deal with the cosmic and the

[7] James, W.—*Varieties of Religious Experience,* Longmans, Green, N. Y., 1902, p. 58.

[8] Ibid., p. 70.

general, we deal only with the symbols of reality, but as soon as we deal with private and personal phenomena as such, we deal with realities in the completest sense of the term." [9]

Subjective experience, then, is the most real experience that we have and the emotion and belief associated with religion give moral support in the struggle for life. There is in religion a sense of high qualities in our personality and the notion that there is more of such in the universe with which we may get in touch. Contact with this "something more," according to James, is made through the sub-conscious. This something he feels might be called God and while it does not interfere with the details of the physical world, ideals come from this region and produce real effects.

It should be remembered that a feeling state, such as the sense of a divine presence, need not correspond to any objective reality outside of the individual no matter how vivid the experience. If it be argued that religious belief is necessary to meet moral needs or to provide a source of inspiration it may be pointed out that moral needs vary and inspirations differ, hence any valid guide to truth is lacking. Finally, it may be recognized that with the revolt of subjectivism, such as that of Blondel, against naturalistic science there is a tendency to identify the will toward a certain thing or state with that thing or state in itself. It would seem that this is a regression to a form of wish-magic such as we have found among the Winnebago and other peoples.

Attempts at Reconciliation of Science and Religion.—It is inevitable that the reaction against naturalistic science should include innumerable attempts at the reconciliation of science and religion, some on the basis of wishful subjectivism or other rationalizations. Many of these attempts are naïve while others show ingenuity and philosophical subtlety

[9] Ibid., p. 498.

and are based on a sincerely sceptical conviction of the inadequacy of the naturalistic picture. Mather believes, "that life as we know it is but one manifestation of the mysterious spiritual powers which permeate the universe" and that none of the facts of astronomical science are "really in any way disturbing to the adherent to Christianity." [10] He writes further, "Not one contradicts any teaching of Jesus Christ known to men. None of them could; for his teachings deal with moral law and spiritual realities. Natural science deals with physical laws and material realities." While himself aware of the inconsistencies of the Bible he seems to approve of the attempts once so common to reconcile evolution and the story of creation by the proposition that, "A day in the sight of the Lord is as a thousand years." He assumes that God as a power or force is back of the process of evolution and is able to find in the ascending forms of life an ever-increasing manifestation of the Christian virtues of coöperation, love and service. It would be well for him to read again *Candide* and its description of the culmination of this happy process. Curiously enough, he assigns to the theologian rather than to the genetic psychologist the task of determining just when and how man gained a soul. Blissfully unaware of the dangers of bias and of the past relations of religion and science he hails the imminent convergence of righteousness and truth. "Thus far, and presumably always, truth when found is also found to be right, in the moral sense of the word. Men of religion seek righteousness: finding it they also find truth. The farther along the two avenues of investigation the scientist and the theologian go, the closer they discover themselves to be. Already many of them are marching shoulder to shoulder in their endeavor to combine a trained and rea-

[10] Mather, K. F.—*Evolution and Religion,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XXI: 3, Sept., 1925, p. 323.

soning mind with a faithful and loving heart in every human individual and thus to develop more perfectly in mankind the image of God." [11]

David Starr Jordan states that, "It is a basal proposition of science that we know nothing until we find it out," and then either violates this principle or enters another realm of a pluralistic universe by pointing out that religion deals with man's relation "to the unseen powers around us, 'the infinite conscious intelligence' that pervades the universe and our relations towards one another." [12] He writes further, "This 'rational order' which pervades all nature we cannot describe or circumscribe, for we cannot speak of it in any term of human experience, nor can we grasp the character of that unconditioned source of matter and force to which with endlessly varied conceptions we give the name of God." Reverence for this rational order he finds to be in no way opposed to science. It may be pointed out that there could hardly be reverence for God so described unless there were faith in his existence and such faith without proof goes beyond the usual assumptions of science as, for example, the reality of sense data. Furthermore, it may be questioned whether reverence for such a vague conception justifies the name of religion.

Bushee defines religion as "the expression of the desire on the part of man to come into more perfect relations with the unknown powers of the universe." Following the lead of Herbert Spencer he finds a compatibility between science and religion in that the former deals with the known and the latter with the unknown.[13] Here again the question of definition arises and one wonders whether first and final

[11] Ibid., p. 327.

[12] Jordan, D. S.—*Reason, Reverence and Love,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XXI:6, Dec., 1925, p. 587.

[13] Bushee, F. A.—*Principles of Sociology,* Holt, N. Y., 1923, p. 535.

causes or the ultimate store of energy, the transformations of which are assumed to lie back of all phenomena, constitute unknown powers sufficiently personal to serve as the nucleus of a vital religion thoroughly compatible with modern science.

One of the greatest physicists in the world has discussed recently the place of religion in the world of science.[14] Dr. Millikan in sketching the development of modern physics points out the collapse of the finalistic system of the nineteenth century with its fixed laws of mechanics and thermodynamics and its equations of electromagnetic phenomena, following the discovery of radioactivity, the identification of matter and energy and the appearance of the quantum and relativity theories. This change of a scientific system is very properly held up as an object lesson to dogmatists. It is also said to reveal new sources of reverence, mystery, and humility, although it does not seem certain that conceptions of atomic structure and curvilinear space are omnipresent comforters in time of tribulation and sorrow. The development of religion is traced from primitive animism and human sacrifice to social ideals, and to conceptions of a spiritual deity, an orderly universe and human progress by knowledge of and adjustment to that universe.

Little incompatibility is seen between modern science, chastened by its own sudden evolution and its glimpse of new mysteries, and modern religion stripped of its supernaturalism down to a body of ideals. These ideals are joined with a reverence for the "Spirit of rational order and of orderly development" which is the "God of Science." Millikan has worked out a solution which is essentially harmonious and satisfying to himself but which in spite of his eminence as a physicist does not necessarily carry more conviction to

[14] Millikan, R. A.—*Evolution in Science and Religion,* New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927.

others than the pronouncements of Sir Oliver Lodge upon social and mental phenomena. The science of religion would hardly flourish like modern physics if all students analyzed the growth of religion in terms of ideas which appear as "divine" events. Millikan's interpretation of the contribution of Jesus to the development of religion would hardly coincide with that of New Testament scholars like Conybeare. One cannot but wonder whether it is science as a whole or merely physics which is reconciled to Dr. Millikan's conception of God.

Balfour attempts to find in the realm of the spiritual a domain in which religion can reign supreme unopposed by science.[15] It may be questioned, however, whether the psychologists of religion like Leuba would accept the exclusion of the spiritual from the subject matter of scientific psychology. While their investigations would not disprove the influence of supernatural powers upon such mental states, a demonstration of the association of states of mysticism and the like with certain peculiar conditions, physical and psychological, would tend to weaken any hypotheses attributing to them a supernatural origin.

Out of the innumerable attempts to reconcile science and religion one additional example may be selected. Julian Huxley is apparently of the opinion that science will not destroy religion in view of the persistence of supreme values such as truth, beauty, love, and goodness and the possibility of their harmonization with the facts of science. There will always be a religion to bring the individual into relations with the universe and science will merely give a new framework for the religious spirit.[16]

[15] See *Introduction* to *Science, Religion and Reality,* J. Needham, Ed., N. Y., Macmillan, 1925, p. 17.

[16] Huxley, J.—*Will Science Destroy Religion,* Harper's, Apr., 1926, pp. 531–539. See also *Religion Without Revelation,* Harper's, N. Y., 1927.

He attempts a more detailed analysis moved by the conviction that the next task of science is to create a new religion. The naturalistic picture of the universe, as made up of matter and energy but manifesting unity, uniformity, and development, is freely accepted. So gradual and uniform is the development that mind is found in the lowest organisms and even in inanimate matter, which is perhaps but one aspect of a world stuff that is both matter and mind.

Religion is defined as, "the reaction between man as a personality on the one side, and on the other, all of the universe with which he comes in contact." [17] In regard to the theory of the universe science has replaced religion but, according to Huxley, has not annihilated it. The history of the earth bears witness to a tendency toward more life and higher forms of life. Mind becomes self-conscious and turns upon itself; values such as love or beauty arise and, when the entire personality becomes organized about them, become absolute or transcendental values. This trend offers a basis for optimism and confidence in more rapid modification of mundane affairs through the agency of mind. God may be regarded as the sum of cosmic forces manifested in the orderly but indifferent and perhaps inimical relationships of interstellar space, in the evolutionary trend on the earth that corresponds roughly to man's own aims and strivings and in the instincts and ideals of humanity. "God in this sense is the universe, not as such, but so far as grasped as a whole by a mind, embodied in an idea, and in consequence capable of influencing that mind, and through it the whole course of events." [18]

A God, then, of a kind, is preserved and even objectively described for religion by science. It remains to show that

[17] Huxley, J.—*Science and Religion* in *Science and Civilization,* F. S. Marvin, Ed., Oxford University Press, London, 1926, p. 286.

[18] Ibid., p. 302.

such a God may play a vital part in human experience. A consideration of the unconscious, mental conflict, sublimation, etc., leads to the notion that religion is a means to integration of the personality. "The various activities and experiences of life, as they are originally given by heredity to the child, are either independent, or else antagonistic and disharmonious. There must be some means provided for bringing all of them into a true organization—in other words into a whole which, though yet single, is composed of co-operating parts." [19]

Primitive symbolic thinking is natural to man and he frequently projects some idea or sentiment attributing to it an objective reality, often of a personal nature. It is easy to focus the personality about the conception of a personality, and cosmic reality conceived in personal terms seems in turn by man to be focused more readily upon his own human personality. Man's reaction to the universe hence comes to be an interpenetration of minds, literally so, if matter and mind be but two aspects of one world substance. The essence of religion is this sense of interpenetration of personality with the universe. Says Huxley, "This, to my mind, is what actually happens when men speak of communion with God. It is a setting, an organization of our experiences of the universe in relation with the driving forces of our soul or mental being, so that the two are united and harmonized. There is a resolution of conflicts, an attainment of a profound serenity, a conviction that the experience is of utmost value and importance." [20]

It is recognized that a system of thought is bound to affect conduct and that symbols tend to become realities, but it is suggested that science may give control, discipline and understanding of religious experience. Mystical experience

[19] Ibid., p. 310.
[20] Ibid., p. 316.

which yields a unity of the personality and merges it with the unity of the universe may be purged by science of superstition. The new religion will be free from dogma and from animistic conceptions and will have artists, poets, philosophers and scientists rather than priests as mediators between the individual and the universe, between man and God.

The Incompatibility of Naturalistic Science and Religion.—While admitting the ingenuity and brilliance of attempts such as that of Huxley to reconcile science and religion it may be questioned whether there is not a more real and permanent incompatibility between these two spheres of human experience than is usually admitted. There is perhaps some truth in Croce's contention that religion is immature philosophy and that only a mature philosophy can make a harmonious adjustment to science.

We should be on guard, however, against loose use of terms and hasty generalizations. It should be noted that it is rather the method and philosophy of science than science itself which is incompatible with religion, although the facts of science certainly contradict the belief phase of most religions, especially the Hebrew-Babylonian account of creation and cosmology. Science rests upon certain practical and useful philosophical assumptions and as a rule develops through the efforts of men using certain methods and entertaining certain attitudes. These assumptions, methods, and attitudes are so closely associated with the conceptual system of science itself that the whole sociologically, if not logically, constitutes a single culture pattern. Let us examine some of the contrasts between religion and this culture pattern formed by the union of naturalistic philosophy, the scientific method, and the body of science.

(1) Science is nourished by the active use of the scientific method involving observation, experimentation, induction,

deduction, and verification. Religion rests upon passive faith.

(2) Science is based upon the principle of induction which is the assumption that a repetition of events implies a further repetition of these events. Furthermore, in spite of the scepticism of Hume and his follower, Pearson, scientists usually assume an external reality organized in an orderly manner. In brief, science is associated with a philosophy of determinism, the assumption that there are no uncaused phenomena, that given a certain set of conditions a certain result must inevitably follow. Religion, on the other hand, commonly if not invariably implies the existence of powers which interfere by miracle and revelation with the laws of the universe.

(3) Science recognizes no personal powers in the universe responsive to the prayers and needs of men. Belief in mysterious powers which constitutes, according to our definition, the conceptual aspect of religion is usually an animistic belief in personal powers. Science in effect denies the existence of spiritual beings which religion affirms.

(4) Science is critical and agnostic while religion is credulous. The scientist accepts nothing save proven existential facts or fruitful hypotheses, while for the conventionally religious person faith is a virtue and doubt a vice.

(5) Science is based upon disciplined thought which demands exact definitions and precise terms as well as a logical manipulation of concepts. Religion makes use of vague symbolism and of terms which are suffused with emotion and serve as a means of communicating feeling rather than as intellectual currency.

(6) Science deals only with observations, that is to say, existential facts and their relationships rather than with judgments or values. Religion, on the other hand, in common with philosophy, deals with values. Dean Inge would deny this point, claiming that the attributes of ultimate

reality are values and that even science is based on such values as coherence, uniformity and commensurability.[21] As has been previously pointed out, culture patterns such as that of religion merge into one another and yet there is a difference of no small degree between science and religion in this respect.

(7) Science represses rationalization, wishful thinking and the various forms of bias, while religion gives expression to such attitudes and modes of thought.

(8) The thought content of science is dynamic, ever changing in the direction of new harmonies. Religious belief tends to harden into dogma and to remain static even in the face of changing conditions.

(9) In its emotional aspects likewise, the naturalistic-scientific culture pattern stands contrasted to that of religion. With scientific achievement there comes an expansion of the ego, a sense of triumph at having wrested from nature some of her cherished secrets. It is true that Newton pictured himself as a child picking up the brighter pebbles along the shores of the vast ocean of truth, and scientists of a mystical turn of mind have entered into humble communion with nature. Nevertheless, in religion there tends to be a greater contraction of the ego and reverence passes readily to awe, self-abasement, a feeling of loss of personality and of absolute dependence. One might venture a guess that scientists tend to the extrovert, and the religiously-minded to the introvert, type, but this is mere speculation with vague terms.

(10) The scientist while aware of the wondrous in the universe is inclined to deny the existence of mystery and seeks to remove it in so far as possible by research. Religion on the other hand is bathed in mystery which it often cherishes for its own sake.

(11) In regard to overt behavior as well as thought and

[21] Inge, W.—See *Science, Religion and Reality*, J. Needham, Ed., Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, pp. 376–377.

feeling, science stands in contrast to religion. The scientist moving calmly among the instruments of his laboratory hardly reminds one of a participant in a Saturnalian orgy or even of the priest presiding over the miracle of transubstantiation. Ritual, on the other hand, deals with objects and processes steeped in emotional value. Even if the ritual be lifeless and devoid of its original emotional appeal it still stands contrasted to scientific procedure in that it is stereotyped and formal, while experimental methods are ever changing in response to the new problems on the frontier of knowledge.

If it be objected that these contrasts do not mean incompatibility, since science and religion have coexisted and scientists have been religious, it is necessary to define the term incompatibility more closely. Within the individual personality two patterns of thought feeling and overt behavior are incompatible when there is mental conflict and reciprocal modification of the systems under conditions in which the patterns are not dissociated or compartmentalized one from another. If the biologist who is an evolutionist, a mechanist and a thoroughgoing determinist in his laboratory is, while in church, a believer in special creation, the Virgin Birth, miracles and bodily resurrection of the dead, it is only because two aspects of his personality are separated. If brought into contact in the course of discussion or during prepartion of a statement of his views, a reorganization would be necessary.

Another index of incompatibility is cultural conflict and modification outside of the individual when two culture patterns are brought into contact. If a systematic attempt were made to bring all of the teachings of a sectarian college which included modern courses in chemistry, physics, biology and psychology as well as religious instruction in chapel and elsewhere into a harmonious and logical whole there would

probably be culture conflict and modification of either the religious or the scientific teaching.

Most of the contrasts between science and religion presented above make for incompatibility between science and religion, according to these two indices. It may be suggested of course that when religion is confined entirely to the realm of values it is rendered immune to the attacks of science and may even seek the aid of science in realizing such values as love, service, and brotherhood. Such a suggestion is implied in a recent article by English [22] and contains a large measure of truth. But do not values in so far as they are free from supernaturalism belong in the realm of philosophy rather than religion? The problem here is merely one of definition and merits little debate since the only issue is the best means of attaining exact description and clarity of thought.

It is the opinion of the writer that the relation of man to the aspects of the cosmos which are unknown at the present time may better be termed philosophy than religion, although Bushee would hold that it was still the latter. Jordan and Huxley both effect a reconciliation of science and religion very simply by giving a broad meaning to the term religion, including under it man's relation to an orderly universe. The religions of the Winnebago, the Ekoi and the Egyptians and most historic religions, are not based upon the relations of men with a conception of an orderly but impersonal universe. Therefore, if the term religion is applied to a vague pantheism in which characteristic emotions and ritual bringing man into relation with mysterious powers in the universe is absent, a new word would be necessary for the religion of the Ekoi and that of William Jennings Bryan.

[22] English, H. B.—*The Conflict Between Science and Religion,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XXIII: 5, Nov., 1926, pp. 423–426.

The same claim may be made in regard to Ellis's very able argument for the compatibility, even the complementary nature, of science and mysticism. While he identifies mysticism with religion, it might be more appropriately interpreted as a philosophic or aesthetic attitude. It would seem that it is the philosophy of science rather than science itself which is incompatible with religion, but that naturalism and science are so bound together that the whole is hostile to religion although compatible with various philosophies to be mentioned later and with emotional sensitivity.

Obviously the validity of this conclusion rests upon the meaning attached to words, and the meaning attached to certain words cannot be quite the same for all people. If it is insisted in spite of the facts of comparative religion that a vague pantheism constitutes the usual core of religion rather than the belief, emotion, and ritual indicated in our own descriptive statement then a different conclusion follows.

Science stripped of its association with naturalistic philosophy is unquestionably compatible with religion so defined. The writer would, however, call such religion a philosophy. The question is simply the unanswerable one of how much a thing may change and still be the same thing. Tables have usually been thought of as having legs and a horizontal top. If the legs shorten and disappear and the top takes a vertical position it is still possible to call it a table. But to insist that this is a true table and that tables fit into narrow quarters is to change the usual meaning of words and to make necessary another word for tables with legs and horizontal tops that are not compatible with narrow spaces.

Using the terms science and religion as we have defined them it is suggested that science when commonly linked with a naturalistic philosophy is incompatible with religion, although compatible with art and with certain semi-religious philosophies. Separated as a body of concepts from its

philosophy it is even more compatible with aesthetic, ethical and pantheistic philosophies although not a comfortable bedfellow for orthodox religion. Since religion is merely a culture pattern whose most essential characteristics are selected on the basis of persistent association with situations which in conventional terminology are called religious there is no sharp line of demarcation between religion and philosophy. The incompatibility between religion and science is then obviously a matter of degree.

The Persistence of Religion.—If it be admitted that the naturalistic-scientific culture pattern is theoretically incompatible with that of religion it by no means follows that religion will become extinct, for the simple reason that the two patterns will remain isolated in separate individuals or in separate compartments of individual personality. Furthermore, there are eternal springs, philosophical, psychological, and sociological, which will feed the sea of faith no matter how much evaporated by the powerful radiations of modern science. Even if religion were as essential to the life of civilization as Dawson thinks, there is little danger on that score of a loss of culture.[23]

Philosophical support for religion will doubtless always be forthcoming. It is not hard to attack the assumptions of modern science and to point out that nothing is known save correlations and sequences of sense data and that order and uniformity are perhaps found by the scientist because he looks merely at phenomena in which order and uniformity exist. As Adams points out in a recent article, science tells only *how,* and leaves unanswered the eternal *why?* [24] Even the law of induction is beyond proof.

There is always the impenetrable refuge of philosophic

[23] Dawson, C.—*Religion and the Life of Civilization,* Quart. Rev., Vol. CCXLIV, Jan., 1925, pp. 98–115.

[24] Adams, J. T.—*Is Science a Blind Alley?* Harper's, Feb., 1928, pp. 265–271. The law of induction is beyond proof.

idealism. If a man declares that inner communion with God is the most real of all his conscious experiences and that he has less reason to doubt the existence of God than the existence of light that falls upon his eyes at high noon, who is to say him nay? If his experience be branded an illusion he can claim a goodly company of fellow-mystics, and further argue that the uniformity of ordinary sense data on the part of the tough-minded is itself assumed on the basis of communication which utilizes sense data no more valid than his own intuitive perception of God. He may admit it cannot be proved, but then nothing can; hence the most satisfying belief is the most acceptable.

Again, it is easy for a rigidly deterministic pantheism such as that of Spinoza or Julian Huxley to undergo an insidious transformation into a supernaturalistic animism which flourishes and claims the logical immunity from scientific criticism of its progenitor.

There is no lack of mystery in the universe to generate even directly religious attitudes heedless of any obligation to make philosophic adjustment to those of science. Pasteur, impressed with limitless space, is reported to have said, "The idea of God is a form of the idea of the infinite. So long as the mystery of the infinite shall weigh upon the human mind, temples of worship will be raised whether the God be called Brahma, Allah, Jehovah or Jesus, and on the floors of these temples you will see men kneeling, prostrate, swallowed up in the thought of the infinite." [25]

Of the psychological causes making for the persistence of religion none are more important than the persistence of deep-seated emotional cravings. Whitehead has defined religion in terms of such cravings. "Religion is the vision of something which stands beyond, behind and within, the

[25] Quoted by Smith, E. F.—*Pasteur the Man,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XVI: 3, Mar., 1923, pp. 269–279.

passing flux of immediate things; something which is real, and yet waiting to be realized; something which is a remote possibility and yet the greatest of present facts; something which gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes apprehension; something whose possession is the final good, and yet is beyond all reach; something which is the ultimate ideal, and the hopeless quest." [26] Fosdick admits that "Science today is religion's overwhelmingly successful competitor in showing men how to get what they want." [27] Nevertheless, he insists that there are wants which science cannot satisfy and that religion is necessary to give meaning to an otherwise futile world. Elsewhere he very properly points out that religion is based upon a craving for happiness and for meaning in existence. It is hard for him as for millions of others to refuse belief in a moral universe and to explain moral values in mechanistic terms. There is a powerful emotional motivation for his conclusion that if it is credulity to believe in a moral universe it is far greater credulity to regard it as merely a blind aggregation of atoms.[28] Having wished a moral order into existence it is easy to follow the footsteps of Kant in his *Critique of Practical Reason* and introduce immortality to support that moral order which would otherwise be subject to negation by the grim fact of death.[29] There are other causes for the belief in immortality such as fear of extinction and longing to meet friends and relatives.[30]

Fosdick, like James and Huxley, has recognized that

[26] Whitehead, A. N.—*Religion and Science,* Atlantic Monthly, Aug., 1925, p. 207.

[27] Fosdick, H. E.—*Will Science Displace God?* Harper's, Aug., 1926, p. 363.

[28] Fosdick, H. E.—*Limitation or Liberty,* Harper's, June, 1926, pp. 64–68.

[29] Fosdick, H. E.—*The Desire for Immortality,* Harper's, Apr., 1926, pp. 573–577.

[30] Wijnaendts, Francken C.—*Psychologie de la Croyance en L'immortalité,* Revue Philos., Vol. LVI, Paris, 1903, pp. 272–282.

one function of religion is integration of the personality.[31] This craving for some unifying influence, some guiding star, is a fundamental and permanent cause contributing to the persistence of religion. Fosdick is also correct when he argues that a personal relationship with God is usually necessary for the most complete satisfaction of this need.[32] In the same attitude another contemporary writer finds religion to be the organizing spirit of life values.[33]

These opinions are of value not only in themselves but as expressions of the yearnings of liberal Christians who are attempting to face the facts of science and yet find some adjustment which will give serenity of soul. It will perhaps be recalled at this point that lack of serenity of soul, in other words, discontent with life, has been isolated by Dunlap as the basic condition upon which religion rests. There is scant reason to believe that man's desires will ever be satiated and harmonized. Therefore, from the depths of his misery man will always indulge in the "sublime folly of hope" and upon that hope erect a faith.

Another psychological fact sustaining religion is the perennial interest in the occult and the existence of phenomena which are not yet completely explained by science. The claim made by Lang so many years ago that the almost universal practice of telepathy, clairvoyance, spiritism and the like among primitive as well as civilized men may be based on something more than fraud and delusion, has recently been reasserted with special reference to the magic of the West African Negro.[34] It is probable that

[31] Fosdick, H. E.—*Moral Autonomy or Downfall,* Harper's, Sept., 1925, pp. 385–389.

[32] Fosdick, H. E.—*How Shall We Think of God?* Harper's, July, 1926, pp. 229–233.

[33] Newton, J. F.—*What is a Religious Man?* Atlantic Monthly, May, 1926, p. 637.

[34] Vandercook, J. W.—*"Voodoo": The Case for Magic Science in West Africa,* Harper's, Feb., 1928, pp. 353–360.

even hypnotism, mediumship, and other manifestations of unconscious processes now given a naturalistic interpretation by scientific students will for a long time suffice to feed the faith in a supernatural world. While it was argued in a previous chapter that supernaturalism as a whole is on the decline there is ample evidence that credulity is still sufficiently widespread to give "psychic" phenomena considerable influence in sustaining supernaturalistic religion.

The human capacity for mental compartmentalization is a remarkable fact and there is little likelihood that this tendency will disappear even among scientists who are informed as to the desirability of mental integration.[35] The dissociation of attitudes among the population at large will doubtless continue indefinitely and thus insulate religious beliefs from the corroding influence of science.

There is reason to believe that mysticism is in considerable measure a matter of temperament and it is probable that mystics will continue to appear as psychological or perhaps biological variants, just as musical geniuses appear whenever the cultural situation makes it possible for them to express themselves. These mystics will have a sense of communion with something not themselves, too vivid to be brushed aside by psychology as mere illusion or as manifestations of a sub-conscious, and they will strengthen the religious faith of others. In a limited sense all normal persons possess a strain of mysticism. As Starbuck and other students of religious psychology have repeatedly shown, conversion, in our culture at least, is most likely to take place at adolescence.[36] This period is commonly one of storm and stress, with doubts, fears, a sense of sin and a need of a reorganization of the personality for harmonious

[35] Young, K.—*Need of Integration of Attitudes Among Scientists,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XVIII: 3, Mar., 1924, pp. 291–305.

[36] Starbuck, E. D.—*The Psychology of Religion,* Walter Scott, London, 1900.

contact with an expanded world. It is a period of idealism and of emotional sensitivity to nature and to man. This surging emotionalism Ellis calls the religious impulse and regards as in itself compatible with the scientific impulse. It might, however, with equal justice be called an aesthetic or an ethical impulse since it is merely a growing capacity for an emotional response to the external world, in contrast to the scientific impulse, the desire to know and understand the universe. All too soon, according to Ellis, this pure impulse is bound to the heavy load of conventional religion, and it may be added, will doubtless keep it in motion for many years to come. Ellis writes, "The burden of traditions, of conventions, of castes, has too often proved fatal alike to the manifestation of the religious impulse and the scientific impulse. It is unnecessary to point out how easily this happens in the case of the religious impulse. It is only too familiar a fact how, when the impulse of religion first germinates in the young soul, the ghouls of the Churches rush out of their caverns, seize on the unhappy victim of the divine effluence and proceed to assure him that his rapture is, not a natural manifestation, as free as the sunlight and gracious as the unfolding of a rose, but the manifest sign that he has been branded by a supernatural force and fettered for ever to a dead theological creed. Too often he is thus caught by the bait of his own rapture; the hook is firmly fixed in his jaw and he is drawn whither his blind guides will; his wings droop and fall away; so far as the finer issues of life are concerned, he is done for and damned." [37]

The outstanding sociological fact making for the persistence of religion is that of culture inertia. Institutions change but slowly and one aspect of culture may lag for

[37] Ellis, H.—*The Dance of Life,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1923, pp. 227–228.

centuries behind some other aspect until at last a readjustment is forced. It is amazing that primitive conceptions of the universe, developed some three thousand years ago in Arabia, are spoken with greater conviction than ever into a tiny microphone and sent winging their way into thousands of homes. The old order changes and gives place to the new but slowly. Furthermore, who can tell what religious leaders, prophets and messiahs will arise to lead men back to the old ways of thought or on to others as profoundly religious as those which preceded them. It is unlikely that the nineteenth century, which produced Joseph Smith and Mary Baker Eddy, will be the last to demonstrate itself fruitful of new leaders and new religious movements.

Chapter XVII

FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE FUTURE

In the preceding chapters the disunity within the religious organization of Western Civilization and the decline in supernaturalism has been stressed, but it has been held that religion of a Fundamentalist type will persist. There is reason to think, however, that it will be shorn of its former strength and that other faiths and other philosophies will claim the allegiance of men who have fairly faced the universe revealed by modern science and have sought an adjustment which preserves to them their intellectual integrity. The sociologist is all too fond of donning the mantle of the prophet and ascending unto a high place there to proclaim to all the world the events that are to come. If we yield to this weakness and venture a guess as to future attitudes that may replace in part supernaturalistic religion we must be careful merely to project present trends into the future and recognize that even then we may not have found the correct equations for the curves of culture change.

It seems, broadly speaking, that the attitudes which will coexist with and yet partly replace Fundamentalist religion will center around art, humanity and science. There are, of course, in addition, various forms of philosophical idealism such as that which finds expression in Christian Science, which are escape mechanisms. Furthermore at the other extreme there is the profound pessimism of Schopenhauer, Hardy, Clough, James Thomson and at times, Anatole France. Hardy makes the Shade of the Earth inquire,

What boots it, Sire,
To down this dynasty, set that one up,
Goad panting peoples to the throes thereof,
Make wither here my fruit, maintain it there,
And hold me travailling through fineless years
In vain and objectless monotony,
When all such tedious conjuring could be stunned
By uncreation? Howsoever wise
The governance of these massed mortalities,
A juster wisdom his who should have ruled
They had not been.[1]

There are many who needs must walk the somber paths of pessimism blind to the forms of beauty which gave solace to Hardy and to France but here we are primarily concerned with positive and constructive attitudes. These attitudes are essentially values and hence lie in a realm protected from the harsh hand of scientific naturalism.

The attitudes which cluster about art and constitute the various manifestations of the aesthetic impulse resemble very closely religion when it is stripped of supernaturalism and of ritual. When Ellis describes his own conversion to a harmonious personal relation to the universe and uses the terms mysticism and religious impulse to describe similar emotional reactions of other men to the world as a whole about them he is dealing with reactions which might properly be termed aesthetic rather than religious.[2] As he points out and demonstrates in his own life, such an emotional sensitivity is quite compatible with scientific interest and achievement. The emotional side of personality must, however, be disciplined and coördinated with the intellectual side. We may note that there are actual similarities between

[1] Hardy, T.—The Dynasts.

[2] Ellis, H.—*The Dance of Life,* Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1923, pp. 191–243.

the experience of the scientist and the artist. The artist, like the scientist, must be free from maudlin sentimentality, must seek hidden relationships in his case of form, line, color, rhythm, unity, and harmony, must select the significant among the sense data that present themselves, must give a condensed description of various aspects of nature and may experience much the same joy in creation. An artist has written, "Euclid alone has looked on Beauty bare."

Again, it may be urged that art and science are further compatible since art deals with values or judgments and science with observations. Science deals with sense data that are absent or else present in an amount statable either in terms of a defined unit or in terms of more or less. In other words it deals with existential facts and their relationships. There is agreement as a rule between scientists since their sense organs aided by instruments receive approximately the same impressions and they agree upon certain rules of logical and mathematical analysis. Values depend not only upon sense impressions but also upon emotional reactions to them which vary between individuals because of differences in makeup, innate or acquired, and because of general cultural changes from age to age. The artist, then, deals in symbols of emotional reactions and the relation of these symbols which is itself a symbol of an emotional reaction, for example, when he says "richness of color and delicacy of shading make this a good picture."

Values are consequently more relative than observations, are superimposed upon them and as a rule are not statable in quantitative terms. An observation is neither beautiful nor good until it is made so by the artist or the moralist, unless the philosophical doctrine of Platonic Ideas or Universals be accepted, which doctrine is opposed in part by the observable fact that people differ widely in their aesthetic and ethical judgments. It is admitted that the

artist may have keener insight and find deeper meaning in situations than the scientist. Again, the scientist and the artist may be combined in the same person. The contention is that the realms of art and science are distinct and complementary rather than opposed to one another. Art can give meaning and richness to life until the end of time without fear of encroachments on the part of science.

There is reason to think that for many people art is psychologically an adequate substitute for religion. In a recent article by Carlson, definitions of religion and of beauty are drawn up in parallel series showing rather effectively the similarity of idea and emotion involved.[3] There are many people who continue their church attendance merely because of the aesthetic appeal of the music and ritual. Many others turning from religion and accepting a naturalistic view of the universe, have found comfort in the world of art. With Santayana they find it is their crown, "to mock the runner's heat with gentle wonder and with laughter sweet." With Renan and Anatole France they find the world essentially meaningless but made bearable by wisdom and beauty. Says Pater, the great master of beauty in prose,

"This at least of flamelike our life has, that it is but the concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their ways. . . . Every moment some form grows perfect in hand or face; some tone on the hills or the sea is choicer than the rest; some mood of passion or insight or intellectual excitement is irresistibly real and attractive to us—for that moment only. Not the fruit of experience, but experience itself, is the end. A counted number of pulses only is given to us of a variegated, dramatic life. How may we see in them all that is to be seen in them by the finest senses? How shall we pass most

[3] Carlson, A. D.—*Beauty and Religion,* Harper's, Mar., 1928, pp. 494–495.

swiftly from point to point, and be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their purest energy? To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life. . . ." [4]

We may look forward, then, to a time when with increase in leisure, education, and means of communication, art is at least a partial surrogate for traditional religion.

Humanitarianism like art, will in all probability serve as the nucleus of attitudes which are a substitute for religion. We have already noted the rise of a liberal Christianity as one reaction on the part of organized religion to the new world of science. While the army of idealists striving for the elimination of war, of poverty, of injustice, and of other social ills may not succeed completely in their efforts, at least they are brought into relation to a larger something not themselves and have their personalities integrated about a dominant ideal. An ethical ideal may serve as well as an aesthetic ideal in giving purpose and meaning to life. An emotional fixation of some kind is apparently the normal state of the personality. If one goes out completely to some other person, usually a mate, but perhaps a child, parent, friend, or that larger person, humanity, emotional stability is attained. There can be little doubt that extreme religious cravings are less common among those whose love-life is happy.

Social Christianity will probably acquire more adherents, both maladjusted and normal, and will become divested to a greater degree of vestigial supernaturalism and thus replace service of God by service of Humanity. Almost a hundred years ago Comte attempted to set up Humanity, the Great Being, as a substitute for God and to hold forth the prospect of social immortality through permanent achievements and sustained gratitude on the part of suc-

[4] Pater, W.—Conclusion to *The Renaissance.*

ceeding generations. In spite of the stress laid by Comte upon ritual, Positivism has apparently been too cold and too intellectual to obtain any real following.[5] Perhaps the advance of Liberal social Christianity will breathe living warmth into this creed.

Ethical Culture is a modern movement which, while essentially devoid of supernaturalism, exalts after the manner of Kant the moral nature of man. Bahaism likewise is tinged with humanitarianism. It is possible that all these movements and cults may fuse into an ethical idealism that will meet the emotional needs of a large element in the population of Western Civilization.

Finally, a prophetic glance may be thrown in the direction of science to see whether that which has destroyed so much and changed so completely man's outlook upon the world may not offer something upon which man may pin his hopes. There are indeed signs on the intellectual horizon that science may minister to the cravings of the human personality. Many scientists have already found God in the universe by adopting some such philosophy as that outlined by Huxley. If He is not yet known, at least some men feel that knowledge of the divine can be acquired only through a study of nature. For certain types of mind scientific research or acquaintance with the results of such research supports a deterministic pantheism in process of revelation. The love of truth which is usually an emotional component of the scientific attitude may develop into a dominant ideal that organizes and motivates the personality as effectively as aesthetic or ethical values or even religion itself. Certainly the sustained efforts of men like Bruno, Newton, Gibbs, Helmholtz and Loeb are motivated by love of truth as effectively as the religionists are moved by religious ideals.

[5] Harrison, F.—*Positive Evolution of Religion,* Putnam, N. Y., 1913.

In the process of evolution men have found support for optimism, for faith in progress and for their predilection to find purpose in the world. Spencer looked to an inevitable static but harmonious social order, Marx saw a rule of the proletariat, Haeckel made essentially a religion out of Evolutionary Monism. In the writings of Bergson there is a reverence for the *élan vital,* in those of Pupin for "creative coördination." Recently Patrick has reasserted rather effectively the support accruing to reverent if not religious attitudes from a vitalistic view of evolution.[6] Most of these attitudes in regard to science imply a faith in the beneficent aspects of nature. Some rather placidly and complacently envisage an endless stream of comforts and conveniences wrested from nature by science. Others, however, find a dominant ideal in control and defiance of nature motivated perhaps by their awareness of ultimate defeat. Huxley conceives of nature as a chess-player, fair but implacable, with whom each must contest throughout his life with success or failure, depending upon a knowledge of the rules of the game which are best taught by science. In Galton's plea for a control of heredity in accordance with a eugenic ideal one finds defiance of nature, but there is lacking the fire with which Nietzsche proclaims the gospel of the Superman who is to redeem mankind. No writer is more aware of man's insignificance in a vast and meaningless universe than Bertrand Russell, yet none is more rebellious and defiant. Like a pygmy throwing a challenge in the teeth of a hurricane he proclaims the ideal of courage and of inteilectual integrity.

"Brief and powerless is Man's life; on him and all his race the slow, sure doom falls pitiless and dark. Blind to

[6] Patrick, G. T. W.—*The Convergence of Evolution and Fundamentalism,* Sci. Mo., Vol. XXIII: 1, July, 1926, pp. 5–15.

good and evil, reckless of destruction, omnipotent matter rolls on its relentless way; for Man, condemned today to lose his dearest, tomorrow himself to pass through the gate of darkness, it remains only to cherish, ere yet the blow falls, the lofty thoughts that ennoble his little day; disdaining the coward terrors of the slave of Fate, to worship at the shrine that his own hands have built; undismayed by the empire of chance, to preserve a mind free from the wanton tyranny that rules his outward life; proudly defiant of the irresistible forces that tolerate, for a moment, his knowledge and his condemnation, to sustain alone, a weary but unyielding Atlas, the world that his own ideals have fashioned despite the trampling march of unconscious power." [7]

Whether there will ever be an intellectual synthesis of the attitudes discussed into a coherent philosophy of life it is impossible to say. Certainly the scientific ideal of control of nature will tend to be taken over by the social idealists as the ideal of telic control through science of man's social and biological destiny. Perhaps, as Leuba suggests, the conception of an evolutionary creative energy will give vitality to a Religion of Humanity.[8]

Certainly the fact of individual differences in temperament brought out in the discussion of differentiation of religion must not be ignored. For many years to come men will work out their own emotional and intellectual salvation in accordance with the cravings of their inner being. For many that ancient trilogy, the ideals of Beauty, Goodness, and Truth will not suffice and they will find in the universe mysterious powers which they can reverence as beings

[7] Russell, B.—"A Free Man's Worship," in *Philosophical Essays,* Longmans, Green, London, 1910, pp. 59–60.

[8] Leuba, J. H.—*A Psychological Study of Religion,* Macmillan, N. Y., 1912, pp. 335–336.

superior to themselves yet approachable in full intimacy by prayer and sacrifice. Thus religion takes protean forms, touching here the borderland of Truth and Beauty and there the realm of Fear, Ignorance and Cruelty. Perhaps the next hundred thousand years will find men living as close to an unseen world as did our half-brute ancestors, long ages before the dawn of human history.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Selected bibliography of books consulted, including those mentioned in the text:

American Year Book, 1926.

Ames, E. G.—Psychology of religious experience, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1910.

Anderson, R. E.—Story of extinct civilizations of the West, Appleton, N. Y., 1903.

Atkins, G. G.—Modern religious cults and movements, Revell, N. Y., 1923.

Ayres, C. E.—Science the false messiah, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1927.

Babson, R. W.—Future of the churches, historic and economic facts, Revell, N. Y., 1921.

Barnes, A. C.—Art in painting, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1925.

——, H. E.—The new history and the social studies, Century, N. Y., 1925.

Bartlett, F. C.—Psychology and primitive culture, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.

Barton, Bruce.—The Man nobody knows, Bobbs-Merrill, Indianapolis, 1925.

——, G. A.—The religions of the world; 2nd ed., Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1919.

Benedict, R. F.—The concept of the guardian spirit in North America, Memoir XXIX, American Anthropological Association.

Boas, Franz.—The Central Eskimo, 6th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology.

——, and others.—Anthropology in North America, Stechert, N. Y., 1915.

Bossard, J. H.—The churches of Allentown, Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1918.

Brasol, Boris.—The elements of crime, Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1927.

Breasted, James H.—Development of religion and thought in ancient Egypt, Scribner's, N. Y., 1912.

Brinton, D. G.—Religions of primitive peoples, Putnam, N. Y., 1897.

Brown, Sanger.—Sex worship and symbolism, Badger, Boston, 1922.

——, W. A.—The Church in America, Macmillan, N. Y., 1922.

Browne, Lewis.—This believing world, Macmillan, N. Y., 1926.

Bury, J. B.—A history of freedom of thought, Holt, N. Y., 1913.

Bushee, F. A.—Principles of sociology, Holt, N. Y., 1923.

CARPENTER, J. E.—Comparative religion, Holt, N. Y., n. d.
CARROLL, H. K.—The religious forces of the United States, Christian Literature Co., N. Y., 1893.
CASE, S. J.—Social origins of Christianity, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1923.
——, ed.—Studies in early Christianity, Century, N. Y., 1928.
CHARLES, R. H.—Future life, 2nd ed., A. C. Black, London, 1913.
CLENNELL, W. J.—Historical development of religion in China, Dutton, N. Y., 1917.
CLODD, E.—Animism the seed of religion, Constable, London, 1905.
COE, G. A.—Psychology of religion, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1916.
—— The spiritual life, Eaton & Mains, N. Y., 1900.
CONYBEARE, F. C.—Myth, magic and morals, Watts and Co., London, 1910.
COULANGES, FUSTEL DE.—The ancient city; 8th. ed., Lee & Shepard, Boston, 1894.
CUMONT, FRANZ.—Oriental religions in Roman paganism, Open Court, Chicago, 1911.
CURTIN, J., and HEWITT, J. N. B.—Seneca fiction, legends and myths, 32nd Report, Bureau of American Ethnology.
CURTIS, W. C.—Science and human affairs, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1922.
CUTTEN, G. B.—The psychological phenomena of Christianity, Scribner's, N. Y., 1912.
CUTTING, R. F.—Church and society, Macmillan, N. Y., 1912.

DAVENPORT, F. M.—Primitive traits in religious revivals, Macmillan, N. Y., 1905.
DAVIS, JEROME, ed.—Business and the church, Century, N. Y., 1926.
——, J. L.—The new age of faith, Viking Press, N. Y., 1925.
DHALLA, M. N.—Zoroastrian theology (publisher not given), N. Y., 1914.
DIEFFENBACH, A. C.—Religious liberty, W. Morrow, N. Y., 1927.
DIMOND, S. G.—The psychology of the Methodist revival, Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1926.
DORCHESTER, D.—The problem of religious progress; rev. ed., Eaton & Mains, N. Y., 1900.
DORSEY, J. O.—A study of Siouan cults, 11th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, 1891.
DRAPER, J. W.—History of the conflict between religion and science, Appleton, N. Y., 1887.
DRESSLAR, F. B.—Superstition and education, Univ. of California Publications in Education, Vol. V, No. 1, July, 1907.
DUNLAP, KNIGHT.—Social psychology, Williams & Wilkins, Baltimore, 1925.
DURKHEIM, EMILE.—Elementary forms of the religious life, Allen, London, n. d.

EDDY, SHERWOOD.—Religion and social justice, Doran, N. Y., 1927.
ELLIS, HAVELOCK.—The dance of life, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1923.
——, R. S.—The attitude toward death and the types of belief in immortality; a study in the psychology of religion, Ph.D. thesis, Clark Univ., Worcester, Mass., 1915.
ELLWOOD, C. A.—Christianity and social science, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.
—— The reconstruction of religion, Macmillan, N. Y., 1922.
ERMAN, ADOLF.—A handbook of Egyptian religion, Dutton, N. Y., 1907.

FERGUSON, C. W.—Confusion of tongues, Doubleday, Doran, N. Y., 1928.
FISHBEIN, MORRIS.—Medical follies, Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1925.
FISKE, CHARLES.—The confession of a puzzled parson, Scribner's, N. Y., 1928.
FLETCHER, ALICE C., and LA FLESCHE, F.—The Omaha tribe, 27th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology, 1911.
FLÜGEL, J. C.—The psycho-analytical study of the family, International Psycho-analytical Press, London, 1921.
FRAZER, SIR JAMES.—Folk-lore in the Old Testament, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.
—— The golden bough (abridged ed.), Macmillan, N. Y., 1922.

GALTON, FRANCIS.—Inquiries into human faculty (Everyman's Library Ed.), Dutton, N. Y., n. d.
GAYLEY, C. M.—Classic myths, Ginn, Boston, 1911.
GENNEP, A. VAN.—Les rites de passage, Nourry, Paris, 1909.
GILMORE, G. M.—Animism, Marshall Jones, Boston, 1919.
GLOVER, T. R.—Conflict of religions in the early Roman Empire, Methuen, London, 1909.
GOLDENWEISER, A. A.—Early civilization, Knopf, N. Y., 1922.
GUILD, R. B.—Christian unity; its principles and possibilities, Association Press, N. Y., 1921.

HADDON, A. C.—Magic and fetishism, Constable, London, 1906.
HALLOWELL, A. I.—Bear ceremonialism in the northern hemisphere, Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Pennsylvania, 1926.
HAMBLY, W. D., and HOSE, C.—Origins of education among primitive peoples, Macmillan, London, 1926.
HARRISON, FREDERIC.—Positive evolution of religion, Putnam, N. Y., 1913.
——, JANE.—Ancient art and ritual, Holt, N. Y., 1913.
HARTLAND, E. S.—Ritual and belief, Williams, London, 1914.
HASTINGS, JAMES, ed.—Encyclopaedia of religion and ethics, Clark, Edinburgh, 1908, 13 vols.
HODGE, F. W., ed.—Handbook of American Indians, Bulletin 30, Bureau of American Ethnology.
HOEFFDING, H.—Philosophy of religion, Macmillan, London, 1906.
HOLMES, J. H.—New churches for old, Dodd, Mead, N. Y., 1922.

Hopkins, E. W.—History of religions, Macmillan, N. Y., 1918.
—— Origin and evolution of religion, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1923.
Hickman, F. S.—Introduction to the psychology of religion, Abingdon Press, N. Y., 1926.
Hubert, H. and Mauss, M.—Esquisse d'une théorie générale de la magié, L'Année Sociologique, Vol. VII.
—— Mélange d'histoire des religions, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1909.
Huxley, Julian.—Religion without revelation, Harper's, N. Y., 1927.

James, William.—Varieties of religious experience, Longmans, N. Y., 1902.
Janet, Pierre.—Psychological healing, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925, 2 vols.
Jastrow, Morris.—The study of religion, Walter Scott, London, 1911.
Jevons, F. B.—Introduction to the study of comparative religion, Macmillan, N. Y., 1912.
—— Magic and religion, Sidgwick, London, 1917.
Josey, C. C.—The psychology of religion, Macmillan, N. Y., 1927.

Kallen, Horace M.—Why religion, Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1927.
Kidd, Benjamin.—Social evolution, Macmillan, N. Y., 1894.
King, Irving.—Development of religion, Macmillan, N. Y., 1910.
Knudson, A. C.—Present tendencies in religious thought, Abingdon Press, N. Y., 1924.
Kroeber, A. L.—Anthropology, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1923.

Lake, Kirsopp.—Landmarks in the history of early Christianity, Macmillan, N. Y., 1922.
—— Religion of yesterday and tomorrow, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926.
Lang, Andrew.—Magic and religion, Longmans, London, 1901.
—— The making of religion; 2nd ed., Longmans, London, 1900.
Langdon-Davis, John.—The new age of faith, Viking Press, N. Y., 1925.
Lecky, W. E. H.—History of the rise and influence of the spirit of rationalism in Europe, Appleton, N. Y., 1914, 2 vols.
Legge, Francis.—Forerunners and rivals of Christianity, Cambridge (Eng.) Univ. Press, 1915, 2 vols.
Leighton, J. A.—Religion and the mind of today, Appleton, N. Y., 1924.
Leuba, J. H.—The belief in God and immortality; 2nd ed., Open Court, Chicago, 1921.
—— The psychological study of religion, Macmillan, N. Y., 1912.
——The psychology of religious mysticism, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1925.
Levy-Bruhl, L.—Primitive mentality, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.
Lindquist, G. E. E.—The red man in the United States, Doran, N. Y., 1923.
Linn, A. W.—The story of the Mormons, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.

LOWIE, R. H.—Primitive religion, Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1924.
—— Primitive society, Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1920.
LUBBOCK, SIR JOHN.—Marriage, totemism and religion, Longmans, London, 1911.

MCCOMAS, H. C.—The psychology of religious sects, Revell, N. Y., 1912.
MCDOUGALL, WILLIAM.—An introduction to social psychology, 13th ed., J. W. Luce, Boston, 1918.
—— Is America safe for democracy? Scribner's, N. Y., 1921.
MACFARLAND, C. S.—The churches of the federal council, Revell, N. Y., 1916.
—— International Christian movements, Revell, N. Y., 1924.
—— The progress of church federation to 1922, Revell, N. Y., 1921.
MCGIFFERT, A. C.—Rise of modern religious ideas, Macmillan, N. Y., 1915.
MACKENZIE, D. R.—The spirit-ridden Konde, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1915.
MACLEOD, W. C.—The American Indian frontier, Knopf, N. Y., 1928.
MADDOX, J. L.—The medicine man, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.
MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW.—Argonauts of the Western Pacific, Dutton, N. Y., 1922.
—— Myth in primitive psychology, W. H. Norton, N. Y., 1926.
MARETT, R. R.—Anthropology, Holt, N. Y., n. d.
—— Psychology and folk-lore, Methuen, London, 1920.
—— The threshold of religion, 2nd ed., Methuen, London, 1914.
MARTIN, A. W.—Comparative religion and the religion of the future, Appleton, N. Y., 1926.
—— E. D.—The behavior of crowds, Harpers, N. Y., 1920.
—— The mystery of religion, Harpers, N. Y., 1924.
MARVIN, F. S.—Living Past, 4th ed., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1920.
——, ed.—Science and civilization, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1926.
MATHEWS, S.—Contributions of science to religion, Appleton, N. Y., 1924.
MAYO, KATHERINE.—Mother India, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1927.
MILLER, H. C.—The new psychology and the preacher, Seltzer, N. Y., 1924.
MILLIKAN, R.—Evolution in science and religion, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1927.
——In science and life, Pilgrim Press, Boston, 1924.
MONTGOMERY, J. A., ed.—Religions of the past and present, Lippincott, Philadelphia, 1918.
MOONEY, J.—Ghost dance religion and the Sioux outbreak of 1890, 14th Report, Bureau of American Ethnology.
MOORE, G. F.—Birth and growth of religion, Scribner's, N. Y., 1924.
—— History of religions, Scribner's, N. Y., 1913, 2 vols.
MOSES, JOSIAH.—Pathological aspects of religions, Clark Univ. Press, Worcester, 1906.
MÜLLER, F. MAX.—Introduction to the science of religion, Longmans, London, 1893.

MÜLLER, W. MAX.—Egyptian mythology, Marshall Jones, Boston, 1918.
MURPHY, JOHN.—Primitive man, his essential quest, Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1927.
MURRY, M. A.—The witch-cult in Western Europe, Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1921.

NASSAU, R. H.—Fetishism in Western Africa, Scribner's, N. Y., 1904.
NEEDHAM, J. ed.—Science, religion and reality, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925.
NEWBOLD, W. R.—The cipher of Roger Bacon, Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 1928.

OGBURN, W. F.—Social change, Huebsch, N. Y., 1922.
OLDHAM, J. H.—Christianity and the race problem, Doran, N. Y., 1924.
OSBORN, H. F.—The earth speaks to Bryan, Scribner's, N. Y., 1925.

PARKER, A. C.—Seneca myths and legends, Buffalo Historical Society, Buffalo, N. Y., 1923.
PARKER and CONVERSE.—Myths and legends of the New York State Iroquois, N. Y. State Museum, Bulletin 125, 1908.
PARMELEE, MAURICE.—Criminology, Macmillan, N. Y., 1918.
—— Poverty and social progress, Macmillan, N. Y., 1921.
PATON, L. B.—Spiritism and the cult of the dead in antiquity, Macmillan, N. Y., 1921.
PEARSON, KARL.—The grammar of science; 3d ed., Black, London, 1911.
PERRY, W. J.—The children of the sun, Dutton, N. Y., 1923.
—— The origin of magic and religion, Dutton, N. Y., 1923.
PETRIE, W. M. F.—Religion and conscience in ancient Egypt, Methuen, London, 1898.
—— Religious life in ancient Egypt, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924.
POVAH, J. W.—New psychology and the Hebrew prophets, Longmans, London, 1925.
PRICE, M. T.—Christian missions and Oriental civilization (no publisher), Shanghai, China, 1924.
PUPIN, M. I.—The new reformation, Scribner's, N. Y., 1927.

RADIN, PAUL.—Monotheism among primitive peoples, Allen, London, 1924.
—— Primitive man as philosopher, Appleton, N. Y., 1927.
—— The story of the American Indian, Boni & Liveright, N. Y., 1927.
—— The Winnebago tribe, 37th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology.
RANDALL, J. H.—Making of the modern mind, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1926.
RATTRAY, R. S.—Religion and art in Ashanti, Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1927.

RAUSCHENBUSCH, WALTER.—Christianity and the social crisis, Macmillan, N. Y., 1914.
—— Christianizing the social order, Macmillan, N. Y., 1919.
READ, CARVETH.—The origin of man and of his superstitions, Cambridge Univ. Press, London, 1920.
REINACH, S.—Orpheus, Heinemann, London, 1909.
Religious Bodies, 1916, Bureau of Census, 2 vols.
REVILLE, A.—Prologomena of the history of religion, Williams & Norgate, London, 1884.
RIVERS, W. H. R.—Medicine, magic and religion, Harcourt, Brace, N. Y., 1924.
ROBERTSON, J. M.—Pagan Christs, Watts, London, 1903.
ROBINSON, T. H.—Outline introduction to the history of religions, Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1926.
ROGERS, R. W.—The religion of Babylonia and Assyria, Eaton & Mains, N. Y., 1908.
ROTH, W. E.—An inquiry into the animism and folk-lore of the Guiana Indians, 30th Annual Report, Bureau of American Ethnology.
RUSSELL, BERTRAND.—Mysticism and logic, Longmans, London, 1918.
—— Philosophical essays, Longmans, London, 1910.

SAYCE, A. H.—The religion of ancient Egypt, Clark, Edinburgh, 1913.
SEARS, C. E.—Days of delusion, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924.
SELDES, G.—The stammering century, John Day, N. Y., 1928.
SETH, J.—English philosophers and schools of philosophy, Dutton, N. Y., 1912.
SHAFER, ROBERT.—Christianity and naturalism, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1926.
SHIPLEY, MAYNARD.—The war on modern science, Knopf, N. Y., 1927.
SHOTWELL, J. T.—Religious revolution of today; 2nd ed., Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1924.
SINGER, CHARLES, ed.—Studies in the history and method of science, Oxford Univ. Press, N. Y., 1921.
SMITH, PRESERVED.—Age of the reformation, Holt, N. Y., 1920.
SMITH, W. R.—Lectures on the religion of the Semites, Macmillan, N. Y., 1927.
SNEATH, E. H. ed.—The evolution of ethics as revealed in the great religions, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1927.
SOPER, E. D.—The religions of mankind, Abingdon Press, N. Y., 1921.
SPENCE, LEWIS.—Myths and legends of ancient Egypt, Stokes, N. Y., n. d.
SPENCER, HERBERT.—Principles of sociology, Appleton, N. Y., 1908, 3 vols.
—— The study of sociology, Appleton, N. Y., 1873.
SPERRY, WILLARD L.—Reality in worship, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925.
SPIER, LESLIE.—The sun dance of the Plains Indians, Anthropological Papers, American Museum of Natural History, Vol. XIV, 1921.

STARBUCK, E. D.—The psychology of religion, Walter Scott, London, 1900.
STELZLE, CHARLES.—American social and religious conditions, Revell, N. Y., 1912.
STRATTON, G. M.—Psychology of the religious life, Allen, London, 1918.
STREET, J.—A genetic study of immortality, Ph.D. thesis, Clark Univ., Worcester, 1898.
SUMNER, W. G.—Folkways, Ginn, N. Y., 1906.
SWISHER, W. S.—Religion and the new psychology, Marshall Jones, 1920.

TALBOT, P. A.—In the shadow of the bush, Heinemann, London, 1912.
TAWNEY, R. H.—Religion and the rise of capitalism, Murray, London, 1926.
THOMAS, W. I.—Source book for social origins, Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1909.
THOMSON, J. A.—Science and religion, Scribner's, N. Y., 1925.
THOULESS, R. H.—An introduction to the psychology of religion, Macmillan, N. Y., 1923.
TOY, C. H.—Introduction to the history of religions, Ginn, Boston, 1913.
TOZZER, A. M.—Social origins and social continuities, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925.
TURNER, RALPH.—America in civilization, Knopf, N. Y., 1925.
TYLOR, E. B.—Anthropology, Appleton, N. Y., 1881.
—— Primitive culture, Murray, London, 1913, 5th ed., 2 vols.

WALLIS, W. D.—Introduction to anthropology, Harper's, N. Y., 1926.
—— Messiahs: Christian and pagan, Badger, Boston, 1918.
WALSH, J. J.—Popes and Science, Fordham Univ. Press, N. Y., 1908.
WARD, H. F.—Social Evangelism, Missionary Education Movement of the United States and Canada, 1915.
WEBB, C. C. J.—Group theories of religion and the individual, Allen and Unwin, London, 1916.
WEBSTER, HUTTON.—Primitive secret societies, Macmillan, N. Y., 1908.
WELLS, F. L.—Mental adjustments, Appleton, N. Y., 1922.
—— H. G.—The salvaging of civilization, Macmillan, N. Y., 1922.
WERNER, M. R.—Brigham Young, Jonathan Cape, London, 1925.
WHITE, A. D.—History of the warfare of science with theology in Christendom, Appleton, N. Y., 1897, 2 vols.
WHITEHEAD, A. N.—Religion in the making, Macmillan, N. Y., 1926.
—— Science and the modern world, Macmillan, N. Y., 1925.
WIEMAN, H. N.—Religious experience and scientific method, Macmillan, N. Y., 1926.
WISSLER, CLARK.—Man and culture, Crowell, N. Y., 1923.
WOODWORTH, R. S.—Psychology, Holt, N. Y., 1921.

INDEX

A

Abbott, F. C., 306
Abdul, 291
Aben Ezra, 367
Abn Abdallah, 211
Abraham, 204
Absolute, 184
Abu-Abdullah, 227
Abyssinia, 216
Achinese, 123
Adams, J. T., 475
Adjustment to world,
  types of, 65
Adonis, 160
Adonis and Aphrodite myth, 174
Adventists, 216, 297
Aeneas, 97
Aeschylus, 341
Aesculapius, 249
Aesthetic sensitivity, 192
Africa, 37, 105, 151, 216, 223, 229, 285
  West, 225
African Methodist Episcopal church, 290
Afro-American churches, 308
Agnostics, 322, 380
Agra, 307
Ahone, 151
Ahriman, 74, 97, 265
Aikman, D., 299
Akhar, Great Mogul, 307
Akpambe, 127
Alabama, 394, 398, 401
Albertus Magnus, 350, 371
Albigeois, 351
Alexander, 342, 343
Alexandria, 174, 176, 210, 247, 343, 344, 346, 347, 349, 364
Alfred the Englishman, 350
Algeria, 216
Algonquians, 250
Aliotta, A.,
  summary of aspects of reaction against naturalistic science, 457–459
All Father, 263
Allentown, 315
Al-Mamun, 349
Alroy David, 210
Altars, 34
Amenhotep, 146, 191
America, 37, 63, 151
American Anti-Bible Society, 404
American army, 317
American Bible Society, 306
American men of science, 318, 364
American Mercury, 318, 387
Amon, 173, 190, 191, 192, 226, 264
Amulets, 106, 126, 127
Anabaptists, 187, 229
Anatomy, 365
Anaxagoras, 341
Anaximander, 357
Anaximenes, 357
Ancestor worship, 27, 29, 35, 36, 37, 42, 56, 81, 142, 144, 146, 147, 149, 151, 226, 272
  Spencer's theory of, 29–42, 80
Ancestors, 38, 39, 40, 57, 144, 147, 148, 149, 154, 253
Andamenese, 52, 110, 151, 154, 263

Anderson, R. E., 258
Angels, 38, 145, 265, 359
Animal magnetism, 217
Animal spirits, 63, 224
Animal worship, 28, 37, 38, 53, 62, 63, 175, 224
Animals, 6, 7, 12, 39
  phantoms of, 23
Animatism, 107
Animism, 13, 22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 56, 60, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 106, 107, 131, 134, 136, 141, 143, 144, 151, 152, 156, 178
  limitations of, 103–104
  Tylor's doctrine of, 21
Animistic origin of religion, 27
Animistic world, 94–101, 104
Anne de Beaupré, St., 274
Anthony, St., 366
Anthropologists, 10, 79, 110, 142, 186, 234
Anthropology, 84, 144
Anti-evolution associations, 388
Anti-evolution laws, 388–399
  present status of, 398
Anti-Saloon League, 427
Antony, Mark, 344
Apaches, 85, 170
Aphrodite, 173
Apis, 174
Apollo, 175
Apollonius, 343, 344
Aquinas, Thomas, 256, 362, 364
Arabia, 166
Arabs, 273, 274, 349, 350
Aralu, 157, 158
Arapahoe, 170, 172, 173
Archimedes, 343
Architecture, 243, 244
Aristotle, 342, 350, 359
Arizona, 397, 428
Ark of the Covenant, 261
Arkansas, 392, 398, 401, 428
Armenia, 232
Art, 64, 119, 138, 140, 233, 238, 241, 242, 244, 245, 246, 249
  and belief phase of religion, 234–242
  and emotional phase of religion, 242–246
  and imitative magic, 245
  and religion
    common origin of, 242
  and ritual, 244
  as a substitute for religion, 483–486
  compatible with science, 484
  decorative, 241, 242, 245, 246
  domestic, 250
  naturalism in, 353
  religious, 241
  symbolic, 246
Arthur, King, 158
Arts and crafts,
  supernatural origin of, 249
Arunta, 49
Aryans, 60, 96, 149, 165, 167
Asceticism, 26, 74, 277
Ascetics, 259, 277, 288
Ashanti, 241
Asia, 37, 63, 140
Asia Minor, 174, 210
Assam, 267
Association by contiguity, 109, 120, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 181
  by similarity, 109, 120, 123, 124, 127, 181
Association for the Advancement of Atheism, 404
Assyria, 231, 362
Astrology, 126, 248, 254, 345
Astronomy, 274, 340, 342, 349
Athanasius, 366
Atharva Veda, 149
Atheism, 164, 393
Atheists, 365, 380, 391, 392
Athens, 174, 176, 262, 347
Aton, 162, 191, 192, 242

Attis, 160
Attis and Cybele myth, 174
Attributes, 19, 134, 135, 136
Augustine, St., 184, 193, 265, 345, 348, 359, 362, 365
Australia, 124, 151, 223, 226, 243, 253, 268
Australian, 2, 62, 122, 150, 263, 269, 287
  aborigines, 44, 53, 81, 92, 110
Autistic thinking, 134, 135, 136
Avalon, 158
Avard, 205
Avatar, 212
Avebury, Lord, 263
Avesta, 97, 161
Awe, 8, 75, 78, 92, 107
Aztecs, 139, 267

B

Bab, the, 212, 291
Babylonians, 59, 143, 157, 158, 160, 189, 210, 231, 246, 254, 258, 340, 362
Bacchus, 160
Bacon, Francis, 353
Bacon, Roger, 351, 364, 371
Bagdad, 349
Bahaism, 212, 291, 307, 487
Bain, R., 325, 328
Balder, 265
Baldwin, S., 409
Balfour, Earl of, 466
Banks Islanders, 151
Bantu, 151, 183, 223, 285
Baptism, 171, 172, 173, 176, 327
Baptists, 276, 289, 290, 292, 293, 294, 297, 298, 308, 392
Bar Kokebas, 194
Barnes, A. C., 233
Barnes, H. E., 445
Barton, Bruce,
  on Christ as a business man, 450
Bateson, William, 378, 379
Bear clan, 173, 224
Bears, 10, 126, 127, 128, 236
Beckaranta, 212
Behavior, 134, 178
  coercive, 65, 135, 250, 251
  impulsive crowd, 279
  mechanical, 65, 250, 251
  non-coercive, 19, 133, 134, 135
  segment, 134, 136, 137
  worshipful, 65
Behaviorists, 75
Belief, 13, 44, 51 134
  in a future life, 23
  in immortality,
    modern, 156, 160, 161
  in repetition of events, 134
  in wish fulfillment, 134
  primary, 156, 161
  religious, 13, 53, 58, 63, 133, 134, 135
  religious, *see* Religious belief
  segment, 134, 135, 136
Benedict, R. F., 53, 82, 180, 224
Benedictine order, 277
Bennett, 206
Bergson, H., 457, 459, 488
Bernard of Clairvoux, 185
Besant, Annie, 290
Bessarion, Cardinal, 352, 371
Betts, G. H., 325
Bible, 171, 172, 229, 261, 266, 273, 280, 284, 285, 309, 361, 368, 376, 379, 380, 382, 385, 391, 393, 400, 416, 445
  as basis of authority, 409
"Bible Crusaders," 387, 390
Bible selected by Catholic Church, 407
Biliku, 154
Biology, 142
Black Plague, 366
Blackfoot, 151
Blavatsky, Madame, 290
Bleuler, 121

Blondel, philosophy of, 460
Boas, Franz, 13, 14, 105, 234, 237, 260
Bodin, 361, 363
Bogoras, 186
Bois, Jules, 291
Bone pointing, 129
Book of Mormon, 201
  see also Mormon Bible
Booth, E., 428
Borneo, 183, 187
Bossard, J. H. S., 315, 316
Boyleston, Dr., 366
Bradford, G.,
  on hollowness of liberal religion, 414
Brahe, Tycho, 355, 361
Brahmanas, 266
Brahmanism, 143
Branford, V., 307
Brasol, Boris,
  on religion as moral sanction, 446
Breasted, J., 61, 88, 95, 123, 158, 190, 192, 193, 373
Breath, 22
Brethren, 297, 298
British Guiana, 223
Brown, A. R., 154
Brown, W. A., 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 308, 312, 313, 317, 318, 444
Bruno, Giordano, 354, 487
Bryan, W. J., 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 385, 389, 392, 395, 402, 403, 404
Bubastis, 249
Budde, 148
Buddha, 164, 193, 218
Buddhism, 8, 143, 161, 165, 177, 267, 307
Buddhists, 69, 75, 140, 193, 264
Buffalo Spirits, 225
Buffon, 357, 358
Bukaua, 268
Bull Dance, 78
Bull (papal),
  of Innocent VIII, 363, 365
Bull-roarers, 46, 92, 269
Burke, 364
Burma, 177
Bury, J. B., 348, 370
Bushee, F. A.,
  compatibility between science and religion, 464, 465, 473
Bushmen, 1, 52, 110, 151, 154, 183, 263
Butler Bill, 389

C

Cabbala, 210
Caesar Julius, 227, 344, 346
Cagn, 151
California, 166, 229, 329, 396–397, 398, 428
  Indians of, 180
Callahan, P., 431
Calvin, 292, 295, 359
Calvinism, 289
Campbellites, 200, 218, 219
Canaanites, 258
Canada, 303, 304
Cannibalism, 258
Cannon, James, 232
Carlson, A. D., similarity of art and religion, 485
Caribs, 122, 235
Carpenter, J., 2, 137, 249, 262, 264, 268, 269
Carroll, H. K., 297, 311, 312, 313
Carthage, 208, 258
Catherine, St., 185
Catholic Church, 243, 288, 289, 298, 311, 368
  moral influence of, 424
  Newman's defense of, 408
  opposition of
    to new order, 407
Catholic religion, 213

Catholic social Christianity, 423–424
critical comments on, 425–426
Catholics, 273, 297, 308, 312, 315, 359, 363, 365, 372, 397, 416
reacting to modern world, 406–409
Cave, 9, 10
Celestial bodies, 58, 59
Celeus, King of Eleusis, 174
Celibacy, 346
Celts, 98
Central Australia, 48
Ceremonial associations, 181
Ceremonialism, 70, 141, 180, 233, 244, 245
Ceremonies, 27, 45, 63, 92, 115, 166, 229, 264
see also Ritual
confirmation, 267
modifying religious pattern, 245
purification, 158
Ceylon, 177
Chamberlin, 373
Chants, 140
Charles I, 365
Charles, R. H., 148, 159
Charms, 120, 123, 130, 135, 189, 253, 279
Chemistry, 349, 365
Chicago, 307
Child welfare, 276
China, 27, 40, 60, 80, 83, 99, 100, 143, 146, 147, 149, 178, 216, 226, 229, 254, 255, 272, 275, 341
Chinese Book of Rites, 264
Chinese Emperor, Son of Heaven, 227
Chinese religion, 152
Chinook, 105
Choctaw, 204, 267
Christ, 126, 164, 173, 188, 193, 198, 209, 212, 216, 276, 281, 309, 327, 376, 420
teachings of
ambiguous, 444–445
Christ, teachings of,
of uncertain validity in modern world, 445
Christendom, 272
Christian, 4, 5, 74, 86, 130, 193, 213, 219, 232, 297, 304, 305, 345, 380
doctrine, 277
dogma, *see* Dogma, Christian
ideals, 284
Science, 217, 274, 290, 294, 309, 397
tradition, 270, 325, 358
Christianity, 69, 89, 126, 143, 144, 145, 150, 160, 166, 186, 193, 267, 272, 275, 276, 283, 290, 297, 298, 307, 324, 346, 348, 369, 370, 378, 385
influence on science, 345–348
social, 288, 417, 418–452
see also Liberal social Christianity,
and repressive Sabbath observance, 448
approaching religion in degree, 422
Catholic, *see* Catholic social Christianity
claim to be a religion examined, 421–423
linked with supernaturalism, 447
nature and aims of, 420–423
rise of, 418–420
Chukchi, 52, 186
Church, 41, 44, 90, 93, 113, 194, 270, 315, 317, 351, 355
and state, 287, 378, 409, 415
as source of moral authority, 430, 431
community, 301
denominational, 301
federated, 301
in relation to labor, 431
membership and attendance, 311–316, 334

Church,
national, 305
of the United Original Seceders, 302
treason to, 351
union, 300–301
Churchmen contributing to science, 371
Cicero, 359
Circumcision, 124, 268
City of God, 345
City of the Devil, 345
Civilization, 41, 272
Clairvoyance, 22, 85, 86, 126, 217
Clan feasts, 224
Clans, 25, 52, 222, 223, 224
Clarke, E. Y., 387, 402
Clay, 172, 173
Clay County, 205
Clayton, 208
Clement V, 367
Clennell, W. J., 99, 147, 227, 230
Cleopatra, 344
Codrington, 104
Cohen, 73
Coleman, G. S., 435
Collective behavior, diffusion of, 178
Color blindness, 296
Colorado, 396, 398
Commercial revolution, 273, 367
Communion, 129, 139, 184
Comparative method, 11, 41, 142
Comparative religion, 58, 144, 306
Compensatory reaction in religion, 74
Compte, A., 412, 486–487
Comstock, Sarah, 402
"Conception billets," 363
Conditioned response, 92
in support of Durkheim's theory, 93
Conflict of desires, 74, 89
Confucianism, 2
Confucius, 99, 164, 194
Congdon, J. E., 395
Congregationalists, 303, 304
Conklin, E. G., 381, 382, 383, 385, 403
Conklin, E. S., 329–330, 331, 332, 373
Connecticut, 397
Continuance theory, 156, 266
see also Tylor
Contract theory of relation of Winnebago gods to men, 189
Conversions, religious, 71, 290, 292
Conybeare, F. C., on New Testament origins, 444
Copernicus, 274, 353, 354, 359, 370, 371, 372, 453
Cordoso, 211
Cordova, 210
Cornelius, J. J., on imperialism linked with missionary work, 448–449
Corpse, 31, 36, 37, 83, 96, 101, 206
Corrobbori, 45, 93, 241, 243
Cosmic dualism, 74, 265, 336
Cosmic exploration, vision experience of, 180
Cosmogony, 45
Cosmology, 345, 349
Cowdry, Oliver, 199, 201, 202
Crashing Thunder, 183
Crawley, E., 15
Creator gods, 80, 94, 150–155
Creators, 153
Crescent, 233
Crete, 174, 210 341
Crises and religion, 77
Crises of life, 114
Croce, B., religion as immature philosophy, 469
Cro-Magnon, 9
Cross, 233
Crow Indians, 170, 180, 181, 184, 187, 225, 259
Crowd psychology, 55, 386
Crusade, children's, 278
Crusades, 210, 231, 274, 277, 278, 350

Crystal gazing, 85, 197
Ctesibius, 344
Cult of the dead, 96, 100, 157
Cults, 146, 147, 148, 153, 163, 171
  medico-religious, 310
  mystery, 161, 177
  of fertility and vegetation, 160
  Oriental, 310, 345
Cultural antecedents, 219, 220, 221
Cultural history, 58
  as determining form of religion, 168
Cultural innovations, 179
Culture, 3, 40, 53, 132, 141, 142, 143, 145, 152, 154, 155, 164, 166
  areas, marginal, 400
  change and the average individual, 178–181
  complex, evolutionary, 399, 400
  diffusion of, 25, 166, 167, 189, 399
  paleolithic, 242
  pattern, 19, 133, 136, 233, 234
    see Universal culture pattern
  tribal, 246
  pre-literate, 21, 143
Cumulative circular social response, 93
Cundiff, Bryce, 394
Customs, 141, 150, 257, 262, 269
  beginning of, 235, 236
Cutten, G. B., 273, 277, 278, 282
Cutting, R. F., 447
Cyril, St., 346, 347

D

Daevas and Deva, 98, 265
Dalai Lama, 229
Dalton, 373
Damnation, fear of, 267
Dance, 140, 158, 184
Dancing epidemic, 278
Danites, 205
Dante, 270, 359
Darumulun, 150, 269
Darwin, C., 142, 355, 358, 380
Darwinism, 275, 379, 384, 390, 391, 393
Davenport, F. M., 282, 283
David, 229, 244, 288
Davis, J. L., 457
Dawson, C., 475
Dayton trial, 389
Deaf and dumb, religious beliefs of, 67
Death, 31, 148, 152, 155, 250, 365
  magical cause of, 253
Definitions of religion, 12, 17, 44, 467
  author's, 19
  emphasizing emotion, 16
  minimum, 13, 19
  stressing belief, 12
Deities, 7, 21, 34, 38, 39, 58, 214, 239, 266
  celestial, 59
  change and fusion of, 155
  origin of, 38
  supreme, 29, 59
Delaware, 397, 398
Delaware prophet, 196, 214
Delawares, 195
Demeter, 174, 175
Democritus, 341
Demon, 27, 33, 34, 40, 67, 164, 265, 365
Denney, J. V., 392
Denominational rivalry, 289–290, 299
Denominations, 297, 298, 302
Dervishes, 70, 184
Descartes, 274, 353, 355
Devils, 27, 38, 74, 90, 145, 161, 203, 265, 325, 334, 335, 346, 391
Dhalla, M. N., 161
Dialogue of a Misanthrope, 158
Diderot, 274
Dieffenbach, A. C., 398
Diffusion, 145, 168
Diffusion and fusion of religion
  examples of, 168–178

Diocletian, 348
Dionysos, 77, 158, 160, 174
Disease, 228, 250, 262, 310, 341, 365
  cure, theories of, 365
  innoculation against, as related to religion, 365, 366
  theories of, among primitive peoples, 252–254
    see also Theories of disease
Disease-Giver, 253
Diseases, sacred, 341, 342
Dissatisfaction with life as basis of religion, 66, 74
Divination, 34, 86, 100, 110, 131, 134, 252, 253, 254
Dobu Islanders, 101
Dogma, Christian, 193, 364, 371, 377
  of original ancestral ghost worship, 34
  theological, 350
Dominican orders, 350
Dorchester, D., 313, 314
Doubles, 31, 36
Dowie, A., 218
Drama, origin of, in religious rites, 244
Draper, J. W., 340, 343, 345, 346, 349, 368
Dream theory, 30, 48, 57, 81, 157
"Dreamers," 196
Dreams, 21, 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 43, 79, 81, 97, 115, 122, 129, 141, 142, 168, 182, 237, 241, 245, 246
Dream-vision theory, 81
Dresser, 218
Dresslar, F. B., 328
Driesch, H., 459
Drugs, 22
Druids, 62
Druses, 212
Duality in nature, 30, 31
Du Buy, Jean, 292
Dunlap, K., 66, 68, 69, 70, 72, 74, 109, 126
Durkheim, E., 16, 21, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 91, 92, 113, 137, 222, 241, 286
Durkheim, definition and approach, 43
  group stimulation theory of, 56, 93
  sociological theory, 42
  theory criticism of, 51
Dynasty, 146

E

Earthmaker, 94, 130, 155, 189, 235, 237, 239, 244
Earthmother, 58, 72, 87
Ebionites, 216
Ecclesiastical institutions, 41, 183
Eddington, A. S., 459
Eddy, Gilbert, 217
Eddy, Mary Baker, 217, 290
Eddy, Sherwood, 420, 432, 444
Eddystone Island, 252
Edict of Toleration, 348
Edman, I., 334
Education, board of, 396
Education, secularization of, 287
Edwards, Jonathan, 69, 282, 335
Egbo society, 71, 132, 225, 243, 269
Egypt, 1, 59, 73, 87, 131, 143, 146, 148, 162, 163, 164, 189, 191, 210, 224, 226, 231, 246, 253, 272, 340, 356, 362, 383
  future life, 158
Egyptian mummies, 204
Egyptian religion, 41, 60, 97, 179, 264, 265, 272
  as modified by diffusion, 173–177
Egyptians, 11, 59, 61, 63, 71, 88, 95, 116, 120, 123, 125, 138, 140, 157, 159, 179, 190, 195, 211, 244, 249, 254, 269, 286
Ekoi, 11, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 68, 71, 72, 94, 105, 123, 127, 130, 131, 132, 135, 138, 147, 149, 156, 180, 189, 194, 195, 224, 225,

236, 237, 243, 249, 254, 263, 266, 269, 279, 286, 338
myths, 245
religion, 58, 61
modified by diffusion, 169
ritual, relation to mysteries, 169
theory of disease, 253
Trickster Tales, 237
Elation, 134, 136
Elephant, 12
Eleusinian mysteries, 159, 169, 175, 244
Elijah, 158
Ellis, Havelock, 5, 263
on compatibility of emotion with science, 483
on impulses, religious and scientific, 479–480
Ellis Bill, 393
Ellwood, C. A., 144, 436
argument for union of Christianity and sociology, 436
proposed union of sociology and religion,
criticism of, 437–438
Elysian fields, 158, 161
Emotion, religious, 16, 17, 43, 55, 67, 184
see also Religious emotion, crowd psychology, theory of
Emotion, stimulation of (by drugs, etc.), 77–78, 184–185
Emotional experience of child in social situation, 92
Emotional factors in religion, 66, 78, 134
Emotional temperament, 184
Emperor, 147
Encyclopaedists, 274
England, 206, 304, 307, 318, 363
English, H. B., 473
Epilepsy, 27, 341
Episcopal church, 290
Epworth League, 306
Erasmus, 367
Eratosthenes, 343
Erman, A., 95, 106, 120, 121, 190
Errors, Syllabus of, 275
Eschatology, 265
Eskimos, 120, 123, 260, 262
Ethical culture, 415, 487
Ethics, 2, 150, 256, 270
Ethnologists, 29, 104
Euchhorn, 368
Euclid, 343, 354
Eugene IV, Pope, 363
Euripides, 341
European peasants, magic of, 123, 124
Evangelical Association, 308
Everlasting gospel, 201
Evil eye, 131, 164
Evolution, 29, 32, 164, 325, 356–359, 375, 380, 381, 382, 384
controversy, 378–386
see also Anti-evolution associations
see also Anti-evolution laws
of ecclesiastical institutions, 40
Evolution, war against, 387–399
Evolutionary scheme, 35, 41, 57
Exogamy, 223
Exorcism, 34, 96, 363
Extraordinary, 18, 19, 52, 67
Ezekiel, 159

F

Fairies, 130, 335
Faith, 141, 349
and philosophy of the future, 482–490
healing, 85, 274, 310
magical, 141
"Fall of Man," 362, 368
Family, 52, 87
organization and religion, 225–226
Fanatical movements, 277–278

Fanatics, 278
Faraday, M., 373
Faris, E., 308
Fasting, 184, 268
Father image, 89
Fayette, N. Y., first conference of Mormon church, 202
Fear, 55, 68, 73, 134, 135, 136, 168, 270
  decline of, 163
Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 304, 305, 313, 431, 432, 446
  report on principles, 420–421
Federation of churches, New York, 301
Fengshui, *see also* Taoism
Ferguson, C. W., 218
Fertility goddesses, 73, 87, 160
Festivals, 34, 346
Fetish worship, 27, 36
Fetishism, 37, 53, 80, 143, 242, 253, 263, 365
Fifth Monarchy Men, 216
Fijians, 24, 39
Fishbein, Morris, 310
Fiske, C.,
  on conception of God as a Rotarian, 449
  on unscientific church social work, 442–443
Flagellants, 278
Florida, 395, 398
Flowers, M., 404
Flügel, J. C., 90, 268
Folk-lore, 63, 130, 137
Folk-tales, 95, 235
Fosdick H. E., 385, 444
  on emotional needs basic to religion, 477–478
Francis, St., 185
Franciscan Order, 350
Franklin, Benjamin, 364
Frazer, J. G., 7, 13, 16, 61, 62, 91, 109, 110, 111, 123, 124, 125, 128, 137, 139, 175, 248
Freedom of thought, 347, 371
Freudians, on God as father image, 264
Fry, C. L., 316
Fundamentalism and "Christian love," 386–387
Fundamentalism,
  attitudes replacing, 482
  causes of, 399–404
  Christian, 375–378
  motivated by its leaders, 402–403
  principles of, 376, 377, 378
  product of distrust of science, 403–404
  product of marginal culture, 399–400
  product of moral earnestness, 404–405
  product of poverty and ignorance, 400–401
  product of war and crowd behavior, 401–402
Fundamentalist,
  attack on science,
    future of, 398–399
  crusade, 375–402
  movement, 356, 399
  social Christianity, 326–429
    and repressive legislation, 426–428
Fundamentalists, 318, 375, 379, 385, 386, 387, 388, 391, 396, 397, 399, 405, 416
  in reaction to modern world, 409
Future life, 24, 32, 156, 157, 266
  see also Immortality
  as compensation, 157
  moral significance of, 266–267
  nature of, 25

G

Gaines, 393
Galen, 274, 344, 365, 369

EVANGELICAL
SCHOOL OF THEOLOGY
139

Galileo, 274, 352, 353, 354, 355, 370, 372
Galton, F., 296, 358, 488
Gambling, laws against, 428
Ganymede, 158
Gauls, 143
Gayley, C. M., 234
Genesis, 356, 380
Genius, 220
  the problem of, 179
Gennep, A. Van, 77
Gentiles, 205, 208
Georgia, 394, 398, 401
Gerard of Cremona, 350
German, 149
German Evangelical Synod, 290
Ghost dance, 78, 170, 177, 215, 220, 243
Ghost soul idea, other factors in the origin of, 83–87
Ghost-soul, 22, 30, 31, 142
Ghost-theory, 37, 42, 48, 79–83, 126
Ghosts, 13, 23, 24, 25, 32, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 48, 49, 60, 63, 65, 83, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 127, 135, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 189
Gibbon, 278
Giddings, F. H., 293, 295
Gift of tongues, 204, 210
Gilbert, William, 354
Gill and Pinchot, 300
Gilmore, G. M., 102
Gladden, Washington, 418, 429
Glover, 217
Gnostic sects, 265
God, belief in, 322, 323
  by students, 323–324, 326–327
God personal, necessary to religion, 422
God unknown, concept of, 156
Goddard, Pliny, 240
Gods, 1, 3, 8–13, 27, 28, 34, 35, 36, 39, 48, 57, 63, 65, 67, 72, 74, 87, 89, 91, 95, 127, 146, 149, 184, 205, 230, 265, 288, 289, 317, 335, 356, 357, 379, 380
  and the morals of men, 263, 266
  creator, *see* Creator gods
  fusion of, 174
  household, 148
  multiple origin of, 103
  nature—*see* Nature gods
  origin and development of, 58, 79, 103, 146–155
  personal, 284, 323, 324, 334, 405
  tribal, 159, 193
Gold plates, 198
Golden Bible, 198
Golden Bough, 61, 62, 109
Goldenweiser, A. A., 17, 18, 51, 52, 53, 54, 67, 80, 104, 106, 107, 110, 111, 136, 137, 141, 177, 247, 248
  totems not worshipped, 224
  varied forms of totemism, 223
Gospel, 156
Gould, R. L., 329
Granada, 350
Great Awakening, 282
Great Spirit, 195
Greece and Greeks, 61, 62, 97, 98, 143, 147, 149, 157, 158, 173, 235, 244, 258, 265, 274, 341, 342, 343
Greenland, 183, 267
Grey Bull, 184
Grosseteste, Robert, 351, 371
Guardian-spirits, 53, 60, 82, 95, 97, 169, 229
Guild, R. B., 302
Gulick, S. L., 432
Guyon, Mme., 185

H

Hades, 97, 146, 157, 175, 176
Haeckel, 358, 383, 384, 488

Hakim Singh, 212
Hale, 198
Hall of Vision, 307
Halley, 361
Hallowell, A. I., 62
Hallucinations, 82, 141, 185, 186
Hammurabi, code of, 266
Handsome-Lake, 177, 219
Hardy, Thomas, quoted, 483
Hare, 63, 237, 244, 249
Harris, Martin, 198–199, 200
Harrison, Frederic, 487
Harrison, Jane, 244, 245
Hartt, R. L.,
  on disruption of Protestantism, 410
  on Papal and Non-Papal Fundamentalists, 409, 415
Hate, 134, 136
Hay, Austin, 381
Haydon, A. E., 186, 413
Healing, supernatural, 310
Heaven, 60, 158, 281, 325
Hebrew Scriptures, 200
Hebrews, 39, 61, 140, 147, 152, 153, 154, 157, 166, 235, 260, 288
Hell, 8, 69, 161, 282, 325, 334, 335, 359
Henotheism, 144
Hensley, 171, 173, 178, 219
Herder, 368
Hereafter, locality of, 25
Heresy, 351, 354, 355, 370
Heretics, 348, 351
Hero, 344
  worship, 147
Herodotus, 175
Hewitt, J. N. B., 105
Hidatsa, 181
Hike, 106, 125
Himes, Joshua, 280, 281
Hindu, 2, 97, 147, 149
Hipparchus, 343
Hippocrates, 274, 365
Hippocratic school, 341
Historians, 186, 320, 335
Hoax for women, 268
Hobbs, 6, 368
Hoeffding, H., 15
Holmes, J. H., 298, 301, 315, 316, 435
Holy Laugh, 283
Holy Rollers, 290
Holy Spirit, 55
Holzinger, 148
Home missions, 303, 306
Homosexuals, 187
Horus, 87, 125, 175, 176
Hottentot, 126
House of David, 284
Howells, W. D., 281
Howerth, I. W., telic progress, with the aid of science and religious ideals, 436–437
Hubert and Mauss, 138
Hugo of St. Victor, 185
Huitzilopochtli, 3
Human sacrifice, 58
Humanism, 352
Humanitarianism, 276, 277
  as a substitute for religion, 486–487
Humility, 16
  in religion, 110
Huxley, Julian
  on reconciliation of science and religion, 466–469, 473, 476
Huxley, Thomas, 263, 358
  on science as guide to living, 488
Hymnals, 70
Hymns, 191
Hypatia, 346, 347
Hypnotism, 85, 131, 132, 216
Hypothesis, 41, 66, 80
Hysteria, 27, 363

I

Iacchos, 175
Idaho, 397

Identification with the group, 93
Idolatry, 28, 36
Idols, 28, 34, 36, 37, 39, 150
Iknaton, 162, 179, 189, 190, 192, 193, 226, 242, 272
Illinois, 205, 206
Illiteracy, 401
Illusion, 43
Im Turn, 81
Imagination, 8
Imhotep, 146
Immaculate conception,
  dogma of, 275, 408
Immortality, 13, 15, 24, 48, 49, 51, 68, 84, 115, 156–162, 193, 197, 209, 237, 245, 284, 322, 334
  belief in, 322
    by students, 324–325, 326–327
Incantations, 126
Incas, 151
Index, 354, 355
India, 27, 60, 78, 97, 139, 165, 185, 212, 216, 223, 258, 265, 272, 307, 341
  caste system of, 229, 269
Indian religion, 106
Indiana, 396, 398
Indians, 2, 28, 69, 77, 81, 85, 105, 165, 195, 212, 213, 214, 227, 239, 284, 285
  California, 166, 215
  Guiana, 140, 212
  Plains, 126, 140, 177, 220, 245, 259
Individual and society, 179
Individual differences and religious change, 182–184, 291
Individualism, 160, 163, 286, 288–289, 429
Indo-Europeans, 59, 60, 97, 149
Induction, law of, 120, 331, 333, 360, 475
Industrial revolution, 288
Inferno, 69
Inge, Dean, 370, 411, 471
Ingersoll, R., 335
Initiation ceremonies, 92, 115, 140, 176, 181, 226, 268–269
Innocent III, 351
Innocent VIII, Pope, 363
Innovations in religion, 180
Inquisition, 210, 351, 353, 354, 393
Instinct, religious, 68
Instincts, 65, 71, 73
Intellectual ability,
  differences in, 183
Intellectual curiosity, 183
Intellectual factors creating a supernatural world, 78–79
Intellectuals, 322
Interchurch World Movement, 304, 431, 447
Inventions, 178, 220, 234
Iowa, 397
Irish, 214
Iroquois, 53, 78, 105, 177, 219, 225
Isadore of Seville, 348, 359
Isaiah, 159
Ishtar, 59, 73
  temple of, 258
Isis, 73, 87, 125, 173, 175, 176, 177, 239, 249, 250, 345
Islamism, 89, 143, 194, 211, 266
Israel, 229
Italy, 160

J

Jackson County, 205
Jahveh, 39, 138, 148, 157, 159, 193, 262, 367
James I, 363
James, W., on reality of subjective experience, 461–462
Janet, Pierre, 218
Japan, 80, 178, 216, 262, 264
Jastrow, M., 14, 143
Jeremiah, 159
Jesuits, 354

Jews, 193, 200, 209, 210, 211, 231, 262, 277, 278, 350, 366
Jin kwei, 149
Job, 157, 159, 193
John of Leyden, 187
John the Baptist, 201
Jones, A., 392
Jones, E., 90
Jones, W., 104
Johnson, F. E., 429
Jordan, D. S., 377, 473
  reverence for rational order not opposed to science, 464
Jovi-s, 149
Judaism, 69, 89, 143
Judas, leader of the Zealots, 209
Jujus, 61, 94, 127, 242, 253, 263
Justinian, 347

K

Ka, 95, 97
Kalevala, 69
Kami, 264
Kanakuk, the Kickapoo prophet, 196, 214
Kansas, 396, 398, 428
Kant, E., 357, 477, 487
Karma, 272
Karnak, 148, 243
Keith, A., 379
Kelvin, 373
Kennedy, R., 217
Kentucky, 392–394, 398, 401
  revival, 282
  University of, 393
Kepler, 274, 355, 361, 372
Keres, 97, 157
Keskamzit, 123
Ketteler, Bishop, 423
Khonds, 74, 250
Kidd Benjamin,
  on religion as ultra-rational sanction, 446
Kinderhook plates, 201
King, Irving, 15, 91, 222
Kingdom of God,
  as a Puritan theocracy, 426
Kings, 91, 125, 139, 146, 148, 150, 152, 155, 183, 193, 194, 226, 229, 231
  Tongan, 183
Kingsley, Charles, 418, 429
Kinsmen, 23, 31, 181
Kiowa, 214
Kirghis, 125
Kirtland, 202, 203, 204
Koran, 69, 266, 347, 349
Koryak, 241
Kroeber, 9, 166
Ku Klux Klan, 387, 402, 416
Kuan ti, 147
Kuan Yü, 147
Kuenen, 368
Kurnai, 150
Kawakiutl, 105

L

La Flesche, F., 69
Labrador, 129, 245, 254
Lamaism, Buddhistic, 229
Lambeth Conference, 429–430
Lang, A., 13, 84, 85, 86, 132, 150, 151, 152, 154, 156, 163, 183
  high-god theory, 152–154, 162, 239, 263
Language and religion, 167
Lao-tse, 164, 194
Laplace, 357
Lateran Council, 365
Latin, 149
Lausanne, 306
Law of participation, 121
Laws, C. L., 375
Leadership
  as a social process, 184
  social nature of, 218–221

Leatherwood God, 281
Lebuff, F. P., 383–384
Lecky, W. F. H., 280
Legend, 235, 367
Legge, F., 174, 175
Leibnitz, 220, 459
Leo XIII, Pope, 408
  on condition of labor, 424
Leuba, J. H., 13, 14, 49, 66, 81, 83, 84, 103, 137, 141, 155, 157, 158, 161, 184, 185, 186, 266, 318, 320, 322, 323, 324, 327, 489
  claim of discontinuity, criticism of, 160–162
  contribution of Hebrews to modern belief, 159
  denying that values constitute religion, 421–422
  magic and coercive behavior, 250
  modern belief due to emotion, 160
  non-genetic origin of immortality, 156, 160
Levy-Bruhl, L., 121, 331
Liberal social Christianity, 429–435
  and fundamentalist missionary work, 448
  and industrial relations, 429–432
  and international relations, 432–433
  and missionary activity, 435
  and political reform, 435
  and race relations, 433–434
  and reflection of economic situations, 449–452
  and social and recreational life, 435
  criticism of, 442–452
  fundamentalist adhesions, 447–449
  imperfect adjustment to science, 442
  lack of unity and authority, 446–447
  lack of valid standards in, 444
Liberals' acceptance of,
  Biblical criticism, 411
  doctrine of divine immanence, 412
  evolution, 411
Liberals,
  aesthetic reaction of, 412
  dissatisfaction of, 413–414
  in reaction to modern world of science, 410–415, 416
  stress on moral and social idealism, 413
Library, Andalusia, 349
  Fatimite, 349
Life-potency, 103
Lightfoot, Dr., 356
Linn, A. W., 197, 198, 200, 208
Linneus, 358
Literature, 64
  sacred, 367
Lloyd, A. H., 373
Logos doctrine, 345
Loki, 265
Lombard, Peter, 356
London Daily News, 318
London Nation and Athenaeum, 318
Longfellow, Samuel, 306
Lord's Day Alliance, 428
Louisiana, 390, 398, 401
Lourdes, 274
Love, 69, 89, 134, 136, 230
Lowie, R., 17, 43, 51, 52, 53, 67, 79, 110, 125, 181, 184, 187, 226, 229, 233, 241, 245, 285
  high god concept, 154–155
  on mental imagery, 182
  on theory of sickness, 165
Lucifer, 359
Lustration, 140
Luther, 356, 357, 359, 361, 363
Lutheran, 297, 302, 303
  National Council, 303
Lutheranism, 289, 298
Lyell, 361
Lynching, opposition to, 434

M

Maccabees, 210
McCann, 384
McComas, H. C., 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 299, 308, 311, 312
McDougall, W., 75, 76, 183
Macfarland, C. S., 304, 421, 431, 435
Mackenzie River Athabaskans, 52
MacLeod, W. C., 170, 195, 213, 214, 285
McPherson, 385
MacPherson, Aimee Semple, 402
McVey, President of Kentucky State University, 393
"Mad Hakim," 211
Mad Mullah, 212
Maddox, J. L., 310
Magic, 2, 7, 8, 10, 20, 34, 44, 66, 67, 102, 104, 114, 125, 126, 127, 132, 134, 135, 136, 141, 163, 195, 214, 239, 248, 251, 260, 310, 311, 331, 363
  adequacy of classification of, 130–132
  and medicine, 252–253
  and primitive science, 109, 111
  and religion, conventional distinctions between, 109–120
  and science, 247–248
  and technology, 114, 250–254, 338, 339
  as emotional expression, 112, 116, 117, 128, 129
  as primitive science, 248
  as use of power, 111
  based on assumed repetition, 120–121, 131, 333
  based on autistic thinking, 120, 121–128, 132
  black, 132, 279, 364
  contagious, 110, 120, 124–128, 130
  decline of, 163
  magic formulae, 106
Magic,
  imitative, 110, 120, 122–124, 130, 139, 251, 262
  nature and types of, 119–130, 133
  negative, 262
  power, 105, 106, 113, 125, 251, 252, 253, 254
  priority to religion, 110, 111
  retroactive, 120, 128
  rites, 61, 65, 101, 113, 116, 124, 129, 130, 137, 163, 181, 214, 223, 248, 250, 251
  sympathetic, 109
  spells, 101, 267
  spells as exertion of will and mana, 112, 116
  traditional element in, 116
  will, 120, 128–130, 131
Magicians, 39, 44, 76, 91, 111, 114, 122, 130, 132, 141, 251, 253
Magico-religious culture pattern, 104, 113, 133, 181, 239, 242
Mahdi, 211, 212
  of the Sudan, 212
Maidu, 263
Maine, 395, 398
Malagasy warrior, 123
Malay, 122, 124, 126
Malinowski, B., 101, 113, 128, 129, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138, 233, 235, 240, 251, 286
  nature of myth, 240
  on mana concept in magic, 118
  on nature and purpose of magic, religion and science, 118
  on nature of magic, 116
  on relation of magic and religion, 113–119
Malinowski's view of magic and religion, criticism of, 119
Man, E. H., 154
Mana, 16, 17, 47, 49, 54, 104, 106, 107, 112, 117, 119, 123, 124,

125, 126, 127, 134, 136, 228, 241, 242, 260, 261, 333
Manaism, 104–108
Manebozho, 214, 250
Manes worship, 147, 157
Manetho, 174, 175
Mangaia Island, 228
Manichean, 265
Manitou, 17, 104, 105, 106, 245
Manu, Laws of, 266
Manuscript Found, 200
Maori, 127
Marett, R. R., 9, 16, 18, 106, 107, 111, 112, 116, 129
on relation between magic and religion, 112–113, 117
Mariner, 255
Martin, A. W., 307
Martin, E. D., 89, 90, 386
Martyrs, 346
Marvin, F. S., 341
Maryland, 397
Masai, 285
Massachusetts, 397
Master of Life, 187
Materialism, 286, 287–288
Mather, K. F.,
on compatibility of science and religion, 463–464
Maurice, F. D., 418, 429
Maxwell, 373
Maya, 246, 247, 338
Mayer, J., 372
Mecca, 178
Medicine, 126, 127, 181, 342, 349, 365
bags or bundles, 28, 126, 131
Crow, 184
dance, 77, 78, 119, 135, 172, 240, 244
compared to meeting of social Christians, 423
men, 40, 70, 152, 194, 196, 227, 250, 253
Mediterranean, 157, 158, 160, 194
Mediums, 97, 98, 101, 310
Melanchthon, 359
Melanesia, 80, 101, 216, 223, 226, 252, 268
Melanesians, 49, 104, 128, 251
Memory images of dead, 83
Mendel, Gregor, 372
Menelaus, 158
Mennonites, 284, 290, 297
Mental abnormality and religion, 186–188
Mental imagery, 182
Messiahs, 187, 188, 195, 196, 209–216, 227, 291
Indian, 212–216
Jewish, 209–211
Mohammedan, 211–212
Messianic hope, 209
Messianic movement, 220, 227, 280
Methodism, 280
Methodist Board of Temperance, Prohibition and Public Morals, 426–427
Methodist Recorder, 232
Methodists, 276, 289, 290, 292, 293, 294, 297, 298, 302, 303, 304, 308
Mexico, 2, 3, 60, 139, 169, 196, 246, 250, 258, 287
Mfour, 127
Michigan, 397
Micmac Indian, 123
Middle Ages, 273, 288, 335, 356, 359, 369, 370, 418
Middle Kingdom, 189
Militarism, 41, 232
Millennial change, 195
Miller, A. M., 394
Miller, H. C., 88
Miller, William, 197, 216, 220, 280, 281
Millerites, 202, 281
Millikan, R. A., 373

Millikan, R. A.,
compatibility of science and religion, 465–466
Milton, 270
Minerva, 249
Minnesota, 395, 398
Minoan civilization, 58, 169
Miracles, 34, 101, 204, 206, 216, 272, 274, 309, 334, 365, 380
Missionaries, 183, 206
Mississippi, 390, 398, 401
Missouri, 205, 206, 394–395, 398
Mithraism, 177, 265
Mocho, Solomon, 210
Modernism, 378
anonymous criticism of, 414
in Catholic Church, 408–409
Modernist movement, 275
Modernists, 376, 385, 387, 398, 405, 412
Mohammed, 166, 187, 194, 196, 218
Mohammedanism, 69, 144, 165, 166, 178, 211, 216, 228, 267, 347
Moloch, 258
Monasticism, 277
Monks, 165
Lama, 230
Monogamy, spiritual, 455
Monolatrous, 148, 153
Monotheism, 58, 143, 144, 145, 153, 154, 159, 164, 176, 179, 189, 193, 197, 226
rise in Egypt, 190–193
Montagnais-Naskapi Indians, 129, 245, 254
Montana, 397, 428
Montespan, 10
Moon, 58, 94
god, 59
Mooney, J., 177, 184, 195, 216
Moral standards, validity of, 257–258
Moral teaching, 268–269
Morality, 150, 256, 257, 265, 266, 267, 270, 271
Moravians, 290
Morehouse, F. C., 430
Mores, 257, 258, 259
see also Customs
Mormon Bible, 200, 202, 208
Mormon prophet, 196
Mormonism, 197, 219, 290
Mormons, 194, 196, 197, 199, 205, 206, 208, 230, 283, 290, 397
Morning Star, 58, 94, 249
Morocco, 216
Morrison, 396
Moses, 172, 196, 362, 368
Mother church, 88, 218
Mother image, 88, 90
Mourners, 40
Mourning, 50, 51
Mourning rites, origin of, 49
Mousterian, 9
Moxon, C., 73
Müller, F. M., 67, 149
type of religion of linguistic stocks, 167
Munganngaur, 150
Münster, 187, 229
Murry, M. A., 335
Music, 243, 250
Muste, A. J., 431
Mysterious, 18, 67, 107
power, 29, 75
Mystery, 17, 471, 476
religion, 214
Mysticism, 184, 185, 345, 367, 372
Mystics, 5, 68, 69, 168, 184–186, 372, 476
Christian, 185
Myth-making, 64, 234
Mythologies, 43
Mythology, 58, 131, 141, 143, 151, 153, 241, 251, 263, 272, 339
and primitive science, 339
Norse, 265
Myths, 149, 152, 158, 161, 234–240, 260, 367, 371

Myths,
about the gods, 236–237
aesthetic or recreational, 238–239, 244
and supernaturalism, 239
as infantile wishful thinking, 238
as part of universal pattern, 234
as transmission of cultural tradition, 240
in relation to magic, 239
in relation to taboo, 239
of origin of death, 84
of origins, 235–236
of unsatisfied desires, 237, 238
origin, 173, 240, 245

N

Napi, 151
Naskapi Indians, *see* Montagnais-Naskapi Indians
Natchez, 60
Nation, Carrie, 228
National Baptist Convention, 290
National Catholic Welfare Council, program of, 424
National Industrial Conference Board and wealth of states, 401
Nationalism, 306
Natural endlessness of man, 84
Natural phenomena, 58, 79
Naturalistic science,
and religion,
the incompatibility of, 469–475
reaction against, 457–462
Naturalistic universe pictured by science, 453–457
Nature gods, 58, 59, 60, 80, 148, 153, 154, 155
Nature-spirits, 149
Naualak, 105
Nauvoo, 206, 207, 208
Navaho, 220
Neanderthal, 9, 383
Nebraska, 397
Necromancy, 131
Negro, Louisiana, 126
Neo-Platonism, 345, 372
Nevada, 397
New Hampshire 217, 397, 398
New Jersey, 397
New Mexico, 397
"New Reformation," 410
New Testament, 91
New Thought Movement, 218, 274
New York, 397
New York Times, 379, 382, 403
New Zealand, 23, 304
Newbold, W. R., 364
Newman, John, 460
justification of unchanging church, 407–408
Newton, F. J., 478
Newton, I., 220, 274, 355, 361, 372, 471, 487
Nias, 124
Nicholas of Cusa, Cardinal, 352, 371
Nile, 60, 61, 148
Nimm, 63, 225, 226, 249
Nirvana, 75
Njomm, 105, 126
Norris, J. F., 375, 391, 402
North America, 52, 53, 82, 104, 106, 180, 213, 214, 223
North Coralina, 396, 398, 401
North Dakota, 397, 398
Northrop, A., 386
Northwest Coast, 165, 242
Nowack, 148
Nsi, 59, 61, 236
Nut, 59
Nymphs, 335

O

Oath-taking, 265
Obassi, 130
O'Brien, J. F., 419
Obstetrics, metaphysical, 218
Ogburn, W. F., 220

Ogburn, W. F.,
on bias in sociology, 441
Ohio, 396, 398
Oji tree, 61
Ojibwa, 106, 122
Oklahoma, 170, 390, 398, 401
Old Testament, 91, 193, 262, 264
Oldham, J. H., 433
Oracles, 27, 148, 228, 265
Ordeals, 194, 265, 267, 268
Oregon, 397, 428
Orenda, 17, 105, 117
Origin of Species, 142, 274, 358
Ormuz, 74, 265
Orpheus, 160
Orphic cult, 158, 159, 161
Osage Indians, 224
Osaw, 58, 237
Osborn, 373, 379, 381, 403
Osirian faith, 160
Osirian judgment, 267
Osiris, 59, 60, 61, 73, 74, 87, 146, 148, 174, 175, 176, 179, 204, 237, 244, 250, 265
myth, 87, 174, 175, 240, 244
Oxford Movement, 368, 407

P

Pachacamac, 151, 260
Pacifism,
sanction for and against in Bible, 445
Page, Kirby, 420, 432, 444, 449
Paine, Tom, 274
Paiutes, 78, 215, 220
Paintings, 9
Pan, 335
Pandora, 97, 236
Panpsychism, 412
Pantheism, 191, 354, 412, 474, 487
Pantheon, 40
Papal Infallibility,
dogma of, 275, 408
Papuans, 181
Paradise, 215, 359
Paradise Lost, 69
Parker, A. C., 238
Parmelee, M., 257, 277
Parrish, H., 299, 410
Parsees, 165
Pascal, 373
Pasteur, 373
quoted, 476
Pater, Walter,
quoted, 485–486
Patheseske, 195
Paton, L. B., 59, 95, 96, 98, 146, 147, 148, 149, 159
Patrick, G. T. W.,
on support to religion from vitalism, 488
Patriotic sentiment, 230
Pattern, religious, 134, 180
Patterson, 217
Paul, St., 156, 184, 185, 193, 194
Paulson, Alice, 310
Pawnee, 58, 151, 170
Pearson, Karl, on method of science, 340, 341, 470
Penances, 267
Pennsylvania, 197, 397, 428
Pentateuch, 368
Penupenu, 252
Perry, W. J., 167
Persecution, religious, 269, 270
Persephone, 174, 175
Persia and Persians, 74, 97, 98, 149, 159, 161, 212, 265, 291
Personality types in religion, 293–295
Personification, tendency to, 79
Peru, 2, 60, 77, 250, 263
Peschel, 58
Peter of Abano, 351
Peter Pan, 88, 335
Peter the Hermit, 278
Peter the Reader, 347
Peters, I. L., 328
Petrie, W. M. F., 61

Pettazzoni, R., 150
Peyote,
as god, 171
Peyote cult, 178, 371
diffusion of, to Winnebago, 169–173
ritual, 172
Pezet, W., on temporal power of evangelism, 426–427
Phantoms, 21, 22, 23
Philadelphia, 303
Philippines, 216, 397, 398
Philo, 345
Philologists, 149
Philosophers, 70, 142, 188, 189, 248, 257, 271, 341, 344
Greek, 159, 247, 357
Philosophical genius, 183
Philosophical idealism, 460, 475, 476
Philosophy, 6, 13, 22, 28, 64, 339, 347
classical, 193
primitive,
in relation to science and mythology, 339
Phrygia, 160
Physical factors in religion, 58
Physicists, 322
Physis, 341
Pinel, 367
Pius IX, 275, 408
Pius X, Pope, crushing of Modernism, 409
Plains tribes, 63, 215, 216
Plant worship, 38, 224
Plato, 159, 342, 350
Play behavior, 70
Pliny, 348
Plotinus, 185
Pluto, 176
Poe, E. A., 335
Poetry and religion, 243–244, 250
Political changes, 40
Political organization and religion, 226, 233
Political power, 40
Political revolution, 227
Politics,
influence on religion, 190
Polygamy, 188, 195
Polygyny,
Mormon doctrine of, 207, 208, 230
Polynesia, 80, 85, 183, 228, 254, 259, 260, 261, 269
socio-religious system of, 229
Polynesians, cosmological system of, 247
Polytheism, 2, 28, 143, 144, 152, 153
Pomponazzi, 352
Pontiac rebellion, 195
Poor relief, 276
Popè, 194, 227
Popes, 165, 194, 227, 247, 355
Poseidon, 60, 176
Positivism, 487
Powell, Rev., 393
Power, spiritual, 54
Power, supernatural, 17, 76, 104, 126, 127, 138, 195, 211, 269, 271
Powers, H. H.,
on ambiguity of Christian teaching, 414–415
Powers, 14, 15, 54, 66, 141, 153, 227, 253, 261
extraordinary, 47
mysterious, 19, 29, 65, 78, 104, 107, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139, 233, 311
natural, 39
of nature, 58
Practices, 44
Pragmatism,
as a reaction to naturalistic science, 460–462
Pratt, J., 292
Pratt, Orson, 208
Prayers, 34, 45, 66, 120, 139, 141, 264, 272, 286, 336, 363
Prayer-wheel, 140

Predestination,
doctrine of, 273
Pre-literate peoples, 11, 20, 25, 64, 65, 101, 119, 246, 248, 286, 338
Presbyterian, 290, 292, 293, 294, 297, 298, 302, 303, 304, 397
Priestesses, 226
Priesthood, 41, 190, 192, 269
of Aaron, 202
Priest-king, 40
Priests, 3, 24, 27, 40, 41, 43, 44, 70, 77, 78, 85, 91, 95, 141, 153, 164, 174, 188, 191, 194, 227, 228, 229, 230, 246, 247, 269, 272, 365
Primitive man, 22, 32, 33, 42, 153
Primitive people, 23, 24, 25, 62, 84, 126, 132, 153, 154, 233, 252
Primitive religion, 11, 52, 104, 141, 143, 155
Prince, Morton, 459
Profane, 45, 113, 286
Prometheus, 249
Prophecy, 67, 101, 213
Prophets, 55, 148, 153, 177, 187, 188, 193, 194–195, 214, 265, 280
Old Testament, 196, 419
Prostitution,
religious, 258
Protestant denominations, 287, 289
Protestantism,
lack of authority, 407
Protestants, 213, 267, 273, 275, 299, 311, 312, 315, 363, 365, 397, 398
Psalter, 204
Psychiatrists, 186
Psychic powers, 86
Psycho-analysis, 73
Psycho-analysts, 88, 126
Psychological factors in religion, 64–87
Psychologists, 320, 322
Psychology, 17, 74, 84, 85
Freudian, 71
Ptah, 174, 226, 249
Ptolemies, 173, 176, 343, 346, 347, 359
Puberty, 82, 114
Pueblo tribes, 53
Puluga, 151, 154
Pupin, M., 374
Purgatory, 359
Purification, 82
Pygmies, 52, 154

Q

Quakers, 276, 296, 415, 429
Questionnaires, 319, 320, 323, 328
Quimby, 217, 218

R

Race prejudice, 290
Radin, Paul, 16, 60, 64, 70, 106–113, 122, 126, 129, 150, 153, 154, 164, 172, 183, 184, 233, 339, 371
on monotheism, 153–154
Randall, J. H., 275, 310, 311, 352, 372, 408
on significance of heliocentric viewpoint, 453–454
religious groupings, suggested by, 406
Rangare, 183
Rationalists, 270
Rationalization, 89, 284, 316, 441, 471
Rattray, R. S., 241
Rauschenbusch, Walter, 444
founding social Christianity, 419, 429
on reconstruction of economic system, 420
Rave, John, 170, 171, 173, 178
Re, 125, 129, 146, 148, 179, 190, 239, 264
Reformation, 231, 273, 288, 289, 299, 303, 306

Reformation,
Protestant, weakening prestige and authority of church, 446
Regiomontanus, 352
Regression, 73, 74, 75, 88, 89
Reincarnation, 24, 48, 49, 84, 188, 212, 227, 267
Relic worship, 345
Relics, 28, 365
Religion,
and custom, 257–259
and imperialism, 275
and integration of personality, 468
and moral teaching, 267–271
and other phases of social life, 222–255
and patriotism, 230–233
and radical movements, 277
and revival of science, 350–353
and science, 246–247
in the ancient world, 340–345
in the Middle Ages, 348–350
no antagonism in simple culture, 247
and social control, 256, 263–266
and social organization, 222–230, 256
and sociology,
proposed union of, 435, 441
union of means introducing values, 438
and technology, 248–250
and the aesthetic impulse, 233–244
and the rise of modern science, 353–356
and the social order, 256–285
animistic origin of, 27
Religion,
antiquity of, judged by extent of diffusion, 165
Arabic, 166
a conservative influence, 271–277
definitions of, *see* Definitions of religion
Religion,
differentiation of, 163, 286, 289–290
emotional phase of, 16
evolution of, 41, 142–145, 164, 166
evolutionary theory of, 143–145
in an age of science, 453–481
Religion, magic and other culture patterns,
a synthetic distinction between, 133–138
Religion,
of groups,
no definite evolution of, 164–165
of humanity, 489
origin of, 6–10, 44, 167
the persistence of, 475–480
due to cultural inertia, 480–481
due to easy change of pantheism to animism, 476
due to emotional cravings, 476–478
due to interest in the occult, 478–479
due to mental compartmentalization, 479
due to mystery in the universe, 476
due to philosophical support, 475–476
due to presence of mystics, 479
primitive, 16, 43
ultimate origin,
whether single or multiple unknown, 168
Religious,
attitude,
characteristics of, 284
belief, 63
among scientists and students, Leuba's study of, 318–325
as influenced by forms of art other than myth, 240–242

Religious,
belief,
questionnaire study of, 316–318
sex differences in, 324, 327, 329–330
ceremonies,
ends in themselves, 115, 233
change and individual differences, 182–184
change,
and the average individual, 179–181
through borrowed culture, 167–180
through leadership, 182–220
development, 42
differentiation,
causes of, 290–296
evidences of, 296–299
disorganization, 286–310
ecstasy, 52, 244
Religious Education Association, 306
Religious,
emotion,
crowd psychology theory of, 44
executives, 188, 194
experience, 55, 184
freedom, 307, 378
genius, 186
grouping,
the effect of science on, 406
groups,
future relations of, 415–417
instinct, *see* Instinct, religious
intolerance, 371
leaders, 179, 290
lacking knowledge to establish valid standards, 445–446
types of, 188–209
persecution, 341, 348, 353, 355, 387
Radicals, 415, 416
reactions to the modern world, 406–417
revivals, 93, 203, 282–283
Religious,
sanction, 214, 266
societies, 224–225
symbols, 47, 169
teachers, 55, 188, 189–194
thinkers, 164
thrill, 17, 55, 67, 111, 141, 161, 248
toleration, 289
unity, 299–310
denominational, 302–303
local, 300–302
national 303–306
world, 306–308
Renaissance, 273, 352, 353
Renan, E., 412, 485
Resurrection, 24, 213, 380
Retribution theory, 25, 26, 156, 266, 267
see also Tylor
Revelations, 129, 187, 196, 198, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 377
Reverence, 8, 17, 19, 66, 75, 78, 134, 135, 136, 155, 168, 231, 233, 242, 243, 261, 464
as religious emotion, 76, 92, 133, 134, 135, 136
Reville, 143
Rhode Island, 397
Rig Veda, 149, 161
Rigdon, S., 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 219
Riley, 375, 376, 387
Rites and ritual, 1, 2, 3, 10–14, 51, 91, 111, 114, 132, 135, 138–141, 150, 157, 169, 171, 174, 225, 235, 242, 243, 286, 346
Rites,
birth, 115
Christian, 126
death, 116, 136, 157
Dionysian, 243, 258
family, 226

Rites,
fertility, 161
funeral, 32, 34
initiation, 268
see also Initiation ceremonies
magico-religious, 245
mourning, origin of,
see Mourning rites, origin of,
of atonement, 260
pagan, 363
puberty, 166, 268
sacrificial, 245
scapegoat, 262
Ritschl,
radical dualism of, 460
Ritter, W. E., 379
Ritual, dairy, 249
Ritual, in contrast to science, 472
Rivers, W. H. R., 252, 253
Roberts, 203
Rogers, R. W., 59
Roman Empire, 272
Romanes, 6
Romanticism, 274
Rome and the Romans, 27, 40, 62, 97, 143, 147, 156, 157, 161, 163, 194, 209, 210, 225, 226, 249, 254, 265, 287, 344, 345, 348
Ross, E. A., 283
Roth, W. E., 140, 235
Ruskin, J., 384
Russell, Bertrand, 81, 271, 457
cosmic drama, 456–457
on defiance of nature, 488–489
Ryan, J. A., on social teachings of the Catholic Church, 423–424, 425

S

Sabbatai Sevi, 210
Sabbath laws, 428
Sacred, 15, 16, 44, 45, 47, 93, 107, 113, 114, 127, 261, 286
Sacred books, 266
Sacredness, 48, 60
Sacrifice, 3, 22, 34, 35, 45, 92, 95, 110, 138, 141, 189, 195, 253, 270, 309
animal, 159, 249
human, 123, 138–139, 250, 258
self, 258–259
Saints, 55, 127, 145, 272, 310, 345
Salerno, 350
Salish, 105
Salvation, 272, 277
Sanction, supernatural, 266
Sanscrit, 149
Santayana, 336, 412, 485
Sargent, Kate, 426
Satan, 229, 279, 362
Savages, 23, 24, 31, 33, 43, 51, 152
Sayce, A. H., 95, 190, 191
Scalp dance, 225
Scandinavians, 267
Schomberg, Cardinal, 354
Schmidt, 150, 154
Scholasticism, 350, 352
Schroeder, T., 201
Schwally, 148
Science, 66, 67, 85, 107, 120, 163, 164, 257, 273, 274, 331, 335, 336, 341, 342, 344, 350, 364, 373, 377
and health, 217
and religion, attempts at reconciliation of, 462–469
conclusion as to the relation of, 473–475
discussions of, critical comments on, 368–374
historical accounts of struggle between, 356–368
in history, 337–373
meaning of incompatibility of, 472–473
and technology, 337–338
and theology, conflict of, concerning antiquity of man, 361–362

Science and theology,
conflict of, concerning chemistry and physics, 364–365
conflict of, concerning geology, 361
conflict of, concerning higher criticism, 367–368
conflict of, concerning medicine, 365–367
conflict of, concerning meteorology, 362–363
conflict of, concerning philology and mythology, 367
warfare of, 351, 356–368
warfare of, concerning astronomy, 359–361
warfare of, concerning evolution, 356–359
warfare of, concerning geography, 358–359
Science,
as substitute for religion, 487-489
definition of, 337
disruption Protestant organizations, 410
does not deal with values, 438
Hellenic, 353, 369
modern, 64, 65, 353, 378
attack on, 375–405
modern warfare against, cause of, 399–404
primitive, 137
supplanting supernaturalism, 333–336
Scientists, 5, 189, 271, 320, 322, 403
Sciosophy, 377
Scopes, John, 389
Scotland, 122, 206, 329
Scriptures, 289, 345, 361, 362, 371
Sculpture, 242, 243, 244
Scythians, 78
Sea Dyaks, 187
Sears, C. E., 281
Secret societies, 71, 225, 226, 269
Sectarianism, 306
Secularization, 286–287
Sedna, 260
Seeley, 418
Seers, 187, 206
Seker, 174
Seldes, G., 218
Self-abasement, 70, 73
Self-assertion, 69, 73
Semang, 110, 154
Semites, 98, 167
Semitic peoples, 35, 99, 147
Seneca Indians, 237
Sense of sin, 89, 264
Serapeum *or* serapion, 176, 177, 346, 347
Serapis cult, 173, 175, 176
Sermon on the Mount, 193
Servetus, 359
Set, 74, 87, 173, 265
Sex in religion, 71, 73
Sex symbolism in religion, 72
Sex taboos, 46
Shadows, 22, 30, 32, 94, 115
Shafer, Robert, 408
Shaman, Winnebago, 171
Shamanism, 186
Shamans, 27, 132, 165, 180, 186–187, 188, 189, 225, 226, 260
Shamash, 59
Shawnee prophet, 187, 195, 214
Sheol, 157
Shinto, 264
Shipley, M., 375–376, 386, 387, 388, 394
Shoshoneans, 52, 170
Shotwell, J., 17, 287
on secularization, 163
Shrines, 310
Shu, 59
Sib organization, 52, 53
Siberia and Siberian peoples, 132, 165, 186
Sibs, 45, 52, 53

Simon de Montfort, 351
Simon Stylites, St., 366
Simpson, 366
Sin, 90, 267
Singer, C., 280, 341, 342, 351, 353, 364, 369
Sioux, 216
Sky god, 58, 72
Slavery, 276
  issue, 290, 418
Sleight-of-hand, 131, 216
Slosson, E. E., 398
Small, Samuel, 378
Smith, E. F., 373, 476
Smith, Joseph, 197–209, 219, 290
Smith, P., 279
Smith, T. V., 402
Smith, W. R., 14, 91, 222
Smohalla, 187, 196, 215
Smyrna, 232
Snu, 59
Social
  change and religion, 271–277
  classes connected with religious organization, 228–230
  Christianity, *see* Christianity, social
  factors in religion, 87–94
    importance of, 94
  inheritance of religion, 91–94
  institutions, 142
  organization, 45, 53, 54
    as based on sex in relation to religion, 226
  psychology, 55, 73
  reform, 15, 283
  science, 20
Social Science, analyzed for judgments introduced by religion, 438–440
Socialism, Christian, 418
Society, 48, 54
  False Face, 225
  military, 181
Sociologists, 42, 142, 320, 322
Sociology
  and religion, some cooperation possible, 443
  bias in with introduction of values by religion, 441
Socrates, 342
Solar
  myth, 58
  system, 274
  worship, 60
Soma, 78, 161
Soothsayers, 126
Sorcerers, 44, 101, 116
Sorcery, 7, 34, 252, 365
Sosigenes, 344
Soul,
  Egyptian conception of, 95
  origin of the idea of, 48
Soul-spirit *or* "Great Man," 129
Souls, 9, 15, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 31, 32, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, 79, 80, 83, 94, 95, 96, 99, 103, 187
  brush, 131
  plurality of, 80, 101, 103
South America, 212, 213
South Carolina, 391, 398, 401
South Dakota, 397
Spain, 273, 274
Spangler, R., C., 385
Spaniards, 194, 198
Spaulding, Solomon, 200, 201
Speck, F., 129, 245, 246
Spells, 120, 125, 127, 128, 131
Spence, 59
Spencer, Herbert, 6, 21, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 37, 38, 40, 41, 42, 56, 57, 58, 67, 79, 80, 102, 126, 142, 144, 146, 148
  on bias in sociology, 441
  on ultimate social order, 488
Spencer-Tylor theory, present status of, 79–83, 150
Sperry, W. L., 412–413
Spinoza, 184, 368, 413, 459, 476

Spirit
possession, 86, 97, 99, 100, 101, 187
writing, 100
Spirit-world, 24, 32, 196
Spirits, 9, 21, 27, 33, 38, 65, 82, 83, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 104, 106, 135, 157, 225, 252
celestial, 149
evil, 68, 157, 253, 335
local, 61, 94
of the dead, 149
origin of belief in, 21, 30
terrestrial, 149
Spiritual,
beings, 94, 104, 142
wives, 208, 283
Spiritualism, 217, 310
Sprague, J. R.,
on religion in business, 450–452
Stade, 148
Starbuck, E. D., 479
State, 41, 91, 194
religion, 161
States, wealth and literacy of, 401
Stelzle, C., 434, 435
on lack of cooperation of church with scientific social work, 443
on workers' attitude toward the church, 449
Stephenson, 220
Stevens, 220
Stoic philosophy, 176, 345
Straton, J. R., 375
Stratton, G. M., 77, 78, 155
Street, J. R., 68
Strevinus, 353
Student belief, Bain's study of, 325–328
Student superstitions, 120, 328–333
see also Superstitions
Harvard, 332–333
Students, high school, 404
Subjectivism, as a reaction to naturalistic science, 460–462
Sudan, 216, 223
Suggestibility, 183, 216
Suicide, 26
Sulia, 105
Sultan, 228
Sumerians, 59
Sumner, W. G., 257
Sun, 58, 94
Dance, 140, 245, 259
god, 59, 148, 190, 191, 242
Sunday, Billy, 282, 386
Sunday school membership, 315
Sunday School Union, American, 306
Supernatural, 18, 19, 33, 52, 74, 79, 107, 111, 132, 141, 184, 229, 239, 240, 254, 255, 259, 260, 261, 274, 287
power as magic potency, 103, 107
world, 81, 84
Supernaturalism, 41, 106, 107, 110, 134, 136, 137, 140, 222, 248, 252, 271, 315, 327, 332
decline of, 286, 309–336
vs. science in pre-literate groups, 338–340
Superstition, 22, 120, 121, 126, 134, 157, 164, 183, 189, 254, 279, 309, 310, 327, 342, 345, 361, 362, 363, 365, 366
prevalence of, 328–333
Superstitions, modern, 126, 328–333
see also Student superstitions
Supreme beings, 152, 177, 263
"Supreme Kingdom," 387
Suzo, 185
Swanton, J. R., 145
Swedenborg, 197
Swisher, 73
Syllabus of Errors, 408, 424
Sylvester II, Pope, 350, 371
Sylvia, St., 366
Sympathy, 69, 73, 92
Syncretism, principle of, 176
Syria, 160, 174

T

Taboos, 16, 38, 76, 99, 107, 117, 120, 123, 125, 132, 134, 137, 223, 225, 228, 229, 254, 259–263, 269
  and rank, 259
  animal, 260
  birth, 259
  death, 259
  food, 251, 259, 260
  menstrual, 226, 239, 259
  psychological aspects of, 260–262
  sex, 259
Talbot, P. A., 58, 61, 127, 169, 236
Tamanoas, 105
Tammuz, 160
Taoism, 255
Tartarus, 157
Tasmanians, 52, 154
Tavibo, 215, 216, 220
Technology, 65, 248, 249, 255, 256, 286, 338, 340, 344
  definition of, 337–338
  rather than science in primitive groups, 338–339, 340
Tecumseh, 214
Telepathy, 85, 86, 126
Tell el-Amarna, 191
Temples, 3, 34, 35, 144, 146, 148, 205, 206, 243, 258, 340, 364
Ten Commandments, 266, 307
Tennessee, 389, 398, 399, 401, 428
Teraphim, 148
Teutons, 98, 143
Texas, 391–392, 398, 401
Texas, University of, 392
Thebes, 189, 190, 192
Theocracy, 188, 194, 378
Theocrasia, 174
Theologians, 355, 356, 359
Theology, 6, 265, 290, 355, 364, 365, 367
Theophilus, 346
Theories of disease, 165
Theories of disease,
  by intrusion, 165
  by soul snatching, 165
  see also Disease, theories of
Theosophy, 290, 397
Theresa, St., 185
Thirty Years War, 275
Thomas Aquinas, 193
Thomas, W. I., 110
Thonga, 110
Thouless, R. H., 13, 71
Thrace, 160
Thunderbird, 58, 94, 241
Thunder-god, 60
Thutmose III, 190
Tibet, 165, 178, 216, 227, 229
Tien, 60
Tien shin, 149
Ti ki, 149
Timotheos, 175
Tippy, W. M., 432
Tirawa, 151
Titans, 174
Tiu, 149
Tlingit, 180
Tobacco Society, 180, 225
Todas, 2, 249
Tokway, 102
Tombs, 144, 146, 148, 346
Tongues, *see* Gift of
Torture, 39, 50, 140, 188, 270, 273, 277, 279, 355, 363
Totem, 45, 223, 224, 242
  animal, 223, 259
  in art, 223
Totemic complex, 223
Totemic,
  cycle, 45
  group, 47
  principle, 47, 48, 54
  symbol, 47
  system, 44
Totemism, 45, 52, 53, 63, 144, 222–224
  and guardian-spirit concept, 224

Totemism,
of Australia, 44, 45
Toulouse, Count of, 351
Tozzer, A. M., 156, 263, 332, 333
Trances, 21, 185, 186, 187
Transmigration, 24
of souls,
Pythagorean doctrine of, 158
Tree worship, 61, 62
Trends in religious development,
conclusion as to, 162
Tricksters, 153, 236, 237
Trinities, 145, 356, 372
Trobriand Islanders, 102, 114, 119, 127, 239, 251, 252
theory of disease, 253–254
Truce of God, 270, 272
Tufts, J. H., 452
Tuke, 367
Turanians, 167
Turks, 232
Tylor, E. B., 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 42, 56, 79, 80, 95, 138, 142, 150, 157, 263, 266
animistic origin of future life, 156
future life, 157
Typhon, 173
Tyson, S. L., 380

U

Uganda, 229
Unitarian, 290, 292, 293, 294, 308
United Church of Christ in America, 303, 304
United States, 229
Unity,
federal, 299, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308
moral, 308
organic, 299, 307, 308
Universal culture pattern, 64
mythology a part of, 234, 339
religion a part of, 168, 234
Universalist, 308
University of Oregon, 329
University of Washington, 325
Unkulunkulu, 151
Urban, Pope, 277
Urban VIII, 354
Urim and Thummim, 198
Usher, Archbishop, 362
Utah, 230, 397
Uzza, 261

V

Valentine, 365
Valhalla, 161
Valkyries, 97
Values, 15, 16
Vampires, 335
Vandercook, J. W., 478
Vanini, 354
Variables, 19, 20, 134, 135, 136
Veddah, 1
Vedic hymns, 266
Ventriloquism, 131
Verdun, Bishop of, 362
Vergil, 97
Vermont, 397
Vesalius, 353, 365
Vice, 276
Vice crusading,
by Fundamentalist social Christians, 428
Vincent of Beauvais, 364
Vinci, Leonardo da,
on scientific method, 352
Virgin birth, 325, 376, 380
Virgin Mary, 345
Virginia, 397
Vision experiences, 182, 261
Vision quest, 268
in North America, 180
of Winnebago, 180, 183
Vision waking, 81–82
Vision-complex
as basic concept of Indian religion, 83, 169

Visions, 21, 22, 23, 29, 79, 113, 115, 142, 168, 170, 171, 177, 180, 210, 249, 253, 278
Vitalism, 459
Voll, J. H., 43
Voltaire, 274
Votaries, 44
Vulcan, 249
Vulgate, 367

W

Waggoner, Rep., 393
Wäinamöinen, 250
Wakan, 17, 106, 117
Wakan,
  compared with divine emanation, 422
Wakanda, 105, 106
Wakonda, 69
Walker, 394
Wallis, W. D., 123, 188, 195, 209, 211, 213, 216, 219, 228
Walsh, J., 371
War, 231, 270, 305
  exploits, 181
  of the Spanish Succession, 275
War-bundle Feast, 225
Ward, H. F., 444
  on social teachings of Jesus as guide to social reform, 447
  plea for social reform, 420, 430
Wars, holy, 232, 233
Washburn, G. F., 387
Washington, state of, 397
Wayne, W., 428
Webb, C. C. J., 44
Webster, H., 225
Wells, F. L., 121, 122
Wells, H. G.,
  on Bible of civilization, 445
Welsh Presbyterian church, 290
Were-wolves, 37
Werner, M. R., 201, 209
Wesley, J., 282, 292
West Virginia, 395, 398
Western civilization, 334, 336, 375, 487
Western Europe, 272, 399
White, A. D., 356–368
Whitehead, A. N.,
  definition of religion quoted, 476–477
Whitmer, 203
Whitnall, 9
Widow-burning, 26, 258
Windsor County, Vt., 316
Winnebago, 11, 16, 55, 58, 60, 61, 62, 70, 73, 77, 78, 82, 92, 93, 105, 106, 110, 113, 119, 122, 126, 128, 130, 131, 132, 135, 138, 147, 149, 155, 156, 180, 183, 188, 195, 225, 233, 235, 244, 263, 266, 286, 287, 338, 371
  cosmological system of, 247
  culture background, 172, 173
  magic and medicine, 253
  religion, 63, 94
    compared with social Christianity, 422–423
    modified by diffusion, 169–173
  totemic clan organization, 223–224
Winston, R. W., 414
Winconsin, 397
Wish power, 129
Wishful thinking, 131
Wissler, C., 339
Witchcraft, 68, 127, 164, 187, 194, 253, 280, 367
  persecution, 279, 284, 363
Witch-cult, 335
Witches, 98, 101, 217, 273, 309, 363, 367
Witchetty grubs, 122
Withington, 280
Wizards, 44
Women's Christian Temperance Union, 306

1875

Woodland tribes,
totemism of, 223
Woodworth, R. S., 124
World War, 276, 304, 310
Worship, 7
nature, 148
of non-human objects, 36
of spirits of dead, 148
Wovoka, 215, 216, 220, 221
Wu, 101
Wurunjerri, 124
Wyoming, 397

Y

Yama, 161
Yarros, V. S.,
recognition of attempt by religious leaders to support personal values by science, 441
Yima, 161
Yogi, 185
Young, Brigham, 194, 230
Young, Kimball, 75, 479
Y. M. C. A., 306, 317, 432
Y. W. C. A., 306, 432

Z

Zagreus,
legend of, 174, 175
Zangwill, 210
Zend-Avesta, 149
Zeus, 60, 149, 173, 174, 176
Zimenes, Cardinal, 349
Zoroaster and Zoroastrian, 164, 209
Zulus, 85, 151

139

P 1

1 3

DATE DUE

UNITED THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

United Theological Seminary Library
MAIN BL60.K5 1929
Kirkpatrick, Religion in human affairs
3 0645 0002 7801 6